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Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 30

Articulus I. Quid sit uti et de utibili.

Quaestio I. Utrum uti sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, vel omnis potentiae.

Circa primum1 de uti, quid sit per essentiam, utrum sit actus voluntatis, an rationis, sic proceditur. Quod sit actus voluntatis ostenditur sic.

1. Ab actu utendi denominatur unusquisque bonus2; sed nullus dicitur bonus nisi ab actu voluntatis: ergo actus utendi pertinet ad voluntatem.

2. Item, Augustinus decimo de Trinitate3: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»: ergo uti est actus voluntatis.

3. Item, hoc videtur per divisionem ipsius uti contra alia, quia decimo de Trinitate4 dividit Augustinus haec tria, ingenium, doctrinam et usum, et dicit, quod ingenium respicit, quid homo possit, doctrina, quid homo sciat, usus, quid5 velit: ergo usus est actus voluntatis.

4. Item, «Opposita nata sunt fieri circa idem»6; sed uti et abuti sunt opposita, ergo cum abuti sit solius voluntatis, quia eius solius est peccare: ergo et uti similiter erit actus solius voluntatis.

Contra: 1. Usus sive assuefactio est via in habitum acquirendum7; sed omnis potentia nata est acquirere habitum: ergo uti videtur esse omnis potentiae.

2. Item, omnis potentia mediante operatione sua ordinatur in finem8; sed eo dicitur aliquid utibile sive uti, quo in finem est ordinabile; sed ordinari in finem mediante propria operatione est omnis potentiae: ergo et uti similiter.

3. Item, sicut Augustinus dicit et habetur in littera9, uti est id quod in usum venerit referre etc. Sed eius est referre, cuius est conferre; sed conferre est solius rationis, ergo et referre: ergo et uti a definitione.

4. Item, ars utitur suis instrumentis10; sed ars est in potentia rationali sive cognitiva, cum sit scientia: ergo cum habitus et actus sint eiusdem potentiae, si ars est in potentia rationali, et usus similiter erit in eadem.

Conclusio. Uti quinque modis potest intelligi: si sumitur communissime et communiter, est actus omnis potentiae; si sumitur proprie, magis proprie et propriissime, est actus voluntatis.

Respondeo11: Dicendum, quod uti quinque modis accipitur, et secundum hoc diversificatur secundum rem et secundum definitionem.

Accipitur enim usus sive uti communissime, secundum quod dividitur contra otium vel otiositatem, pro naturali operatione debita cuilibet rei, sive p. 31ad quam unaquaeque res ordinatur, et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus12: «Cuius usus bonus etc.».

Secundo modo dicitur communiter; et sic usus dividitur contra dissuetudinem. Et hoc modo definitur a Victorino13: «Usus est actus frequenter elicitus a potentia», et hoc modo potest dici, quod est actus omnis potentiae nec addit super actum nisi frequentiam.

Tertio modo accipitur uti proprie; et sic dividitur contra habitus memoriae et intelligentiae, scilicet14 contra ingenium et doctrinam. Et sic definitur ab Augustino decimo de Trinitate: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis», et sic dicit actum voluntatis proprie.

Quarto modo accipitur magis proprie; et sic dividitur contra actum quietativum, scilicet contra frui. Et sic definitur ab Augustino15: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis propter aliud», et sic est actus voluntatis ut ad aliud relatae.

Quinto accipitur propriissime; et sic dividitur contra actum inordinatum, scilicet contra abuti. Et sic definitur ab Augustino de Doctrina christiana16: «Uti est id quod in usum venerit referre ad id, quo fruendum est», et sic uti dicit actum voluntatis relatum et ordinatum in finem.

Ratio ergo diversarum notificationum est multiplex acceptio eius quod est uti; et ratio multiplicis acceptionis est oppositio eius ad diversa.

Si ergo quaeratur, cuius potentiae est17 actus: dicendum, quod, communissime et communiter loquendo, est actus omnis potentiae; et sic non loquitur Augustinus; proprie vero, magis proprie et propriissime actus est ipsius voluntatis.

Ad argumenta in contrarium:

1. Et sic patet primo obiectum in contrarium, scilicet quod18 sit omnis potentiae.

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod omnis potentia refertur in finem per actum suum; dicendum, quod illa potentia dicitur uti suo actu, quae est domina sui actus; et talis potentiae est referre suum actum, non tantum referri. Et quoniam sola voluntas est domina sui actus et sola est se ipsam movens, ideo ipsa sola est, cuius est active uti. Aliis autem potentiis contingit uti materialiter et passive, quia habent referri, et non referre. Et hinc est, quod ab Augustino dicitur19: «Uti est assumere aliquid in facultatem voluntatis»; facultas enim dicitur eius dominium, quo faciliter potest in actum suum tanquam illius princeps.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod rationis est referre; dicendum, quod dupliciter est referre, scilicet per collationem et illationem, sicut praemissae referuntur ad conclusionem; et hoc est rationis, et hoc non est uti. Et est referre per20 inclinationem et ordinationem ad aliud; et hoc est proprie voluntatis, quia potest aliquid assumere quiescendo ibi, vel aliud intendendo; et hoc est referre21, per quod definitur uti etc.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de arte, dicendum, quod ars dicit quod est operationis, et quod est speculationis. Secundum quod dicit22 quod est speculationis, non habet uti, et sic est rationis; secundum vero quod dicit quod est operationis, sic extenditur ad voluntatem et eam regulat in utendo.

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Article I. What use is, and concerning the useful.

Question I. Whether use is an act of the will, of reason, or of every faculty.

Concerning the first1 point about use — what it is by essence, whether it is an act of the will or of reason — one proceeds thus. That it is an act of the will is shown thus.

1. By the act of using, each one is called good2; but no one is called good except from an act of the will: therefore the act of using pertains to the will.

2. Likewise, Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity3: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will": therefore to use is an act of the will.

3. Likewise, this is apparent by the division of use itself against other things, because in the tenth book On the Trinity4 Augustine divides these three — talent (ingenium), doctrine, and use — and says that talent regards what a man can do, doctrine what a man knows, use what5 he wills: therefore use is an act of the will.

4. Likewise, "Opposites are by nature produced about the same thing"6; but to use and to misuse are opposites; therefore, since to misuse belongs to the will alone, because to sin belongs to it alone: therefore to use will likewise be an act of the will alone.

On the contrary: 1. Use or habituation is the way to acquiring a habit7; but every faculty is by nature able to acquire a habit: therefore use seems to belong to every faculty.

2. Likewise, every faculty is ordered to an end through its own operation8; but something is called useful or to be used insofar as it is orderable to an end; but to be ordered to an end through its proper operation belongs to every faculty: therefore use likewise.

3. Likewise, as Augustine says and as is held in the Lectio [of the Master]9, to use is to refer that which has come into use, and so on. But it belongs to that which can refer, to which it belongs to compare; but to compare belongs to reason alone, therefore so does to refer: therefore so also does to use, from its definition.

4. Likewise, art uses its own instruments10; but art is in the rational or cognitive faculty, since it is a science: therefore, since habit and act belong to the same faculty, if art is in the rational faculty, use likewise will be in the same.

Conclusion. Use can be understood in five ways: if it is taken most commonly and commonly, it is an act of every faculty; if it is taken properly, more properly, and most properly, it is an act of the will.

I respond11: It must be said that use is taken in five ways, and accordingly it is diversified both with respect to the thing and with respect to the definition.

For use or uti is taken most commonly insofar as it is divided against idleness or leisure, for the natural operation due to any given thing, or that p. 31to which each thing is ordered; and according to this the Philosopher says12: "Whose use is good, etc."

In a second mode it is said commonly; and thus use is divided against disuse. And in this mode it is defined by Victorinus13: "Use is an act frequently elicited from a faculty," and in this mode it can be said that it is an act of every faculty, and it adds nothing to the act except frequency.

In a third mode use is taken properly; and thus it is divided against the habits of memory and intelligence, namely14 against talent and doctrine. And thus it is defined by Augustine in the tenth book On the Trinity: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will," and thus it names an act of the will properly.

In a fourth mode it is taken more properly; and thus it is divided against the quietative act, namely against enjoyment (frui). And thus it is defined by Augustine15: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will on account of another thing," and thus it is an act of the will as referred to another.

In a fifth mode it is taken most properly; and thus it is divided against the disordered act, namely against misuse (abuti). And thus it is defined by Augustine On Christian Doctrine16: "To use is to refer what has come into use to that which is to be enjoyed," and thus uti names an act of the will referred and ordered to an end.

Therefore the reason for the diverse definitions is the manifold acceptation of uti; and the reason for the manifold acceptation is its opposition to diverse things.

If, then, it be asked of which faculty it is17 the act: it must be said that, speaking most commonly and commonly, it is the act of every faculty; and in this way Augustine does not speak; but properly, more properly, and most properly, it is the act of the will itself.

To the arguments on the contrary:

1. And thus the first objection on the contrary side is clear, namely that18 it is of every faculty.

2. As to what is objected secondly, that every faculty is referred to its end through its own act: it must be said that that faculty is said to use its own act which is mistress of its act; and it belongs to such a faculty to refer its act, not only to be referred. And since the will alone is mistress of its act and alone is self-moving, therefore it alone is that to which it belongs actively to use. To the other faculties, however, it pertains to be used materially and passively, because they are referable, not refer-ers. And hence it is that it is said by Augustine19: "To use is to take up something into the faculty of the will"; for facultas is called its dominion, by which it can easily proceed into its act as the prince of that act.

3. To what is objected, that to refer belongs to reason: it must be said that to refer is twofold, namely by collation and by inference, as premises are referred to a conclusion; and this belongs to reason, and this is not to use. And there is to refer by20 inclination and ordering to another; and this belongs properly to the will, because it can take up something either by resting in it or by directing it toward another; and this is to refer21 by which use is defined, and so on.

4. To what is objected concerning art, it must be said that art expresses both what belongs to operation and what belongs to speculation. According to what it says22 belongs to speculation, it has no use, and so it belongs to reason; but according to what it says belongs to operation, it extends to the will and regulates it in using.

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Scholion

Plurimi scholastici satis consentiunt. Scot., I. Sent. d. 1. q. 2. et 5. in fine. — S. Thom., hic q. 1; S. Theol. 1. 2. q. 16. a. 1. — B. Albert. M., hic a. 13. 16. et 17. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. qui doctrinam S. Bonavent. breviter repetit. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 1. principalis q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 6. q. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Brul., hic q. 1.

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Scholion

Most scholastics agree well enough on this. Scotus, I Sent. d. 1, q. 2 and 5, at the end. — St. Thomas, here q. 1; Summa Theol. I-II, q. 16, a. 1. — Bl. Albert M., here a. 13, 16, and 17. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1, which briefly repeats the doctrine of St. Bonaventure. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here a. 1, principal q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 6, q. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 1. — Brulefer, here q. 1.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Consentientibus mss. et ed. 1, restituimus verba Circa primum et mox mutavimus aut in an, quod et grammatice melius est.
    With the agreement of the manuscripts and the first edition, we have restored the words Circa primum, and we have at once changed aut into an, which is also grammatically better.
  2. 2
    Forsitan respicitur illud Aristot. II. Ethic. c. 3. in fine: Qui enim bene his (voluptatibus et doloribus) utetur, bonus; qui male, erit malus.
    Perhaps reference is being made to that passage of Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 3, at the end: "For he who uses these things (pleasures and pains) well, will be good; he who uses them badly, will be evil."
  3. 3
    Cap. 11. n. 17; vide supra in lit. Magistri, c. 3. in initio.
    Chap. 11, n. 17; see above in the Master's text, c. 3, at the beginning.
  4. 4
    Ibidem, paulo ante; et XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 25.
    Ibid., a little before; and On the City of God XI, c. 25.
  5. 5
    Cod. X hic iterum addit homo.
    Codex X here again adds homo.
  6. 6
    Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis circa finem: Palam vero est, quod circa idem aut specie aut genere nata sunt fieri contraria.
    Aristotle, Categories, chapter on Opposites, near the end: "It is plain that contraries are by nature produced about the same thing, either in species or in genus."
  7. 7
    Idem B. Albert., S. I. tr. 2. q. 8. m. 1. his verbis exprimit: Secundo dicitur uti rei exercitium ad inducendum habitum, secundum quod dicit Victorinus in Rhetoricis suis (seu Comment. in Rhetor. Ciceronis, l. c. 25. et n. c. 89.), quod natura habilem facit, ars potentem, usus facilem. — Vide et Aristot., II. Ethic. c. 1.
    The same point Blessed Albert, Summa I, tr. 2, q. 8, m. 1, expresses in these words: "Secondly, uti is called the exercising of a thing for the inducing of a habit, in accordance with what Victorinus says in his Rhetorica" (or Commentary on Cicero's Rhetoric, l. c. 25 and n. c. 89), "that nature makes one apt, art makes one able, use makes one ready." — See also Aristotle, Ethics II, c. 1.
  8. 8
    Vide Aristot., IX. Metaph. text. 16. (Ed. Paris. VIII. c. 8.). — Mox codd. C F G H K L O R S U cc et ed. 1 utile pro utibile; cod. Z utile sive utibile quo etc.
    See Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 16 (Paris ed. VIII, c. 8). — Soon after, codices C F G H K L O R S U cc and ed. 1 read utile for utibile; cod. Z, utile sive utibile quo, etc.
  9. 9
    Hic, c. 2. — Faventibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, pro infra substituimus in littera. In conclusione huius argumenti Vat. ergo referre et per consequens uti; praeferimus tamen lectionem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 tanquam distinctiorem.
    Here, c. 2. — With the support of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have substituted in littera for infra. In the conclusion of this argument the Vatican edition has ergo referre et per consequens uti; we however prefer the reading of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1 as more distinct.
  10. 10
    Aristot., I. de Anima, text. 53. (c. 3.). — Circa finem argumenti mendum Vat. ponentis sic pro si castigatur ex mss. et ed. 1. — Mox Vat. post usus addit sive uti; quod deest in antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
    Aristotle, On the Soul I, text 53 (c. 3). — Near the end of the argument the Vatican error ponentis sic in place of si is corrected from the manuscripts and ed. 1. — Soon after, the Vatican edition adds sive uti after usus; this is absent from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.
  11. 11
    Plures codd. ut A I T etc. Solutio pro Respondeo.
    Several codices, such as A, I, T, etc., have Solutio in place of Respondeo.
  12. 12
    Sententia: Cuius usus bonus est, ipsum quoque bonum est, verbotenus legitur apud Boethium, de Differentiis topicis, libr. II. circa medium, in quo libro auctor proponit locorum topicorum divisiones, quae ex una parte, duce Aristotele, a Themistio, et ex altera parte a Cicerone exhibentur, earumque differentias indicat.
    The sentence Whose use is good, that itself is also good is read verbatim in Boethius, On Topical Differences, book II, near the middle, in which book the author sets out the divisions of topical places — which on one side are presented by Themistius (following Aristotle) and on the other by Cicero — and indicates their differences.
  13. 13
    Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor († inter 370–382), qui praeter opuscula theologica contra Arianos varios confecit libros philosophicos et rhetoricos; sic transtulit Porphyrii librum de Praedicabilibus in linguam latinam (cfr. Boeth., Dialogus I. in Porphyrium) scripsitque commentarium in Rhetorica et Topica Ciceronis (cfr. Boeth. Comment. in Topica Ciceronis; et ed. Operum Ciceronis per Orelli, ubi Victorini Comment. in Rhetor. invenitur). Licet definitio usus, de qua hic agitur, explicite non inveniatur in praenotatis Victorini operibus, colligi tamen posse videtur ex supra (argum. 1. ad opp.) allatis eius verbis una cum hac exercitationis definitione, quam in Comment. super I. Rhetor. Ciceronis, c. 2. proponit: Exercitatio est suscepti operis continuatio. Cfr. et ibid. c. 28., ubi de definitione habitus agitur, in qua ponitur usus sive exercitatio.
    Fabius Marius (Laurentius) Victorinus, Rhetor († between 370 and 382), who, besides theological tracts against the Arians, composed various philosophical and rhetorical books; thus he translated Porphyry's book On the Predicables into Latin (cf. Boethius, Dialogus I in Porphyrium) and wrote commentaries on Cicero's Rhetorica and Topica (cf. Boethius, Comment. in Topica Ciceronis; and the edition of Cicero's works by Orelli, where Victorinus's Commentary on the Rhetoric is found). Although the definition of use here in question is not explicitly found in Victorinus's noted works, it nevertheless seems gatherable from the words of his cited above (argum. 1 on the opposite side) together with this definition of exercise which he sets out in his Commentary on Cicero's Rhetoric I, c. 2: "Exercise is the continuation of an undertaken work." Cf. also ibid. c. 28, where the definition of habit is treated, in which use or exercise is set down.
  14. 14
    Perturbatam lectionem Vat. et pro scilicet emendavimus ope mss. et sex primarum edd. Vide etiam supra fundam. 3, sicuti et de sequenti definitione ab Augustino data cfr. fundam. 2.
    We have emended the corrupt Vatican reading et in place of scilicet with the help of the manuscripts and the first six editions. See also above, fundamentum 3, and likewise concerning the following definition given by Augustine, cf. fundamentum 2.
  15. 15
    Vide hic lit. Magistri c. 3. in princ. — In fine propositionis Vat. male et contra mss. et ed. 1 relative pro relatae.
    See here the Master's text, c. 3, at the beginning. — At the end of the proposition the Vatican edition wrongly, and against the manuscripts and ed. 1, has relative in place of relatae.
  16. 16
    Vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2, in quo textu codd. A F G H I K S X Y etc. sibi non constantes habent venit pro venerit.
    See above in the Master's text, c. 2, in which text codices A F G H I K S X Y etc., inconsistent with themselves, have venit in place of venerit.
  17. 17
    Codd. S Y Z satis bene sit. Mox Vat., reluctantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, post quod addit duobus primis modis est actus omnis potentiae, tribus vero ultimis est actus ipsius voluntatis; sed superflue, quia verbis immediate sequentibus idem dicitur. Dein multi codd. ut C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc. cum edd. 2 et 3 post communissime, omissis verbis et communiter, transponunt ea post Augustinus simulque omittunt et propriissime, sic legendo: Communiter vero et proprie actus est ipsius voluntatis; quae lectio praecedentibus manifeste contradicit. Codd. D P Q T post propriissime addunt loquendo, id est tribus ultimis modis.
    Codices S, Y, Z [read] sit well enough. Soon after, the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, adds after quod: in the first two modes it is an act of every faculty, but in the last three modes it is an act of the will itself — but superfluously, since the same thing is said in the words immediately following. Then many codices, such as C F K L M O R S U V W X Y Z etc., together with editions 2 and 3, after communissime, omitting the words et communiter, transpose them after Augustinus and at the same time omit et propriissime, so reading: But commonly and properly it is an act of the will itself; which reading manifestly contradicts what precedes. Codices D P Q T after propriissime add loquendo, that is, in the last three modes.
  18. 18
    Supple cum cod. bb uti; Vat. autem praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 hic addit uti communissime sumtum, qua additione non quidem falsus, sed alius sensus obtinetur; in lectione siquidem mss. a S. Doctore hic non datur explicita responsio ad primo obiectum, sed breviter repetitur ipsa obiectio; e contra est in lectione Vat.
    Supply with codex bb uti; the Vatican edition, however, beyond the faith of the manuscripts and ed. 1, here adds uti communissime sumtum — by which addition not indeed a false but a different sense is obtained; for in the reading of the manuscripts no explicit response is here given by the Holy Doctor to the first objection, but the objection itself is briefly repeated; the contrary is the case in the Vatican reading.
  19. 19
    Postulante maiore parte codd. F G H I R S T etc. et ed. 1, posuimus modum passivum pro activo Augustinus dicit.
    At the demand of the greater part of the codices F G H I R S T etc. and ed. 1, we have set down the passive mode in place of the active Augustinus dicit.
  20. 20
    Cod. D secundum.
    Codex D [reads] secundum.
  21. 21
    Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc addit quo vel, quod tamen abest ab antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican edition, with the later codex cc, adds quo vel, which however is absent from the older manuscripts and ed. 1.
  22. 22
    Ed. 1 hic et paulo infra illud loco quod dicit.
    Ed. 1, here and a little below, [reads] illud in place of quod dicit.
Cited by

8 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Doubts on the Master's text
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 13 · 2×
supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the account of the image is found in memory, understanding, and will
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the image is found in these powers through their comparison to God
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3 · 3×
supra d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.
Whether the coming-about of evils is a good
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 46
supra pag. 31, nota 1
Whether free choice is the name of a habit or of a power
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
tom. I. pag. 31, nota 2
Whether the use of servile fear is good or evil
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 34
tom. I. pag. 31, nota 1
Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XVI, Part I)
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16 · 3×
tom. I. pag. 31, nota 2
On the fourth vision: the third treatment, which treats specially both of the second object of this vision, namely of the consideration of the Church militant, and of the third, which is the soul itself made hierarchic
Collationes in Hexaëmeron · Collatio XXII: De quarta visione tractatio tertia, quae specialiter agit tum de secundo obiecto huius visionis, nempe de consideratione militantis Ecclesiae, tum de tertio, quod est ipsa anima hierarchizata
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1.

9 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

← Dist. 1Dist. 1, Art. 1, Q. 2→