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Dist. 1, Art. 3, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus
English Translation
p. 39

Quaestio II. Utrum solo Deo sive bono increato fruendum sit.

Ultimo quaeritur, utrum solo Deo sive bono increato sit fruendum; et quod sic, videtur.

Fundamenta.

1. Illo solo est fruendum, quod est propter se diligendum; sed illud solum1 est propter se diligendum, quod est propter se bonum; illud autem propter se est bonum, quod bonitatem, quam habet, nec habet ab alio, nec bonitas illa est ad aliud; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

p. 402. Item, illo solo est fruendum, quod quietat animae appetitum; sed animae appetitus non quietatur sufficienter nisi in eo quod est illa perfectius et maius bonum; hoc autem est solus Deus: ergo etc.

3. Item, appetitus non sufficienter quietatur nisi per aliquid, quod animam implet, quia ex ea parte anima deficit in quiete, qua deficit in plenitudine; sed2 est capax Dei secundum appetitum: ergo si omne creatum est in infinitum minus illo, nullum supplet animae appetitum. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus3: «Animam totius Trinitatis capacem nihil minus quam Trinitas potest implere».

4. Item, bonum, quod potest cogitari, potest appeti: ergo si aliquo maius bonum potest cogitari, maius illo potest appeti; sed omni finito maius potest cogitari: ergo maius potest appeti: ergo nullum finitum terminat animae appetitum sufficienter: ergo solo bono infinito, quod Deus est, est fruendum, quo habito, non potest amplius cogitari nec desiderari.

Contra:

1. Videtur, quod bono creato contingat frui, quia, quamvis appetitus materiae sit infinitus, tamen per formam creatam incorruptibilem4 sufficienter finitur: ergo similiter videtur, quod sit aliquod bonum creatum, quod sufficienter finiet animae appetitum; sed omni tali est fruendum: ergo aliquo bono creato est fruendum.

2. Item, appetitus humanus est finitae capacitatis, ergo non capit nisi finitum, vel si capiat infinitum, capit finite; ergo si finiatur per illud quod capit, finitur per bonum finitum: ergo videtur, quod aliquo bono finito sit fruendum.

3. Item, specialiter videtur, quod homine sit fruendum, quia omni eo est fruendum, quo Deus fruitur; sed Deus homine fruitur, quia hominem amat; sed amore illo, quo amat se, amat hominem, quia non est in eo5 duplex amor; sed primus est fruitionis: ergo et secundus.

4. Item, videtur specialiter de virtute; quia omni eo est fruendum, quod est propter se appetendum; haec est manifesta per se; sed omne bonum honestum est propter se appetendum, «quia honestum est quod sua vi nos trahit et dignitate sua nos allicit», sicut dicit Tullius6, et Augustinus dividit honestum contra utile; sed virtus cadit in genere honesti: ergo virtute est fruendum.

5. Item, videtur specialiter de beatitudine. Omni eo est fruendum, quo habito animus quiescit et delectatur et nihil ultra potest quaerere; sed beatitudo creata est huiusmodi: ergo etc.

Conclusio.

Solo Deo proprie est fruendum; improprie frui licet bonis spiritualibus, quae delectant et fini sunt coniuncta.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod solo Deo est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione et quietatione. Sed communiter accepto frui, prout dicit motum cum delectatione tantum7, omnibus, quae spiritualiter delectant et coniuncta sunt fini, cuiusmodi sunt fructus, dona et beatitudines, potest frui homo non indebite; sed primo modo solo Deo.

Et ratio huius est, quia nihil potest animam sufficienter finire nisi bonum, ad quod est8. Hoc autem est bonum summum, quod superius est anima, et bonum infinitum, quod excedit animae vires. Cognitio enim animae naturalis9 est cognitio non arctata; unde nata est quodam modo omnia cognoscere, unde non impletur cognitio eius aliquo cognoscibili, nisi quod habet in se omnia cognoscibilia et quo cognito omnia cognoscuntur. Similiter affectio eius nata est diligere omne bonum; ergo nullo bono sufficienter finitur affectus, nisi quod10 est bonum omnis boni et quod est omnia in omnibus.

p. 41De quo bono Exodi trigesimo tertio11: Ostendam tibi omne bonum. Hoc autem est summum bonum: ergo etc.

Item12, nihil sufficienter finit animam nisi bonum infinitum, quia ad hoc, ut finiatur, necesse est, ipsam finiri secundum aestimationem; alioquin non esset beata, nisi se existimaret beatam. Aestimatio autem supergreditur omne finitum, quia omni finito potest maius cogitari aliquid: ergo cum affectio possit13 se extendere ubi et aestimatio, necessario affectio animae supergreditur omne finitum; et si hoc, nullo bono finito sufficienter finitur. Fruendum est ergo solo Deo, quia summum bonum et infinitum.

Et non solum Deo fruendum propter perfectam finitionem, sed etiam propter perfectam delectationem. Ad delectationem enim concurrit14 delectabile et coniunctio eius cum eo quod delectatur. Omne autem, quod delectat animam, delectat in ratione boni et pulcri; et quoniam solus Deus est ipsa15 bonitas et pulcritudo, ideo in Deo solo est perfecta delectatio.

Item, quia ibi est coniunctio; solus autem Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur. Nam coniungitur secundum16 veritatem et intimitatem. Solus enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabitur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi.

Omnes enim17 hae quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc: quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum, quod Deus est, ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui.

Ad argumenta pro parte opposita:

1. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de appetitu materiae; dicendum, quod appetitus materiae ordinatur ad formam tanquam ad perfectionem substantialem, ex qua18 et materia fit unum; et ideo necesse est, formam esse eiusdem generis cum materia, nec est omnino supra materiam: ideo finita est omnis talis forma. Talis autem, si sit incorruptibilis, propter unionem19 arctat appetitum materiae et arctatum finit; unde non finitur in sua amplitudine. Appetitus autem animae non sic arctatur propter unionem cum appetibili, immo dilatatur; et ideo oportet, quod perficiatur aliquo omnino summo.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod20 non capit nisi finite; dicendum, quod infinitum bonum finite capit, quoniam ipsa est finita. Sed quoniam bonum illud est infinitum, ideo ab ipso totaliter absorbetur, ut iam eius capacitas undique terminetur. Unde non tantum gaudebit, sed sicut dicit Anselmus21, in gaudium Domini introibit. Quod si tantum caperet et non vinceretur nec absorberetur, adhuc posset insurgere appetitus ad amplius aliquid capiendum. Patet igitur, quod ad hoc quod anima compleatur, quamvis capacitatem habeat finitam22, tamen necesse est adesse bonum infinitum.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur de homine; dicendum, quod Deus diligit hominem, et amor Dei est amor fruitionis; tamen homine non fruitur, quia diligendo se diligit hominem, id est, fruendo se utitur homine. Quod patet sic: quia dilectio Dei ad creaturam non est affectio, sed effectus23 communicatio. Communicatio autem secundum rationem habitualem attenditur secundum bonitatem; quia bonum est quod natum est se communicare. Secundum rationem vero actualem attenditur sive respicit voluntatem; quia enim vult, ideo facit. Ratio ergo communicandi venit ex voluntate et bonitate, sicut ratio cognoscendi ab exemplari et intelligentia. Quia igitur ex conversione voluntatis supra suam bonitatem nos diligit24, ideo se fruendo nos diligit.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de virtute, quod virtus est bonum honestum; dicendum, quod bonum honestum dicitur dupliciter: aut quod est pure bonum, aut in quo relucet eius similitudo. Primo modo honesto est fruendum, proprie accepto frui, quia hoc solum terminat et quietat. Secundo modo non, nisi communiter accipiatur, prout dicit delectationem.

p. 42Huiusmodi enim25 propter assimilationem ad Deum habent pulcritudinem, qua nos delectant et alliciunt; tamen in ipsis non est quiescendum, quia tunc amittunt pulcritudinem, quia «virtutes, cum ad se referuntur, superbae sunt et inflatae26».

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur de beatitudine; dicendum, quod beatitudo creata non finit appetitum per se, sed per coniunctionem cum increata: unde anima ipsam27 diligit propter Deum, non propter se.

Question II. Whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed.

Lastly it is asked whether God alone, or only the uncreated good, is to be enjoyed; and that it is so, seems [evident].

Foundations.

1. That alone is to be enjoyed which is to be loved for its own sake; but that alone1 is to be loved for its own sake which is good for its own sake; and that is good for its own sake which neither has from another the goodness it has, nor is that goodness in relation to anything else; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, that alone is to be enjoyed which quiets the appetite of the soul; but the soul's appetite is not sufficiently quieted save in that which is a more perfect and greater good than itself; but this is God alone: therefore, etc.

3. Likewise, the appetite is not sufficiently quieted save through something which fills the soul, since the soul fails in rest on that side on which it fails in fullness; but [the soul]2 is capable of God according to appetite: therefore, if every created thing is infinitely less than that [God], no [created thing] supplies the soul's appetite. And this is what Augustine3 says: «Nothing less than the Trinity can fill a soul that is capable of the whole Trinity».

4. Likewise, the good which can be thought can be desired: therefore, if a greater good than some [given good] can be thought, a greater than that can be desired; but a greater than every finite [good] can be thought: therefore a greater can be desired: therefore no finite [thing] sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite: therefore the only infinite good, which is God, is to be enjoyed, which once possessed, nothing further can be thought or desired.

On the contrary:

1. It seems that the created good may be enjoyed, since although the appetite of matter is infinite, yet through a created incorruptible form4 it is sufficiently terminated: therefore similarly it seems that there is some created good which sufficiently terminates the soul's appetite; but every such [good] is to be enjoyed: therefore some created good is to be enjoyed.

2. Likewise, the human appetite is of finite capacity; therefore it does not grasp save the finite, or if it grasps the infinite, it grasps finitely; therefore if it is terminated by that which it grasps, it is terminated by a finite good: therefore it seems that some finite good is to be enjoyed.

3. Likewise, specially it seems that the human being is to be enjoyed, since that is to be enjoyed by which God enjoys; but God enjoys the human being, since he loves the human being; but with that love with which he loves himself, he loves the human being, since there is not in him5 a twofold love; but the first is of enjoyment: therefore also the second.

4. Likewise, specially it seems concerning virtue; since that is to be enjoyed which is to be desired for its own sake; this is manifest per se; but every honorable good is to be desired for its own sake, «since the honorable is what by its own force draws us and by its own dignity attracts us», as Tully6 says, and Augustine divides the honorable against the useful; but virtue falls in the genus of the honorable: therefore virtue is to be enjoyed.

5. Likewise, specially it seems concerning beatitude. That is to be enjoyed by the possession of which the mind rests and is delighted, and can seek nothing further; but created beatitude is of this kind: therefore, etc.

Conclusio.

God alone is properly to be enjoyed; it is improperly permitted to enjoy spiritual goods, which delight and are conjoined to the end.

I respond: It must be said that God alone is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight and quieting. But, taking "to enjoy" commonly, insofar as it expresses a motion with delight only7, a human being can not unfittingly enjoy all things which spiritually delight and are conjoined to the end—of which kind are the fruits, gifts, and beatitudes; but in the first mode [he can enjoy] God alone.

And the reason for this is that nothing can sufficiently terminate the soul except the good for which it exists8. But this is the highest good, which is above the soul, and the infinite good, which exceeds the powers of the soul. For the soul's natural cognition9 is a cognition not constrained; whence it is born in a certain way to cognize all things, whence its cognition is not filled by any cognoscible save what has in itself all cognoscibles and by which once cognized all things are cognized. Likewise its affection is born to love every good; therefore the affection is not sufficiently terminated by any good save by that which10 is the good of every good and which is "all in all".

Of which good [it is said] in Exodus the thirty-third11: I will show thee every good. But this is the highest good: therefore, etc.

Likewise12, nothing sufficiently terminates the soul save the infinite good, because for it to be terminated, it is necessary that it be terminated according to estimation; otherwise it would not be blessed, unless it esteemed itself blessed. But estimation transcends every finite [thing], since something greater than every finite [thing] can be thought: therefore, since affection can13 extend itself where also estimation [extends], necessarily the soul's affection transcends every finite [thing]; and if this, [it is] not sufficiently terminated by any finite good. Therefore God alone is to be enjoyed, since [he is] the highest and infinite good.

And not only is God to be enjoyed on account of perfect termination, but also on account of perfect delight. For to delight there concurs14 the delightable and the conjunction of it with that which is delighted. But everything which delights the soul delights under the account of good and beautiful; and since God alone is goodness and beauty itself15, therefore in God alone is there perfect delight.

Likewise, because there is conjunction; but God alone is the one who is most perfectly conjoined. For he is conjoined according to16 truth and intimacy. For God alone, on account of supreme simplicity and spirituality, glides into the soul, so that according to truth he is in the soul and more intimate to the soul than [the soul] itself is to itself.

For all17 these four reasons reduce to one, namely to this: that since the soul is born to perceive the infinite good, which is God, therefore in him alone it ought to rest and enjoy him.

To the arguments for the opposite side:

1. To that which is objected concerning the appetite of matter; it must be said that the appetite of matter is ordered to form as to substantial perfection, out of which18 also matter becomes one [thing]; and therefore it is necessary that the form be of the same genus as the matter, nor is it altogether above matter: therefore every such form is finite. But such [a form], if it be incorruptible, on account of union19 constrains the appetite of matter and once constrained terminates it; whence it is not terminated in its [own] amplitude. But the appetite of the soul is not so constrained on account of union with the desirable, rather it is dilated; and therefore it is required that it be perfected by something altogether highest.

2. To that which is objected, that20 [the soul] does not grasp save finitely; it must be said that it grasps the infinite good finitely, since [the soul] itself is finite. But since that good is infinite, therefore by it [the soul] is wholly absorbed, so that its capacity is on every side terminated. Whence it will not so much rejoice, but, as Anselm21 says, it will enter into the joy of the Lord. For if it merely grasped and were not conquered and absorbed, the appetite could still rise up to grasp something further. It is therefore evident that, for the soul to be completed, although it has a finite capacity22, yet it is necessary that the infinite good be present.

3. To that which is objected concerning the human being; it must be said that God loves the human being, and the love of God is the love of enjoyment; yet he does not enjoy the human being, since by loving himself he loves the human being, that is, by enjoying himself he uses the human being. Which is evident thus: that God's love toward the creature is not affection, but [a] communication of effect23. But communication, according to habitual account, is attended to according to goodness; since the good is what is born to communicate itself. According to actual account, however, it is attended to or regards the will; since because [God] wills, therefore he acts. Therefore the account of communicating comes from will and goodness, just as the account of cognizing [comes] from the exemplar and intelligence. Since therefore from the conversion of his will upon his own goodness he loves us24, therefore by enjoying himself he loves us.

4. To that which is objected concerning virtue, that virtue is an honorable good; it must be said that the honorable good is said in two ways: either as what is purely good, or as that in which its likeness shines forth. In the first mode the honorable is to be enjoyed, taking "to enjoy" properly, since this alone terminates and quiets. In the second mode not, unless it be taken commonly, insofar as it expresses delight.

For such [virtues]25 on account of assimilation to God have beauty, by which they delight and attract us; nevertheless in them one is not to rest, since then they lose their beauty, since «the virtues, when they are referred to themselves, are proud and inflated26».

5. To that which is objected concerning beatitude; it must be said that created beatitude does not terminate the appetite per se, but through conjunction with the uncreated: whence the soul loves it27 on account of God, not on account of itself.

Scholion

I. Omnes antiqui doctores, excepto Durando, conveniunt in ea sententia, quod solo Deo obiective et materialiter sit fruendum, beatitudine vero creata sive beatitudine subiective sumta (ut moderni loquuntur), formaliter tantum. Seraphicus Doctor in solut. ad 5. iam reprobaverat Durandi (hic. q. 2.) singularem et falsam opinionem, quod actus mentis, quo Deus immediate attingitur, sit fruitionis obiectum immediatum, Deus vero eiusdem obiectum remotum.

II. Quomodo quis improprie frui possit virtutibus, magis explicatur II. Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, ubi etiam exponitur, quomodo dona, fructus et beatitudines coniuncta sint fini, qui secundum Scripturam est caritas. — Valde notanda sunt profunda et copiosa argumenta, quibus Seraphicus probat, quod in Deo solo sit perfecta delectatio et quietatio, de quo etiam egregie loquitur II. Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. etiam S. Thom. S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — Quoad illapsum Dei in animam cfr. II. Sent. d. 8 p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

Quoad quaestionem principalem vide auctores in Scholio praecedenti.

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Scholion

I. All the ancient doctors, except Durandus, agree in this opinion: that God alone is to be enjoyed objectively and materially, but [that] in created beatitude—or in beatitude taken subjectively (as the moderns speak)—only formally. The Seraphic Doctor in the reply to the fifth [objection] had already rejected the singular and false opinion of Durandus (here, q. 2.), [namely] that the act of the mind by which God is immediately attained is the immediate object of enjoyment, while God is the remote object of the same.

II. How one can improperly enjoy the virtues is more fully explained in II Sent. d. 38. a. 1. q. 2. ad 3, where it is also expounded how the gifts, fruits, and beatitudes are conjoined to the end, which according to Scripture is charity. — The profound and copious arguments by which the Seraphic [Doctor] proves that in God alone is perfect delight and quieting are greatly to be noted, on which subject he also speaks excellently in II Sent. d. 16. a. 1. q. 1. Cfr. also S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 43; III. c. 48. 50. — As to the gliding-in of God into the soul, cfr. II Sent. d. 8 p. II. a. 1. q. 2.

As to the principal question, see the authors in the preceding Scholion.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. 1
    Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus solum, quod male abest a Vat. et recentiore cod. cc. — De hac propositione minore argum. cfr. Aristot., VIII. Ethic. c. 5: Quod enim absolute bonum ac iucundum est, amabile est atque eligibile; unicuique vero quod unicuique est tale. Cfr. etiam I. Ethic. c. 1. 2. et 8, ubi de ultimo fine; et I. Magnor. Moral. c. 2, ubi de bono in communi agitur.
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have added solum, which is wrongly absent from the Vatican [edition] and from the more recent cod. cc. — On this minor proposition of the argument, cfr. Aristotle, Ethics VIII, c. 5: For what is good and pleasant in an absolute sense is lovable and choiceworthy; but to each one, what is such for each one. Cfr. also Ethics I, c. 1, 2, and 8, where the ultimate end is discussed; and Magna Moralia I, c. 2, where the good in general is treated.
  2. 2
    Supple cum cod. I anima. Paulo infra fide codd. cum ed. 1 post nullum expunximus creatum; cod. W ponit implet pro supplet.
    Supply anima (soul) with cod. I. A little below, on the authority of the manuscripts with ed. 1, after nullum we have removed creatum; cod. W has implet for supplet.
  3. 3
    Potius auctor libri de Spiritu et anima, c. 27, ubi sic habetur: Animam tamen hominis, id est mentem, nulla creatura iuxta substantiam implere potest, nisi sola Trinitas. Et paulo inferius: Solius enim Trinitatis est intrare et implere naturam sive substantiam, quam creavit.
    Rather, the author of the book On the Spirit and the Soul, c. 27, where it is so stated: Yet the soul of man, that is, the mind, no creature can fill according to substance, save the Trinity alone. And a little below: For it belongs to the Trinity alone to enter and fill the nature or substance which it has created.
  4. 4
    Vat. et cod. K creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem; omnes fere codd. omittunt corporalem et; melioris notae codd. ut FGHTW aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 retinent solummodo incorruptibilem; alii ut A habent incorporalem; solummodo V corporalem, X corruptibilem; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incorporalem et incorruptibilem. Praeter auctoritatem codd. pro nostra lectione facit eiusdem convenientia tum cum solutione huius obiectionis, tum cum doctrina nostri Doctoris. Intelligi enim potest assertio hic posita tum de caelo empyreo, sicut cod. aa intelligit, addendo: ut patet in corporibus caelestibus, tum de ipsa anima, quae iuxta Seraphicum, licet sit spiritualis et incorporea, non omnino expers est compositionis ex forma et materia; et II. Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. explicite de ipsa affirmatur, quod appetitum materiae perfecte satiet et quietet. Quoad caelum empyreum Scholastici iuxta Aristotelem communiter asserebant, ipsum esse et incorruptibile et immobile. Cfr. II. Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. et d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. et III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Mox cod. T finiat loco finiet.
    The Vatican [ed.] and cod. K read creatam corporalem et incorruptibilem (created, corporeal, and incorruptible); almost all manuscripts omit corporalem et; manuscripts of better repute such as FGHTW aa bb ee ff and ed. 1 retain only incorruptibilem; others such as A have incorporalem; only V has corporalem, X corruptibilem; edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 incorporalem et incorruptibilem. Besides the authority of the manuscripts, our reading is supported by its agreement both with the solution of this objection and with the doctrine of our Doctor. For the assertion posited here can be understood both of the empyrean heaven, as cod. aa understands it, adding: as is evident in the celestial bodies, and of the soul itself, which according to the Seraphic [Doctor], although it is spiritual and incorporeal, is not wholly exempt from composition of form and matter; and in II Sent. d. 19. a. 1. q. 1. in the body, it is explicitly affirmed of [the soul] that it perfectly satisfies and quiets the appetite of matter. As to the empyrean heaven, the Scholastics following Aristotle commonly asserted it to be both incorruptible and immobile. Cfr. II Sent. d. 12. a. 2. q. 1. and d. 14. p. I. a. 3. q. 1. and III Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. — Soon after, cod. T reads finiat in place of finiet.
  5. 5
    Cod. K Deo pro eo.
    Cod. K reads Deo (God) for eo (him).
  6. 6
    Libr. II. Rhetor. c. 53. (ed. Taurin. 1823): Nam (honestum) est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad se, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate. — De divisione boni, quae ex August. affertur, vide ipsius lib. 83 Qq. q. 30. — Immediate post mendum Vat. dividitur loco dividit castigamus ex mss. et primis edd.
    Rhetoric II, c. 53 (Turin ed. 1823): For (the honorable) is something which by its own force allures us to itself, capturing not by any gain, but drawing by its own dignity. — On the division of the good which is adduced from Augustine, see his book 83 Questions, q. 30. — Immediately after, we correct the Vatican [ed.]'s mistake dividitur in place of dividit from the manuscripts and the earliest editions.
  7. 7
    Cod. K hic addit sic. Mox multi codd. ut AFGHKWXYZ ee etc. cum ed. 1 pro fini habent frui.
    Cod. K here adds sic (thus). Soon after, many manuscripts such as AFGHKWXYZ ee etc. with ed. 1 have frui (to enjoy) for fini (to the end).
  8. 8
    Vat. addit creata, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican [ed.] adds creata (created), which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. 1.
  9. 9
    Naturalis refertur ad cognitio, ita ut sensus sit: Si inspicias naturam cognitionis, quae animae competit, ipsa non est arctata. — Vat., contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, rationalis loco naturalis, sed non ita bene. — De propositione, quae deinde sequitur, vide Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 4. in q. praeced. cit.
    Naturalis refers to cognitio, so that the sense is: If you inspect the nature of the cognition which belongs to the soul, it is not constrained. — The Vatican [ed.], against the manuscripts and ed. 1, has rationalis in place of naturalis, but not so well. — On the proposition which then follows, see Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 4, cited in the preceding question.
  10. 10
    Cod. K adiungit per illud, quae additio videtur adiuncta, quia supplendum est eo sive illo.
    Cod. K adds per illud (through that), which addition seems adjoined, since eo or illo must be supplied.
  11. 11
    Vers. 19.
    [Exodus 33,] verse 19.
  12. 12
    Vat. contra fere omnes mss.: Similiter pro Item et paulo post ter existimatio loco aestimatio.
    The Vatican [ed.], against nearly all the manuscripts: Similiter (likewise) for Item (likewise) and a little after, three times, existimatio for aestimatio.
  13. 13
    Vat. contra codd. A T aa bb etc. posset, sed minus apte, quia agitur hic de naturali consecutione, quae subiecto semper inest. Hinc et immediate post Vat., obnitente maiore parte mss. ut AGKLOTVWXYZ etc. et ed. 1, minus bene extendere eo, ubi est existimatio. Cod. cc. ut loco ubi. Paulo infra auctoritate plurimorum codd. ut ACFGHKLOSTUVWZ etc. cum ed. 1 post et si substituimus hoc pro haec. Cod. K planius et si hoc, ergo.
    The Vatican [ed.], against codd. A T aa bb etc., has posset (it could), but less fittingly, since the matter here concerns a natural consequence, which is always present in the subject. Hence also, immediately after, the Vatican [ed.], with the greater part of the manuscripts such as AGKLOTVWXYZ etc. and ed. 1 resisting, less well [reads] extendere eo, ubi est existimatio. Cod. cc has ut in place of ubi. A little below, on the authority of very many manuscripts such as ACFGHKLOSTUVWZ etc. with ed. 1, after et si we have substituted hoc for haec. Cod. K more plainly: et si hoc, ergo.
  14. 14
    Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus concurrit loco concernitur et paulo post castigavimus mendum Vat., quae cum recentiore cod. cc habet delectat pro delectatur. — Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opp.
    From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted concurrit (concurs) in place of concernitur (is concerned) and a little after we have corrected the mistake of the Vatican [ed.], which together with the more recent cod. cc has delectat for delectatur. — Cfr. above, a. 3. q. 1. arg. 1. ad opp.
  15. 15
    Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 ipsa, quod Vat. omittit.
    We have supplied from the manuscripts and ed. 1 the word ipsa (itself), which the Vatican [ed.] omits.
  16. 16
    Cod. W per.
    Cod. W reads per (through).
  17. 17
    Cod. R autem.
    Cod. R reads autem (however).
  18. 18
    Supple hic, sicuti et paulo infra, post omnino cum cod. T forma.
    Supply here, as also a little below, after omnino with cod. T the word forma (form).
  19. 19
    Multi codd. antiquiores et meliores ut ACFGLORSTUXYZ etc. ponunt sibi pro sui. Mox cod. T post unde falso omittit non. — Sententiam hic positam S. Doctor breviter complectitur III. Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6. his verbis: Sicut dicimus de forma caeli, quod complet appetitum materiae, quia materia eius non appetit esse sub ulteriori forma, adeo forma ipsam statuit in actualitate completa. Cfr. Scot., II Phys. q. 1. n. 1. et 15.
    Many of the older and better manuscripts such as ACFGLORSTUXYZ etc. read sibi (to itself) for sui (of itself). Soon after, cod. T after unde wrongly omits non. — The opinion here posited the Holy Doctor briefly summarizes in III Sent. d. 13. a. 1. q. 3. ad 6 in these words: Just as we say of the form of the heaven that it fills the appetite of matter, since its matter does not desire to be under any further form, so the form establishes [the matter] itself in complete actuality. Cfr. Scotus, Physics II, q. 1. n. 1 and 15.
  20. 20
    Subaudi cum cod. X anima humana. Mox cod. A post bonum finite addit anima.
    Understand with cod. X anima humana (the human soul). Soon after, cod. A after bonum finite adds anima (soul).
  21. 21
    Proslog. c. 26: «Non ergo totum illud gaudium intrabit in gaudentes, sed toti gaudentes intrabunt in gaudium». Alludit ad Matth. 25, 21. — Immediate post Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 totum pro tantum.
    Proslogion c. 26: «Therefore not the whole of that joy shall enter into those who rejoice, but those who rejoice, wholly, shall enter into the joy». He alludes to Matthew 25,21. — Immediately after, the Vatican [ed.], contrary to the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, [reads] totum for tantum.
  22. 22
    Plures antiquiorum codd. ut ACGOSTUX bb ee ff cum ed. 1, sensu eodem remanente, quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est.
    Several of the older manuscripts such as ACGOSTUX bb ee ff with ed. 1, the sense remaining the same, [read] quamvis capacitate habeat finitatem, necesse est (although it has finitude in capacity, it is necessary).
  23. 23
    Vat., quae habet affectus, emendatur ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
    The Vatican [ed.], which has affectus (affection), is emended from the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6.
  24. 24
    Ed. 1 hic addit Deus, quod certe subaudiendum est.
    Ed. 1 here adds Deus (God), which certainly must be understood.
  25. 25
    Subaudi cum cod. R virtutes. Mox plures antiquiores codd. ut ACFGKLORSUYZ ee post pulcritudinem loco qua habent quia.
    Understand with cod. R virtutes (virtues). Soon after, several of the older manuscripts such as ACFGKLORSUYZ ee, after pulcritudinem, have quia in place of qua.
  26. 26
    August., XIX. de Civ. Dei, c. 25: Virtutes, cum ad se ipsas referuntur nec propter aliud expetuntur, etiam tunc inflatae ac superbae sunt.
    Augustine, On the City of God XIX, c. 25: The virtues, when they are referred to themselves and not sought on account of something else, even then are inflated and proud.
  27. 27
    Lapsum librariorum Vat. ponentium ipsa pro ipsam correximus ope mss. et ed. 1.
    A scribal slip of the Vatican [editors], who place ipsa for ipsam, we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts and ed. 1.
Cited by

15 places in the Opera Omnia citethis question. Derived from Quaracchi’s own apparatus, never tagged by hand.

Whether the divine essence is infinite
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 43
supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Whether God alone is unchangeable
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8
supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Whether free choice is in those alone that have reason and will
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 25
pag. 40, nota 3
What is that end from whose goodness the will is good, and to which our wills ought to be referred so that they may be right
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 38 · 2×
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2
Whether the demons can slip into souls.
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 8
I Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Whether the divine nature could be united with human nature
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 1
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2
Whether Christ had any other knowledge besides that which he had in the Word
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 14
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Whether gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 28
pag. 40, nota 5
Whether charity in loving sets God before us
Book III: On the Incarnation of the Word · Distinction 29
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Doubts concerning the text of the Master (Dist. XVI, Part I)
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 16
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
Whether matrimony is in the genus of the useful or of the honorable
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 31
tom. I. pag. 40, nota 5
In what way beatitude is desirable
Book IV: On the Sacraments · Distinction 49
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
On the gift of wisdom
Collationes de septem donis Spiritus Sancti · Collatio IX: De dono sapientiae · 2×
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.
On virginal holiness
Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica · Quaestio III: De continentia
tom. I. pag. 40, nota 5
On the kingdom of God described in the gospel parables
Sermones selecti de rebus theologicis · Sermo II: De regno Dei descripto in parabolis evangelicis
I. Sent. d. 1. a. 3. q. 2.

5 further references address the article or printed page this question belongs to, rather than the question itself.

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