Dist. 1, Art. 3, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1
Articulus III. De fruibili.
Ostenso, quid sit frui per essentiam, quaestio est de fruibili, et
primo, utrum Deo contingat frui;
secundo, utrum fruendum sit ipso solo.
Quaestio I. Utrum Deo sit fruendum.
Circa primum, quod sit Deo fruendum, ostenditur sic.
Fundamenta.
1. «Eo fruendum est, quod beatos nos facit1», quia in beatitudine est recta fruitio; sed Deo beati efficimur, quia ipse est nostra beatitudo: ergo Deo est fruendum.
2. Item, bonum est amabile; ergo magis bonum magis amabile et summe bonum summe amabile2; sed eo fruimur, quod summe amamus: ergo etc.
3. Item, pulcrum delectat et3 magis pulcrum magis delectat, ergo summe pulcrum summe delectat; sed eo fruimur, in quo summe delectamur: ergo etc.
Sed contra:
Ad oppositum.
1. Ubi est fruitio, ibi est delectatio; «sed delectatio est coniunctio convenientis cum convenienti4»; Dei autem ad creaturam nulla est convenientia, immo summa distantia: ergo nec delectatio, ergo nec fruitio.
2. Item, excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum vel saltem contristat, quia delectatio est in mediis5: ergo pari ratione excellens intelligibile corrumpit vel contristat intellectum. Sed Deus est excellentissima lux: ergo contristat, non delectat, ergo etc. Si dicas, quod sensibilis potentia est corruptibilis, non intellectus; hoc non solvit, quia intellectus, dum est in carne, fatigatur et impeditur in actu, corpore corrupto.
3. Item, ubi fruitio, ibi quietatio; sed in infinito non est quietatio, «quia semper est aliquid extra accipere6»: ergo cum Deus sit infinitus, in Deo non est quietatio, ergo nec fruitio.
Conclusio. Deo proprie est fruendum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deo fruendum est, eo quod ipse solus perfecte finit7 et delectat ipsam animam propter se et super omnia.
Ad argumenta.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod delectatio est coniunctio convenientis etc.; dicendum, quod8 est convenientia per unius naturae participationem vel per comparationem communem9. Prima convenientia facit communitatem univocationis, secunda communitatem analogiae sive proportionis. Et haec est secundum triplicem differentiam: aut secundum similem comparationem duorum ad duo, ut sicut homo ad animal, ita albedo se habet ad colorem; aut secundum dissimilem comparationem duorum ad unum, ut animalis et cibi ad sanitatem; vel p. 39secundum comparationem duorum ad invicem, ut puta cum unum est imitatio vel similitudo alterius. Similitudo enim non convenit cum consimili10 in tertio, sed se ipsa. Sic est in proposito, quia anima est expressa similitudo Dei. Haec convenientia in uno extremo ponit inclinationem et indigentiam, in alio quietationem et sufficientiam, quia unum11 factum est propter alterum, unde ordinatur ad alterum. Et quoniam ad inclinationis quietationem et indigentiae suppletionem, ubi est sensus, est delectatio sive sequitur12, ideo anima cum tali modo quietatur a Deo, fruitur eo.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod excellentia sensibilis corrumpit sensum: ergo etc., dicendum, quod non est simile de intelligere et sentire. Et ad hoc est triplex ratio: una est ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, alia ex parte apprehensi sive obiecti, tertia est ex parte modi apprehendendi.
Ex parte virtutis apprehensivae, quia sensus potest corrumpi, intellectus autem non. Cuius ratio est, quia sensus dependet ab organo, in quo est quaedam medietas et harmonia, quae non tantum corrumpitur per contrarium, sed per excellens; sed intellectus non dependet ab organo, quia est vis immaterialis, ideo non tristatur in excellenti13.
Ex parte obiecti non est simile, quia obiectum intelligibile14 excellens iuvat et confortat, quia influentia talis cognoscibilis procedit ab intimis et intrat ipsam potentiam, et ideo ipsam confortat et corroborat. Sicut si magnus mons daret virtutem portandi se, facilius ferretur quam parvus; sic est in intelligibili, quod Deus est. Sensibile autem obiectum tantum extra excitat, et ideo hoc corrumpit, illud autem non.
Ex parte modi apprehendendi similiter est dissimilitudo, quia sensus in apprehensione sui obiecti tendit ad exterius, unde percipiendo15 illud dispergitur exterius nec fortificatur16 interius, ideo debilitatur. Sed obiectum intellectus cum sit intimum ipsi intellectui, in eius perceptione virtus non dispergitur, sed colligitur, et quanto virtus est magis unita, tanto fortior.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de infinito; dicendum, quod infinitum dicitur dupliciter, scilicet per privationem perfectionis; et sic materia dicitur infinita, et talis infiniti non est finire, sed potius finiri indiget, secundum quod17 est possibile. Alio modo infinitum dicitur per privationem limitationis; et quod sic infinitum est, proprie habet finire, quoniam ultra ipsum, cum non sit maius cogitare, non contingit aliquid appetere. Unde talis infinitas convenit ultimo fini, quae18 maxime habet finiendi rationem.
Article III. On the enjoyable.
Having shown what it is to enjoy through essence, the question concerns the enjoyable, and
first, whether God can be enjoyed;
second, whether He alone is to be enjoyed.
Question I. Whether God is to be enjoyed.
Concerning the first, that God is to be enjoyed, is shown thus.
Foundations.
1. "That is to be enjoyed which makes us blessed1," since right enjoyment lies in beatitude; but we are made blessed by God, since He Himself is our beatitude: therefore God is to be enjoyed.
2. Likewise, the good is lovable; therefore the more good is the more lovable, and the supremely good is supremely lovable2; but we enjoy that which we love supremely: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the beautiful delights, and3 the more beautiful delights more; therefore the supremely beautiful delights supremely; but we enjoy that in which we are supremely delighted: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
To the opposite.
1. Where there is enjoyment, there is delight; "but delight is the conjunction of the fitting with the fitting4"; but there is no fittingness of God to the creature, but rather the greatest distance: therefore no delight, therefore no enjoyment.
2. Likewise, an excelling sensible object corrupts the sense or at least saddens it, since delight lies in middle things5: therefore, by parity of reasoning, an excelling intelligible object corrupts or saddens the intellect. But God is the most excelling light: therefore He saddens, He does not delight, therefore etc. If you say that the sensible power is corruptible, the intellect is not; this does not solve the matter, since the intellect, while it is in the flesh, is wearied and impeded in its act, the body being corrupted.
3. Likewise, where enjoyment is, there is rest; but in the infinite there is no rest, "since there is always something beyond to be received6": therefore, since God is infinite, in God there is no rest, therefore neither enjoyment.
Conclusion. God is properly to be enjoyed.
I respond: It must be said that God is to be enjoyed, in that He alone perfectly terminates7 and delights the soul itself for His own sake and above all things.
To the arguments.
1. To that, then, which is objected, that delight is the conjunction of the fitting etc.; it must be said that8 there is a fittingness through participation in one nature, or through a common comparison9. The first fittingness produces the community of univocation, the second the community of analogy or proportion. And this latter is according to a threefold difference: either according to a similar comparison of two to two, as just as man is to animal, so whiteness is to color; or according to a dissimilar comparison of two to one, as of the animal and food to health; or p. 39according to a comparison of two to each other, as for instance when one is the imitation or likeness of the other. For a likeness does not agree with that-which-is-like it10 in a third [term], but in itself. So it is in the case at hand, since the soul is the express likeness of God. This fittingness, in the one extreme, posits inclination and indigence, in the other rest and sufficiency, since the one11 is made for the sake of the other, whence it is ordered to the other. And since, for the rest of the inclination and the supplying of the indigence, where there is sense, there is delight, or [delight] follows12, therefore the soul, when it is rested in such a way by God, enjoys Him.
2. To that which is objected, that an excelling sensible object corrupts the sense: therefore etc., it must be said that the case of understanding and sensing is not alike. And for this there is a threefold reason: one is on the part of the apprehending power, another on the part of the apprehended or the object, the third is on the part of the mode of apprehending.
On the part of the apprehending power, since the sense can be corrupted, but the intellect cannot. The reason for this is that the sense depends on an organ, in which there is a certain mean and harmony, which is corrupted not only by the contrary, but by the excelling; but the intellect does not depend on an organ, since it is an immaterial power, and so it is not saddened by an excelling [object]13.
On the part of the object it is not alike, since an excelling intelligible14 object aids and strengthens, since the influence of such a knowable proceeds from interior depths and enters the power itself, and therefore strengthens and fortifies it. Just as if a great mountain were to give the power of bearing itself, it would be borne more easily than a small one; so it is in the intelligible, which God is. But the sensible object only stirs from outside, and therefore this corrupts, but that does not.
On the part of the mode of apprehending there is likewise dissimilarity, since the sense, in the apprehension of its object, tends outward, whence by perceiving15 it, it is scattered outwardly and is not strengthened16 inwardly, therefore it is weakened. But since the object of the intellect is interior to the intellect itself, in its perception the power is not scattered, but gathered, and the more the power is unified, the stronger it is.
3. To that which is objected concerning the infinite, it must be said that the infinite is said in two ways, namely, by privation of perfection; and thus matter is called infinite, and it is not for such an infinite to terminate, but rather it stands in need of being terminated, insofar as17 this is possible. In another way the infinite is said by privation of limitation; and that which is infinite in this way properly has [the power] to terminate, since beyond it, since nothing greater can be conceived, nothing else can be sought. Whence such infinity belongs to the last end, which18 most of all has the character of terminating.
I. Hanc et sequentem quaestionem alii antiqui commentatores Lombardi sub una quaestione tractant. — Circa analogiam eiusque differentias, de qua sermo est in solut. ad 1, fusius S. Doctor loquitur infra d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in corp.; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in corp. — De comparatione duorum ad duo etc. infra d. 46. q. 5. in corp. — De analogia proportionis et proportionalitatis cfr. infra d. 48. q. 1; d. 33. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4; et d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.
II. De ipsa hac quaestione: Scot., hic q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert., hic q. 12. et seqq. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4. — Biel, hic q. 4.
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I. This and the following question other ancient commentators on Lombard treat under a single question. — Concerning analogy and its differences, of which there is mention in the solution to [obj.] 1, the holy Doctor speaks more fully below at d. 14. q. 2; d. 29. a. 1. q. 2; d. 7. q. 4. in the body; d. 25. a. 2. q. 2. in the body. — On the comparison of two to two etc., below at d. 46. q. 5. in the body. — On the analogy of proportion and proportionality, cf. below d. 48. q. 1; d. 33. a. 1. q. 1; III. Sent. d. 1. a. 1. q. 1. ad 4; and d. 29. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2; IV. Sent. d. 1. dub. 3.
II. On this question itself: Scotus, here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 2. a. 1; S. I. II. q. 11. a. 3. — B. Albert, here q. 12. and following. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 72. q. 3. n. 11. — Durandus, here q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4. — Biel, here q. 4.
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- 1August., I. De Doctr. christ. c. 33. n. 37: Illo enim frueris, quo efficieris beatus. — In quo textu cod. R post Illo addit solo.Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. I, c. 33, n. 37: For you enjoy that by which you are made blessed. — In which text codex R, after Illo, adds solo.
- 2Simile argumentum reperitur in Aristot., I. Ethic. c. 7, ubi agit de felicitate, quae est bonum optimum, ideoque et maxime exoptandum ac amandum. Cfr. III. Topic. c. 1. seq.A similar argument is found in Aristotle, Ethics bk. I, c. 7, where he treats of happiness, which is the best good, and therefore most to be desired and loved. Cf. Topics bk. III, c. 1 and following.
- 3Supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 particulam et.We have supplied the particle et from the older manuscripts and the first edition.
- 4Haec delectationis definitio est S. Doctori ceterisque Scholasticis familiaris et convenit cum ea, quam exhibet Avicenna in fine VIII. Metaph. c. 7. circa finem: Delectatio non est nisi apprehensio convenientis, secundum quod conveniens est — Quae ab Avicenna data definitio fundari videtur in illa, quam Aristot., I. Rhetor. c. 11. tradit: Est autem delectatio motus quidam animae et constitutio simul tota, sensibilis, in existentem naturam (haec definitio explicatur ab Henr. Gand., S. a. 50. q. 2.). Ed. Paris. 1878 sic Aristot. interpretatur: Positum sit igitur nobis, voluptatem esse motionem quandam animi et constitutionem subitam sensuque percipiendam in statu conveniente naturae. Cfr. etiam VII. Ethic. c. 11. seq. et praecipue X. Ethic. c. 1-5. ac II. Magnor. Moral. c. 7, ubi plura ad delectationem (voluptatem) pertinentia explicantur. — Mox, contradicentibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc facturam pro creaturam. Paulo post cod. R infinita loco summa.This definition of delight is familiar to the holy Doctor and to the other Scholastics, and agrees with that which Avicenna gives at the end of Metaph. VIII, c. 7, near the end: Delight is nothing other than the apprehension of the fitting insofar as it is fitting — This definition given by Avicenna seems to be founded on that which Aristotle, Rhetoric bk. I, c. 11, transmits: Delight, however, is a certain motion of the soul and a complete settling, sensible, into its existent nature (this definition is explained by Henry of Ghent, S. a. 50. q. 2.). The Paris edition of 1878 thus interprets Aristotle: Let it then be laid down by us that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul and a sudden settling, to be perceived by sense, into a state agreeable to nature. Cf. also Ethics bk. VII, c. 11 and following, and especially Ethics bk. X, c. 1-5, and Magna Moralia bk. II, c. 7, where many things pertaining to delight (pleasure) are explained. — Next, against the older manuscripts and the first edition, the Vatican edition together with the later codex cc has facturam in place of creaturam. A little later codex R has infinita in place of summa.
- 5Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. (ed. Paris. Firmin-Didot, III. c. 2.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489 legitur: Manifestum autem ex his, et propter quid excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt sensitiva... Et manifesta est ex hoc causa, propter quam sensibilia intensa corrumpunt instrumenta sensuum. Et text. 143. (ed. Paris. loc. cit.): Proportio autem est symphonia... unde et delectabilia quidem sunt, dum dicuntur sincera et mixta entia ad rationem... excellentia autem contristant aut corrumpunt. Tandem libr. III. text. 29: Et est delectari aut tristari agere sensitiva medietate ad bonum et malum in quantum talia. — Vat. rationem additam contra mss. et ed. 1 ita exhibet: quia vera delectatio non est nisi in mediis. Cod. X circa finem huius argumenti loco in carne ponit in corpore.Aristotle, On the Soul bk. II, text 123 (Paris Firmin-Didot ed., III. c. 2.), where according to the Venice edition of 1489 one reads: It is manifest from these things, and why the excellences of sensibles corrupt the sense-faculties... And the cause is made manifest from this, on account of which intense sensibles corrupt the instruments of the senses. And text 143 (Paris ed., loc. cit.): Proportion, moreover, is a symphony... whence delightful indeed are things said to be sincere and the entities mixed unto reason... but excellences sadden or corrupt. Finally, bk. III, text 29: And to be delighted or to be saddened is for the sensitive [faculty] to act by a middle state with respect to good and evil insofar as they are such. — The Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and the first edition, gives the added reason thus: since true delight is only in middle things. Codex X, near the end of this argument, places in corpore in place of in carne.
- 6Aristot., III. Phys. text. 63. (c. 6.): Infinitum igitur id est, cuius secundum quantitatem accipientibus semper aliquid accipere extra est; cuius autem nihil est extra, id est perfectum et totum. — Mox praeter fidem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 non ita bene Vat. cum recentiore cod. cc ergo non fruitio.Aristotle, Physics bk. III, text 63 (c. 6.): The infinite, therefore, is that of which, according to quantity, for those receiving it there is always something to be received beyond; but that of which nothing is beyond is the perfect and the whole. — Next, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and the first edition, not so well does the Vatican edition together with the later codex cc have ergo non fruitio.
- 7Id est, quietat.That is, brings to rest.
- 8Corruptam lectionem Vat. et recentioris cod. cc, in qua ponitur et pro vel et omittitur communem, restauravimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1. Paulo ante cod. X dicendum, quod convenientia dicitur vel per. — De convenientia vide Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1. et VII. Phys. text. 21-34. (c. 4.).We have restored from the older manuscripts and the first edition the corrupt reading of the Vatican edition and of the later codex cc, in which et is put in place of vel and communem is omitted. A little earlier codex X has it must be said that fittingness is said either through. — On fittingness see Aristotle, Categories c. 1, and Physics bk. VII, text 21-34 (c. 4.).
- 9Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt se habet, quod Vat. cum aliquibus tantum codd. hic addit.Most codices together with the first edition omit se habet, which the Vatican edition, together with only some codices, here adds.
- 10Plures mss. ut A F G H K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 simili. Mox mendum Vat., quae post se ipsa addit anima, castigamus ex mss. et ed. 1; cod. X sed est se ipsa similis. In lectione in textum recepta similitudo sumitur concrete et sensus est: simile ratione similitudinis convenit immediate cum consimili. — Paulo post cod. T homo pro anima; plures vero codd. ut C L R S U omittunt anima, sed non bene.Several manuscripts such as A F G H K S T Y etc., with the first edition, [have] simili. Next, the error of the Vatican edition, which after se ipsa adds anima, we correct from the manuscripts and the first edition; codex X has sed est se ipsa similis. In the reading received into the text, similitudo is taken concretely, and the sense is: the like, by reason of likeness, agrees immediately with the like. — A little later codex T has homo in place of anima; several codices however, such as C L R S U, omit anima, but not rightly.
- 11Cod. X hic repetit unum.Codex X here repeats unum.
- 12Cod. WXZ adiungunt ibi, et mox cod. A post sequitur repetit delectatio.Codices W, X, Z add ibi, and next codex A, after sequitur, repeats delectatio.
- 13Cod. X addit etiam. Paulo post codd. aa bb spiritualis loco immaterialis. Mox codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam codd. A C G I L S T U W post tristatur omittunt in; codd. R et ff ponunt ab; cod. bb vero ex; plures autem ut F H K. etc. cum ed. 1 in.Codex X adds etiam. A little later codices aa and bb have spiritualis in place of immaterialis. Next, the codices do not agree among themselves; for codices A C G I L S T U W, after tristatur, omit in; codices R and ff put ab; codex bb has ex; many however, such as F H K etc., with the first edition, have in.
- 14De hac differentia inter sensum et intellectum vide Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 123. et 143. paulo supra relatos, et libr. III. text. 4. (ed. Paris. c. 4.): Necesse est itaque, quoniam (intellectus) omnia intelligit, immixtum esse; et text. 7: Quod autem non similis sit impassibilitas sensitivi et intellectivi, manifestum est sensoriis et sensu. Sensus enim non potest sentire ex vehementi sensibili... sed intellectus cum aliquid intellexerit valde intelligibile, non minus intelligit inferiora, sed et magis; sensitivum enim non sine corpore est, hic (intellectus) autem separabilis est.On this difference between sense and intellect see Aristotle, On the Soul bk. II, text 123 and 143, recounted a little above, and bk. III, text 4 (Paris ed., c. 4.): It is therefore necessary, since (the intellect) understands all things, that it be unmixed; and text 7: That the impassibility of the sensitive and of the intellective are not alike is manifest in the sense-organs and in sense. For sense cannot sense from a vehement sensible... but the intellect, when it has understood something very intelligible, does not understand inferior things less, but even more; for the sensitive is not without a body, but this (the intellect) is separable.
- 15Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. substituimus intelligibile loco intelligentiae.On the authority of the older [manuscripts] we have substituted intelligibile in place of intelligentiae.
- 16Ita codd. C H K O S T U Y aa bb et ed. 1; sed codd. A F I L M R V W X Z participando; Vat. autem cum cod. cc per. Mox codd. X et Y confortatur loco fortificatur.Thus codices C H K O S T U Y aa bb and the first edition; but codices A F I L M R V W X Z [have] participando; the Vatican edition, however, with codex cc, has per. Next, codices X and Y have confortatur in place of fortificatur.
- 17Cod. cc scilicet quantum pro secundum quod.Codex cc has scilicet quantum in place of secundum quod.
- 18Codd. F et I qui, satis bene, et conveniunt quoad sensum cum cod. T, qui habet quia.Codices F and I have qui, which is well enough, and agree as to sense with codex T, which has quia.