Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; each entry pairs La. (Latin) with En. (English).

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primum de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus est amor Patris sive caritas sive dilectio. Quaeritur ergo, utrum caritas et dilectio differant; et quod sic, videtur per Isidorum¹ dicentem: Amor est rationalium et irrationalium, dilectio rationalium tantum. Sed contra: Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus, capite quarto²: « Mihi videntur Theologi commune quid dicere dilectionis et amoris nomine »: et ibidem³ reprehendit distinguentes dicens, quod faciunt vim in levibus sonis, quasi nos non possimus quatuor per bis duo, et patriam per natale solum significare.

Respondeo: Aliqui voluerunt dicere, quod differunt, quia dilectio dicitur illa proprie, quae est ex voluntate ordinata, sed amor est affectio libidinosa. Sed haec distinctio est contra Dionysium⁴ et contra Augustinum super Ioannem⁵ et contra canonem sacrae Scripturae, quia Dominus primo quaesivit a Petro: Simon Ioannis, diligis me? et postea dixit: amas me? et ita pro eodem accipiuntur: et hanc differentiam⁶ reprehendit Dionysius.

Potest tamen nihilominus aliqua differentia assignari. Quamvis enim de una et eadem possint dici affectione, tamen alia et alia ratione. Amor enim dicit affectus adhaesionem respectu amati; unde Dionysius⁷: « Amorem unitivum dicimus ». Dilectio vero ultra hoc addit electionem: unde dilectio ex diversis electio: unde Canticorum quinto⁸: Dilectus meus electus ex millibus. Caritas autem ultra illa addit magnam appretiationem. Carum enim dicitur illud quod magni pretii aestimatur, secundum quod Apostolus in epistolis suis vocat fideles carissimos, primae ad Corinthios quarto⁹.

Dub. II.

Item dubitatur de hoc quod dicit: Proprie Verbum Dei etiam Dei sapientia dicitur; quia aut accipitur proprie, quia soli convenit, aut proprie, quia appropriate: quia si soli, hoc falsum est, quia sapientia nullo modo dicit proprietatem personalem; si proprie, quia appropriate, hoc nihil facit ad propositum, quia Magister vult inquirere proprietatem Spiritus sancti, non appropriatum. Et iterum, caritas videtur magis appropriari Patri, secundum quod dicitur in illa prosa, « caritas Pater est »¹⁰: Item, hoc videtur per Richardum¹¹, quia « amor gratuitus est in Patre, in Spiritu sancto debitus, in Filio ex utroque permixtus »: ergo cum caritas dicat amorem gratuitum, debet ergo appropriari Patri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod non est omnimoda similitudo¹², sed in hoc est similitudo: nam commune potest appropriari, manente unitate vocis vel significationis. Potest similiter aliquod nomen simul dici per proprietatem et per essentiam, manente unitate vocis et significationis, et tamen est de se commune; et tale est hoc nomen caritas.

Aliter potest dici, quod caritas est commune et proprium et appropriatum; et Augustinus¹³ primo ostendit, quod est appropriatum per similitudinem ad sapientiam, et post ostendit, quod est vere¹⁴ proprium, infra: Nunc, quod incepimus ostendere etc. Unde ex hac auctoritate non habetur, quod caritas sit proprium, sed solum quod appropriatum. Sed tamen ex aliis verbis Augustini habetur, quod caritas non solum est appropriatum, sed etiam proprie proprium Spiritus sancti.

Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod caritas appropriatur Patri: dicendum, quod caritas habet duplicem

comparationem ad virtutes alias. Comparatur enim ut mater, ut dicit Ambrosius¹⁵, comparatur ut vinculum, ut dicit Apostolus ad Colossenses tertio¹⁶: Caritas est vinculum perfectionis. Ratione primi appropriatur Patri, ratione secundi Spiritui sancto.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de Richardo, dicendum, quod gratuitum non dicit proprietatem amoris sive amandi, sed proprietatem personae, quae dat et non recipit.

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod Spiritus sanctus est dilectio, qua Pater et Filius se invicem et nos diligunt. Quaeritur, utrum Pater et Filius diligant nos Spiritu sancto. Utrum enim diligant se Spiritu sancto, quaeretur¹⁷ distinctione trigesima secunda, ubi istam quaestionem specialiter movet. Sed prima videtur omnino falsa et impropria. Cum enim dicitur: Pater et Filius diligunt nos etc., constat quod verbum diligendi tenetur essentialiter; ergo si diligant¹⁸ Spiritu sancto, sunt Spiritus sanctus. Et iterum, dicit Augustinus¹⁹, quod haec nullo modo conceditur: Pater diligit se Spiritu sancto, quia diligere tenetur essentialiter: ergo similiter in proposito.

Respondeo: Quidam dicunt, quod ablativus ille exponitur per hanc praepositionem per cum accusativo, id est per Spiritum sanctum; et regula²⁰ est, quod haec praepositio per cum verbis transitivis dicit subauctoritatem, cum absolutis vero auctoritatem. Unde cum diligere sit transitivum, sensus est, quod Pater et Filius diligunt nos per Spiritum sanctum, quasi diceret: Pater operatur per Filium. — Sed haec expositio non videtur conveniens, quia similiter posset²¹ dici: Pater et Filius puniunt sive odiunt nos Spiritu sancto; quod non vult dicere Augustinus.

Propterea notandum, quod diligere aliquando tenetur pure essentialiter, ut cum dicitur: Pater diligit se²²; aliquando pure notionaliter, ut cum dicitur: Pater et Filius diligunt se Spiritu sancto, sicut patebit²³; aliquando partim essentialiter, partim notionaliter, sicut cum dicitur: diligunt nos Spiritu sancto; et hoc²⁴ patet, quia idem est Patrem et Filium diligere nos Spiritu sancto, quod Spiritum sanctum nobis mittere sive inspirare. Mittere autem sive inspirare importat actum notionalem et essentialem, quia sensus est, quod Spiritum producunt et donum eius nobis conferunt; unde dicit simul Spiritus sancti productionem et gratiae collationem. Et quamvis respectu actus essentialis non recipiatur habitudo ablativi, recipitur tamen ratione notionis, sicut et hic: Pater dicit se suo Verbo, dicit etiam creaturas Verbo; simili modo intelligendum est in proposito.

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sive enim sit unitas amborum sive sanctitas; quid dicatur per hoc nomen unitas; quia aut unitas dicit unitatem essentialem, aut notionalem, aut personalem. Non essentialem, quia tunc non esset amborum, sed trium; non notionalem, quia Spiritus sanctus non est communis spiratio; non personalem, quia Pater et Filius non sunt unum in persona. Item quaeritur, quo modo haec²⁵ distinguantur, unitas, sanctitas, caritas.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod unitas personaliter tenetur. Sed attendendum, quod unitas aliquorum dicitur dupliciter: aut qua aliqui sunt unum, et sic Patris et Filii non est unitas personalis; aut qua aliqui sunt uniti, et sic Pater et Filius unica persona uniuntur, sicut persona Spiritus sancti, quae est amor et vinculum nectens.

Ad illud quod quaeritur, quomodo differunt illa tria; dicendum, quod unum²⁶ addit supra alterum. Nam unitas dicit conditionem omnis amoris, quoniam omnis amor est vis unitiva; sanctitas dicit conditionem amoris casti contra libidinosum, qui non est purus; caritas dicit conditionem amoris praecipui: ideo enim caritas dicitur, quia est amor inaestimabiliter habens carum amatum.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si uterque non participatione, sed essentia sua... servantes unitatem spiritus. Videtur enim non bene dicere, quia servare unitatem spiritus est producere Spiritum sanctum: ergo secundum hoc Pater et Filius sua essentia Spiritum sanctum producunt, et ita videtur

essentia²⁷ spirare. Item videtur etiam falsum quod dicitur, non participatione, quia Pater et Filius participatione spirationis²⁸ servant unitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus²⁹ vult ostendere, duplicem modum unitatis esse inter Patrem et Filium, qui est inter membra Christi, scilicet naturae et voluntatis; sed differenter, quia in nobis est unitas naturae per participationem unius communis essentiae, sed non sumus ipsa essentia³⁰. Pater vero et Filius non participant essentiam quasi diversum, immo sunt ipsa essentia. Similiter in nobis est conformitas voluntatis per donum Dei, quod unit nos; sed Pater et Filius uniuntur non dono accepto ab alio, sed Spiritu proprio; et sic patet responsio³¹.

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de ratione Augustini: Quia enim communis est ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprie, quod ambo communiter; ergo secundum hoc pari ratione Spiritus sanctus dicitur Deus proprie, cum Deus sit commune ambobus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aequivocatio est in communitate. Nam Augustinus non vocat commune quod est in pluribus et de pluribus, sed quod a pluribus; et ita commune dicitur magis a communione, quam a communitate, ut fiat vis in verbo, sicut fit inter unionem et unitatem. Et quoniam caritas non tantum dicit communitatem, quia in pluribus, sed communionem per unitatem³² distinctorum: ideo quamvis dicatur essentialiter, potest tamen nihilominus dici personaliter.

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Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, namely that the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father, or charity, or love (dilection). It is asked therefore whether caritas and dilectio differ; and that they do is seen through Isidore¹, who says: Amor belongs to rational and irrational beings, dilectio to rational beings only. But on the contrary: Dionysius, On the Divine Names, chapter four²: « To me the theologians seem to say something common under the name of dilectio and amor »: and in the same place³ he rebukes those who distinguish, saying that they make much of light sounds, as though we could not signify four through twice two, and fatherland through native soil.

I respond: Some have wished to say that they differ, because dilectio is properly said of that which is from an ordered will, but amor is a libidinous affection. But this distinction is against Dionysius⁴ and against Augustine on John⁵ and against the canon of sacred Scripture, since the Lord first asked Peter: Simon son of John, do you love (diligis) me? and afterwards said: do you love (amas) me? — and so they are taken for the same: and Dionysius rebukes this difference⁶.

Nevertheless some difference can be assigned. For although they may be said of one and the same affection, yet by different accounts. For amor expresses the affection's adhesion in respect of the beloved; whence Dionysius⁷: « We call amor unitive ». But dilectio adds election beyond this: hence dilectio (love-by-choice) is "election from various ones"; whence Canticles 5⁸: My beloved (dilectus) is chosen out of thousands. But caritas adds beyond these a great appreciation. For that is called carum (dear) which is esteemed of great price, according to which the Apostle in his epistles calls the faithful carissimi (most dear), 1 Corinthians 4⁹.

Dub. II.

Likewise it is doubted concerning what he says: Properly the Word of God is also called the wisdom of God; for either it is taken properly because it belongs to him alone, or properly because by appropriation: for if to him alone, this is false, because wisdom in no way states a personal property; if properly, because by appropriation, this does nothing for the matter in hand, because the Master wishes to inquire into a property of the Holy Spirit, not something appropriated. And again, caritas seems rather to be appropriated to the Father, according to what is said in that prose, « charity is the Father »¹⁰: Likewise this seems so through Richard¹¹, because « gratuitous love is in the Father, owed love in the Holy Spirit, mingled from both in the Son »: therefore since caritas signifies gratuitous love, it ought to be appropriated to the Father.

I respond: It must be said that the similitude is not in every way¹², but there is a similitude in this: for what is common can be appropriated, the unity of the vocable or of the signification remaining. Likewise some name can at the same time be said by property and by essence, the unity of the vocable and signification remaining, and yet it is of itself common; and such is this name caritas.

Otherwise it can be said that caritas is common and proper and appropriated; and Augustine¹³ first shows that it is appropriated by similitude to wisdom, and afterwards shows that it is truly¹⁴ proper, below: Now, what we have begun to show, etc. Hence from this authority it is not gathered that caritas is proper, but only that it is appropriated. But nevertheless from other words of Augustine it is gathered that caritas is not only appropriated, but also properly proper to the Holy Spirit.

To that which is objected, that caritas is appropriated to the Father: it must be said that caritas has a twofold

comparison to the other virtues. For it is compared as a mother, as Ambrose says¹⁵, and it is compared as a bond, as the Apostle says to the Colossians 3¹⁶: Charity is the bond of perfection. By reason of the first it is appropriated to the Father, by reason of the second to the Holy Spirit.

To that which is objected from Richard, it must be said that gratuitous does not state a property of the love or of loving, but a property of the person who gives and does not receive.

Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that the Holy Spirit is the love by which the Father and the Son love one another and us. It is asked whether the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit. For whether they love themselves by the Holy Spirit will be asked¹⁷ in distinction 32, where he moves this question specifically. But the first seems altogether false and improper. For when it is said: the Father and the Son love us etc., it is established that the verb to love is held essentially; therefore if they love¹⁸ by the Holy Spirit, they are the Holy Spirit. And again, Augustine says¹⁹ that this is in no way conceded: The Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, because to love is held essentially: therefore likewise in the matter in hand.

I respond: Some say that this ablative is expounded through this preposition per (through) with the accusative, that is, through the Holy Spirit; and the rule²⁰ is that this preposition per with transitive verbs states sub-authority, but with absolute verbs authority. Hence since to love is transitive, the sense is that the Father and the Son love us through the Holy Spirit, as though one were saying: the Father works through the Son. — But this exposition does not seem fitting, because likewise it could²¹ be said: the Father and the Son punish or hate us by the Holy Spirit; which Augustine does not wish to say.

Therefore it must be noted that to love is sometimes held purely essentially, as when it is said: The Father loves himself²²; sometimes purely notionally, as when it is said: The Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as will be shown²³; sometimes partly essentially, partly notionally, as when it is said: they love us by the Holy Spirit; and this²⁴ is clear, because it is the same thing for the Father and the Son to love us by the Holy Spirit, and for them to send or inspire the Holy Spirit into us. But to send or to inspire implies a notional and an essential act, because the sense is that they produce the Spirit and confer his gift upon us; whence he says at one stroke the production of the Holy Spirit and the conferral of grace. And although in respect of an essential act the relation of the ablative is not received, nevertheless it is received by reason of the notion, just as also here: the Father speaks himself by his Word, he also speaks creatures by the Word; in a similar way it is to be understood in the matter in hand.

Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: Whether (this) be the unity of the two or their sanctity; what is said by this name unitas; for either unitas states essential unity, or notional, or personal. Not essential, because then it would not be of the two, but of the three; not notional, because the Holy Spirit is not common spiration; not personal, because the Father and the Son are not one in person. Likewise it is asked, in what way these three²⁵ are distinguished — unitas, sanctitas, caritas.

I respond: It must be said that unitas is held personally. But it must be observed that the unity of some is said in a twofold way: either that by which some are one, and thus there is not a personal unity of the Father and the Son; or that by which some are united, and thus the Father and the Son are united by a single person, namely the person of the Holy Spirit, who is love and the binding bond.

To what is asked, in what way these three differ; it must be said that one²⁶ adds upon another. For unitas states the condition of every love, since every love is a unitive power; sanctitas states the condition of chaste love over against libidinous love, which is not pure; caritas states the condition of pre-eminent love: for caritas is so called because it is a love having its beloved as dear beyond estimation.

Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: If each (loves) not by participation but by his own essence... preserving the unity of the spirit. For he seems not to speak well, because to preserve the unity of the spirit is to produce the Holy Spirit: therefore according to this the Father and the Son by their essence produce the Holy Spirit, and so it seems

that they spirate by essence²⁷. Likewise also what is said seems false, not by participation, because the Father and the Son by participation in spiration²⁸ preserve the unity.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine²⁹ wishes to show that the twofold mode of unity between the Father and the Son is the same as that between the members of Christ, namely of nature and of will; but differently, because in us there is unity of nature through participation in one common essence, but we are not that essence itself³⁰. But the Father and the Son do not participate in essence as in something distinct; rather, they are the essence itself. Similarly in us there is conformity of will through the gift of God which unites us; but the Father and the Son are united not by a gift received from another, but by their proper Spirit; and so the response is clear³¹.

Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning the argument of Augustine: For because it is common to both, that is properly called the same which both (are) in common; therefore according to this, by parity of reasoning the Holy Spirit is properly called God, since God is common to both.

I respond: It must be said that there is equivocation in commonness. For Augustine does not call common what is in many and of many, but what is from many; and so commune is called rather from communio (communion) than from communitas (community), so that emphasis falls upon the word, just as happens between unio (union) and unitas (unity). And because caritas states not only community, because in many, but communion through the unity³² of distinct ones: therefore although it is said essentially, it can nevertheless also be said personally.

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