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Dist. 17, Part 1, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 17

Textus Latinus
p. 303

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de ista consequentia: Qui diligit proximum, consequens est, ut ipsam dilectionem diligat. Videtur enim ista consequentia non valere. Quamvis enim possibile sit, dilectionem diligi, non tamen est necesse, quod aliquis diligat eam; multa enim frequenter amamus, quae nollemus amare.

Item dubitatur de ista consequentia: Qui diligit dilectionem, consequens est, ut Deum diligat; quia, aut intelligit de increata, aut1 creata. Si de creata, nihil valet: diligit quid creatum, ergo increatum; si de increata, tunc in nullo concordat cum priori sententia, quia dilectio, qua diligimus2 proximum, est dilectio creata.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod utraque consequentia bona est in proposito. Quidam enim est amor, in quo non est quietatio nec delectatio nec complacentia, ut puta ille qui est ex pronitate corruptionis, cui ratio obsistit. Quidam vero est amor, qui est cum delectatione, complacentia et quietatione; et in tali amore non est tantum acceptatio rei amatae, immo3 etiam ipsius amoris; et talis amor est caritas, et ideo sequitur: qui amat proximum amat dilectionem, id est, acceptat.

Sed quoniam bene sequitur: qui acceptat aliquid ex se, multo magis acceptat illud, in quo invenitur ratio acceptationis;4 si dilectio, eo ipso quo dilectio, acceptatur, maior dilectio magis acceptatur. Cum ergo dilectio nostra sit dilectio exemplata, et dilectio divina sit5 exemplar omnis rectae dilectionis, et in illa est prima et summa ratio omnis acceptationis: hinc est, quod sequitur, quod qui diligit dilectionem diligit Deum. Unde Augustinus6 arguit ex hac suppositione, quod ipsa caritas sive dilectio proximi est dilectio cum acceptatione; et ex hoc tenet prima consequentia;7 et ex alia suppositione, quod prima ratio acceptationis est in dilectione exemplante, non exemplata; et ex hoc patet secunda.8

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Ecce iam potes notiorem Deum habere quam fratrem. Videtur enim falsum, quia primae ad Timotheum ultimo9 dicitur de Deo, quod lucem habitat inaccessibilem. Praeterea, de fratre novit, quid est, de Deo vero non novit, quid est, sed, si est; ipse autem10 non loquitur quantum ad cognitionem, si est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliquid magis certitudinaliter cognosci est dupliciter, quia certitudo cognitionis est secundum praesentiam; aliquid autem praesentius est dupliciter: aut quantum ad rationem cognoscibilis, aut quantum ad substantiam.11 Quantum ad substantiam Deus est praesentior cuilibet rei quam aliqua alia res; quantum autem ad rationem cognoscendi hoc est dupliciter: aut a parte cognoscibilis, sicut sol est praesens caeco, et tamen caecus est absens lumini; sic Deus est praesentior quam frater; si autem a parte cognoscentis, sic praesentior est frater, quia praesens est oculis carnis,12 quorum cognitio viget secundum statum praesentem.

Aliter potest dici, quod praesentius est aliquid dupliciter in ratione cognoscibilis: vel secundum effectum, vel secundum se. Secundum se notior est frater, secundum effectum notior est Deus. Quia effectus divinus, qui est dilectio, intrat ipsam animam et ei est praesens et magis cognoscitur quam frater.13

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de illo verbo canonicae Ioannis quarto, quod est in littera: Qui diligit, manet in lumine. Videtur enim improprie dictum, quia lumen

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respicit cognitionem, sicut calor affectionem: ergo magis deberet dicere: manet in calore, quam manet in lumine.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod luminis est manifestare. Manifestare autem aliquid alicui est dupliciter: aut sicut viam cognoscendorum, aut sicut viam agendorum. Primum est per scientiam, et contra illud lumen opponitur tenebra ignorantiae simplicis; secundum est per gratiam, unde: Unctio docebit vos de omnibus;14 et contra illud est tenebra malitiae sive peccati; et de hoc lumine et de his tenebris loquitur beatus Ioannes, quod patet in textu, et Ecclesiastici undecimo15: Error et tenebrae peccatoribus concreata sunt. Et quoniam caritas semper est cum gratia, aliae virtutes non, ideo dicit: Qui amat, manet in lumine, per appropriationem.16

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in divinis donis nihil maius est caritate. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia sapientiae donum ponitur excellentissimum inter omnia dona, vel si idem est caritas et sapientia, caritas non retinet praerogativam inter dona. Item quaeritur de consequentia: si caritas est praecipuum inter dona Dei, et nullum maius est quam Spiritus sanctus: ergo Spiritus sanctus est caritas. Aut ergo17 loquitur de caritate creata, aut increata; si de increata, tunc ergo probat idem per idem; si de creata, tunc nulla videtur consequentia, quia non valet, quod si creata est caritas maior inter dona creata, quod sit Spiritus sanctus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod praedicta auctoritas Augustini potest intelligi de caritate creata et increata; et pro utraque habet veritatem. Si de increata, certum est; si de creata, maximum est inter dona, quia plus habet in se de ratione bonitatis sive de ipsa bonitate, quam aliquod donum,18 loquendo praecise. Quaedam enim dona sunt, quae sunt sine caritate; et hoc quidem certum est, quod minora sunt. Quaedam praesupponunt caritatem, sicut19 donum sapientiae. Caritas enim est, quae dat sensum gustui, ut sapiant ei bona aeterna. Unde sapientia superaddit quandam ulteriorem habilitatem,20 quae comparata ad caritatem minus bonum est, sed prout claudit caritatem, maius bonum est ratione eius quod praesupponit. Et ita patet, quod caritas, praecise loquendo, est excellentissimum donum; sapientia vero, praesupponendo sive implicando donum caritatis, dicitur excellentissimum.

Ad illud quod obiicitur de consequentia, dicendum, quod utroque modo bona est. Si enim intelligatur de caritate increata, si21 ipsa est donum primum et praecipuum, et Spiritus sanctus est huiusmodi: oportet quod ipsa sit Spiritus sanctus, quia quod per superabundantiam dicitur, uni soli convenit.22 Si autem de caritate creata; tunc consequentia Augustini intelligenda est a parte nominis sic: si caritas creata est maximum23 inter dona creata, et Spiritus sanctus est maximum donorum: ergo melius nominatur nomine doni excellentissimi quam alio. Consequens ergo est, ut Spiritus sanctus sit caritas, sed non creata, immo illa quae Deus est.24

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non utique sic dictum est, quod Dei substantia est nostra patientia. Videtur enim male dicere, quia caritas, qua nos diligimus Deum, non est ipse Deus, nisi intelligamus quo diligimus exemplariter vel causaliter: ergo cum simile sit de patientia, videtur quod Augustinus male destruit25 illud simile. Item, cum Deus faciat nos diligentes, sicut patientes, quare non dicitur Deus caritas nostra, sicut patientia nostra?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Deus est caritas et essentialiter et causaliter: essentialiter, quia in se amor est; causaliter, quia in nobis amorem efficit. Sed Deus non est patientia essentialiter, sed solum causaliter; et ideo Scriptura istum diversum modum innuens26 dicit, Deum esse patientiam nostram, et Deum esse caritatem sine additione. Ratio autem huius est, quia27 quidam habitus dicunt incompletionem, sicut patientia, spes et huiusmodi, qui non cadunt in Deo per essentiam, sed per causam, quia huiusmodi sunt a Deo. Quidam autem sunt habitus di-

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centes complementum, et huiusmodi28 sunt in Deo essentialiter, sicut caritas et sapientia et huiusmodi. Notandum autem, quod Augustinus vult dicere, quod Deus est caritas essentialiter, sed ipse non vult dicere, quod sit caritas nostra essentialiter, sed causaliter et exemplariter. Nec ita est patientia nostra exemplariter.29 Quamvis enim omnes virtutes habeant exemplar cognoscitivum in Deo et omnes habeant exemplar secundum similitudinem longinquam, tamen quaedam virtutes non habent sibi correspondens in Deo per omnia, sicut patientia, quae duo dicit, scilicet passionem et superferri passionibus. Quantum ad primum, non habet in Deo correspondens, sed quantum ad secundum solum. Caritas autem habet amorem in Deo sibi per omnia correspondentem, et30 amorem non tantum essentialem, sed etiam personalem: et ideo dicunt auctoritates,31 quod Spiritus sanctus est caritas, qua diligimus Deum; et ablativus qua dicit habitudinem non tantum causae efficientis, sed etiam formalis, non perficientis, sed exemplantis.32

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod solum donum caritatis dividit inter filios regni et filios perditionis. Videtur enim male dicere, quia aut loquitur de divisione quantum ad cognitionem, aut quantum ad veritatem. Si quantum ad veritatem, hoc falsum est, quia non solum in caritate, sed etiam in fide gratuita et spe differunt; si quantum ad cognitionem, tunc minime dividit, quia nescitur, quis hoc donum habeat.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod omnia dona virtutum possunt esse informia praeter caritatem. Et quoniam possunt esse informia, possunt esse in iustis et peccatoribus, et ideo in illis nunquam separantur ab invicem. Sed caritas nunquam potest esse informis nec esse cum peccato, quia actus eius est diligere Deum33 propter se et super omnia, qui removetur per omne peccatum. Ideo dicit Augustinus,34 quod sola caritas distinguit, loquendo de distinctione in universali.

Quod obiicitur de fide gratuita sive formata, concedo, quod distinguit; sed tamen hoc non habet, quia fides, sed quia gratuita; et ita ex hoc, quod caritati coniuncta;35 et sic patet illud.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Si tradidero corpus meum, ita ut ardeam etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia Dominus dicit, Ioannis decimo quinto36: Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut animam suam ponat etc.: ergo si hoc est maximum opus caritatis, impossibile est, quod fiat sine caritate.

Respondeo: Aliqui dicunt, quod Apostolus dicit per impossibile; posito enim adhuc,37 quod aliquis hanc poenam pateretur sine caritate pro Christo, adhuc non prodesset sibi. Credo tamen, quod aliqui38 ex industria naturalium et aliqua gratia gratis data possent sustinere pro fide Christi mortem etiam sine caritate, sicut39 haereticus sustinet per errorem. Et quod dicit Dominus, quod illud est summae caritatis, hoc dicit quantum ad signum et exteriorem ostensionem; signa tamen sunt fallibilia, et ideo non necessario oportet, quod si aliquis mortem sustinet pro Christo sive pro eius fide,40 habeat caritatem. Credo tamen, quod si aliquis pro Christo sustineret mortem, qui non magnum haberet obicem, quod disponeret se ad gratiae susceptionem, ita quod daretur sibi caritas.

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English Translation

DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first there is doubt about this consequence: He who loves the neighbor, it consequently follows that he loves the love itself. For this consequence appears not to hold. For although it is possible that love be loved, yet it is not necessary that someone love it; for many things we frequently love which we would not wish to love.

Likewise there is doubt about this consequence: He who loves love, it consequently follows that he loves God; because [the proposition] is taken either of uncreated [love] or1 of created. If of created, it has no force: he loves something created, therefore something uncreated; if of uncreated, then it accords in nothing with the prior statement, because the love by which we love2 the neighbor is a created love.

I respond: It must be said that both consequences are good in the matter proposed. For there is a certain love in which there is no rest nor delight nor complacence — such, for instance, as that which is from the proneness of corruption, to which reason resists. But there is another love which is with delight, complacence and rest; and in such love there is acceptance not only of the thing loved, but rather3 also of the love itself; and such love is charity, and therefore it follows: he who loves the neighbor loves the love, that is, accepts [it].

But since it well follows: he who accepts something from itself, much more accepts that in which is found the ground of acceptance;4 if love, by the very fact that it is love, is accepted, a greater love is more accepted. Since therefore our love is an exemplated love, and the divine love is5 the exemplar of every right love, and in it is the first and supreme ground of all acceptance: hence it is that it follows that he who loves love loves God. Whence Augustine6 argues from this supposition, that charity itself or the love of the neighbor is love with acceptance; and from this the first consequence holds;7 and from another supposition, that the first ground of acceptance is in exemplating love, not in exemplated love; and from this the second is clear.8

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: Behold, you can already have God more known than your brother. For it appears false, because in the last [chapter] of First Timothy9 it is said of God, that he dwells in inaccessible light. Furthermore, of one's brother one knows what he is; but of God one does not know what he is, but only whether he is; he himself, however,10 does not speak as to the cognition whether he is.

I respond: It must be said that for something to be known more certainly is twofold, since the certitude of cognition is according to presence; but something is more present in two ways: either with respect to the ground of being knowable, or with respect to substance.11 With respect to substance, God is more present to any thing whatever than any other thing is; with respect to the ground of knowing, however, this is twofold: either on the side of the knowable, as the sun is present to the blind man, and yet the blind man is absent from the light; thus God is more present than the brother; but if on the side of the knower, thus the brother is more present, because he is present to the eyes of the flesh,12 whose cognition flourishes according to the present state.

It can be said otherwise, that something is more present in two ways in the ground of being knowable: either according to effect, or according to itself. According to itself the brother is more known; according to effect God is more known. For the divine effect, which is love, enters the soul itself and is present to it and is more known than the brother.13

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about that word of the canonical [Letter] of John, chapter four, which is in the text: He who loves abides in light. For it appears improperly said, because light

regards cognition, as heat [regards] affection: therefore he ought rather to say abides in heat than abides in light.

I respond: It must be said that it belongs to light to manifest. But to manifest something to someone is twofold: either as the way of things to be known, or as the way of things to be done. The first is by knowledge, and against this light is opposed the darkness of simple ignorance; the second is by grace, whence: The unction shall teach you concerning all things;14 and against this is the darkness of malice or sin; and of this light and of these darknesses speaks the blessed John, as is plain in the text, and Ecclesiasticus eleven15: Error and darkness are created together with sinners. And since charity is always with grace, but other virtues not, therefore he says: He who loves, abides in light, by appropriation.16

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that in the divine gifts nothing is greater than charity. For it appears to say falsely, because the gift of wisdom is set down as most excellent among all the gifts; or, if charity and wisdom are the same, charity does not retain a prerogative among the gifts. Likewise it is asked of the consequence: if charity is the chief among the gifts of God, and nothing is greater than the Holy Spirit: therefore the Holy Spirit is charity. Either therefore17 he speaks of created charity, or of uncreated; if of uncreated, then he proves the same by the same; if of created, then no consequence appears, because it does not hold, that if a created charity is the greater among created gifts, then it is the Holy Spirit.

I respond: It must be said that the aforesaid authority of Augustine can be understood of charity created and uncreated; and for both it has truth. If of uncreated, it is certain; if of created, it is the greatest among the gifts, because it has more in itself of the ground of goodness, or of goodness itself, than any [other] gift,18 speaking precisely. For there are certain gifts which are without charity; and this indeed is certain, that they are lesser. There are certain ones which presuppose charity, such as19 the gift of wisdom. For charity it is that gives sense to taste, that eternal goods may have savor for it. Whence wisdom superadds a certain further capability,20 which compared to charity is a lesser good, but inasmuch as it includes charity, it is a greater good by reason of that which it presupposes. And so it is plain, that charity, precisely speaking, is the most excellent gift; but wisdom, presupposing or implicating the gift of charity, is called the most excellent.

To that which is objected concerning the consequence, it must be said, that in either way it is good. For if it is understood of uncreated charity, if21 it is the first and chief gift, and the Holy Spirit is of this kind: it is necessary that it be the Holy Spirit, because what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone.22 But if of created charity; then the consequence of Augustine is to be understood from the side of the name thus: if created charity is the greatest23 among created gifts, and the Holy Spirit is the greatest of gifts: therefore he is better named by the name of the most excellent gift than by another. Consequently, then, the Holy Spirit is charity, but not created, but rather that [charity] which is God.24

Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: It was not at all said in this manner, that the substance of God is our patience. For it appears to speak ill, because the charity by which we love God is not God himself, unless we understand by which we love exemplarily or causally: therefore, since it is similar concerning patience, it appears that Augustine wrongly destroys25 that similarity. Likewise, since God makes us loving, just as he makes us patient, why is God not called our charity, just as our patience?

I respond: It must be said that God is charity both essentially and causally: essentially, because in himself he is love; causally, because he effects love in us. But God is not patience essentially, but only causally; and therefore Scripture, hinting at this diverse mode,26 says God to be our patience, and God to be charity without addition. The reason for this is that27 certain habits state incompletion, like patience, hope, and the like, which do not fall in God by essence, but by cause, because such things are from God. But there are certain habits

stating completion, and such28 are in God essentially, like charity and wisdom and such. Yet it must be noted that Augustine wishes to say that God is charity essentially, but he does not wish to say that he is our charity essentially, but causally and exemplarily. Nor is he our patience in this way exemplarily.29 For although all virtues have a cognoscitive exemplar in God and all have an exemplar according to a remote likeness, yet certain virtues do not have something corresponding to them in God in every respect, as patience, which states two things, namely passion and the bearing-up-over passions. With respect to the first, it has no correspondent in God; but only with respect to the second. But charity has love in God corresponding to it in every respect, and30 love not only essential, but also personal: and therefore the authorities say,31 that the Holy Spirit is the charity by which we love God; and the ablative qua states a relation not only of efficient, but also of formal cause, not perfecting but exemplating.32

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the gift of charity alone divides between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition. For it appears to speak ill, because either he speaks of division with respect to cognition, or with respect to truth. If with respect to truth, this is false, because they differ not only in charity, but also in gratuitous faith and hope; if with respect to cognition, then it does not divide at all, because it is not known who has this gift.

I respond: It must be said that all gifts of the virtues can be unformed except charity. And since they can be unformed, they can be in the just and in sinners, and therefore in them they are never separated from one another. But charity can never be unformed nor be with sin, because its act is to love God33 for his own sake and above all things, which act is removed by every sin. Therefore Augustine says,34 that charity alone distinguishes, speaking of distinction in the universal.

To that which is objected concerning gratuitous or formed faith, I concede that it distinguishes; but yet this it has not because [it is] faith, but because [it is] gratuitous; and so from this, that it is joined to charity;35 and so that is plain.

Doubt VII.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: If I shall have delivered my body so that I burn etc. For it appears to speak ill, because the Lord says, John fifteen36: Greater love than this no one has, that he lay down his soul etc.: therefore if this is the greatest work of charity, it is impossible that it be done without charity.

I respond: Some say, that the Apostle speaks by an impossibility; for granting still,37 that someone should suffer this penalty without charity for Christ, still it would not profit him. Yet I believe, that some38 by an industry of natural [powers] and some grace gratuitously given could sustain death for the faith of Christ even without charity, just as39 the heretic sustains [it] through error. And as to what the Lord says, that this is of the highest charity, he says this with respect to sign and exterior showing; yet signs are fallible, and therefore it is not necessary, that if someone sustains death for Christ or for his faith,40 he have charity. Yet I believe, that if someone should sustain death for Christ, who did not have a great obstacle, that he would dispose himself to the reception of grace, so that charity would be given to him.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aliqui codd. ut HK aa ee ff cum ed. 1 repetunt hic de.
    Some codices, such as HK, aa, ee, ff, with edition 1, here repeat de.
  2. Ex mss. et ed. 1 posuimus diligimus loco diligit. Paulo ante cod. O, posito consequentia, loco sententia, addit immo aequivocatur dilectio.
    From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have placed diligimus in place of diligit. A little before, codex O, having placed consequentia in place of sententia, adds immo aequivocatur dilectio.
  3. Cod. dd sed pro immo.
    Codex dd [reads] sed for immo.
  4. Sequimur nonnullos codd. ut FGHKT ponendo acceptationis loco dilectionis, quorum lectio toto contextus processu confirmatur. Mox aliqui mss. ut VZ comparativo maior praemittunt particulam et, ac dein post magis multi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt certe supplendum acceptatur.
    We follow some codices such as FGHKT in placing acceptationis in place of dilectionis, whose reading is confirmed by the whole course of the context. Soon some manuscripts such as VZ prefix the particle et to the comparative maior, and then after magis many codices with edition 1 omit acceptatur, which is certainly to be supplied.
  5. Lectio Vat., in qua habetur ut loco ut, castigatur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, ex quibus etiam paulo infra post hinc supplevimus est quod. Aliqui codd. ut AGHIKT etc. cum ed. 1 voci hinc praefigunt particulam et.
    The reading of the Vatican [edition], in which there is ut in place of ut, is corrected with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, 6; from these also a little below, after hinc, we have supplied est quod. Some codices such as AGHIKT etc., with edition 1, prefix the particle et to the word hinc.
  6. Lib. VIII. de Trin. c. 8. n. 12, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est.
    Book VIII On the Trinity, c. 8, n. 12, from which the text of this doubt is taken.
  7. Scil., quod qui diligit proximum, diligat ipsam dilectionem. — Plurimis codd. consentientibus, substituimus et ex hoc pro et ex hac.
    Namely, that he who loves the neighbor loves the love itself. — Most codices agreeing, we substitute et ex hoc for et ex hac.
  8. Nempe: quod qui diligit dilectionem, diligat Deum. — Ed. 1 ex hac loco ex hoc. — Plura de hac re vide supra q. 2. et apud B. Albert., hic a. 3. — S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic expos. lit.
    Namely: that he who loves love, loves God. — Edition 1 [reads] ex hac in place of ex hoc. — More on this matter see above q. 2, and in B. Albert, here a. 3. — St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the expositio litterae.
  9. Vers. 16, ubi Vulg. inhabitat loco habitat.
    [1 Tim. 6,] verse 16, where the Vulgate [reads] inhabitat in place of habitat.
  10. Nonnulli codd. ut AIVX cum ed. 1 omittunt minus bene autem; cod. Y addit Magister.
    Some codices such as AIVX with edition 1 omit, less well, autem; codex Y adds Magister.
  11. Vat. et cod. cc in hac propositione contra multos mss. et ed. 1 praesens loco praesentius, ac mox contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1, omisso primo aut, ponunt cognoscendi loco cognoscibilis, quod transferunt post substantiam. Pro rationem cognoscibilis magis placeret rationem cognoscendi, si faverent codd.
    The Vatican [edition] and codex cc, in this proposition against many manuscripts and edition 1, [read] praesens in place of praesentius; and soon, against most codices and edition 1, with the first aut omitted, they put cognoscendi in place of cognoscibilis, which they transfer after substantiam. In place of rationem cognoscibilis, rationem cognoscendi would please more, if the codices favored [it].
  12. Ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus carnis pro carneis.
    From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted carnis for carneis.
  13. De duplici modo, quo Deus intellectui nostro praesens est, vide supra d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — In solutione huius dubii conveniunt B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3.
    On the twofold mode in which God is present to our intellect, see above d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — In the solution of this doubt B. Albert, here a. 4, agrees. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 6. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3.
  14. I. Ioan. 2, 27, ubi Vulgata: Unctio eius docet vos de omnibus. — Vat. contra mss. post unde addit per Ioannem.
    I John 2, 27, where the Vulgate [reads]: His unction teaches you concerning all things. — The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts, after unde adds per Ioannem.
  15. Vers. 16.
    Verse 16.
  16. Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic in expos. textus.
    Cf. B. Albert, here a. 6; St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the expositio textus.
  17. Ed. 1 enim loco ergo, quae et mox post aut repetit de caritate.
    Edition 1 [reads] enim in place of ergo, which also soon after aut repeats de caritate.
  18. Ed. 1 donorum, cod. dd autem addit aliud. Mox pauci codd. ut VZ omittunt quae sunt.
    Edition 1 [reads] donorum; codex dd, however, adds aliud. Soon a few codices such as VZ omit quae sunt.
  19. Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 velut. Ed. 1 post sicut adiungit est.
    The Vatican [edition], beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] velut. Edition 1 after sicut adds est.
  20. Exhibemus lectionem fere omnium mss. ponendo habilitatem pro virtutem quae habilitat; ed. 1 habititationem. Paulo infra ex multis codd. ut AGHIK TW etc. et ed. 1 pro minus bona substituimus minus bonum, quod et in se distinctius et cum subnexis magis correspondens.
    We give the reading of nearly all the manuscripts in placing habilitatem for virtutem quae habilitat; edition 1 [reads] habititationem. A little below, from many codices such as AGHIK, TW etc., and edition 1, in place of minus bona we substitute minus bonum, which is both more distinct in itself and more corresponding to what follows.
  21. Vat. sic loco si, et mox post huiusmodi addit ergo, bene, quia agitur tantum de consequentia ostendenda. Obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1 et quidem.
    The Vatican [edition reads] sic in place of si, and soon after huiusmodi adds ergo, rightly, because the consequence alone is being shown. Yet the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 stands against [it], and indeed.
  22. Aristot., V. Top. c. 3. (c. 5.).
    Aristotle, Topics V, c. 3 (c. 5).
  23. Aliqui codd. ut IT addunt donum.
    Some codices such as IT add donum.
  24. Cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 7. — Petr. a Tar., Richard., hic circa lit.
    Cf. B. Albert, here a. 7. — Peter of Tarentaise, Richard, here circa litteram.
  25. Cod. J destruat.
    Codex J [reads] destruat.
  26. Mendum Vat. inveniens loco innuens correximus ope mss. — Textus S. Scripturae de isto diverso modo vide hic in lit. Magistri, c. 3.
    The error of the Vatican [edition], inveniens in place of innuens, we have corrected with the help of the manuscripts. — For the texts of Holy Scripture concerning this diverse mode, see here in the Master's text, c. 3.
  27. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quia, loco quod, et paulo infra qui pro quae.
    From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we substitute quia for quod, and a little below qui for quae.
  28. In cod. I additur habitus.
    In codex I is added habitus.
  29. In Vat. haec propositio: Nec ita est patientia nostra exemplariter perperam deest, quae tamen in mss. et ed. 1 habetur.
    In the Vatican [edition] this proposition: Nor is our patience [so] exemplarily, is wrongly absent, which yet is found in the manuscripts and edition 1.
  30. Cod. V per loco et.
    Codex V [reads] per in place of et.
  31. Quas videsis in lit. Magistri, hic c. 14.
    Which you may see in the Master's text, here c. 14.
  32. Duplex siquidem tunc distinguebatur causa formalis, scil. intrinseca seu informans (perficiens), et extrinseca seu exemplaris. — De hoc dubio vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 8 et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.
    A twofold formal cause was then distinguished, namely the intrinsic or informing (perfecting), and the extrinsic or exemplary. — On this doubt see also B. Albert, here a. 8, and Peter of Tarentaise, here circa litteram.
  33. Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus male omissum Deum. Mox relativum qui referas ad actum. — Plura de eo, quod caritas non possit esse informis, vide III. Sent. d. 27. a. 1. q. 1.
    On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have added Deum, which had been wrongly omitted. Soon refer the relative qui to actum. — More on this, that charity cannot be unformed, see III Sent. d. 27, a. 1, q. 1.
  34. Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 18. n. 32, ex quo textus huius dubii sumtus est.
    Book XV On the Trinity, c. 18, n. 32, from which the text of this doubt is taken.
  35. In ed. 1 additur huius. Idem dubium solutum invenies apud B. Albert., hic a. 9.
    In edition 1 is added huius. The same doubt resolved you will find in B. Albert, here a. 9.
  36. Vers. 13.
    Verse 13.
  37. Vat. perperam, et antiquioribus mss. cum edd. 1, 6 refragantibus, ad hoc. Dein edd. 2, 3 habens pro hanc.
    The Vatican [edition reads] wrongly, with the older manuscripts and editions 1 and 6 contradicting, ad hoc. Then editions 2 and 3 [read] habens for hanc.
  38. Ex pluribus codd. ut TX et ed. 1 adiecimus aliqui. Cod. Z aliquis, et paulo post posset loco possent; cod. V absque aliqui habet posset.
    From many codices such as TX and edition 1 we have added aliqui. Codex Z [reads] aliquis, and a little after posset in place of possent; codex V, without aliqui, has posset.
  39. Cod. bb addit particulam et. Mox cod. M pro errore, et cod. ee cum ed. 1 propter errorem loco per errorem.
    Codex bb adds the particle et. Soon codex M [reads, in place of] errore, and codex ee with edition 1 [reads] propter errorem in place of per errorem.
  40. Vat. cum aliquibus mss. hic repetit quod, in maiore parte codd. et ed. 1 tamen deest.
    The Vatican [edition] with some manuscripts here repeats quod; in the greater part of the codices and edition 1, however, it is absent.
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