Dist. 11, Art. 1, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 11
Quaestio II. Utrum Spiritus sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio tanquam ab uno principio.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum Spiritus sanctus procedat a Patre et Filio, in quantum sunt unum, aut in quantum differentes.
1. Et quod in quantum unum, videtur per Anselmum in libro de Processione Spiritus sancti1: «Nullus intellectus capit, Spiritum sanctum esse Patris et Filii, secundum quod alter est Pater, alter Filius, sed secundum quod uterque est idem Deus».
2. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: unitas effectus est ab unitate actus, et unitas actus ab unitate potentiae vel subiecti; ergo cum una sit persona producta a Patre et Filio, ergo per unum actum producitur et per unam potentiam: ergo spirant, in quantum sunt unum.
3. Item, quod est a duobus, in quantum duo, aut est insufficienter a quolibet, aut ab altero superflue; sed Spiritus sanctus a nulla persona est insufficienter nec superflue, quia neutrum convenit naturae perfectae: ergo etc.
4. Item, quod est a duobus in quantum duo, est compositum, si consubstantialiter2 est ab illis; ergo cum a duobus in quantum duo procedit unus, oportet quod illud unum habeat differentiam; sed Spiritus sanctus non est compositus: ergo etc.
5. Item, nihil unum procedit a duobus consimilibus3 in natura in quantum duo, nisi alter sit sicut principium activum, alter sicut principium passivum, sive alter ut pater, alter ut mater; sed hoc non est in divinis: ergo etc.
Contra:
1. Qui procedit a duobus, ita quod ab uno principalius quam ab alio, procedit4 in quantum sunt duo; sed Spiritus sanctus principaliter procedit a Patre, sicut dicit Augustinus et habetur in sequenti distinctione5: ergo etc.
2. Item, qui procedit a duobus in quantum sunt distincti, procedit a duobus in quantum sunt duo; sed nexus non est nisi distinctorum: ergo qui procedit ut nexus, procedit ab eis ut a distinctis, et ita ut a differentibus.
3. Item, ab unitate subiecti est unitas actus, et a pluralitate subiectorum pluralitas actuum6; sed Pater et Filius sunt duo: ergo spirant duplici spiratione: ergo spiratur Spiritus sanctus ab eis, in quantum sunt duo: ergo etc.
4. Item, si spirant Spiritum sanctum in quantum sunt unum, aut7 in quantum sunt unum in substantia, aut in notione, aut in persona. Si in quantum sunt unum in substantia: ergo cum Spiritus sanctus sit idem in substantia, Spiritus sanctus procedit a se. Si in quantum sunt idem in notione; hoc nihil est, quia non ideo spirant, quia sunt spiratores, sed e converso. Nec in quantum sunt unum in persona, quia in persona non uniuntur.
Conclusio. Spiritus sanctus procedit a Patre et a Filio, non quatenus sunt distinctae personae, sed quatenus in eis est una fecunditas voluntatis sive una spiratio activa.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Spiritus sanctus procedit a Patre et Filio, in quantum sunt unum in fecunditate voluntatis. Una autem est in Patre et Filio voluntas, quia Pater et Filius sunt una substantia; si ergo est in eis voluntatis fecunditas, una est fecunditas in eis. Voluntatis autem fecunditas est in Patre et in Filio, quia uterque8 Deus improcessibilis. Sicut enim superius dictum fuit de numero personarum9 et infra melius patebit10, cum agetur de innascibilitate, quae idem est in Patre quod primitas; cum primum et principium sint idem11; ratio primitatis est ratio principiandi, sive fecunditatis. Quoniam igitur Pater prior est omni emanatione, scilicet processione et generatione, quia nec generatur nec procedit, hinc est, quod utroque modo est principium. Quia vero Filius prior est emanatione processionis, non generationis — quia generatur, tamen est inspirabilis — hinc est, quod est principium spirandi, non generandi. Quia vero Spiritus sanctus neutro modo se habet, neutro modo est principium. Inde est igitur, quod12 quamvis Spiritus sanctus a duobus procedat, quia tamen procedit non ut sunt differentes, sed ut est in eis una fecunditas voluntatis, Spiritus sanctus procedit ab eis, in quantum sunt unum.
Ad argumenta in oppositum:
Ad 1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod principaliter procedit a Patre; dicendum, quod principaliter potest dici dupliciter: aut respectu secundarii; et sic importat ordinem prioris et posterioris, et sic ponit diversitatem, et hoc modo non accipitur hic; alio modo prout principalitas dicit quandam auctoritatem, sicut Pater dicitur operari per Filium. Unde unaquaeque13 creatura producitur a Patre per Filium, in quantum sunt unum; et sic intelligendum est in proposito.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nexus procedit a pluribus etc.; dicendum, quod ratio nexus incipit a distinctione et tendit sive perducit14 in unitatem: unde ultima et completiva ratio est unitas. Licet ergo nexus sit duorum et a duobus, si est perfectus nexus, est ab eis in quantum sunt unum, non in quantum sunt plures15.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod ab unitate subiecti est unitas actus et a pluralitate pluralitas; dicendum, quod istud non habet instantiam secundum modum loquendi, quia si duo sunt termini copulati, actus numeratus debet eis16 reddi; sed secundum rem distinguendum est, quia subiectum dicitur dupliciter: aut per se et primo, aut non primo; et illud verum est de subiecto per se et primo, non de alio; et sic accipiendo, Pater et Filius non sunt unum principium, seu17 primum subiectum spirationis, quia non spirant secundum quod Pater et Filius, sed secundum quod in eis est una fecunditas voluntatis, et ita in quantum unum.
Alia solutio. Vel aliter dicendum, quod est loqui de actu, ut est actus vel18 origo, et de actu, ut est accidens. Si loquamur de actu, ut est accidens, de necessitate numeratur ad numerum subiecti, quia non est unum accidens in duobus subiectis. Si autem loquamur de actu, ut est actus, sic comparatur ad subiectum ut ad principium, et sic non numeratur ad numerum subiecti secundum quod subiectum, sed secundum quod principium. Quoniam igitur in divinis spiratio non est accidens, sed productio vel relatio: ideo sequitur unitatem subiecti, ut est principium, quia19 Pater et Filius, quamvis duae sint personae, tamen sunt principium unum, quia per eandem virtutem spirant: ideo actus non numeratur in illis, ideo spirant una spiratione, quamvis sint duo.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur ultimo, aut in quantum unum in substantia etc.; dicendum, quod in quantum unum in fecunditate voluntatis, prout illa voluntas tracta est ad notionem per fecunditatem, quae fecunditas est ratione primitatis, quae primitas significatur per hoc quod est improcessibilis. Et hoc est quod dicit Anselmus, quod Pater et Filius spirant, secundum quod uterque est idem Deus, non secundum quod Deus simpliciter, sed secundum quod Deus in utroque; hoc est considerare voluntatem in personis.
Duplex opinio. Si ergo quaeras, utrum in quantum unum in substantia, aut notione, aut persona; dicendum, quod responderi potest dupliciter, secundum duas opiniones prius positas de potentia generandi, distinctione septima20: quod quidam dicunt, quod potentia generandi non differt a generatione sive paternitate nisi modo loquendi, et ita dicit notionem, scilicet personalem proprietatem, ut generatio, licet alio modo. Similiter isti dicunt, quod fecunditas voluntatis sive vis spirativa dicit eandem notionem quam spiratio, licet alio modo, quia vis spirativa dicit ut in ratione aptitudinis, sed spiratio21 in ratione actus; et ita secundum hos in quantum sunt unum notione. Alii dicunt, quod sicut potentia generandi dicit naturam in persona, ita essentiam personaliter, sic vis spirativa voluntatem dicit, ut voluntas est in personis, in quibus est fecunda22; et ita Pater et Filius spirant in quantum unum in essentia sive natura sive voluntate, ut dicatur proprius23 voluntate considerata in personis. Quaelibet harum positionum mihi videtur satis probabilis.
I. Pro intelligentia huius quaestionis notandum, quod Pater et Filius conveniunt in aliqua re notionali scil. spiratione activa, in qua Spiritus sanctus non convenit cum eis; unde ipsa ad relationem aliquo modo spectare debet, cum constet, in essentia tres personas omnino convenire. Ad eandem quaestionem accuratius explicandam S. Doctor redit infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2.
II. In solut. ad 4. recurrit S. Doctor ad ea quae supra d. 7. q. 1. de duplici opinione circa potentiam generandi dixit; cfr. ibi Scholion, et infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2, et d. 28. per totam. Sibi constans Seraphicus, qui ibi utramque opinionem probabilem declaravit, etiam hoc loco secundum utramque positionem respondit.
III. Conclusio est, quod Pater et Filius producunt Spiritum sanctum, quatenus sunt unum in fecunditate voluntatis. Evidens enim est, quod non possint spirare, quatenus sunt unum in essentia, quia in essentia etiam cum Spiritu sancto unum sunt, quoad personam vero sunt duo, non unum; ergo producunt Spiritum sanctum, quatenus sunt unum in notione, i.e. in spiratione activa.
IV. Cfr. infra d. 29. a. 2. q. 1. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 70. m. 3. a. 3. seqq. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1; et Report. d. 12. q. 1. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2. seqq.; S. I. q. 36. a. 4; S. c. Gent. IV. c. 25. — B. Albert., hic a. 3. i. 5; S. p. I. tr. 7. q. 31. m. 3. q. 1. incident. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. seq. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. seq. — Aegid. R., hic 2. princ. q. 1. et 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. q. 6. n. 50. seqq. — Durand., hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3. 4. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 12. q. 1. 2.
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Question II. Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from one principle.
Secondly it is asked, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one, or insofar as they are differing.
1. And that [it is] insofar as they are one seems [to follow] from Anselm in his book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit1: «No understanding grasps that the Holy Spirit is of the Father and of the Son according as the one is Father and the other Son, but rather according as each is the same God».
2. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: the unity of the effect is from the unity of the act, and the unity of the act from the unity of the power or subject; therefore since the person produced from the Father and the Son is one, He is produced through one act and through one power: therefore they spirate insofar as they are one.
3. Likewise, what is from two, insofar as [they are] two, is either insufficiently from each, or from the other [given] superfluously; but the Holy Spirit is neither insufficiently nor superfluously from any person, because neither befits a perfect nature: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, what is from two insofar as [they are] two is composite, if it is from them consubstantially2; therefore since one proceeds from two insofar as [they are] two, that one must have difference; but the Holy Spirit is not composite: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, no one [thing] proceeds from two things alike3 in nature insofar as [they are] two, unless the one be as an active principle, the other as a passive principle, or the one as father, the other as mother; but this is not so in the divine being: therefore etc.
On the contrary:
1. He who proceeds from two, in such a way that from one more principally than from the other, proceeds4 insofar as they are two; but the Holy Spirit principally proceeds from the Father, as Augustine says and as is found in the following distinction5: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, he who proceeds from two insofar as they are distinct, proceeds from two insofar as they are two; but a bond exists only of distinct things: therefore he who proceeds as a bond proceeds from them as from distinct things, and so as from differing things.
3. Likewise, from unity of subject is unity of act, and from plurality of subjects plurality of acts6; but the Father and the Son are two: therefore they spirate by a twofold spiration: therefore the Holy Spirit is spirated by them, insofar as they are two: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, if they spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one, then either7 insofar as they are one in substance, or in notion, or in person. If insofar as they are one in substance: then since the Holy Spirit is the same in substance, the Holy Spirit proceeds from Himself. If insofar as they are the same in notion; this is nothing, because they do not spirate because they are spirators, but conversely. Nor [do they spirate] insofar as they are one in person, because they are not united in person.
Conclusion. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son, not insofar as they are distinct persons, but insofar as in them there is one fecundity of will, or one active spiration.
I respond: It must be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son insofar as they are one in fecundity of will. Now there is one will in the Father and the Son, because the Father and the Son are one substance; if therefore there is in them fecundity of will, there is one fecundity in them. Now the fecundity of will is in the Father and in the Son, because each8 is the unprocessible God. For as was said above concerning the number of persons9, and as will appear better below10 when treatment is made of innascibility, which in the Father is the same as primacy; since first and principle are the same11; the formal character of primacy is the formal character of being-a-principle, or of fecundity. Since therefore the Father is prior to every emanation, namely procession and generation, because He is neither generated nor proceeds, hence it is that He is principle in either mode. But because the Son is prior to the emanation of procession, not of generation — because He is generated, yet is not-spirable — hence it is that He is principle of spirating, not of generating. But because the Holy Spirit is in neither mode, He is in neither mode a principle. Hence it is, therefore, that12 although the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, yet because He proceeds not as they are differing, but as in them there is one fecundity of will, the Holy Spirit proceeds from them insofar as they are one.
To the arguments to the contrary:
To 1. To what is objected, that He principally proceeds from the Father; it must be said that principally can be said in two ways: either with respect to a secondary; and so it imports the order of prior and posterior, and so posits diversity, and in this way it is not taken here; in another way, insofar as principality denotes a certain authority, just as the Father is said to operate through the Son. Hence every13 creature is produced by the Father through the Son, insofar as they are one; and so it is to be understood in the case at hand.
To 2. To what is objected, that the bond proceeds from many etc.; it must be said that the formal character of bond begins from distinction and tends or leads14 into unity: hence the ultimate and completive formal character is unity. Although therefore a bond is of two and from two, if it is a perfect bond, it is from them insofar as they are one, not insofar as they are several15.
To 3. To what is objected, that from unity of subject is unity of act and from plurality plurality; it must be said that this admits no instance according to the mode of speaking, because if there are two terms coupled, the act, [though] numbered, ought to be predicated of them16; but in reality a distinction is to be made, because subject is said in two ways: either per se and primarily, or not primarily; and that [maxim] is true of subject per se and primarily, not of the other; and taking it thus, the Father and the Son are not one principle, or17 the primary subject of spiration, because they do not spirate according as they are Father and Son, but according as in them there is one fecundity of will, and so insofar as they are one.
Another solution. Or it must be said otherwise, that there is to speak of act as act or18 origin, and of act as accident. If we speak of act as accident, of necessity it is numbered to the number of the subject, because there is not one accident in two subjects. But if we speak of act as act, then it is referred to the subject as to a principle, and so it is not numbered to the number of the subject as subject, but as principle. Since therefore in the divine being spiration is not an accident, but production or relation: it follows the unity of subject, as it is principle, because19 the Father and the Son, although they be two persons, yet are one principle, because they spirate by the same power: therefore the act is not numbered in them, therefore they spirate by one spiration, although they are two.
To 4. To what is asked last, whether [they spirate] insofar as [they are] one in substance etc.; it must be said: insofar as [they are] one in fecundity of will, inasmuch as that will is drawn into a notion through fecundity, which fecundity is by reason of primacy, which primacy is signified by the fact that [the Father] is unprocessible. And this is what Anselm says, that the Father and the Son spirate according as each is the same God, not according as [each is] God simply, but according as [each is] God in both; this is to consider the will in the persons.
Twofold opinion. If, therefore, you ask whether [they spirate] insofar as [they are] one in substance, or in notion, or in person; it must be said that it can be answered in two ways, according to the two opinions previously laid down concerning the power of generating, in distinction seven20: that some say that the power of generating does not differ from generation or paternity except by mode of speaking, and so it denotes a notion, namely a personal property, just as generation does, although in another way. Similarly these say that the fecundity of will, or the spirative power, denotes the same notion as spiration does, although in another way, because the spirative power denotes [it] in the formal character of aptitude, but spiration21 in the formal character of act; and so according to these, [Father and Son spirate] insofar as they are one in notion. Others say that, just as the power of generating denotes nature in the person, and so essence personally, so the spirative power denotes the will, as the will is in the persons, in which it is fecund22; and so the Father and the Son spirate insofar as [they are] one in essence, or nature, or will — so that it is said more properly23 of will considered in the persons. Each of these positions seems to me sufficiently probable.
I. For the understanding of this question, it must be noted that the Father and the Son agree in some notional reality, namely active spiration, in which the Holy Spirit does not agree with them; whence that [reality] must in some way pertain to relation, since it is established that in essence the three persons agree altogether. To explain this same question more accurately, the Holy Doctor returns below at d. 29, a. 2, qq. 1–2.
II. In the reply to 4, the Holy Doctor recurs to what he said above at d. 7, q. 1, concerning the twofold opinion about the power of generating; cf. the Scholion there, and below d. 27, p. I, q. 2, and d. 28 throughout. Consistent with himself, the Seraphic [Doctor], who there declared each opinion probable, also in this place answers according to each position.
III. The conclusion is that the Father and the Son produce the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one in fecundity of will. For it is evident that they cannot spirate insofar as they are one in essence, because in essence they are also one with the Holy Spirit, while as to person they are two, not one; therefore they produce the Holy Spirit insofar as they are one in notion, i.e. in active spiration.
IV. Cf. below d. 29, a. 2, qq. 1–2. — Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 70, m. 3, a. 3, seqq. — Scotus, I. Sent. d. 12, q. 1; and Reportata d. 12, qq. 1–2. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 2, seqq.; S. I. q. 36, a. 4; S.c.G. IV, c. 25. — Bl. Albert, here a. 3, i. 5; S. p. I, tr. 7, q. 31, m. 3, q. 1, incident. — Peter of Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 2, seq. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3, seq. — Giles of Rome, here 2, princ. q. 1 et 2. — Henry of Ghent, S. a. 34, q. 6, n. 50, seqq. — Durandus, here q. 3. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here qq. 3–4. — Biel, I. Sent. d. 12, qq. 1–2.
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- Cap. 21: Nullus sensus capit, Spiritum sanctum esse Spiritum Patris aut Filii... uterque unus idemque Deus est.[Anselm,] cap. 21: «No sense grasps that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father or of the Son... each is one and the same God».
- Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 consubstantialiter loco substantialiter. In proxime sequenti propositione exhibemus lectionem, quae in pluribus tantum codicibus ut A H P Q W etc. invenitur. Maior quidem pars codd. cum ed. 1 legit procedit unus loco procedit unum, quod habet Vat., sed in reliquis convenit cum Vat. ponendo quia loco ergo si et praemittendo particulas et ita verbo oportet. Inspicienti tamen patet, in hac propositione non contineri rationem maioris, etiamsi cum cod. T legatur quia a duobus in quantum duo non procedit unus; unde in ipsa continetur applicatio maioris ad aliquod speciale, quod et satis clare indicatur per terminum unus, scil. persona Spiritus sancti, quae tanquam quid unum habere deberet in se compositionem seu differentiam. Aliqui codd. ut H M bb ee bene post habeat addunt in se.Very many codices with ed. 1 read consubstantialiter in place of substantialiter. In the proposition immediately following we present a reading found only in several codices, as A H P Q W etc. The greater part of the codices with ed. 1 reads procedit unus in place of procedit unum, which the Vatican has, but in the rest it agrees with the Vatican by placing quia in place of ergo si and prefixing the particles et ita to the verb oportet. Yet it is plain to one who inspects [the text] that in this proposition the reason of the major is not contained, even if with codex T one reads because from two insofar as two one [thing] does not proceed; whence in [this proposition] there is contained the application of the major to something special, which is also indicated clearly enough by the term one, namely the person of the Holy Spirit, which as a certain unity ought to have in itself composition or difference. Some codices, as H M bb ee, well add in se after habeat.
- Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus consimilibus pro similibus.From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted consimilibus in place of similibus.
- In cod. O additur ab eis.In codex O ab eis is added.
- Vide ibid., lit. Magistri, c. 2 et q. 2.See in the same place, the littera Magistri (Lombard's text), c. 2, and q. 2.
- Supplevimus ex cod. T et a pluralitate subiectorum pluralitas actuum, quia et contextus ea verba requirit, et in principio solutionis huius obiectionis ipsa explicite recitantur. — Ratio haec fundatur in illo axiomate: actus sunt suppositorum; ergo duorum suppositorum non est unica actio.From codex T we have supplied and from plurality of subjects plurality of acts, because the context requires those words and they are explicitly recited at the beginning of the solution of this objection. — This reasoning is grounded in the axiom: acts belong to supposits; therefore of two supposits there is not one [single] action.
- Cod. W non male addit ergo.Codex W not unfittingly adds ergo.
- Cod. Y addit est; cod. Z vero habet est loco Deus.Codex Y adds est; codex Z has est in place of Deus.
- Dist. 2, q. 2 et 4.D. 2, qq. 2 and 4.
- Dist. 28 per totam.D. 28 throughout.
- Aristot., I Poster. c. 2: Idem enim dico primum et principium. — Vat., variata constructione, praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 et primum et principium sunt idem, et ratio, sed minus distincte, quae et paulo infra cum cod. cc, antiquioribus interim codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, post prior est perperam adiungit in.Aristotle, Posterior [Analytics] I, c. 2: «For I call the first and the principle the same». — The Vatican, with altered construction, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, reads et primum et principium sunt idem, et ratio, but less distinctly; and a little below, with codex cc — the older codices and ed. 1 meanwhile resisting — after prior est it wrongly adds in.
- Auctoritate plurimorum mss. expunximus patet, quod Vat. minus apte praefigit verbo quod; ed. 1 loco patet habet hinc est. — Consentit Augustinus, V de Trin. c. 14, n. 15: Si ergo et quod datur principium habet eum a quo datur... fatendum est, Patrem et Filium principium esse Spiritus sancti, non duo principia; sed sicut Pater et Filius unus Deus, et ad creaturam relative unus Creator et unus Dominus, sic relative ad Spiritum sanctum unum principium etc.On the authority of very many manuscripts we have expunged patet, which the Vatican less aptly prefixes to the word quod; ed. 1 has hinc est in place of patet. — Augustine agrees, De Trin. V, c. 14, n. 15: «If, then, what is given also has the principle [from] which it is given... it must be confessed that the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit, not two principles; but just as the Father and the Son are one God, and relatively to the creature one Creator and one Lord, so relatively to the Holy Spirit they are one principle, etc.»
- Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut F G H P Q unaquaeque loco una.We prefer the reading of several manuscripts, as F G H P Q, unaquaeque (every) in place of una (one).
- Ita plures codd. ut A D E G H I P Q R T etc. Vat. procedit, sed minus bene; alii cum ed. 1 falso produxit. Mox cod. Z post ratio addit eius.So several codices, as A D E G H I P Q R T etc. The Vatican reads procedit, but less well; others with ed. 1 falsely produxit. Just after, codex Z after ratio adds eius.
- Vide d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3, eandem obiectionem ita solvit: Dico, quod istud argumentum non plus concludit, nisi quod procedit a pluribus; et hoc est verum. Ab eis tamen procedit in quantum in potentia spirativa sunt unum.See d. 10, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3, solves the same objection thus: «I say that this argument concludes no more than that He proceeds from several [persons]; and this is true. Yet He proceeds from them insofar as in spirative power they are one».
- Vat. ei loco eis, castigatur ope plurimorum mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, loco cuius cod. X habet sic. Exemplum accipe in hoc: Petrus et Paulus currunt; ubi actus currendi redditur in plurali utrique subiecto.The Vatican reads ei in place of eis; it is corrected with the help of very many manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, in place of which codex X has sic. Take an example in this: Peter and Paul are running; where the act of running is rendered in the plural for both subjects.
- Codd. inter se non conveniunt; multi cum ed. 1 omittunt seu; cod. T omittit principium seu, cod. H principium seu primum; codd. G Z substituunt unum pro seu.The codices do not agree among themselves; many with ed. 1 omit seu; codex T omits principium seu, codex H principium seu primum; codices G Z substitute unum for seu.
- Ed. 1 sive. — Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit vel origo.Ed. 1 reads sive. — The Vatican, against the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1, adds vel origo.
- Vat., fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 reluctantibus, quare; cod. I et quia.The Vatican, with nearly all the older manuscripts and ed. 1 resisting, reads quare; codex I, et quia.
- Quaest. 1. — Fide mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 supplevimus verba distinctione septima; quod quidam dicunt, quod, loco quorum Vat. quia ipsa, quae et paulo infra, post sive, multis mss. ut A F G I P Q S T V W X etc. obnitentibus, addit in.Q. 1. — On the testimony of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6, we have supplied the words distinctione septima; quod quidam dicunt, quod, in place of which the Vatican has quia ipsa; and a little below, after sive, with many manuscripts (A F G I P Q S T V W X etc.) resisting, [the Vatican] adds in.
- Cod. V repetit hic ut.Codex V here repeats ut.
- Aliqui codd. ut H I Z fecunditas.Some codices, as H I Z, read fecunditas.
- Pauci codd. ut F M X perperam prius. Mox ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 substituimus harum loco illarum.A few codices, as F M X, wrongly read prius. Just after, from the ancient manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted harum in place of illarum.