Dist. 13, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 13
QUAESTIO III.
Utrum processio Spiritus sancti differat a generatione Filii realiter, vel solum secundum rationem intelligendi.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum processio Spiritus sancti realiter differat a generatione Filii, an solum secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod realiter, videtur:
1. Quia personae differunt secundum suas emanationes; ergo1 cum personae realiter differant, non tantum intellectualiter — quia, omni intellectu circumscripto, adhuc remanet trinitas — ergo emanationes, quae sunt processio et generatio, differunt realiter.
2. Item, quae sunt a diversis principiis, realiter differunt; sed generatio est ab uno in divinis, processio Spiritus sancti a duobus, quia a Patre et Filio: ergo realiter differunt.
3. Item, secundum rem2 et veritatem aliquorum est principium divina substantia ut voluntas, quorum non est principium ut natura, sicut patet, quia creaturae sunt a Deo agente per modum voluntatis, non per modum naturae: si ergo processio est voluntatis per modum voluntatis, generatio per modum naturae ut naturae, processio et generatio realiter differunt.
4. Item, in imagine creata egressus verbi et egressus amoris distinguuntur, quia differunt realiter; hoc3 perfectionis est, quia ex hoc faciunt imaginis trinitatem; sed quod differunt essentialiter, hoc est imperfectionis; sed omne quod perfectionis est, ponendum est in divinis: ergo processio et generatio realiter differunt, quamvis non essentialiter.
Contra:
1. Pater4 spirat et generat, aut ergo in quantum unus, aut in quantum plures vel plura. Si in quantum plures vel plura, Pater est compositus; si in quantum unus; sed quia Pater et Filius spirant in quantum unum, non sunt duae spirationes, sed una: ergo similiter, si Pater spirat et generat in quantum unum, spiratio et generatio est una productio.
2. Item, secundum omnes verum est, quod Pater ratione fecunditatis naturae5 generat, ratione fecunditatis voluntatis spirat; sed in Deo idem est voluntas et natura: ergo etc.
3. Item, emanationes6 penes terminos distinguuntur; sed Pater omnino idem et totum, quod dat Filio per generationem, dat Spiritui sancto per processionem: ergo spiratio et generatio sunt omnino una emanatio.
4. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur per impossibile. Si differunt, aut se ipsis, aut aliis: non se ipsis, quia emanationes nec sunt a se nec ad se: ergo si unumquodque distinguitur per illud quod est, vel a quo est7, emanationes huiusmodi se ipsis non distinguuntur; si aliis: aut essentia, aut notione, aut persona. Non essentia; constat, quia illa non distinguit nec distinguitur; non persona, quia eius est distingui, non distinguere: ergo si differunt, hoc erit aliis notionibus; et similiter erit quaerere de illis aliis, et sic in infinitum: ergo etc.
5. Item, si differunt, aut differentia substantiali, aut accidentali: non substantiali, quia talis differentia non est in divinis; non accidentali, quia in Deo non est accidens: ergo etc.
6. Item, plus differt Filius a creatura quam a Spiritu sancto: ergo plus differt generatio a creatione quam a processione; sed generatio non distinguitur a creatione: ergo nec a processione. Probatio mediae: creatio est divina essentia8; sed persona et essentia non distinguuntur ab invicem: ergo nec generatio et creatio.
CONCLUSIO.
Generatio et spiratio non tantum secundum modum dicendi differunt, sed etiam secundum differentiam tum originis, tum habitudinis, et etiam se ipsis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod generatio et spiratio sive processio differunt non tantum secundum rationem dicendi, sed etiam secundum differentiam9 originis et habitudinis, quia diversus est modus se habendi et differens modus originis; talis autem differentia unitati essentiae non repugnat.
Si autem quaeratur ratio differentiae harum emanationum, dicendum, quod prima ratio differendi non potest assignari a parte terminorum. Termini enim sunt personae, quae non important rationem differendi active, sed passive10.
Si ergo personae11 differunt, quaeritur: quibus? et necesse est redire ad emanationes et relationes, quae sunt generatio et processio; et ita in hac assignatione erit circulus.
Similiter ex parte principiorum. Si enim dicatur, quod differunt hae duae emanationes secundum fecunditatem duplicem naturae et voluntatis, quaeritur12, quo modo differat fecunditas a fecunditate. Si dicas, quod fecunditas naturae est in solo Patre, voluntatis in Patre et Filio: hoc ulteriorem habet quaestionem, unde veniat haec differentia, et oportet ad hoc venire, quod fecunditas naturae est in uno, quia imago procedens per illam nata est esse solum ab uno, fecunditas voluntatis in duobus, quia nexus sive processio per modum nexus est in duobus; et ita redit differentia in primum, et est ibi ratio circularis. Ergo patet secundum hoc, quod harum emanationum differentia prima nec est sumenda a parte termini, nec a parte principii.
Et ideo notandum, quod est loqui de huiusmodi emanationibus quantum ad esse et quantum ad distingui.
Si quantum ad esse, sic habent rationem essendi a suis perfectis principiis et fecundis. Quia enim in Deo est perfectissima natura et natura vera, ideo perfecta et vera fecunditas13 in hypostasi, quae habet rationem principii. Et quia vera et perfecta et propria est fecunditas naturae, ideo veram et propriam habet emanationem; et haec est generatio. Similiter intelligendum est de spiratione quantum ad voluntatem. Unde ratio, quare huiusmodi vere sunt14 in Deo, est vera fecunditas naturae et voluntatis.
Si autem loquamur quantum ad differre, dicendum, quod se ipsis differunt, sicut ostensum est15, quia omnis distinctio in divinis venit a modis originis et relationis. Unde sicut duae differentiae se ipsis differunt, ut rationale et irrationale, similiter16 in divinis hae duae emanationes. Et sicut differentiae differentiarum innotescunt nobis per alias differentias, quae ab illis oriuntur, sic et in divinis. Quia enim se ipsis distinguuntur generatio et spiratio, ad eas consequitur secundum rationem intelligendi differentia duplex: una, quia generatio est ab uno, sed spiratio a duobus. Quia enim generatio est emanatio per modum perfectae assimilationis, ideo ad unum principium respicit; quia vero spiratio est emanatio per modum connexionis, ideo est a duobus. Alia differentia est in comparatione ad nos. Quia enim Spiritus sanctus spiratur ut nectens et ita in alterum tendens, ideo Spiritus sanctus procedit ut donabilis; Filius vero generatur, et generatio non respicit tertium.
Per has differentias necessario elicitur harum emanationum concomitantia. Quia spiratio dat praeintelligere generationem — non enim nectuntur nisi distincti et similes, et ita illi quorum unus est ab alio per generationem — similiter generatio dat consequenter intelligere spirationem; necesse est enim distinctos et omnino similes per deliciosum amorem coniungi.
Concedendae igitur sunt rationes probantes, quod differunt, sicut est manifestatum in rationibus; sed illae rationes non sunt sumtae a priori.
Aliqui tamen voluerunt assignare alias differentias: et quidam per vim spirativam et generativam17 dicunt differre; sed haec differentia declarat ignotum per ignotius. Alii etiam dixerunt, quod Filius procedit per modum esse, Spiritus sanctus per modum bene esse; sed haec verba non sunt sana nec tali materiae convenientia.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur, utrum Pater spiret in quantum unus etc.; dicendum, quod nec in quantum unus, nec in quantum plures, sed in quantum alio et alio modo se habens; quia alio modo se habet ad Filium, alio modo ad Spiritum sanctum. Iste autem alius et alius modus se habendi non repugnat unitati substantiae vel personae; sed Pater et Filius spirant in eo, quod unum uno modo se habens. Inde est, quod duplex est processio18 Filii et Spiritus sancti a Patre, sed una est spiratio sive processio Spiritus sancti a Patre et Filio.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod natura et voluntas in Deo sunt idem; dicendum, quod etsi natura et voluntas in Deo considerata absolute sint idem, tamen aliquid respicit voluntas ut voluntas in ratione principii, quod non respicit natura ut natura. Et inde est, quod, sicut non sequitur: «creatura est a Deo per modum voluntatis, [ergo] quod ideo sit etiam per modum naturae»; similiter, quia natura et voluntas comparantur ad has emanationes sub ratione principii, ideo nihil prohibet, has emanationes differre, quamvis idem sint in substantia natura et voluntas.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod emanationes differunt penes terminos; dicendum, quod in his inferioribus est verum, ubi emanatio dicit ens in potentia et ita imperfectum; non autem est verum in Deo, quia ibi non dicunt ens in potentia nec imperfectum19; unde in divinis sunt ratio distinguendi. Tamen si velimus dicere, quod differunt penes terminum,
non accipiemus terminum pro substantia vel essentia, sed pro hypostasi, ut prius habitum est20.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum se ipsis vel aliis: patet, quod se ipsis. Et ad id21 quod obiicitur, quod non habent esse a se, ergo nec distingui; dicendum, quod illud non tenet in esse originali. Quamvis enim differentiae habeant ortum a genere, tamen non distinguuntur a genere, sed se ipsis22.
Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quo modo differunt, aut substantiali aut accidentali differentia; dicendum, quod insufficienter dividit, quia in divinis est relationum differentia, ut dicit Augustinus in quinto de Trinitate23, quae nec accidentalis nec substantialis est, sed magis dicitur originalis.
Ad 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de creatione, dicendum, quod ratione connotati magis differt creatio; sed ratione principalis significati non tantum differunt, quia non tantum differt essentia a persona, quantum persona a persona. Unde praedicatur essentia24 de persona nec facit aliquo modo aliquem numerum; persona vero distinguitur ab alia persona; et ideo non valet argumentum.
SCHOLION.
I. In solutione huius subtilis quaestionis antiqui Scholastici diversis viis incedunt. Ut status quaestionis accurate discernatur, attendendum est, quod hic agitur de generatione et spiratione activa, non de passiva. Unde haec quaestio differt tum a quaestione de differentia inter secundam et tertiam divinam personam (de qua supra d. 9. q. 2), tum ab illa, quid sit potentia generandi (d. 7. q. 1), cum qua tamen cohaeret.
Quaeritur igitur primo, cuius naturae sit distinctio inter generationem et spirationem activam. Primo cum sententia communi resolvitur, quod non sit distinctio mere rationis sive secundum modum dicendi; insuper in fundam. asseritur, has emanationes realiter differre. Sensus huius distinctionis realis a Brulifero et Barth. de Barberiis (Cursus Theol. disp. 12. q. 7. conclus. 3) explicatur, ut idem dicat ac distinctio formalis Scoti. Alii eam intelligunt in sensu distinctionis virtualis. Plura de hoc vide infra d. 26. q. 1, ubi in Scholio mens Seraphici, collatis variis eiusdem locis, explicabitur. Sufficiat hic notare, non intelligi sub hoc nomine distinctionem stricte realem absolutam, sed «secundum differentiam originis et habitudinis», i. e. «distincta est una ab alia non re essentiali, sed notionali», ut dicit Richard. (hic q. 3.). Insuper constat, S. Doctorem interdum omnem distinctionem maiorem, quam quae est rationis ratiocinantis, nominare realem.
Deinde supposita hac duarum emanationum differentia, iterum quaeritur, quae sit ratio huius differentiae, et cum plures assignari possint rationes, quae sit prima eiusdem ratio. In hac secunda quaestione stat praecipua difficultas, quae tanta est, ut Aureolus cum Nominalibus temeritatis arguat eos qui hoc indagare praesumant. Etiam Augustinus cum Magistro (hic in textu) propriam circa hoc ignorantiam confitetur. Quid alii Scholastici circa hanc difficultatem doceant, paucis dicamus.
II. Praecipui doctores et antiqui et moderni conveniunt in nonnullis assertionibus, in aliis dissident. Conveniunt (praeter Durand.):
1. in hoc, quod radicalis ratio diversitatis huius ponenda sit in differenti ratione utriusque productionis, cum Filius producatur per modum intellectus et naturae, Spiritus sanctus per modum voluntatis et liberalitatis. Hoc docet S. Bonav. supra d. 6. a. 1. q. 2, d. 10. a. 1. q. 1, hic et in fundam. et in corp. — Communiter theologi, praesertim post Conc. Florentinum, docent, harum emanationum principium quod esse personas producentes, principium vero quo proximum primae emanationis esse essentiam divinam cum intellectu, sive memoriam fecundam (uti multi cum Seraphico loquuntur); secundae vero principium quo esse eandem essentiam cum voluntate sive voluntatem fecundam.
2. Natura divina aeque formaliter et per se communicatur Spiritui sancto ac Filio. Licet huic positioni nonnulli contradicant, videtur esse certa doctrina, quam docet S. Bonav. praesertim d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 3. Unde sequitur, radicem illius differentiae quaerendam esse in proprietate duplicis huius fecunditatis (cfr. hic q. 2. ad 1. et 2.).
3. Plures possunt et debent assignari differentiae harum emanationum: nempe differentia terminorum, sive personarum emanatarum, quae certe realiter distinguuntur; differentia principiorum, tum quia generatio est ab uno, et spiratio a duobus (hic in 2. fundam. et corp.), tum quia principium quo proximum est aliud et aliud (3. fundam.); denique est differentia in comparatione ad nos (in corp.), quia in secunda emanatione est aliquis specialis respectus ad creaturam secundum aptitudinem donabilitatis, de quo cfr. infra d. 18. q. 2. et 3. Nec est controversia, utrum hae differentiae subsistant, sed quae earum sit prima ratio et quasi a priori.
III. Dissident vero theologi circa aliquas determinationes specialiores.
1. Durandus cum nonnullis nullam aliam differentiam admittere videtur nisi hanc, quod generatio procedat ab uno, spiratio a duobus, quam sententiam merito S. Doctor cum communi impugnat.
2. Disputatur, utrum praeter differentias petitas quasi extrinsecus (sive originaliter a suis principiis, i. e. personis producentibus, sive consequenter a suis terminis) emanationes hae etiam intrinsecus et formaliter (a priori) differant se ipsis, i. e. propriis ipsarum rationibus, analogo modo, sicut ultimae differentiae (v. g. rationale et irrationale) differunt. Si hoc affirmatur, haec differentia dici debet prima et quasi formalis. Illud affirmat S. Doctor in corp. et ad 4. Consentiunt praeter alios Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. et praecipue Scot., qui etiam addit: «differunt se totis». Haec ultima particula explicatur a Scotistis in hoc sensu, quod duabus emanationibus non sit communis aliqua realitas per differentias contrahibilis, licet conveniant in conceptu communi entis et relationis (Rada, Controv. 11. a. 2; Macedo, Coll. 7. diff. 2, qui acriter Scotum contra interpretationem ipsius, quam facit Caietanus, defendit). — S. Thomas in Summa (I. q. 27. a. 4. ad 1.) concordat cum S. Bonaventura docendo, quod propriis ipsarum rationibus differant, quod idem est ac se ipsis differre, uti concedit Caietanus (ad hunc locum). Sed idem, de Potentia q. 10. a. 2. hanc sententiam non admittit; de alia vero, quod penes principia distinguantur, sic iudicat: «Non sufficit, nisi aliud addatur»; denique tertiam ponit, quod «solus ordo processionum, qui attenditur secundum
originem, processiones multiplicat in divinis». In Comment. (hic q. 1. a. 2. ad ult.) idem contra rationem S. Bonaventurae de circulo vitioso dicit: «Quod ergo obiicitur, quod relationes consequuntur processiones, unde magis videtur, quod processiones diversae causent diversitatem relationum, quam e converso, vel ad minus erit ibi circulatio; dicendum, quod relatio in divinis non tantum habet, quod sit notio, sed etiam quod sit personalis, id est constituens personam, et ex hoc habet quasi actum differentiae constitutivae et formae propriae ipsius personae, cuius est operatio generationis et spirationis; et ideo non est inconveniens, quod secundum relationis rationem relationes consequantur ipsas processiones et recipiant differentiam ab eis; secundum autem quod sunt formae propriae ipsarum personarum, causent differentiam processionum». Quomodo varia Angelici dicta concilianda sint, disputatur, et conferri potest Caietanus (ad q. 27. a. 4; q. 36. a. 2.). Porro aliquae rationes S. Thomae impugnantur a Scoto, de quo cfr. Rada et Macedo locis citatis. Ceterum eadem difficultas et quaedam differentia opinionis inter Seraphicum et Angelicum redit infra d. 27. p. I. q. 2, ubi plura dicentur in Scholio de hac subtilissima materia.
3. Diversus modus loquendi est circa rationem propriam, cur processio per modum naturae differat ab alia per modum voluntatis. In prima secundum Bonaventuram (hic in corp.) est «emanatio per modum perfectae assimilationis», et antea dicit, quod per illam procedat imago. Quae verba, si conferantur cum explicatione imaginis, quam dat d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 2, et cum dictis d. 10. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. 3, clare probant, Seraphicum consentire sententiae S. Thomae, qui (S. I. q. 27. a. 4.) docet, in prima emanatione esse rationem similitudinis vi ipsius processionis, non in secunda. Hinc sequitur, falso attribui Seraphico sententiam, cui Richardus (hic q. 3.) favere videtur, quod ista ratio quaerenda sit in hoc, quod Filius accipiat solummodo voluntatem fecundam, non naturam fecundam.
4. Disputatur, utrum dici queat, Spiritum sanctum procedere necessario quidem, sed tamen libere, quod cum aliis dicit Sirmondus etiam S. Thomas de Potent. q. 10. a. 2. ad 5, qui tamen aliis in locis docet, procedere naturaliter, quamvis per modum voluntatis. Certe hoc vocabulum libere sumitur hic non in sensu stricto et nunc communiter recepto, sed pro voluntarie, quatenus non excludit necessarium, ut apud plurimos antiquos Patres et doctores et etiam apud S. Bonav., II. Sent. d. 25. p. II. q. 2. Unde Rada (Contr. 13.) et Macedo (Coll. 7.) recte probant, esse hic potius litem de nomine.
5. Disputatur, utrum Verbum procedat per actum dicendi, ut vult Scotus, cui favet Bonaventura, an per actum intelligendi, uti docet S. Thomas cum suis. De hac controversia cfr. infra d. 27. p. II. q. 1. et 3. et Scholion.
IV. Sensus solutionis ad 4. hic est. Licet hi actus notionales non habeant esse a se i. e. extrinsecus distinctionem a suis principiis originalibus, tamen intrinsece distinguuntur se ipsis. Neganda enim est ista illatio («non tenet illud»), quod in esse ab alio orto non possit intrinsecus esse distinctio. Sic albedo et nigredo, licet sint ab aliis causis, differunt se ipsis. Ipse S. Doctor exemplum ponit ultimarum differentiarum, quae se ipsis distinguuntur, «quamvis a genere ortum habeant». Genus enim, quod iuxta Aristotelicos in se potentia continet species et differentias, aliquo modo est principium differentiarum. In obiectione igitur commissa est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia mutatum est genus unius causae, scil. efficientis, in aliud genus, scil. formalis.
V. Praeter iam laudatos auctores cfr. Scot., in utroque scripto hic q. unica. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 11. a. 5. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 60. q. 1. n. 36. et seq.
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Question III.
Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the generation of the Son really, or only according to the mode of understanding.
Thirdly, it is asked whether the procession of the Holy Spirit really differs from the generation of the Son, or only according to the mode of understanding. And that it differs really, is shown:
1. Because the persons differ according to their emanations; therefore1, since the persons really differ — not only intellectually, since, with every act of intellect set aside, the trinity still remains — therefore the emanations, which are procession and generation, really differ.
2. Likewise, things which are from diverse principles really differ; but generation in divine things is from one, the procession of the Holy Spirit from two, since [it is] from the Father and the Son: therefore they really differ.
3. Likewise, according to the matter2 and the truth of certain things, the divine substance is the principle as will, of which it is not the principle as nature — as is plain, since creatures are from God acting by way of will, not by way of nature: if therefore procession is of the will by way of will, and generation by way of nature as nature, then procession and generation really differ.
4. Likewise, in a created image the going-forth of the word and the going-forth of the love are distinguished, since they really differ; this3 belongs to perfection, since from this they make the trinity of the image; but that they should differ essentially — this belongs to imperfection; but everything that belongs to perfection is to be posited in divine things: therefore procession and generation really differ, although not essentially.
On the contrary:
1. The Father4 spirates and generates — therefore either insofar as he is one, or insofar as he is several or many things. If insofar as several or many, the Father is composite; if insofar as one — but since the Father and Son spirate insofar as they are one, the spirations are not two, but one: therefore likewise, if the Father spirates and generates insofar as one, spiration and generation are one production.
2. Likewise, according to all it is true that the Father generates by reason of the fecundity of nature5, and spirates by reason of the fecundity of will; but in God will and nature are the same: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, emanations6 are distinguished by their terms; but the Father gives wholly the same and the whole, which he gives to the Son by generation, to the Holy Spirit by procession: therefore spiration and generation are wholly one emanation.
4. Likewise, the same point is shown by reductio ad impossibile. If they differ, [they differ] either by themselves or by other things: not by themselves, since emanations are neither from themselves nor to themselves: therefore if each thing is distinguished by that which it is, or by that from which it is7, emanations of this kind are not distinguished by themselves; if by other things: either by essence, or by notion, or by person. Not by essence — it is plain, since essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished; not by person, since it belongs to person to be distinguished, not to distinguish: therefore if they differ, this will be by other notions; and similarly we will have to ask about those others, and so on to infinity: therefore etc.
5. Likewise, if they differ, [they differ] either by substantial difference or by accidental: not by substantial, since such a difference is not in divine things; not by accidental, since in God there is no accident: therefore etc.
6. Likewise, the Son differs more from a creature than from the Holy Spirit: therefore generation differs more from creation than from procession; but generation is not distinguished from creation: therefore neither from procession. Proof of the middle [premise]: creation is the divine essence8; but person and essence are not distinguished from each other: therefore neither generation and creation.
Conclusion.
Generation and spiration differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference both of origin and of relation [habitudo], and even by themselves.
I respond: It must be said that generation and spiration — i.e. procession — differ not only according to the mode of speaking, but also according to a difference9 of origin and of relation, since the mode of self-relating is diverse and the mode of origin is differing; and such a difference is not repugnant to the unity of essence.
But if the reason of the difference of these emanations is asked, it must be said that the first reason of differing cannot be assigned from the side of the terms. For the terms are persons, who do not import the account of differing actively, but passively10.
If therefore the persons11 differ, it is asked: by what? — and we have to come back to the emanations and relations, which are generation and procession; and so in this assignment there will be a circle.
Likewise from the side of the principles. For if it be said that these two emanations differ according to the twofold fecundity of nature and of will, it is asked12 in what manner one fecundity differs from the other. If you say that the fecundity of nature is in the Father alone, of will in the Father and the Son: this has the further question whence this difference comes, and we have to come round to this — that the fecundity of nature is in one, since the image proceeding through it is by nature only from one; the fecundity of will is in two, since the bond, or procession by way of bond, is in two; and so the difference returns to the first [point], and the account is circular there. Therefore it is plain on this account that the first difference of these emanations is not to be taken from the side of the term, nor from the side of the principle.
And therefore it is to be noted that one can speak of emanations of this kind both as to being and as to being-distinguished.
If as to being, they thus have the account of being from their perfect and fecund principles. For since in God there is the most perfect nature and a true nature, therefore there is perfect and true fecundity13 in the hypostasis which has the account of principle. And since the fecundity of nature is true and perfect and proper, therefore it has a true and proper emanation; and this is generation. Similarly we are to understand of spiration with respect to will. Hence the reason why these are truly14 in God is the true fecundity of nature and of will.
But if we speak as to the differing, it must be said that they differ by themselves, as has been shown15, since every distinction in divine things comes from the modes of origin and relation. Hence just as two differences differ by themselves — as rational and irrational — so likewise16 in divine things these two emanations. And just as the differences of differences become known to us through other differences which arise from them, so also in divine things. For since generation and spiration are distinguished by themselves, there follow upon them, according to our mode of understanding, a twofold difference: one, since generation is from one, but spiration from two. For since generation is emanation by way of perfect assimilation, therefore it regards one principle; while spiration is emanation by way of connection, therefore it is from two. The other difference is in comparison to us. For since the Holy Spirit is spirated as connecting and so tending toward another, therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds as donable; the Son, however, is generated, and generation does not regard a third.
Through these differences there is necessarily elicited the concomitance of these emanations. For spiration gives [us] to understand generation in advance — since [persons] are not connected unless they are distinct and like, and so [unless they are] those of whom one is from the other by generation; — likewise generation gives [us] to understand spiration consequently, for it is necessary that the distinct and wholly like be conjoined by delightful love.
The arguments proving that they differ are therefore to be granted, as has been made plain in the [pro-]arguments; but those arguments are not taken a priori.
Some, however, have wished to assign other differences: certain ones say that they differ by the power of spirating and of generating17; but this difference declares the unknown by what is more unknown. Others have said that the Son proceeds by way of being, the Holy Spirit by way of well-being; but these words are neither sound nor suitable to such matter.
To 1. To that, then, which is first objected — whether the Father spirates insofar as he is one, etc. — it must be said that [he spirates] neither insofar as he is one, nor insofar as he is several, but insofar as he is self-relating in one mode and another; since he relates to the Son in one mode, to the Holy Spirit in another mode. This other-and-other mode of self-relating, however, is not repugnant to the unity of substance or person; but the Father and the Son spirate in this — that they are one self-relating in one mode. Hence it is that there is a twofold procession18 of the Son and of the Holy Spirit from the Father, but the spiration or procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is one.
To 2. To what is objected — that nature and will in God are the same — it must be said that, although nature and will in God considered absolutely are the same, nevertheless something is regarded by will-as-will in the account of principle which is not regarded by nature-as-nature. And hence it is that, just as it does not follow that "the creature is from God by way of will, [therefore] for that reason it is also by way of nature," similarly, since nature and will are compared to these emanations under the account of principle, therefore nothing prohibits these emanations from differing, although nature and will are the same in substance.
To 3. To what is objected — that emanations differ by their terms — it must be said that this is true in lower things, where emanation signifies a being in potency and so something imperfect; but it is not true in God, since there [the emanations] do not signify a being in potency, nor anything imperfect19; hence in divine things [the terms] are not the [first] reason of distinguishing. Yet if we wish to say that they differ by their term,
we will not take term for substance or essence, but for hypostasis, as was held above20.
To 4. To what is asked — whether by themselves or by other things: it is plain, by themselves. And to that21 which is objected — that they do not have being from themselves, therefore neither [do they have] being-distinguished — it must be said that this does not hold in original being. For although differences have origin from the genus, yet they are not distinguished from the genus, but by themselves22.
To 5. To what is objected — in what manner do they differ, by substantial or by accidental difference: it must be said that the division is insufficient, since in divine things there is the difference of relations, as Augustine says in book V On the Trinity23, which is neither accidental nor substantial, but is rather called original.
To 6. To what is objected concerning creation, it must be said that by reason of what is connoted creation differs more; but by reason of what is principally signified they do not differ as much, since essence does not differ from person as much as person from person. Hence essence is predicated24 of person and does not in any way make any number; person, however, is distinguished from another person; and therefore the argument does not hold.
Scholion.
I. In the solution of this subtle question the older Scholastics proceed by various paths. That the state of the question may be accurately discerned, it must be attended to that here we are dealing with active generation and spiration, not with passive. Hence this question differs both from the question on the difference between the second and third divine person (on which see above d. 9, q. 2), and from that question on what the power of generating is (d. 7, q. 1), with which, however, it coheres.
It is asked therefore in the first place, of what nature is the distinction between active generation and active spiration. First, with the common opinion, it is settled that it is not a distinction of mere reason, or according to the mode of speaking; in addition, in the fundamenta, it is asserted that these emanations really differ. The sense of this real distinction is explained by Bruliferus and Bartholomaeus de Barberiis (Cursus Theologicus disp. 12, q. 7, conclus. 3) as saying the same as the formal distinction of Scotus. Others understand it in the sense of virtual distinction. On this see further below at d. 26, q. 1, where in the Scholion the Seraphic Doctor's mind, after collating various places of his, will be explained. Let it suffice here to note that under this name we are not to understand a strictly real absolute distinction, but [a distinction] "according to a difference of origin and relation," i.e. "one is distinguished from the other not by an essential reality, but by a notional [reality]," as Richard says (here q. 3). Furthermore, it is plain that the Holy Doctor sometimes calls real every distinction greater than that of reason reasoning [rationis ratiocinantis].
Then, with this difference of the two emanations supposed, it is asked again what is the reason of this difference; and since several reasons can be assigned, what is the first reason of it. In this second question lies the chief difficulty — so great that Aureolus with the Nominalists charges with rashness those who presume to investigate this. Augustine too, with the Master (here in the text), confesses his own ignorance on this point. Let us say briefly what other Scholastics teach on this difficulty.
II. The chief doctors, both ancient and modern, agree on some assertions, and differ on others. They agree (except for Durandus):
1. in this — that the radical reason of this diversity is to be placed in the differing account of the two productions, since the Son is produced by way of intellect and nature, the Holy Spirit by way of will and liberality. This St. Bonaventure teaches above d. 6, a. 1, q. 2; d. 10, a. 1, q. 1; here both in the fundamenta and in the corpus. — Theologians commonly, especially after the Council of Florence, teach that the principium quod of these emanations are the producing persons; the proximate principium quo of the first emanation is the divine essence with intellect, or fecund memory (as many speak with the Seraphic Doctor); but the principium quo of the second is the same essence with will, or fecund will.
2. The divine nature is communicated equally formally and per se to the Holy Spirit as to the Son. Although some contradict this position, it appears to be certain doctrine, which St. Bonaventure teaches especially d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3. Whence it follows that the root of that difference is to be sought in the property of this twofold fecundity (cf. here q. 2, ad 1 and 2).
3. Several differences of these emanations can and ought to be assigned: namely the difference of terms, or of the persons emanated, which certainly are really distinguished; the difference of principles, both since generation is from one and spiration from two (here in the second fundamentum and in the corpus), and since the proximate principium quo is one and another (third fundamentum); finally there is the difference in comparison to us (in the corpus), since in the second emanation there is some special regard to the creature according to the aptitude of donability, on which see below d. 18, q. 2 and 3. Nor is there controversy about whether these differences subsist, but about which of them is the first reason and as it were a priori.
III. Theologians differ, however, on certain more particular determinations.
1. Durandus with some seems to admit no other difference except this — that generation proceeds from one, spiration from two — which opinion the Holy Doctor with the common [tradition] rightly opposes.
2. It is disputed whether, beyond the differences sought as it were extrinsically (whether originally from their principles, i.e. the producing persons, or consequently from their terms), these emanations also intrinsically and formally (a priori) differ by themselves, i.e. by their own proper accounts, in an analogous way to that in which ultimate differences (e.g. rational and irrational) differ. If this is affirmed, this difference must be called the first and as it were formal. The Holy Doctor affirms this in the corpus and ad 4. Among others Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla agree, and especially Scotus, who also adds: "they differ by their wholes." This last clause is explained by Scotists in this sense — that the two emanations have no common reality contractible by differences, although they agree in the common concept of being and relation (Rada, Controversiae 11, a. 2; Macedo, Collationes 7, diff. 2 — who keenly defends Scotus against the interpretation of him made by Cajetan). — St. Thomas in the Summa (I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 1) agrees with St. Bonaventure in teaching that they differ by their own proper accounts, which is the same as to differ by themselves, as Cajetan grants (on this place). But the same [Thomas], De Potentia q. 10, a. 2, does not admit this opinion; and on the other [opinion] — that they are distinguished by their principles — he judges thus: "It is not enough, unless something else is added"; finally he posits a third — that "the order of processions alone, which is attended to according to
origin, multiplies processions in divine things." In his Commentary (here q. 1, a. 2, ad ult.) the same [Thomas] against Bonaventure's argument from the vicious circle says: "What therefore is objected — that the relations follow upon the processions, whence it appears rather that diverse processions cause the diversity of relations, than conversely, or at least there will be a circle there — is to be answered: that relation in divine things has not only that it is notion, but also that it is personal, that is, constituting the person; and from this it has as it were the act of a constitutive difference and of the proper form of the very person, whose [act] is the operation of generating and of spirating; and therefore it is not unsuitable that, according to the account of relation, the relations follow upon the processions themselves and receive a difference from them; whereas insofar as they are the proper forms of the persons themselves, they cause the difference of the processions." How the various sayings of the Angelic Doctor are to be reconciled, is disputed, and Cajetan can be consulted (on q. 27, a. 4; q. 36, a. 2). Furthermore some of St. Thomas's reasonings are impugned by Scotus; on which see Rada and Macedo at the cited places. The same difficulty and a certain difference of opinion between the Seraphic and the Angelic Doctor returns below at d. 27, p. I, q. 2, where more will be said in the Scholion on this most subtle matter.
3. There is a different mode of speaking concerning the proper reason why procession by way of nature differs from the other by way of will. In the first, according to Bonaventure (here in corp.), there is "emanation by way of perfect assimilation," and earlier he says that through it the image proceeds. These words, if compared with the explanation of image which he gives at d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 2, and with what is said at d. 10, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2 and 3, clearly prove that the Seraphic Doctor agrees with the opinion of St. Thomas, who (S. I, q. 27, a. 4) teaches that in the first emanation there is the account of likeness by force of the procession itself, not in the second. Hence it follows that the opinion is wrongly attributed to the Seraphic Doctor, to which Richard (here q. 3) seems to incline — that this reason is to be sought in the fact that the Son receives only the fecund will, not fecund nature.
4. It is disputed whether it can be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds necessarily indeed but yet freely, which Sirmondus says with others — also St. Thomas, de Potentia q. 10, a. 2, ad 5 — who however in other places teaches that he proceeds naturally, although by way of will. Certainly this word libere is taken here not in the strict and now commonly received sense, but for voluntarie, insofar as it does not exclude the necessarium, as among very many ancient Fathers and doctors and even with St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 25, p. II, q. 2. Hence Rada (Controversiae 13) and Macedo (Collationes 7) rightly prove that this is rather a dispute over a name.
5. It is disputed whether the Word proceeds by an act of speaking [dicere], as Scotus holds — to whom Bonaventure inclines — or by an act of understanding [intelligere], as St. Thomas teaches with his [followers]. On this controversy see below d. 27, p. II, q. 1 and 3, and the Scholion.
IV. The sense of the response to 4 here is this. Although these notional acts do not have being from themselves — i.e. extrinsically [do not have] distinction from their original principles — yet intrinsically they are distinguished by themselves. For the inference must be denied ("that does not hold") that in being arisen from another there cannot intrinsically be distinction. Thus whiteness and blackness, although they are from other causes, differ by themselves. The Holy Doctor himself sets the example of ultimate differences, which are distinguished by themselves "although they have origin from the genus." For the genus, which according to the Aristotelians contains in itself in potency the species and differences, is in some manner the principle of the differences. In the objection, then, there has been committed the fallacy of figure of speech, since the genus of one cause — namely the efficient — has been changed into another genus — namely the formal.
V. Besides the authors already cited, cf. Scotus, in both scripta here, q. unica. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1, and d. 11, a. 5. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 3. — Aegidius of Rome, here 1. princ. q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 60, q. 1, n. 36 ff.
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- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic ergo et paulo ante Quia.From the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here supplied ergo ("therefore"), and a little earlier Quia ("Because").
- Ed. 1 rationem loco rem.Ed. 1 reads rationem ("the account") in place of rem ("the matter").
- Fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic a Vat. additum enim, sicuti mox post sed adiunctum secundum.On the testimony of the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here struck out enim ("for"), added by the Vatican edition, just as shortly after, secundum ("according to") joined after sed ("but").
- Vat. nomini Pater praefigit sic, cod. cc quia sic, cod. Y ergo; sed plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 quamlibet particulam omittunt.The Vatican edition prefixes sic ("thus") to the name Pater, codex cc reads quia sic ("since thus"), codex Y reads ergo ("therefore"); but most codices, with ed. 1, omit any such particle.
- Auctoritate fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 removimus hic a Vat. additum intellectualis.On the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have here removed intellectualis ("intellectual"), added by the Vatican edition [reading "fecundity of intellectual nature"].
- Vat. praeter fidem vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 addit Patris, et paulo infra post idem contra mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omittit et.The Vatican edition, against the testimony of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, adds Patris ("of the Father") [reading "the emanations of the Father"], and a little below, after idem ("the same"), against the manuscripts and edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, omits et ("and").
- Pauci codd. ut MZ addunt est.A few codices, such as M and Z, add est ("is") [reading "vel a quo est", "or by which it is"].
- In codd. O Z satis bene adiicitur: generatio vero est divina persona.In codices O and Z there is added, well enough: "but generation is the divine person" [parallel to "creation is the divine essence"].
- Codd. P Q addunt et rationem.Codices P and Q add et rationem ("and an account") [reading "according to a difference and an account of origin and of relation"].
- Sensus est: non important ipsam rationem, quae facit differentiam, sed sunt subiecta, inter quae habetur differentia. — Paulo ante cod. X post enim adiungit proprie.The sense is: [the persons] do not import the very account that makes the difference, but are the subjects between which the difference is held. — A little earlier, codex X after enim adds proprie ("properly").
- Ita mss. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. initium huius propositionis variis adiectis ita exhibet: si ergo personae differunt, quare et in quibus differant, si ostendere voluerimus necesse est etc. Mox ed. 1 esset loco erit.Thus the manuscripts with ed. 1, while the Vatican edition, with various additions, presents the opening of this proposition thus: "if therefore the persons differ, why and in what they differ, if we should wish to show, it is necessary, etc." Shortly after, ed. 1 reads esset ("would be") in place of erit ("will be").
- Sequimur vetustiores codd. cum ed. 1 ponendo quaeritur pro quaero.We follow the older codices with ed. 1 in placing quaeritur ("it is asked") for quaero ("I ask").
- In cod. Y additur dupliciter.In codex Y is added dupliciter ("in two ways") [reading "perfect and true fecundity in two ways"].
- Cfr. supra d. 9. q. I; de voluntate d. 10. a. 1. q. 1.Cf. above [I Sent.] d. 9, q. I; on the will, d. 10, a. 1, q. 1.
- Vat., plurimis mss. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, sint.The Vatican edition, despite the resistance of most manuscripts and ed. 1, reads sint ("they should be") [for sunt, "they are"].
- In hac ipsa quaestione; cfr. etiam q. praec. praesertim ad 1. et 2.[The back-reference] is to this very question; cf. also the preceding question, especially ad 1 and ad 2.
- Cod. V loco similiter habet sic, cod. X sic etiam. Mox aliqui codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 prave tunc loco sicut.Codex V in place of similiter ("likewise") reads sic ("thus"); codex X sic etiam ("thus also"). Shortly after, some codices with edd. 1, 2, 3 perversely [read] tunc ("then") in place of sicut ("just as").
- In cod. bb additur scilicet.In codex bb is added scilicet ("namely") [glossing the vim spirativam et generativam phrase].
- Vat. sibi non constans et contra plurimos codd. nec non ed. 1 imperfectionem, dum cod. 1 et hic et paulo supra legit imperfectionem. Mox post divinis Vat. addit non, quod codd. cum sex primis edd. omittunt, et bene, quia subiectum huius propositionis non sunt termini, sed emanationes, quae, uti supra dictum est, in Deo se ipsis differunt et sunt ratio distinguendi. Unus alterve codex ut B O cum ed. 1 modo singulari in divinis est ratio, sed non ita bene propter subiecti mutationem; simile dicas de lectione cod. bb in divinis sunt rationes.The Vatican edition, inconsistent with itself and against most codices and ed. 1, [reads] imperfectionem ("imperfection") [for imperfectum, "imperfect"], while codex 1 both here and a little above reads imperfectionem. Shortly after, after divinis the Vatican edition adds non ("not"), which the codices with the first six editions omit, and rightly, because the subject of this proposition is not the terms but the emanations, which, as was said above, in God differ by themselves and are the [first] reason of distinguishing. One or another codex, like B and O, with ed. 1, in the singular [reads] in divinis est ratio ("in divine things [the term] is the reason"), but not so well, because of the change of subject; you may say the like of the reading of codex bb in divinis sunt rationes ("are reasons").
- Quaest. praeced. ad 3.[I.e.] in the preceding question [d. 13, q. 2], ad 3.
- Plures codd. ut F H K T etc. illud.Several codices, such as F, H, K, T, etc., read illud ("that") [for id].
- Vat. cum ed. 1 sed a se ipsis; obstant autem mss.The Vatican edition with ed. 1 reads sed a se ipsis ("but from themselves"); the manuscripts, however, are against this.
- Cap. 5. n. 6. — Mox cod. Z differentia loco dicitur.[Augustine, De Trinitate V,] c. 5, n. 6. — Shortly after, codex Z reads differentia ("a difference") in place of dicitur ("is called").
- Vat. et cod. cc essentialiter pro essentia, sed emendavimus ex ceteris mss. et ed. 1.The Vatican edition and codex cc read essentialiter ("essentially") for essentia ("essence"); but we have emended from the other manuscripts and ed. 1.