Dist. 1, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 1

Textus Latinus

English Translation

p. 42

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Dub. I.

In parte ista circa litteram quaeruntur plura, et primo de hoc quod dicit: Eorum vero quaedam sunt, quorum usus omnis est in significando, non in iustificando. Sed contra: Omnia Sacramenta sunt medicinae, quia secundum Hugonem de sancto Victore¹ Sacramenta omni tempore fuerunt medicinae; sed omnis medicina habet effectum in curando: ergo et Sacramenta similiter; sed ista curatio est iustificatio: ergo omni tempore Sacramenta habuerunt iustificare.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod dupliciter est considerare Sacramenta veteris Legis, scilicet in se sive ratione operis operati; et sic erant tantum ad significandum; vel ratione fidei annexae sive caritatis sive ratione operis operantis; et sic erant ad iustificandum Sacramenta legalia, praeter Circumci\[sionem\]².

Dub. II.

Omne igitur signum res est aliqua. Opponitur de ista divisione. Videtur enim Magister male dividere, quia superius non dividitur contra suum inferius; sed res est superius ad signum: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verum est, quod superius in sua generalitate acceptum non dividitur contra suum inferius; sed contractum³ bene potest dividi. Hic autem res⁴ contrahitur ad standum pro re non significante.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Magister: Non autem e converso omnis res signum. Videtur enim male dicere, quia signum est quod ducit in aliud cognoscendum; sed omnis res ducit in aliud, quia omnis res est causa, vel effectus. Causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus⁵ et e converso. Si dicas, quod non omne, quod ducit, est signum, sed quod ducit in prius; tunc omnis creatura est signum, cum ducat in Deum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod duplex est signum, scilicet naturale et institutum. De primo non intenditur hic, sed de secundo; unde non valet obiectio ad propositum, quoniam hic⁶ intenditur de signo ex institutione, sicut sunt signa vocalia et sacramentalia.

Dub. IV.

Item videtur Magister male dicere in hoc quod dicit: Primum de rebus, postea de signis. Videtur enim dicere⁷ debuisse potius e converso, quia signum ducit in cognitionem rei: ergo prius esset agendum vel dicendum de signis quam de rebus.

p. 43Respondeo: Dicendum, quod prior est cognitio signi quam rei, respectu cuius est signum; sed non oportet, quod omnis rei. Unde ipse primo agit de rebus, quarum sacramenta non sunt signa.

Dub. V.

Item videtur, quod ista divisio rerum: Aliae sunt quibus fruendum etc., sit male assignata respectu divisi, quia divisum simplicius est dividentibus et dividentibus aliquid est⁸ commune; sed Deo nihil est simplicius nec est aliquid commune Deo et creaturae: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est divisio unius communis secundum nomen tantum; et sic est divisio aequivoci; est alia divisio communis secundum nomen et rem; et haec est divisio univoci; est etiam tertia medio modo; et ista est analogi, ubi non est communitas secundum unitatem naturae⁹, sed secundum similitudinem proportionis; et haec communitas est rationis.

Dub. VI.

Item videtur mala divisio quantum ad membra: videtur enim, quod tertium membrum sit superfluum. Omni enim re aut est utendum, aut fruendum: ergo tertium superfluit.

Item, sicut est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ita est res, qua fruendum est et utendum, ut Christus: ergo qua ratione ponitur¹⁰ tertium membrum, deberet poni quartum.

Respondeo: Omnis res, quae est natura aliqua, aut est finis; et sic est res, qua fruendum; aut deducens ad finem; et sic est res, qua utendum; aut ad finem perveniens; et sic est res, quae fruitur et utitur, ut homo: et sic accipiuntur membra. Et est ista divisio satis conveniens huic scientiae, quia cum theologia sit de Creatore et de creaturis, utile est, ut theologus doceat, quomodo homo per alias res tendat in Deum.

Dub. VII.

Item opponitur de hoc quod dicit: Res, quibus fruendum; quia si¹¹ tres sunt res per se et non per accidens, et a diversitate rerum est diversitas sive multiplicitas fruitionis: ergo sicut sunt tres res, sic erunt tres fruitiones.

Item, tres articuli sunt, quia¹² de tribus personis: ergo a simili et tres fruitiones.

Respondeo: Quod res accipitur hic communiter ad essentiam et personam propter sui generalitatem; et quia sumtum¹³ est hoc vocabulum res ab actu animae, ideo tres dicuntur res, quia tres personae, sed tamen una res, quia una bonitas est in eis. Quia ergo una bonitas, ideo et una fruitio, quamvis tres res. — Et quoniam articulus dicit quid a parte animae distinguentis, scilicet intellectus, et fruitio respicit ipsam¹⁴ divinam essentiam et bonitatem et unionem affectus communiter, ideo fruitio est una.

Dub. VIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: Omnis, qui fruitur, utitur; quia videtur falsum, quoniam stulti¹⁵ homines similiter et bestiae fruuntur, quia propter se delectantur in delectabili, sed non utuntur. Si dicas, quod dicitur translative; quare non similiter transfertur verbum utendi?

Respondeo: Uti importat libertatem in sua generali acceptione, in speciali importat libertatem cum relatione ad aliud; frui importat libertatem cum delectatione; et licet nec libertas nec collatio¹⁶ conveniat brutis, convenit eis tamen delectatio. Ideo uti nullo modo convenit brutis; frui autem convenit eis aliquo modo, licet improprie¹⁷.

Dub. IX.

Item videtur male dicere, quod in homine spes ponenda non est, quia¹⁸ de beata Virgine cantatur Vita, dulcedo et spes ab Ecclesia, quae non errat.

p. 44Item, Ionae primo¹⁹: Accessit ad eum gubernator; Glossa: « Naturale est homini magis de aliis quam de se in periculis confidere ».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sperare de aliquo est dupliciter, aut sicut de adiutore, aut sicut de salvatore. Prima spes potest esse in homine, secunda non. — Vel est sperare finale praemium; et hoc debet esse tantum in Deo; vel temporale beneficium; et hoc potest esse in homine. Primum si ponitur²⁰ in homine, meretur maledictionem, secundum non.

Dub. X.

Item quaeritur, quare dicit de homine: Itaque frater, ego fruar te in Domino, magis quam de asino vel de alia creatura, cum in omnibus creaturis reluceat vestigium divinae bonitatis.

Respondeo: Quod dicatur²¹ aliquis aliquo frui in Deo, non facit repraesentatio, sed magis inhabitatio. Unde conversa est propria, videlicet haec: Ego fruar Domino in te, dum per opera sciam, Deum habitare in te; et est figurativa locutio.

Dub. XI.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Augustini, qua solvit auctoritatem praedictam per illam determinationem in Domino. Sed Ecclesiastici octavo²² simpliciter dicitur: Fruere magnatis. Item, Deuteronomii vigesimo octavo²³: Filios generabis et filias, et non frueris eis; ex hoc implicat, quod, si non peccarent, fruerentur.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta solutio non est generalis, sed solum ad propositam auctoritatem. Et ideo recurrendum est ad solutionem praedictam extra litteram in quaestionibus²⁴, quod, cum frui accipiatur communiter et proprie, in praedictis locutionibus accipitur communiter tantum.

Dub. XII.

Item non videtur valere quod dicit Magister: Si enim nec fruitur, nec utitur etc., quia Deus diligit se, non tamen utitur, quia non diligit se propter aliud; nec fruitur, quia ubi fruitio, ibi est inhaerentia et indigentia, ut dicit Augustinus²⁵; Deus autem utroque caret etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod fruitio de sui generali ratione dicit amoris unionem, scilicet fruibilis cum fruente. Quoniam igitur contingit aliquid uniri sibi et alii, contingit non tantum frui alio, sed etiam se ipso; sed ubi est unio ad alterum, ibi est dependentia, inhaerentia et indigentia; ubi vero ad se ipsum, si ipsum est summum bonum, ibi²⁶ non est inhaerentia nec dependentia vel indigentia, sed omnimoda sufficientia. Si vero ipsum bonum deficiens est, indiget; et inde est, quod solus Deus se ipso perfecte fruitur, nihil autem aliud ab ipso potest perfecte se ipso frui. Solus enim Deus est summum bonum et diligit se fruendo se, diligit etiam alia fruendo se: et ita nec fruitio Dei nec usus est cum indigentia, sicut nostra fruitio et usus.

Dub. XIII.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: Quia bonus est, sumus: ergo quia ab aeterno bonus est, ab aeterno sumus.

Respondeo: Dicendum breviter, quod hoc est, quia bonus dicit causam²⁷. Sed est causa naturalis et necessaria, et causa voluntaria. Bonitas autem divina est causa nostri esse et boni esse per modum voluntatis, non naturae; haec autem causa non ponit effectum statim, cum est.

Dub. XIV.

Item, adhuc obiicitur, quare similiter non sequitur: quia iustus est, iusti sumus²⁸? Si dicas, quod iustitia non est eius dispositio in quantum causa; contra: sapientia est dispositio Dei in quantum causa: ergo pari ratione, quia sapiens est, sapientes sumus. Si tu dicas, quod non est dispositio immediata, sicut bonitas; obiicitur de voluntate, quae est immediatissima, et tamen non sequitur: quia volens est, volentes sumus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ratio huius consequentiae triplex est. Una est, quia bonitas est conditio causae in quantum causa; secunda est, quia p. 45est proxima ad actum²⁹; tertia, quia dispositio generalis, in qua consistit vestigii ratio; dicit enim respectum ad finem. Unde sicut Deus unus imprimit unitatem, ita bonus bonitatem.

Dub. XV.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicitur: Ut scilicet ametur propter se ipsam tantum, quia sicut per se ad per accidens, ita propter se ad propter aliud. Sed nihil, quod convenit alicui per accidens, convenit per se: ergo nihil, quod convenit alicui propter aliud, convenit propter se. Si ergo virtutes sunt appetendae propter aliud, non ergo propter se.

Respondeo: Sicut dicit Philosophus³⁰, « Idem est finis et propter quod ». Finis autem dupliciter est: uno modo finis ultimus, qui propriissime est finis, in quo est status; alio modo finis sub fine, qui³¹ dicitur proprie terminus. Sic et propter quod diversificatur; unde uno modo excludit finem, alio modo non, ut dicit Magister.

Quod ergo obiicitur de per se; dico, quod, sicut per se uno modo opponitur ei quod est per aliud — et sic idem est per se et secundum quod ipsum, sive primum universale³² — alio modo opponitur ei quod est per accidens: sic et propter se dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo opponitur ei quod est propter aliud, alio modo ei quod est per accidens, quia³³ ad illud accidentaliter ordinatur. Secundum hoc distinguit Magister propter se, et consequenter honestum sive fruibile, et ipsam denique fruitionem³⁴.

Dub. XVI.

Item obiicitur de hoc quod dicit: Et quaedam sunt res, per quas fruimur, ut virtutes. Videtur quod solis potentiis possit frui anima³⁵. Sine omni enim virtute potest frui bono creato; ergo cum magis sit fruibile bonum increatum, et anima magis ad hoc nata est, poterit eo frui solis potentiis.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod summum bonum est quod supra nos est; ad hoc ergo, quod illi uniamur, necessario intervenit duplex medium: medium unum, per quod anima nata est uniri alii a se diverso; et hoc est potentia; aliud speciale³⁶ supra hoc, quod ipsam sublevet; et hoc est virtus. Quod obiicitur non est simile, quia potentia per se potest deficere et inclinari, sed non per se elevari³⁷.

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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

Doubt I.

In this part, concerning the text, many things are asked, and first concerning what he says: "But of these certain are those whose whole use is in signifying, not in justifying." But on the contrary: All the Sacraments are medicines, because according to Hugh of St. Victor¹ the Sacraments were medicines at every time; but every medicine has its effect in curing: therefore the Sacraments likewise; but this curing is justification: therefore at every time the Sacraments had to justify.

I respond: It must be said that the Sacraments of the Old Law are to be considered in two ways, namely in themselves or by reason of the work-worked (opus operatum); and thus they were only for signifying; or by reason of attached faith or of charity or by reason of the work-working (opus operans); and thus the legal Sacraments were for justifying, except Circumci\[sion\]².

Doubt II.

"Therefore every sign is some thing." It is objected concerning this division. For the Master seems to divide badly, because a superior is not divided against its inferior; but thing is superior to sign: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that it is true that a superior, taken in its generality, is not divided against its inferior; but contracted³ it can well be divided. Here, however, thing⁴ is contracted to stand for a thing that does not signify.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what the Master says: "But not conversely is every thing a sign." For he seems to speak badly, because a sign is what leads to the knowing of another; but every thing leads to another, because every thing is a cause or an effect. Now the cause leads to the knowledge of the effect⁵ and conversely. If you say that not everything which leads is a sign, but what leads to something prior; then every creature is a sign, since it leads to God.

I respond: It must be said that there is a twofold sign, namely natural and instituted. The first is not intended here, but the second; whence the objection does not hold against the proposition, since here⁶ it is treated of the sign by institution, as are vocal and sacramental signs.

Doubt IV.

Likewise the Master seems to speak badly in this that he says: "First concerning things, afterwards concerning signs." For he seems⁷ rather to have ought to have said the converse, because the sign leads to the knowledge of the thing: therefore one should first treat or speak of signs rather than of things.

I respond: It must be said that the knowledge of the sign is prior to that of the thing in respect of which it is a sign; but it is not necessary that [it be so] of every thing. Hence he first treats of things of which the sacraments are not signs.

Doubt V.

Likewise it seems that this division of things, "Some are those by which one is to enjoy" etc., is badly assigned with respect to what is divided, because what is divided is simpler than the dividing members, and to the dividing members something is⁸ common; but nothing is simpler than God, nor is there anything common to God and creature: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that there is a division of one common thing according to name only; and this is the division of an equivocal; there is another division of what is common according to name and reality; and this is the division of a univocal; there is also a third in a middle way; and this is the division of the analogous, where there is not community according to unity of nature⁹, but according to likeness of proportion; and this community is one of reason (rationis).

Doubt VI.

Likewise the division seems bad as to its members: for it seems that the third member is superfluous. For of every thing one must either use or enjoy: therefore the third is superfluous.

Likewise, just as there is a thing which enjoys and uses, so there is a thing by which one is to enjoy and to use, as Christ: therefore by the same reasoning by which the third member is posited¹⁰, a fourth ought to be posited.

I respond: Every thing which is some nature is either an end; and thus it is a thing by which one is to enjoy; or leading to the end; and thus it is a thing by which one is to use; or arriving at the end; and thus it is a thing which enjoys and uses, as man: and so the members are taken. And this division is sufficiently fitting to this science, because, since theology is concerning the Creator and creatures, it is useful that the theologian teach how man tends to God through other things.

Doubt VII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: "Things by which one is to enjoy"; because if¹¹ there are three things per se and not by accident, and from the diversity of things comes the diversity or multiplicity of enjoyment: therefore as there are three things, so there will be three enjoyments.

Likewise, there are three articles, because¹² [they are] of three persons: therefore by similar reasoning, three enjoyments.

I respond: That thing is here taken commonly for both essence and person on account of its generality; and because¹³ this word thing is taken from an act of the soul, therefore three are called things, because three persons, but nevertheless one thing, because one goodness is in them. Therefore since there is one goodness, there is also one enjoyment, although three things. — And since article signifies something from the side of the distinguishing soul, namely the intellect, and enjoyment respects the¹⁴ divine essence and goodness and union of affection in common, therefore enjoyment is one.

Doubt VIII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: "Everyone who enjoys, uses"; because this seems false, since foolish¹⁵ men and likewise beasts enjoy, because for the sake of themselves they delight in what is delightful, but they do not use. If you say that it is said by transference, why is the word to use not similarly transferred?

I respond: To use (uti) imports liberty in its general acceptance; in its special [acceptance] it imports liberty with relation to another; to enjoy (frui) imports liberty with delight; and although neither liberty nor comparison¹⁶ (collatio) belongs to brutes, delight does belong to them. Therefore to use in no way belongs to brutes; to enjoy however belongs to them in some way, though improperly¹⁷.

Doubt IX.

Likewise [the Master] seems to speak badly, that hope is not to be placed in man, because¹⁸ of the Blessed Virgin is sung by the Church (which does not err) "Life, sweetness and hope."

Likewise, in Jonah, chapter one¹⁹: "The pilot approached him"; the Gloss: « It is natural for man to confide rather in others than in himself in dangers ».

I respond: It must be said that to hope concerning someone is twofold, either as concerning a helper, or as concerning a saviour. The first hope can be in man, the second cannot. — Or it is to hope for final reward; and this ought to be only in God; or temporal benefit; and this can be in man. The first, if placed²⁰ in man, deserves the curse, the second not.

Doubt X.

Likewise it is asked, why he says of man: "Therefore, brother, I shall enjoy thee in the Lord", rather than of an ass or of another creature, since in all creatures the vestige of divine goodness shines forth.

I respond: That someone be said²¹ to enjoy something in God is not due to representation, but rather to indwelling. Whence the converse is proper, namely this: "I shall enjoy the Lord in thee", when through deeds I know God to dwell in thee; and it is a figurative manner of speech.

Doubt XI.

Likewise it is asked concerning this solution of Augustine, by which he solves the aforesaid authority by that determination "in the Lord." But in Ecclesiasticus chapter eight²² it is said simply: "Enjoy a great man." Likewise, Deuteronomy chapter twenty-eight²³: "Thou shalt beget sons and daughters, and shalt not enjoy them"; from this it is implied that, if they did not sin, they would enjoy.

I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid solution is not general, but only to the proposed authority. And therefore one must have recourse to the solution aforesaid outside the text, in the questions²⁴, that, since frui is taken commonly and properly, in the aforesaid locutions it is taken commonly only.

Doubt XII.

Likewise what the Master says does not seem to hold: "For if [God] neither enjoys nor uses" etc., because God loves himself, yet does not use, because he does not love himself on account of another; nor does he enjoy, because where there is enjoyment, there is inherence and indigence, as Augustine says²⁵; but God lacks both etc.

I respond: It must be said that enjoyment in its general account signifies the union of love, namely of the enjoyable with the enjoyer. Therefore since it happens that something is united to itself and to another, it happens that one not only enjoys another, but also oneself; but where there is union to another, there is dependence, inherence and indigence; but where [there is union] to oneself, if that very self is the highest good, there²⁶ is no inherence nor dependence nor indigence, but every kind of sufficiency. But if the good itself is deficient, it has need; and hence it is that God alone perfectly enjoys himself, but nothing other than himself can perfectly enjoy itself. For God alone is the highest good and loves himself by enjoying himself, and loves other things also by enjoying himself: and thus neither God's enjoyment nor use is with indigence, as is our enjoyment and use.

Doubt XIII.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: "Because [God] is good, we are": therefore because he is good from eternity, we are from eternity.

I respond: It must be said briefly, that this is so because good signifies a cause²⁷. But there is a natural and necessary cause, and a voluntary cause. The divine goodness, however, is the cause of our being and well-being by way of will, not of nature; and this cause does not posit the effect immediately, when it is.

Doubt XIV.

Likewise, it is further objected: why does it not follow similarly: because he is just, we are just²⁸? If you say that justice is not his disposition insofar as he is cause; on the contrary: wisdom is the disposition of God insofar as he is cause: therefore by parity of reasoning, because he is wise, we are wise. If you say that it is not an immediate disposition, like goodness; it is objected concerning the will, which is most immediate, and yet it does not follow: because he is willing, we are willing.

I respond: It must be said that the reason of this consequence is threefold. One is that goodness is a condition of cause as cause; the second is that

it is proximate to act²⁹; the third, that it is a general disposition, in which consists the account of vestige; for it bespeaks respect to the end. Whence just as the one God impresses unity, so the good [God impresses] goodness.

Doubt XV.

Likewise it is objected against this that is said: "That it may be loved on account of itself alone," because as per se is to per accidens, so for its own sake is to for the sake of another. But nothing which belongs to something per accidens belongs to it per se: therefore nothing which belongs to something for the sake of another belongs for its own sake. If therefore the virtues are to be sought for the sake of another, therefore not for their own sake.

I respond: As the Philosopher says³⁰, « The end and that for the sake of which are the same ». Now the end is twofold: in one way the ultimate end, which most properly is the end, in which there is rest; in another way the end under the end, which³¹ is properly called the terminus. So also that for the sake of which is diversified; whence in one way it excludes the [ultimate] end, in another way not, as the Master says.

As to what is objected concerning per se; I say that, just as per se is in one way opposed to that which is per aliud — and thus per se and insofar as it is itself (secundum quod ipsum), or first universal³², are the same — in another way it is opposed to that which is per accidens: so also for its own sake (propter se) is taken in two ways. In one way it is opposed to that which is for the sake of another, in another way to that which is per accidens, because³³ [the latter] is ordered to that [end] accidentally. According to this the Master distinguishes for its own sake, and consequently the honourable or enjoyable, and finally enjoyment itself³⁴.

Doubt XVI.

Likewise it is objected against this that he says: "And certain are things through which we enjoy, as the virtues." It seems that the soul can enjoy by the powers alone³⁵. For without any virtue it can enjoy a created good; therefore since the uncreated good is more enjoyable, and the soul is more born for this, it will be able to enjoy it by the powers alone.

I respond: It must be said that the highest good is that which is above us; for the soul to be united to it, therefore, a twofold medium necessarily intervenes: one medium, through which the soul is born to be united to another different from itself; and this is the power (potentia); another, a special³⁶ [medium] above this, which raises it up; and this is virtue. What is objected is not similar, because the power per se can fail and be inclined [downward], but cannot per se be elevated³⁷.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Libr. I. de Sacram. p. 8. c. 12. (ed. Paris. 1526): Si quis igitur quaerat tempus institutionis Sacramentorum, sciat, quia quamdiu morbus est, tempus medicinae est.
Book I On the Sacraments, part 8, c. 12 (Paris ed., 1526): "If anyone therefore asks the time of the institution of the Sacraments, let him know that, as long as there is disease, it is the time of medicine."
2
Cod. Z addit: supple, quae non tantum erat ad significandum ratione operis operati, sed ad iustificandum.
Codex Z adds: "supply, [the Circumcision] which was not only for signifying by reason of the work-worked, but for justifying."
3
Hoc est, si genus per differentiam ad speciem contrahitur.
That is, if a genus is contracted through a difference to a species.
4
Codd. LO satis bene: Sic est hic, et res contrahitur.
Codices L and O quite well: "So it is here, and the [term] thing is contracted."
5
Plures codd. ut ACLORTWX etc. indebite omittunt: causa autem ducit in cognitionem effectus.
Several codices such as A, C, L, O, R, T, W, X etc. improperly omit: "now the cause leads to the knowledge of the effect."
6
Contradicentibus codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, perperam Vat. loco hic habet hoc et post sacramentalia superflue addit tale ergo signum non est omnis res; licet omnis res sit signum primo modo.
Against the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, the Vatican edition wrongly has hoc in place of hic, and after sacramentalia superfluously adds "such a sign therefore is not every thing; although every thing is a sign in the first way."
7
Multi codd. ut ACFGKLOUWX etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 dixisse.
Many codices such as A, C, F, G, K, L, O, U, W, X etc. together with editions 1, 2, 3, 6 [read] dixisse [for dicere].
8
Praeferimus lectionem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 lectioni Vat. divisum debet esse loco aliquid est, utpote subnexis conformiorem.
We prefer the reading of the manuscripts and of editions 1, 2, 3 to the Vatican reading divisum debet esse in place of aliquid est, as more conformable to what follows.
9
Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1, 2, 3 emendavimus interpolationem Vat.: est tertia medio modo, et ista est analogi, sicut ista est, ubi non est communitas creaturae et Creatori secundum naturae participationem, sed. Deinde in fine responsionis codd. D I X Y ee addunt et per hoc patet responsio, quia obiectio procedit de divisione univoci; haec autem divisio est analogi. Placet haec additio, utpote continens applicationem principii. Cfr. supra a. 3. q. 1. ad 1.
From nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3 we have emended the Vatican interpolation: "there is a third in a middle way, and this is of the analogous, as this is the [one], where there is no community of creature and Creator according to participation of nature, but." Then at the end of the response codices D, I, X, Y, ee add "and through this the response is clear, because the objection proceeds from the division of the univocal; but this division is of the analogous." This addition is pleasing, as containing an application of the principle. Cf. above a. 3, q. 1, ad 1.
10
Refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, habet Vat. ponit. Cod. dd omittit ut Christus et deinde legit ergo tertium superfluit, vel qua ratione.
Against the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican has ponit. Codex dd omits ut Christus and then reads "therefore the third is superfluous, or by what reason."
11
Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 si. Paulo post cod. R ad diversitatem loco a diversitate.
We have supplied si from the manuscripts and edition 1. A little after, codex R has ad diversitatem in place of a diversitate.
12
Contra codd. omittit Vat. quia.
Against the codices, the Vatican omits quia.
13
Vat. contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 assumtum et paulo infra post tamen addit aeque bene.
The Vatican, against the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, has assumtum, and a little below after tamen adds aeque bene.
14
Fide fere omnium codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 suffecimus ipsam et paulo infra pro effectus posuimus affectus.
On the faith of nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, 3 we have substituted ipsam, and a little below for effectus we have placed affectus.
15
Codd. inter se non conveniunt; nam alii, ut ACGKLORSUVWX etc. cum ed. 1 loco stulti ponunt multi, qui et dein fere omnes omittunt similiter et bestiae, dum e contra alii ut FH (T a secunda manu correctus), omissis verbis stulti homines similiter et, retinent bestiae, (codd. H T bruta); edd. 4, 5, 6 loco multi habent mali. Verba Augustini, in quibus obiectio fundatur, sunt: Et frui quidem cibo et qualibet corporali voluptate non adeo absurde existimantur et bestiae; uti autem aliqua re non potest nisi animal, quod rationis est particeps. Scire namque, quo quidque referendum sit, non datum est rationis expertibus, sed neque ipsis rationalibus stultis (83. Qq. q. 30.).
The codices do not agree among themselves; for some, as A, C, G, K, L, O, R, S, U, V, W, X etc. with edition 1, in place of stulti put multi, and then nearly all omit similiter et bestiae; while on the contrary others, as F, H (T corrected by a second hand), omitting the words stulti homines similiter et, retain bestiae (codices H, T have bruta); editions 4, 5, 6 in place of multi have mali. The words of Augustine on which the objection is founded are: "And indeed beasts also are not absurdly thought to enjoy food and any bodily pleasure; but to use any thing belongs only to an animal which is partaker of reason. For to know to what each thing is to be referred is not given to those without reason, nor even to rational fools themselves" (83 Questions, q. 30).
16
Substituimus ex plurimis mss. ut ACFGHIKOSTUVWXZ etc. et ed. 1 collatio pro relatio; cod. R legit delectio. Paulo supra cod. O post relatione addit vel collatione.
We have substituted collatio for relatio on the basis of very many manuscripts, such as A, C, F, G, H, I, K, O, S, T, U, V, W, X, Z etc., and edition 1; codex R reads delectio. A little above, codex O after relatione adds vel collatione.
17
Cfr. August. loc. cit.; insuper B. Albert., hic a. 17. ad 2. — Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. et S. I. II. q. 11. a. 2. — Scot., hic q. 5. — Richard., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3.
Cf. Augustine, loc. cit.; further, Bl. Albert, here a. 17, ad 2. — Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and Summa Theol. I-II, q. 11, a. 2. — Scotus, here q. 5. — Richard, here a. 2, q. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 3.
18
Ope codd. et ed. 1 expunximus particulam et, quam Vat. ponit post quia.
By the aid of the codices and edition 1 we have expunged the particle et, which the Vatican places after quia.
19
Vers. 6. Textus Glossae interlinearis apud Lyranum est: Naturale est, unumquemque in suo periculo plus de alio quam de se sperare.
Verse 6. The text of the interlinear Gloss in Lyranus is: "It is natural that everyone in his own danger hopes more in another than in himself."
20
Vat. contra multos codd. ut AFGKTWX etc. et sex primas edd. ponatur.
The Vatican, against many codices such as A, F, G, K, T, W, X etc. and the first six editions, [has] ponatur.
21
Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 dicitur. Paulo infra Vat. contra codd. CISTVWXZ etc. et ed. 1 post conversa supervacanee addit per consequens.
The Vatican, against the manuscripts and edition 1, [has] dicitur. A little below, the Vatican, against codices C, I, S, T, V, W, X, Z etc. and edition 1, after conversa superfluously adds per consequens.
22
Vers. 10. Ita codd. et ed. 1 ac Hugo de S. Charo in hunc locum; Vulgata vero serire magnatis; Vat. autem citando Ecclesiasten 7, 15. legit fruere bonis.
Verse 10. Thus the codices and edition 1, and Hugh of St. Cher on this passage; but the Vulgate [has] serire magnatis ("to serve the great"); the Vatican, however, citing Ecclesiastes 7:15, reads fruere bonis.
23
Vers. 41. — Mox post fruerentur in Vat. additur eis.
Verse 41. — Shortly after, after fruerentur in the Vatican is added eis.
24
Hic, a. 2. q. 1. in corp. — Deinde Vat. praeter fidem omnium codd. et sex primarum edd. post quod omittit cum et post praedictis contra antiquiores mss. loco locutionibus ponit auctoritatibus.
Here, a. 2, q. 1, in the body. — Then the Vatican, against the faith of all the codices and the first six editions, after quod omits cum, and after praedictis, against the older manuscripts, in place of locutionibus places auctoritatibus.
25
Libr. I. de Doctr. christ. c. 31. n. 34: Sed si fruitur, eget bono nostro, quod nemo sanus dixerit. — Ex antiquioribus codd. cum ed. 1 post ibi adiecimus est.
Book I On Christian Doctrine, c. 31, n. 34: "But if [God] enjoys, he has need of our good, which no sane person would say." — From the older codices with edition 1 we have added est after ibi.
26
Auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus ibi. Paulo infra cod. dd post dependentia habet nec pro vel.
On the authority of the codices and edition 1 we have supplied ibi. A little below, codex dd after dependentia has nec in place of vel.
27
Vat. quod hoc quia bonus est dicit causam, sed secuti sumus auctoritatem mss. et ed. 1. Mox lectio Vat. minus recta sed est aliqua causa naturalis etiam necessaria et est aliqua causa voluntaria castigatur ex codd. et ed. 1. Paulo infra Vat. post naturae, contradicentibus mss. et ed. 1, addit et necessitatis.
The Vatican [has] quod hoc quia bonus est dicit causam, but we have followed the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1. Shortly the less correct Vatican reading sed est aliqua causa naturalis etiam necessaria et est aliqua causa voluntaria is corrected from the codices and edition 1. A little below the Vatican after naturae, against the manuscripts and edition 1, adds et necessitatis.
28
Ope mss. et ed. 1 expunximus verba, quae Vat. hic addit sicut quia bonus est, boni sumus.
By the aid of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the words which the Vatican here adds: "as because he is good, we are good."
29
Absque ulla auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 hic Vat. addit: quae cum bonum sit sui communicativum, de sui ratione importat communicabilitatem, importat etiam voluntatem, quae duo ponunt effectum in actu. Paulo ante, obnitentibus mss. et ed. 1, ponit Vat. dispositio pro conditio et paulo infra post dicit omittit enim. — Hoc et praecedens dubium fuse ab Alex. Hal. explicantur S. 1. q. 17. m. 9. — De ratione vestigii cfr. infra d. 3. p. 1. q. 2. in fine et ibidem dub. 6.
Without any authority of the codices or edition 1, the Vatican here adds: "which since good is self-communicative, by its account imports communicability, and also imports will, which two place the effect into act." A little before, against the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican places dispositio for conditio, and a little below after dicit omits enim. — This and the preceding doubt are extensively explained by Alex. of Hales, Summa 1, q. 17, m. 9. — On the account of vestige cf. below d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, at the end, and there dub. 6.
30
Libr. II. Phys. text. 29. (c. 3.), ubi iuxta ed. Venet. 1489: Dicitur etiam (causa) secundum finem intentum, et hoc est illud propter quod.
Book II Physics, text 29 (c. 3), where according to the Venice ed. of 1489: "A cause is also said according to the intended end, and this is that for the sake of which."
31
Vat. cum pluribus codd. F G K etc. et pro qui.
The Vatican with several codices F, G, K etc. [has] et in place of qui.
32
Propositio haec, ex Aristot., I. Poster. text. 11. (c. 4.) sumta, iuxta antiquam versionem (ed. Venet. apud Octavianum Scotum, 1538) sic exhibetur: « Per se autem et secundum quod ipsum, idem, ut per se lineae inest punctus et rectum: etenim secundum quod linea ». Et paulo ante: « Universale autem dico, quod utique et de omni sit et per se et secundum quod ipsum… Universale tale est tunc, quando in quolibet et primo monstretur ». — S. Thomas in Commentario ad hunc locum observat, quod hic « universale non hoc modo accipitur, prout omne quod praedicatur de pluribus dicitur universale, secundum quod Porphyrius determinat de quinque universalibus; sed dicitur hic universale secundum quandam adaptationem vel adaequationem praedicati ad subiectum, cum scilicet neque praedicatum invenitur extra subiectum neque subiectum sine praedicato… Primo dicit, quod universale, scilicet praedicatum, est etiam quod de omni est, id est, universaliter praedicatur de subiecto; et etiam per se, scilicet inest ei, convenit subiecto, secundum quod ipsum subiectum est. Multa enim de aliquibus praedicantur universaliter, quae non conveniunt ei per se et secundum quod ipsum est. Sicut omnis lapis coloratus est, non tamen secundum quod lapis, sed secundum quod ipsum est superficiem habens » (ed. Parmae 1865). — Vocatur illud primum universale, quando universale praedicatum non solum in quolibet est, de quo praedicatur, sed et primo demonstratur inesse ei, de quo praedicatur; sic, ut in exemplo ab Aristotele persistemus, habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis non convenit primo isosceli, sed triangulo (quia isosceli convenit in quantum triangulus est), adeoque et primum universale trianguli, non isoscelis est. Plura videsis apud S. Thomam loc. cit. et Scot. in I. Poster. q. 15-39. — Ad normam ed. operum Aristot. et codd. nec non ed. 1 substituimus in propositione praedicta post per se particulam et pro quod.
This proposition, taken from Aristotle, I Posterior [Analytics], text 11 (c. 4), according to the old version (Venice ed., Octavianus Scotus, 1538) is given thus: « Per se and insofar as it is itself are the same, as per se the point and the straight belong to a line: for [they belong to it] insofar as it is a line ». And a little before: « By universal I mean that which is at once of every [instance] and per se and insofar as it is itself… A universal is such then, when in any [instance] and first it is demonstrated [to belong] ». — St. Thomas in his Commentary on this passage observes that here « universal is not taken in this way, as everything which is predicated of many is called universal, according to which Porphyry determines the five universals; but here universal is said according to a certain adaptation or adequation of predicate to subject, when, namely, neither the predicate is found outside the subject nor the subject without the predicate… First he says that universal, namely the predicate, is also that which is of every [instance], that is, is predicated universally of the subject; and also per se, namely is in it, belongs to the subject insofar as the subject itself is. For many things are predicated of some [subjects] universally which do not belong to it per se and insofar as it is itself. As every stone is coloured, yet not insofar as it is stone, but insofar as it has a surface » (ed. Parma 1865). — That is called first universal, when the universal predicate not only is in every [instance] of which it is predicated, but is first demonstrated to be in that of which it is predicated; thus, to persist in the example from Aristotle, to have three angles equal to two right angles does not belong first to the isosceles, but to the triangle (because it belongs to the isosceles insofar as it is a triangle), and so the first universal of triangle, not of isosceles, it is. See more in St. Thomas loc. cit. and Scotus in I Posterior [Analytics], q. 15-39. — To the norm of the editions of Aristotle's works and of the codices, and also of edition 1, we have substituted in the aforesaid proposition after per se the particle et in place of quod.
33
Praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. hic Vat. addit aliud.
Against the faith of the manuscripts and the first six editions, the Vatican here adds aliud.
34
In solutione huius dubii concordat Richard., hic a. 2. q. 3. ad 1.
In the solution of this doubt Richard agrees, here a. 2, q. 3, ad 1.
35
Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus verba hic a Vat. adiecta sine omni virtute, utpote quae iam satis indicantur particula exclusiva solis.
On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted the words here added by the Vatican sine omni virtute, as being already sufficiently indicated by the exclusive particle solis.
36
Additur hic a Vat. vel spirituale, quod deest in fere omnibus codd. et ed. 1; pauci codd., ut H U W cc loco speciale ponunt minus recte spirituale. Paulo ante cod. R pro intervenit habet concurrit, et cod. X loco unum satis bene legit generale.
Here the Vatican adds vel spirituale, which is lacking in nearly all the codices and edition 1; a few codices, as H, U, W, cc, in place of speciale place, less correctly, spirituale. A little before, codex R for intervenit has concurrit, and codex X in place of unum quite well reads generale.
37
Quo sensu virtutibus sit fruendum, vide supra a. 3. q. 2. et II. Sent. d. 18. a. 1. q. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 21. — Aegid. R., hic l. princ. q. 2.
In what sense the virtues are to be enjoyed, see above a. 3, q. 2, and II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 21. — Giles of Rome, here book [I], at the beginning, q. 2.