Dist. 19
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19
DISTINCTIO XIX.
De aequalitate trium personarum.
Cap. I. De aequalitate trium personarum.
Nunc postquam coaeternitatem trium personarum pro modulo1 facultatis nostrae insinuavimus, iam de earundem aequalitate aliquid eloqui superest. Fides enim catholica sicut coaeternas, ita et coaequales tres personas asserit. Aequalis est enim in omnibus Patri Filius, et Patri et Filio Spiritus sanctus; quia, ut Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum2, breviter aperiens, quomodo intelligatur aequalitas, docet: «Nullus horum alium aut praecedit aeternitate aut excedit magnitudine aut superat potestate; quia nec Filio nec Spiritu sancto,
quantum ad naturae divinae unitatem pertinet, anterior aut maior est Pater, nec Filius Spiritu sancto. Aeternum quippe et sine initio est, quod Filius de Patris natura existit; et aeternum ac sine initio est, quod Spiritus sanctus de natura Patris Filiique procedit. Ob hoc ergo tres unum recte credimus et dicimus Deum, quia una prorsus aeternitas, una immensitas, una naturaliter trium personarum est divinitas». Ecce breviter assumpsit Augustinus, in quo trium personarum consistit aequalitas, scilicet quia alia aliam non excedit aeternitate, magnitudine[?] aut potestate.
Cap. II. Quod aeternitate et magnitudine et potentia in Deo unum est, etsi videantur esse diversa.
Cumque enumerentur ista quasi diversa, in Deo tamen unum et idem sunt, scilicet essentia divina simplex et incommutabilis. Unde Augustinus in libro septimo de Trinitate3: «Non alio magnus, alio Deus est, sed eo magnus, quo Deus; quia non aliud illi est magnum esse, aliud Deum esse. Eadem quippe eius magnitudo est, quae virtus, et eadem essentia, quae magnitudo». Pater ergo et Filius simul una essentia et una magnitudo. Ita etiam et potentia Dei essentia divina est. Unde Augustinus in septimo libro Confessionum4: «Voluntas et potentia Dei Deus ipse est». Aeternitas quoque Dei essentia divina est. Quod Augustinus ostendit super illum locum Psalmi5 In generationem et generationem anni tui, dicens: «Est generatio generationum, quae iam transit, collecta de omnibus generationibus, id est sanctis. In illa erunt anni Dei, qui non transeunt, id est aeternitas Dei. Non enim sunt aliud anni Dei, aliud ipse, sed anni Dei aeternitas Dei est. Aeternitas vero ipsa Dei substantia est, nihil habens mutabile». Inconcusso igitur teneamus, quod unum et idem est, scilicet essentia divina, Dei aeternitas, potentia, magnitudo; et tamen consuevit Scriptura haec et his similia quasi distincta ponere. In his ergo verbis trium personarum aequalitatem breviter complexus est Augustinus. Quia alius alium nec aeternitate nec magnitudine nec potentia superat. Quod autem aeternitate aliqua trium personarum aliam non excedat, supra ostensum est6, ubi coaeternitas trium personarum insinuata est.
Cap. III. Nunc superest ostendere, quod magnitudine vel potentia alius alium non excedat; et prius de magnitudine videamus.
Sciendum est ergo, quia Pater non est maior Filio, nec Pater vel Filius maior Spiritu sancto, nec maius aliquid duae personae simul sunt quam una, nec tres simul maius aliquid quam duae, nec maior est essentia in tribus quam in duabus nec in duabus quam in una, quia tota est in singulis. Unde Ioannes Damascenus7 ait: «Confitemur Deitatis naturam omnem perfecte esse in singula suarum hypostaseon, id est personarum: omnem in Patre, omnem in Filio, omnem in Spiritu sancto. Ideoque perfectus Deus Pater, perfectus Deus Filius, perfectus Deus Spiritus sanctus».
Cap. IV. Quomodo dicitur Pater esse in Filio et Filius in Patre et Spiritus sanctus in utroque.
Et inde est, quod Pater dicitur esse in Filio et Filius in Patre et Spiritus sanctus in utroque et singulus in singulis. Unde Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum8: «Propter unitatem naturalem totus Pater in Filio et Spiritu sancto est, totus quoque Spiritus sanctus in Patre et Filio est. Nullus horum extra quemlibet ipsorum est propter naturae divinae unitatem». Haec hic aperit aliqualenus — non enim potest plene tantum ab homine reserari arcanum — ex qua intelligentia dicatur singula personarum tota esse in aliis. Unde etiam Hilarius ista interius perquirens in libro tertio de Trinitate9 ait: «Affert plerisque obscuritatem sermo Domini, cum dicit: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est; nec immerito. Natura enim intelligentiae humanae rationem dicti huius non capit, nec exemplum aliquod rebus divinis comparatio humana praestabit; sed quod inintelligibile10 est homini, Deo esse possibile est. Cognoscendum itaque atque intelligendum est, quid sit illud: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est; si tamen comprehendere hoc ita ut est valebimus, ut quod
natura rerum pati non posse aestimatur, ut divinae veritatis ratio consequatur». «Patrem igitur in Filio et Filium in Patre esse, plenitudo in utroque divinitatis perfecta est11»; «quia plenitudo deitatis est in Filio. Quod in Patre est, hoc et in Filio est; quod in Ingenito est, hoc in Genito; alter ab altero et uterque unum»: «is scilicet qui est, nihil habens quod non sit etiam in eo, a quo est12»; «non duo unus, sed alius in alio, quia non aliud in utroque»; «ut unum in fide nostra sint uterque, non unus: nec eundem utrumque, nec aliud confitemur; quia Deum ex Deo natum nec eundem nativitas, nec aliud esse permittit13». «Eandem igitur in utroque et virtutis similitudinem et deitatis plenitudinem confitemur, quia Veritas dicit: Ego in Patre, et Pater in me est. Omnia enim Filius accepit a Patre14». «Nam si partem eiusdem, qui genuit, accepit, neuter ergo perfectus est: deest enim et unde decessit, nec plenitudo in eo erit, qui ex portione constiterit. Neuter ergo perfectus est, si plenitudinem suam et qui genuit amittit, nec qui natus est consequitur15». «Fateamur ergo, quod Pater est in Filio et Filius in Patre, Deus in Deo», ut idem Hilarius ait in septimo libro de Trinitate16, «non per duplicem convenientium generum coniunctionem, nec per insitivam capacioris substantiae naturam, sed per naturae unitam similitudinem, per nativitatem viventis naturae ex vivente natura; dum res non differt, dum naturam Dei non degenerat nativitas, dum non aliud aliquid ex Deo quam Deus nascitur, dum nihil in his novum est, nihil alienum, nihil separabile». Ecce his verbis, prout humana permittit infirmitas, intelligi potest17, ex quo sensu Christus dixerit, se esse in Patre et Patrem in se. Ex eodem etiam sensu intelligitur Spiritus sanctus esse in utroque et singula personarum in singulis; quia scilicet in singulis est eadem plenitudo divinitatis et unita similitudo naturae; quia non est maior divina natura in aliqua harum personarum, sed unius et indifferentis naturae sunt hae tres personae. Ideoque altera in altera esse dicitur, ut praedictum est. Unde Ambrosius18 praedictorum verborum sententiam nobis aperiens super Epistolam secundam ad Corinthios quinto ait: «Per hoc intelligitur Pater esse in Filio et Filius in Patre, quia una est eorum substantia. Ibi enim est unitas, ubi nulla est19 diversitas». Ecce tribus illustrium virorum testimoniis, scilicet Augustini, Hilarii atque Ambrosii, in idem concurrentibus revelatione Spiritus sancti in eis loquentis pie credere volentibus ostenditur — tamen quasi per speculum et in aenigmate20 — qualiter accipiendum sit, cum dicitur Pater in Filio esse vel Filius in Patre vel Spiritus sanctus in utroque.
Pars II.
Sed iam nunc ad propositum redeamus coeptoque insistamus ostendentes, quod magnitudine nulla trium personarum aliam superat, quia nulla maior aliis, nec maius aliquid sunt duae quam una, nec tres quam duae, nec maior Deus quam singuli eorum; quia singulus illorum perfectus est, nec est quo crescat illa perfectio21.
Cap. V. Quod nulla personarum pars est in Trinitate.
Nec est aliqua trium personarum pars Dei vel divinae essentiae, quia singula harum verus et plenus Deus est et tota et plena divina essentia est; et ideo nulla istarum in Trinitate pars est. Unde Augustinus in libro secundo contra Maximinum22 haereticum sic ait: «Putas, Deum Patrem cum Filio et Spiritu sancto unum Deum esse non posse; times enim, ne Pater sit pars unius Dei, qui constet ex tribus. Noli hoc timere, nulla enim fit partium in deitatis unitate divisio. Unus est Deus Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, id est ipsa Trinitas unus est Deus. Ergo, inquis, Deus Pater est pars Dei; absit».
Cap. VI. Quare tres personae dicantur summe unum.
«Tres enim personae sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et hi tres, quia unius substantiae sunt,
unum sunt et summe unum sunt, ubi nulla naturarum, nulla est diversitas voluntatum. Si enim natura unum essent, et voluntate non essent, non summe unum essent: si vero natura dispares essent, unum non essent. Hi ergo tres, quia23 unum sunt propter ineffabilem coniunctionem Deitatis, qua ineffabiliter copulantur, unus Deus est». «Pars ergo Trinitatis esse non potest quicumque unus24 in tribus. In Trinitate igitur, quae Deus est, et Pater Deus est, et Filius Deus est, et Spiritus sanctus Deus est, et simul hi tres unus Deus; nec huius Trinitatis tertia pars est unus, nec maius aliquid duo quam unus est ibi, nec maius aliquid sunt omnes quam singuli, quia spiritualis, non corporalis est magnitudo. Qui potest capere, capiat25; qui autem non potest, credat et oret, ut quod credit intelligat. Verum est enim quod dicitur per Prophetam: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis26». His verbis aperte ostendit indifferentem magnitudinem trium personarum. Item in eodem27: «Tu nempe dixisti, unum Deum non ex partibus esse compositum; et hoc de Patre tantum vis intelligi. Ille, inquis, virtus est ingenita, simplex. Et tamen in hac simplici virtute multa videris commemorare, cum dicis: Deus Deum genuit, bonus bonum genuit, sapiens sapientem, clemens clementem, potens potentem. Nunquid ergo bonitas et sapientia et clementia et potentia partes sunt unius virtutis, quam simplicem esse dixisti? Si dixeris, partes sunt: simplex ergo virtus ex partibus constat. Et simplex ista virtus, te definiente, unus est Deus; ergo Deum ex partibus compositum esse dicis. Non dico, inquis, non sunt ergo28 partes. Si ergo in una persona Patris et illa invenis quae plura videntur, et partes non invenis, quia una virtus simplex est: quanto magis Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus et propter individuam deitatem unus Deus est et propter uniuscuiusque proprietatem tres personae sunt et propter singulorum perfectionem partes unius Dei non sunt! Virtus est Pater, virtus est Filius, virtus est Spiritus sanctus. Hoc verum dicis; sed quod virtutem de virtute genitam et virtutem de virtute procedentem non vis eandem habere naturam, hoc falsum dicis, hoc contra fidem rectam et catholicam dicis». His verbis aperte docetur, quod tres illae personae non sunt partes Dei vel divinae essentiae, nullaque illarum29 Trinitatis pars dicenda est nec una maior aliis.
Cap. VII. Cum dicimus, tres personas esse unam essentiam, nec ut genus de speciebus nec ut speciem de individuis praedicamus, quia non est essentia genus et persona species, vel essentia species et personae individua.
Hic adiiciendum est, quod tanta est aequalitas trium personarum atque indifferens magnitudo, quod cum dicamus, tres personas unam esse30 essentiam vel substantiam, neque ut genus de speciebus, neque ut speciem de individuis praedicamus. Non enim essentia divina genus est et tres personae species, vel essentia divina species et tres personae individua. Quod Augustinus rationibus probabilibus atque irrefragabilibus aperte demonstrat in libro septimo de Trinitate31 ita dicens: «Si essentia genus est, species autem persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, oportet appellari tres substantias, ut appellantur tres personae; sicut cum sit animal genus et equus species, appellantur tres equi, iidemque tria animalia. Non enim species ibi pluraliter dicitur et genus singulariter, ut si diceretur, tres equi sunt unum animal; sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine dicuntur». Cum ergo tres personas unam fateamur esse essentiam, non tres32 essentias, cum tres equi tria animalia dicantur, non unum: patet, nomine essentiae non significari genus nec nomine personae speciem.
«Si vero dicunt, nomine personae non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum, et nomine essentiae speciem intelligi, ut persona non dicatur sicut homo, sed quomodo dicitur hic homo, velut Abraham, Isaac et Iacob vel quis alius, qui etiam digito praesens demonstrari possit; sic quoque illos eadem ratio confutabit. Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac et Iacob tria individua, ita tres homines et tria animalia. Cur ergo Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, si secundum genus et speciem et individuum ista distinguantur[?], non ita dicuntur tres essentiae, ut tres personae[?]».
Alio quoque modo idem probat Augustinus, scilicet quod essentia divina non est genus, nec personae species, vel essentia non est species nec personae
individua. «Una, inquit33, essentia non habet species, sicut unum animal non habet species unius essentiae. Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus non sunt tres species unius essentiae: divina ergo essentia genus non est. Sed nec species est essentia divina et personae individua, sicut homo species est, individua autem Abraham, Isaac et Iacob. Si enim essentia species est, ut homo, sicut unus homo non dicitur esse Abraham, Isaac et Iacob, ita non dicetur34 una essentia esse tres personae. Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus».
Cap. VIII. Quod nec secundum materialem causam dicuntur tres personae una essentia.
Notandum etiam, quod essentia divina non est materia trium personarum, ut Augustinus in eodem libro35 docet, «tanquam secundum communem eandemque materiam tres personae dicantur esse una essentia, sicut ex eodem auro si fierent tres statuae, diceremus tres statuas unum aurum. Non autem sic Trinitatem, id est tres personas, dicimus unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant. In statuis enim aequalibus plus auri est tres simul quam singulae, et minus auri est una quam duae. In illa vero essentia Trinitatis nullo modo ita est». Non ergo secundum materialem causam tres personas unam dicimus esse36 essentiam, sicut tres statuae dicuntur unum aurum.
Cap. IX. Nec ita dicuntur tres personae una essentia, ut tres homines una natura vel unius naturae.
His quoque addendum est, quod tres personas non ita dicimus esse unam essentiam, ut Augustinus in eodem37 ait, vel unius essentiae, «sicut dicimus, aliquos tres homines eiusdem sexus et eiusdem temperationis corporis eiusdemque animi unam esse naturam vel unius naturae. Nam in his rebus non tantum est unus homo, quantum tres homines simul, et plus aliquid sunt homines duo quam unus homo, sicut et in statuis esse diximus; at in Deo non est ita. Non enim maior essentia est Pater et Filius simul quam solus Pater vel solus Filius, sed tres simul illae personae aequales sunt singulis». Ex praemissis patet, quod tres personae dicuntur divina essentia nec secundum materialem causam, ut tres statuae unum aurum, nec secundum complexionis similitudinem, ut tres homines unius naturae, nec ut genus praedicatur de speciebus, vel ut species de individuis, id est continens de contentis, maius de minoribus.
His autem videntur adversari quae quidam sacrae Scripturae tractatores catholici in suis scriptis tradiderunt, in quibus significare videntur, quod essentia divina sit quoddam38 commune et universale, velut species; tres vero personae sint tria particularia, tria individua numero differentia. Unde Ioannes Damascenus, inter Doctores Graecorum magnus, in libro, quem de Trinitate scripsit39, quem et papa Eugenius transferri fecit, ait: «Communia et universalia praedicantur de subiectis sibi ipsis particularibus. Commune ergo substantia est, particulare vero hypostasis, id est persona. Particulare autem dicitur, non quod partem naturae habet, sed particulare numero, ut atomus, id est individuum. Numero enim et40 non natura differre dicuntur hypostases». Item in eodem41: «Substantia significat communem et circumplectivam speciem homoideon, id est similium specie hypostaseon, id est personarum, ut puta Deus, homo; hypostasis autem individuum demonstrat, id est Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum, Petrum, Paulum et huiusmodi». Ecce aperte dicit, substantiam esse universale, hypostasim vero particulare, et quod Deus est species, ut homo, et quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt individua, sicut Petrus et Paulus, eo quod numero differunt; quae42 praemissae sententiae Augustini penitus contradicere videntur. Quid ergo dicemus ad haec? Hoc utique dicere possumus atque debemus, quod ea quae Augustinus tradidit superius, sine omni haesitatione tenenda sunt.
Haec autem, quae hic dicuntur, licet in sermonis superficie aliquid a fide alienum resonare videantur, sane tamen intelligi queunt piumque lectorem atque
intellectorem plurimum efflagitant. In quorum explanatione mallem silens alios audire, quam loquendo malevolis detrahendi occasionem praestare. Videtur43 tamen mihi ita posse accipi. Cum ait: substantia est commune, et hypostasis est particulare; non ita haec accepit, cum de Deo dicantur, ut accipiuntur in philosophica disciplina, sed per similitudinem eorum quae a philosophis dicuntur, locutus est; ut sicut ibi commune vel universale dicitur quod praedicatur de pluribus, particulare vero vel individuum quod de uno solo: ita hic44 essentia divina dicta est universale, quia de omnibus personis simul et de singulis separatim dicitur, individuum vero singula quaelibet personarum, quia nec de aliis communiter nec de aliqua aliarum singulariter praedicatur. Propter similitudinem ergo praedicationis substantiam Dei45 dixit universale, et personas particularia vel individua. Propter hoc idem etiam eandem divinam essentiam dixit esse «speciem communem et circumplectivam similium specie personarum», quia sicut haec species homo de suis praedicatur individuis, velut de Petro, Paulo et aliis, nec isti specie differunt, sed conveniunt46, ita Deus de tribus praedicatur personis, quae in divinitate non differunt, sed per omnia conveniunt. Hanc ergo similitudinem inter res sempiternas et res temporales perpendens Ioannes universalitatis et particularitatis nomina, quae rebus temporalibus proprie conveniunt, ad res aeternas transtulit; Augustinus vero, maiorem videns dissimilitudinem quam similitudinem inter res praedictas, ab excellentia Trinitatis praedicta nomina removit.
Cap. X. Utrum tres personae differant numero quae proprietatibus distinctae sunt.
Quod autem Ioannes dicit, hypostases differre numero, non natura, in eo quod non differre natura ait, verissime et sine scrupulo loquitur; quod vero dicit, differre numero, cavendum est, quomodo intelligatur; diversis enim modis dicuntur aliqua differre numero. Dicuntur enim aliqua differre numero, quando ita differunt, ut hoc non sit illud nec aliquid, quod illud est vel in ipso est: qualiter differunt Socrates et Plato et huiusmodi, quae apud philosophos dicuntur individua vel particularia: iuxta quem modum non possunt dici tres personae differre numero. Dicuntur quoque differre numero quae in enumeratione sive computatione non sibi adiunguntur, sed a se invicem discernuntur, ut cum de aliquibus rebus loquentes dicimus una, duae, tres; et secundum hunc modum forte dixit Ioannes hypostases, id est personas, differre numero. Possumus enim dicere: Pater est unus, et Pater et Filius sunt duo, et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres; et item: haec persona est una, et haec et illa sunt duae, et haec et illa et alia sunt tres. Convenientius tamen tres illae personae proprietatibus tantum distingui dicuntur, de quarum distinctione secundum proprietates in sequenti tractabitur47. Nunc vero ad inceptum redeamus, quae dicta sunt repetentes, ut saepius versando familiarius innotescant.
Cap. XI. Quare tres personae simul non sunt maius aliquid quam una.
Sciendum est ergo, «tantam aequalitatem esse in Trinitate, ut ait Augustinus in octavo libro de Trinitate48, ut non solum Pater non sit maior quam Filius, sed nec Pater et Filius simul maius aliquid sint quam Spiritus sanctus, aut quaelibet persona minus aliquid sit quam ipsa Trinitas». Quod autem ita sit, aliquo modo, si fieri potest, demonstrandum est. «Quantum ergo ipse Creator adiuvat, attendamus, inquit Augustinus in eodem49, quomodo in hac Trinitate duae vel tres personae non sunt maius aliquid quam una earum».
«Quod ibi magnum dicitur, aliunde magnum non est quam eo, quo vere est; quia ibi magnitudo ipsa50 veritas est et veritas essentia; non ergo ibi maius est quod verius non est. Non autem verius est Pater et Filius simul quam Pater solus vel Filius. Non ergo maius51 aliquid uterque simul quam singulus eorum. Et quia aeque vere est etiam Spiritus sanctus, ideo Pater et Filius simul non sunt aliquid maius quam ipse, quia nec verius sunt. Item in essentia veritatis hoc est verum esse, quod est esse, et hoc est esse, quod est magnum esse: hoc est ergo magnum esse quod verum esse. Quod igitur ibi aeque verum est, et aeque magnum est. Quod ergo ibi plus veritatis non habet, non habet plus magnitudinis. Plus autem veritatis non habet quod verius non est. Non est autem verius una persona quam alia, vel duae quam una, vel tres simul quam singula. Non ergo plus veritatis habet una quam alia, vel duae quam una, vel tres simul quam singula. Sic ergo et ipsa Trinitas non est maius aliquid quam unaquaeque ibi persona, sed tam magnum quam singula. Non enim ibi maior est quae verior non est, ubi ipsa veritas est magnitudo52». Ecce modo convenienti et ratione catholica ostensum
est, quomodo indifferens sit magnitudo trium personarum, quia nec una maior est alia, nec duae maius aliquid quam una53, nec tres simul maius aliquid quam singula.
Cap. XII. Quod Deus non est dicendus triplex, sed trinus.
Praeterea cum Deus dicatur trinus, non tamen debet dici triplex. Ibi enim non est triplicitas, ubi summa est unitas et indifferens aequalitas. Unde Augustinus in libro sexto de Trinitate54 ait: «Non, quoniam Deus Trinitas est, ideo triplex putandus est: alioquin minor esset Pater solus, vel Filius solus, quam simul Pater et Filius». «Cum itaque tantus est Pater solus vel solus Filius, vel solus Spiritus sanctus, quantus est simul Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, nullo modo triplex dicendus est Deus. Non enim Pater cum Filio et Spiritu sancto maior Deus est quam singuli eorum, quia non est quo crescat illa perfectio. Perfectus autem est et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et perfectus dicitur Deus singulus eorum. Et ideo Trinitas potius quam triplex dici debet».
«In rebus corporeis non tantum est una, quantum tres simul, et plus sunt duae quam una res; in Trinitate vero summa tantum est una persona, quantum tres simul, et tantum sunt duae, quantum una, et in se infinitae sunt55», quia non est finis magnitudinis earum. Ac per hoc aperitur quod supra diximus56, scilicet quomodo et singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum in omnibus est, et unum omnia. Ecce iam ostendimus sufficienter, qualiter in Trinitate aliqua persona aliam non superet magnitudine.
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DISTINCTION XIX.
On the equality of the three Persons.
Cap. I. On the equality of the three Persons.
Now, after we have set forth the coeternity of the three Persons according to the small measure1 of our ability, it remains to say something about their equality. For the catholic faith asserts that the three Persons are not only coeternal but also coequal. For the Son is in all things equal to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son; since, as Augustine in his book On Faith to Peter2, briefly opening up how equality is to be understood, teaches: "None of these either precedes another in eternity or exceeds another in greatness or surpasses another in power; since neither to the Son nor to the Holy Spirit,
as far as the unity of the divine nature is concerned, is the Father prior or greater, nor is the Son so to the Holy Spirit. For it is eternal and without beginning that the Son exists from the Father's nature; and it is eternal and without beginning that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the nature of the Father and of the Son. For this reason, therefore, we rightly believe and call the three one God, since there is altogether one eternity, one immensity, one divinity by nature of the three Persons." Behold, Augustine has briefly summed up that in which the equality of the three Persons consists — namely, that one does not exceed another in eternity, in greatness[?], or in power.
Cap. II. That eternity and greatness and power in God are one, even though they may seem to be diverse.
And although these are enumerated as if diverse, in God they are nevertheless one and the same — namely, the simple and unchangeable divine essence. Whence Augustine in the seventh book On the Trinity3: "He is not great by one thing and God by another, but He is great by that whereby He is God; for it is not one thing for Him to be great, another to be God. For His greatness is the same as His power, and the same essence as His greatness." Therefore the Father and the Son together are one essence and one greatness. So also the power of God is the divine essence. Whence Augustine in the seventh book of the Confessions4: "The will and the power of God are God Himself." The eternity of God is also the divine essence. Which Augustine shows on that place of the Psalm5 Through generation and generation are Your years, saying: "There is a generation of generations, which has now passed, gathered out of all generations — that is, of the saints. In that generation will be the years of God, which do not pass — that is, the eternity of God. For the years of God are not one thing and He Himself another, but the years of God are the eternity of God. And the eternity itself is the substance of God, having nothing changeable." Let us therefore hold unshaken that one and the same is the divine essence, the eternity of God, His power, His greatness; and yet Scripture is accustomed to set down these and similar things as if distinct. Therefore in these words Augustine has briefly comprised the equality of the three Persons. For one does not exceed another in eternity, in greatness, or in power. That, however, none of the three Persons exceeds another in eternity has been shown above6, where the coeternity of the three Persons was set forth.
Cap. III. Now it remains to show that one does not exceed another in greatness or in power; and let us first see about greatness.
It must be known, therefore, that the Father is not greater than the Son, nor is the Father or the Son greater than the Holy Spirit, nor are two Persons together anything greater than one, nor are three together anything greater than two, nor is the essence greater in three than in two, nor in two than in one, since it is whole in each. Whence John of Damascus7 says: "We confess the entire nature of the Deity to be perfectly in each of His hypostases — that is, of the Persons: the whole in the Father, the whole in the Son, the whole in the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Father is perfect God, the Son is perfect God, the Holy Spirit is perfect God."
Cap. IV. How the Father is said to be in the Son and the Son in the Father and the Holy Spirit in both.
And from this it is that the Father is said to be in the Son and the Son in the Father and the Holy Spirit in both, and each in each. Whence Augustine in his book On Faith to Peter8: "On account of the natural unity, the whole Father is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and likewise the whole Holy Spirit is in the Father and in the Son. None of these is outside any of them, on account of the unity of the divine nature." This he opens up here in some measure — for the mystery cannot be fully unsealed by man alone — from what understanding it is said that each of the Persons is wholly in the others. Whence also Hilary, searching into these matters more inwardly, in the third book On the Trinity9 says: "The word of the Lord brings obscurity to many when He says: I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me; and not without reason. For the nature of human understanding does not grasp the reasoning of this saying, nor will any human comparison furnish an example for divine things; but what is unintelligible10 to man is possible to God. It must therefore be known and understood, what that is: I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me; if, however, we will be able to comprehend it as it is — so that what
the nature of things is judged not to be able to bear, may yet follow the reasoning of divine truth." "Therefore that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, the perfect plenitude of divinity in both11 is"; "since the plenitude of the deity is in the Son. What is in the Father, this also is in the Son; what is in the Unbegotten, this is in the Begotten; one from the other, and each is one": "He, namely, who is, having nothing that is not also in Him from whom He is12"; "not one [being] two, but one in another, since not anything other in either"; "so that in our faith both are one, not one [person]: nor do we confess each as the same, nor as something other; since the fact that God was born of God neither lets nativity be the same, nor anything else13." "Therefore in both we confess the same likeness of power and the same plenitude of deity, since Truth says: I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me. For the Son has received all things from the Father14." "For if He has received a part of the same one who begot Him, then neither is perfect: for there is lacking from Him who is decreased, nor will there be plenitude in Him who has come to subsist out of a portion. Neither, therefore, is perfect, if He who begot loses His own plenitude, nor does He who is born attain to it15." "Let us therefore confess, that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, God in God," as the same Hilary says in the seventh book On the Trinity16, "not by the twofold conjunction of agreeing genera, nor by the implanted nature of a more capacious substance, but by the unity of likeness of nature, by the nativity of a living nature from a living nature; while the thing does not differ, while the nativity does not degenerate the nature of God, while nothing other than God is born from God, while there is nothing new, nothing alien, nothing separable in these." Behold, by these words, insofar as human weakness permits, it can be understood17 in what sense Christ said that He is in the Father and the Father in Him. From the same sense too it is understood that the Holy Spirit is in both, and each of the Persons in each; namely because in each there is the same plenitude of divinity and the united likeness of nature; for the divine nature is not greater in any one of these Persons, but these three Persons are of one and undifferentiated nature. And therefore one is said to be in another, as has been said before. Whence Ambrose18, opening to us the meaning of the aforesaid words on the second Letter to the Corinthians, chapter five, says: "Through this it is understood that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, since their substance is one. For there is unity, where there is no19 diversity." Behold, by the testimonies of three illustrious men coming together to the same — namely, of Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose — by the revelation of the Holy Spirit speaking in them, it is shown to those who wish to believe piously — though as if through a glass and in an enigma20 — how it is to be received when it is said that the Father is in the Son or the Son in the Father or the Holy Spirit in both.
Part II.
But now let us return to our purpose, and pressing on with what we have begun, let us show that none of the three Persons surpasses another in greatness, since none is greater than the others, nor are two anything greater than one, nor three than two, nor God greater than each of them; for each of them is perfect, nor is there anything by which that perfection might grow21.
Cap. V. That no Person is a part in the Trinity.
Nor is any of the three Persons a part of God or of the divine essence, since each of them is true and full God, and is the whole and full divine essence; and therefore none of them is a part in the Trinity. Whence Augustine in the second book Against Maximinus22 the heretic thus says: "You think that God the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be one God; for you fear lest the Father be a part of the one God, who consists of three. Do not fear this, for there is no division of parts in the unity of the deity. The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one God — that is, the Trinity itself is one God. Therefore, you say, God the Father is a part of God; God forbid."
Cap. VI. Why the three Persons are said to be supremely one.
"For the three Persons are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three, since they are of one substance,
are one and are supremely one, where there is no diversity of natures, no diversity of wills. For if they were one in nature, and were not so in will, they would not be supremely one: but if they were unlike in nature, they would not be one. Therefore these three, since23 they are one on account of the ineffable conjunction of the Deity, by which they are ineffably bound together, is one God." "Therefore no one24 of the three can be a part of the Trinity. In the Trinity, therefore, which is God, both the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and at the same time these three are one God; nor is any one of them a third part of this Trinity, nor is anything greater two there than one, nor are all anything greater than each, since the greatness is spiritual, not bodily. He who is able to grasp it, let him grasp it25; but he who is not able, let him believe and pray that what he believes he may understand. For it is true what is said by the Prophet: Unless you believe, you will not understand26." By these words he openly shows the undifferentiated greatness of the three Persons. Likewise in the same place27: "You yourself indeed have said that one God is not composed of parts; and you wish this to be understood of the Father alone. He, you say, is unbegotten, simple power. And yet in this simple power you seem to commemorate many things, when you say: God begot God, the good begot the good, the wise the wise, the merciful the merciful, the powerful the powerful. Are then goodness and wisdom and mercy and power parts of the one power, which you have said is simple? If you say they are parts: then the simple power consists of parts. And this simple power, by your own definition, is one God; therefore you say that God is composed of parts. I do not say so, you reply; therefore28 they are not parts. If, then, in the one Person of the Father you find both those things which seem to be many, and you do not find parts, since the one power is simple: how much more are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one God on account of the undivided deity, and three Persons on account of the property of each, and not parts of one God on account of the perfection of each! The Father is power, the Son is power, the Holy Spirit is power. This you say truly; but that you do not wish power begotten of power and power proceeding from power to have the same nature — this you say falsely, this you say against the right and catholic faith." By these words it is openly taught, that those three Persons are not parts of God or of the divine essence, and none of them29 is to be called a part of the Trinity, nor is one greater than the others.
Cap. VII. That when we say three Persons are one essence, we predicate neither as a genus of species nor as a species of individuals, since the essence is not a genus and a Person a species, nor the essence a species and the Persons individuals.
Here it must be added that there is so great an equality of the three Persons and an undifferentiated greatness, that when we say the three Persons to be30 one essence or substance, we predicate neither as a genus of species nor as a species of individuals. For the divine essence is not a genus and the three Persons species, nor the divine essence a species and the three Persons individuals. Which Augustine, by probable and irrefragable reasonings, openly demonstrates in the seventh book On the Trinity31 saying thus: "If essence is a genus, and Person a species, as some think, three substances must be called, just as three Persons are called; just as, since animal is a genus and horse is a species, three horses are called, and the same three animals. For the species there is not said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as if it were said, three horses are one animal; but as the three horses are called by the specific name, so the three animals by the generic name." Since therefore we confess the three Persons to be one essence, not three32 essences, while three horses are called three animals, not one: it is clear that by the name essence a genus is not signified, nor by the name Person a species.
"But if they say that by the name Person not a species is signified, but something singular and individual, and that by the name essence a species is to be understood, so that Person may not be said as man, but as this man is said — like Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, or any other who can be pointed out present with the finger — the same reasoning will refute them as well. For just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are called three individuals, so they are called three men and three animals. Why then are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, if these are distinguished[?] according to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as three Persons[?]?"
In another way also Augustine proves the same — namely, that the divine essence is not a genus, nor the Persons species, or that the essence is not a species nor the Persons
individuals. "One essence," he says33, "does not have species, just as one animal does not have species of one essence. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence: therefore the divine essence is not a genus. But neither is the divine essence a species and the Persons individuals, just as man is a species, and the individuals are Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. For if the essence is a species, like man, just as one man is not said to be Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so it will not be said34 that one essence is three Persons. Therefore we do not say these things according to genus and species."
Cap. VIII. That neither according to material cause are the three Persons called one essence.
It must be noted also that the divine essence is not the matter of the three Persons, as Augustine in the same book35 teaches, "as if according to a common and the same matter the three Persons were said to be one essence — just as if from the same gold three statues were made, we should say that the three statues are one gold. But we do not so call the Trinity — that is, the three Persons — one essence and one God, as if from one matter three things subsist. For in equal statues there is more gold three together than one, and there is less gold in one than in two. But in that essence of the Trinity it is in no way so." Therefore we do not call the three Persons to be36 one essence according to material cause, as three statues are called one gold.
Cap. IX. Nor are the three Persons so called one essence, as three men are one nature or of one nature.
To these things also it must be added, that we do not so say the three Persons to be one essence, as Augustine in the same place37 says, or of one essence, "as we say that three men of the same sex and the same temperament of body and of the same soul are one nature, or of one nature. For in these things one man is not as much as three men together, and two men are something more than one man, as we said also in the case of statues; but in God it is not so. For the Father and the Son together are not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone, but the three Persons together are equal to each." From the foregoing it is clear that the three Persons are called the divine essence neither according to material cause, as three statues are one gold, nor according to the likeness of complexion, as three men of one nature, nor as a genus is predicated of species, nor as a species of individuals — that is, the container of the contained, the greater of the lesser.
But to these things there seem to be opposed certain things which some catholic treatise-writers of sacred Scripture have handed down in their writings, in which they seem to signify that the divine essence is something38 common and universal, as a species; but that the three Persons are three particulars, three individuals differing in number. Whence John of Damascus, the great one among the Doctors of the Greeks, in the book which he wrote On the Trinity39, which Pope Eugenius caused to be translated, says: "The common and universal things are predicated of the particulars subject to themselves. The common, therefore, is the substance, and the particular is the hypostasis, that is, the Person. And it is called particular, not because it has part of the nature, but particular by number, as an atom, that is, an individual. For the hypostases are said to differ in number, and40 not in nature." Likewise in the same place41: "Substance signifies the common and surrounding species homoideon — that is, of hypostases alike in species, that is, of Persons; as for example God, man; but hypostasis points to an individual — that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul, and the like." Behold, he openly says that the substance is the universal, the hypostasis the particular, and that God is a species like man, and that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are individuals, like Peter and Paul, in that they differ by number; which42 seem entirely to contradict the foregoing opinions of Augustine. What, then, shall we say to these things? This indeed we can and ought to say: that those things which Augustine has handed down above are to be held without any hesitation.
But these things which are said here, although on the surface of the discourse they seem to ring out something foreign to the faith, can yet be soundly understood, and earnestly demand a pious reader and
an understanding interpreter. In whose explanation I would rather, being silent, listen to others than, by speaking, give occasion to the malicious for detraction. Yet it seems43 to me that they may be received thus. When he says: substance is the common, and hypostasis is the particular; he did not so receive these things, since they are said of God, as they are received in philosophical discipline, but he spoke by likeness of those things which are said by the philosophers; so that just as there common or universal is called what is predicated of many, and particular or individual what is of one alone: so here44 the divine essence has been called universal, since it is said of all the Persons together and of each separately, and individual in turn each one of the Persons, since it is predicated neither in common of the others, nor singularly of any of the others. By the likeness of predication, therefore, he called the substance of God45 universal, and the Persons particulars or individuals. For this same reason also he called the divine essence "the common species and surrounding [species] of Persons alike in species," since just as this species man is predicated of its individuals, as of Peter, Paul, and others, and these do not differ in species, but agree46, so God is predicated of the three Persons, who do not differ in divinity, but agree in all things. Pondering this likeness, therefore, between eternal things and temporal things, John transferred the names of universality and particularity, which properly belong to temporal things, to eternal things; but Augustine, seeing greater dissimilarity than likeness between the said things, removed the said names from the excellence of the Trinity.
Cap. X. Whether the three Persons differ in number, who are distinct by properties.
But that John says the hypostases differ in number, not in nature — in that he says they do not differ in nature, he speaks most truly and without scruple; but in that he says they differ in number, one must beware how it is to be understood; for in different ways some things are said to differ in number. For some things are said to differ in number, when they so differ that one is not the other, nor anything that the other is, or is in the other: in which way Socrates and Plato and the like differ — those which are called by the philosophers individuals or particulars: by which mode the three Persons cannot be said to differ in number. Some things are also said to differ in number, which in enumeration or computation are not joined to each other, but are distinguished from each other, as when, speaking of certain things, we say one, two, three; and according to this mode perhaps John said that the hypostases — that is, the Persons — differ in number. For we can say: the Father is one, and the Father and the Son are two, and the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three; and likewise: this Person is one, and this and that are two, and this and that and another are three. Yet more fittingly the three Persons are said to be distinguished only by properties, of whose distinction according to properties it will be treated in what follows47. Now, however, let us return to what we began, going over the things that have been said, so that, by being often turned over, they may become more familiar.
Cap. XI. Why the three Persons together are not anything greater than one.
It must therefore be known that "such is the equality in the Trinity, as Augustine says in the eighth book On the Trinity48, that not only is the Father not greater than the Son, but neither are the Father and the Son together anything greater than the Holy Spirit, nor is any Person anything less than the Trinity itself." That this is so must, in some way, if it can be done, be demonstrated. "As far, then, as the Creator Himself helps, let us attend, says Augustine in the same place49, how in this Trinity two or three Persons are not anything greater than one of them."
"What is there called great is great from no other source than from that whereby it truly is; since there greatness itself50 is truth, and truth is essence; therefore there is not anything greater there which is not more true. But the Father and the Son together are not more truly than the Father alone or the Son. Therefore neither51 is anything greater both together than one of them. And since the Holy Spirit too is equally truly, therefore the Father and the Son together are not anything greater than He, since they are not more truly. Likewise in the essence of truth, this to be true is what to be is, and this to be is what to be great is: this therefore is to be great which is to be true. What therefore there is equally true, is also equally great. What therefore there does not have more truth, does not have more greatness. But that does not have more truth which is not more truly. But one Person is not more truly than another, nor two than one, nor three together than each. Therefore one does not have more truth than another, nor two than one, nor three together than each. Thus therefore the Trinity itself also is not anything greater than each Person there, but as great as each. For there is not greater what is not more true, where truth itself is greatness52." Behold, in a fitting way and by catholic reasoning it has been shown
how the greatness of the three Persons is undifferentiated, since neither is one greater than another, nor two anything greater than one53, nor three together anything greater than each.
Cap. XII. That God is not to be called threefold, but triune.
Furthermore, although God is called triune, He must nevertheless not be called threefold. For there is no triplicity, where there is supreme unity and undifferentiated equality. Whence Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity54 says: "Not because God is Trinity is He therefore to be thought threefold: otherwise the Father alone, or the Son alone, would be less than the Father and the Son together." "Therefore, since the Father alone, or the Son alone, or the Holy Spirit alone, is as much as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit together, in no way is God to be called threefold. For the Father with the Son and the Holy Spirit is not a greater God than each of them, since there is nothing by which that perfection might grow. But both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are perfect, and each of them is called perfect God. And therefore Trinity rather than threefold ought He to be called."
"In bodily things one is not as much as three together, and two are more than one thing; but in the supreme Trinity one Person is as much as three together, and two are as much as one, and they are infinite in themselves55"; since there is no end of their greatness. And by this is opened up what we said above56 — namely, how each is in each, and all are in each, and each is in all, and all are in all, and one is in all, and one is all. Behold, we have now shown sufficiently how in the Trinity any Person does not surpass another in greatness.
---
- Ed. 1 modico.Edition 1 reads modico ("by a small one") in place of modulo ("by a small measure").
- Cap. 1. n. 1; cfr. August., libr. VI. de Trinitate c. 3. n. 7. — Paulo supra ante Augustinus solummodo Vat. et ed. 1 omittunt ut, cui codd. et edd., exceptis Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 8, male addunt ait.Chapter 1, n. 1; cf. Augustine, On the Trinity book VI, c. 3, n. 7. — A little earlier, before Augustinus, the Vatican edition alone and edition 1 omit ut, to which the manuscripts and editions, except the Vatican and editions 1, 6, 8, wrongly add ait.
- August., de Trin. VII, c. 1, n. 2.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 1, n. 2.
- Confessionum libr. VII vel potius August., de Trin., locus quo*ad sensum.Confessions Book VII, or rather Augustine, On the Trinity, the passage taken as to the sense. [?: editorial reference partly damaged in the page footer; the text-citation as given in the body refers to Confessionum libr. VII.]
- Psalm. 101, 25.Psalm 101:25 (Vulg.).
- Dist. IX.Distinction IX.
- De Fide orthodoxa, locus quoad sensum ex libr. VI [?] de Trinitate — citatio Damasceni.On the Orthodox Faith, the citation from John of Damascus; the apparatus footer reference is partly damaged. [The body cites Damascene; cf. the parallel citation at apparatus n. 39 below.]
- Cap. 1. n. 1 (eiusdem libelli de Fide ad Petrum).Chapter 1, n. 1 (of the same little book On Faith to Peter).
- Hilar., de Trin. III, n. 1. — Locus est apud Hilarium libr. III.Hilary, On the Trinity III, n. 1. — The passage is in Hilary, book III.
- Lectio inintelligibile a codd. et editionibus tradita; vide Hilarium, libr. III. de Trinitate.The reading inintelligibile is handed down by the manuscripts and editions; see Hilary, On the Trinity III.
- Ibid. n. 23; et quod sequitur n. 1; in quo textu Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd. et originale legunt divinitatis pro deitatis.Ibid., n. 23; and what follows, n. 1; in which text the Vatican edition and other editions, against the manuscripts and the original, read divinitatis in place of deitatis.
- Ibid. n. 23, et deinde n. 1; in quo textu cod. C post non duo adiicit sunt.Ibid., n. 23, and then n. 1; in which text codex C, after non duo, adds sunt.
- Libr. I. n. 17.Book I, n. 17.
- Libr. III. n. 23. — Locus Scripturae est Ioan. 6, 11 [?].Book III, n. 23. — The Scripture passage is John 6:11 [?] (the chapter/verse in the OCR is partly garbled; the citation is to John, ch. 6).
- Libr. III. n. 8, in quo circa initium Vat. cum paucis edd. deesset pro deest, et paulo infra post neuter ergo edd. 1, 8 addunt eorum.Book III, n. 8, in which near the beginning the Vatican edition with a few editions reads deesset in place of deest, and a little later after neuter ergo, editions 1, 8 add eorum.
- Num. 39; sed verba: per naturae unitam similitudinem, sumta sunt ex n. 37. — In textu Vat. cum aliis edd. contra 1, 8 et codd. post in Patre addit et. Deinde Vat. et edd. 1, 6, 9 male legunt insitam pro insitivam. Denique post viventis auctoritate codd. ABB et edd. 1, 8 adiecimus naturae. Hilarius: viventis ex vivente naturae.Number 39; but the words per naturae unitam similitudinem are taken from n. 37. — In the text the Vatican edition with other editions, against editions 1, 8 and the manuscripts, after in Patre adds et. Then the Vatican edition and editions 1, 6, 9 wrongly read insitam in place of insitivam. Finally after viventis, on the authority of codices ABB and editions 1, 8, we have added naturae. Hilary reads: viventis ex vivente naturae.
- Vat. et aliae edd., exceptis 1, 8, aperitur pro intelligi potest contra omnes codd.The Vatican edition and other editions, except 1, 8, read aperitur in place of intelligi potest, against all the manuscripts.
- Vel potius Ambrosiaster, ut communiter citatur, qui, teste Augustino, est quidam Hilarius, non Pictaviensis, sed quidam diaconus Romanus, ut videtur, auctor Commentarii in XII Epistolas beati Pauli (in appendice Operum Ambrosii). Contra eundem S. Hieronymus in Dialogo seu altercatione contra Luciferianos n. 25. scripsisse fertur. — Locus Apostoli ab ipso explicatus est II. Cor. 3, 17 [?]. — Ante vocem Ambrosius edd. 1, 8 bene addunt etiam.Or rather Ambrosiaster, as he is commonly cited — who, on Augustine's testimony, is a certain Hilary, not the one of Poitiers, but some Roman deacon, as it seems, the author of the Commentary on the twelve Letters of blessed Paul (in the appendix of the works of Ambrose). Against the same one St. Jerome is reported to have written in the Dialogue or Altercation against the Luciferians, n. 25. — The passage of the Apostle expounded by him is 2 Corinthians 3:17 [?]. — Before the word Ambrosius, editions 1, 8 well add etiam.
- Vat. et aliae edd., excepta una[?], omittunt est contra omnes codd. et originale.The Vatican edition and other editions, except one[?], omit est, against all the manuscripts and the original. [The numeral identifying the dissenting edition in the OCR footer is illegible.]
- I. Cor. 13, 12. — Paulo supra ante concurrentibus sola Vat. male legit in eodem pro in idem.1 Corinthians 13:12. — A little earlier, before concurrentibus, the Vatican edition alone wrongly reads in eodem in place of in idem.
- Praecedentia quoad sensum et aliqua verba sumta sunt ex August. libr. VI. de Trinit. c. 8. n. 9, et c. 10. n. 12. — Vat. cum pluribus edd. post singuli et singulus habet bis horum loco eorum et illorum.What precedes is taken as to the sense, and some words verbatim, from Augustine, On the Trinity VI, c. 8, n. 9, and c. 10, n. 12. — The Vatican edition with several editions, after singuli and singulus, has twice horum in place of eorum and illorum.
- Cap. 10. n. 1, et duo sequentes loci ibid. n. 2.Chapter 10, n. 1, and the two following passages at the same place, n. 2.
- Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 addunt unum, contradicentibus aliis edd., codd. et originali. Paulo post cum originali, codd. et ed. 1 expunximus summe ante non essent.The Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 add unum, with the other editions, the manuscripts, and the original contradicting. A little later, with the original, the manuscripts, and edition 1, we have struck out summe before non essent.
- Edd. 1, 6, 8 et originale qui.Editions 1, 6, 8 and the original read qui.
- Matth. 19, 12.Matthew 19:12.
- Isai. 7, 9. iuxta lectionem Septuag. et Augustini. Vulg.: Si non credideritis, non permanebitis.Isaiah 7:9, according to the reading of the Septuagint and of Augustine. The Vulgate reads: If you will not believe, you will not abide.
- Ibid. n. 3.Ibid., n. 3.
- Vat. et plures edd. omittunt ergo contra originale, codd. et ed. 1, 6. Mox Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 non inveniunt [?] (variantia partly garbled).The Vatican edition and several editions omit ergo against the original, the manuscripts, and editions 1, 6. Then the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 non inveniunt [?] (the OCR of the variant is partly garbled).
- Codd. BCDE eorum, cod. A harum. Deinde in fine aliis solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 9 non bene addunt est.Codices BCDE read eorum, codex A harum. Then at the end of aliis, the Vatican edition alone and editions 4, 9 not well add est.
- Vat. et ed. 4 omittunt esse.The Vatican edition and edition 4 omit esse.
- Cap. 6. n. 11. — Vat. contra edd. 1, 8 et codd. omittit ita ante dicens. Verba vero Augustini sic leguntur in originali: «Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, omitto illud quod iam dixi, oportere appellari tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres equi, eademque animalia tria, cum sit species equus, animal genus. Neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est et genus singulariter, tanquam diceretur tres equi, unum animal; sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine».Chapter 6, n. 11. — The Vatican edition, against editions 1, 8 and the manuscripts, omits ita before dicens. But the words of Augustine are read in the original thus: "For if essence is a genus, but substance or person a species, as some think, I leave aside that which I have already said, that three essences must be called, just as three substances or persons are called — just as three horses are called, and the same three animals, since horse is a species, animal a genus. For neither is the species there said in the plural and the genus in the singular, as if it were said: three horses, one animal; but as the three horses by the specific name, so three animals by the generic name."
- Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 hic male adiiciunt esse.The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9 here wrongly add esse.
- Loc. cit. parum infra; sed ultimas propositiones Magister contraxit ex diffusiore Augustini doctrina. — Mox auctoritate omnium codd. et ed. 1 inseruimus unius essentiae post animal non habet species. Deinde solummodo Vat. et ed. 8 post Pater ergo omittunt et.Loc. cit., a little later; but the Master has compressed the last propositions out of Augustine's more diffuse teaching. — Then on the authority of all the manuscripts and edition 1 we have inserted unius essentiae after animal non habet species. Then the Vatican edition alone and edition 8, after Pater ergo, omit et.
- Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra edd. 1, 3, 7, 8 et codd. BCE dicitur; codd. AD bene diceretur. In fine codd. CD dicuntur pro dicimus.The Vatican edition with several editions, against editions 1, 3, 7, 8 and codices BCE, reads dicitur; codices AD well read diceretur. At the end, codices CD read dicuntur in place of dicimus.
- Loc. cit. immediate post.Loc. cit. immediately after.
- Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, contra omnes codd. adiiciunt substantiam vel.The Vatican edition and other editions, except edition 1, against all the manuscripts add substantiam vel.
- Cap. 6. n. 11. — Prima propositio iam paulo ante relata est. In textu Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra edd. 1, 6, 8, codd. et originale omittit et ante in statuis.Chapter 6, n. 11. — The first proposition has just been quoted a little before. In the text the Vatican edition with several editions, against editions 1, 6, 8, the manuscripts, and the original, omits et before in statuis.
- Cod. D cum Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 6, 8 quiddam. Paulo ante post adversari codd. AC non male addunt ea.Codex D with the Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, 6, 8 reads quiddam. A little earlier, after adversari, codices AC not badly add ea.
- Libr. III. de Fide orthodoxa c. 6, secundum versionem a Burgundione Pisano iussu Eugenii III. factam et a Ioanne Conon valde impugnatam, qua tamen antiqui Scholastici saec. 13. post Lombardum utebantur. Teste Fabricio (Biblioth. Graec. tom. 9.) nunquam typis impressa est. Subiicimus Damasceni verba iuxta versionem Mich. Lequien Ord. Praed. (ed. Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. 94.): «Quae communia et universalia sunt de particularibus sibi subiectis praedicantur. Commune porro quoddam est essentia, ut species; particulare persona. Particulare, inquam, non quod naturae partem quandam sibi vindicet, sed quia numero particulare est, ut individuum. Personae siquidem non natura, sed numero inter se distingui dicuntur». — Vat. contra ed. 1 et codd. legit Graecorum maximus loco Graecorum magnus.Book III, On the Orthodox Faith, c. 6, according to the version made by Burgundio of Pisa at the bidding of Eugenius III, and strongly impugned by John Conon, which nevertheless the ancient Scholastics of the thirteenth century after the Master used. According to Fabricius's testimony (Biblioth. Graec. tom. 9), it has never been printed. We subjoin the words of Damascene according to the version of Michel Lequien O.P. (ed. Migne, Patrolog. Graec. tom. 94): "The things which are common and universal are predicated of the particulars subject to themselves. The common, then, is something — namely, the essence as species; the particular, the Person. Particular, I say, not as claiming for itself some part of nature, but because it is particular by number, as an individual. For Persons are said to be distinguished from each other not by nature, but by number." — The Vatican edition, against edition 1 and the manuscripts, reads Graecorum maximus in place of Graecorum magnus.
- Vat. et edd. 4, 6 omittunt et, et immediate post contra originale, codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8, Vat. cum aliis edd. videntur loco dicuntur.The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 omit et; and immediately after, against the original, the manuscripts, and editions 1, 6, 8, the Vatican edition with other editions reads videntur in place of dicuntur.
- Cap. 4. — Ed. Migne: «Quod porro aliud sit substantia et aliud hypostasis, multoties a nobis dictum est, quodque substantia sive essentia communem speciem eiusdemque speciei personas (ὁμοειδῶν ὑποστάσεων) complectentem significet, ut Deus, homo; persona autem ac hypostasis individuum denotet, puta Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum, Petrum, Paulum».Chapter 4. — The Migne edition reads: "That moreover substance is one thing and hypostasis another, has been said by us many times; and that substance or essence signifies the common species and that which embraces the Persons of the same species (ὁμοειδῶν ὑποστάσεων), as God, man; but Person, that is hypostasis, denotes the individual — for example the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Peter, Paul."
- Sola Vat. videntur; et paulo infra accipit pro accepit et dicuntur pro dicantur.The Vatican edition alone reads videntur; and a little later accipit in place of accepit, and dicuntur in place of dicantur.
- Vat. et edd. 4, 8 contra alias edd. et codd. haec.The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, against the other editions and the manuscripts, read haec.
- Codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt Dei, sed minus bene. Mox sola Vat. post hoc idem omittit etiam.The manuscripts and editions 1, 8 omit Dei, but less well. Then the Vatican edition alone, after hoc idem, omits etiam. [Footnote-anchor positioning here approximate; the OCR ordering is partly conflated with 45.]
- Vat. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 9 contra alias edd. et codd. addunt per omnia.The Vatican edition and editions 1, 5, 6, 9, against the other editions and the manuscripts, add per omnia.
- Lectionem conveniunt sequimur cum codd. et ed. 1; Vat. cum aliis edd. convenire dicitur[?].We follow the reading conveniunt with the manuscripts and edition 1; the Vatican edition with other editions reads convenire dicitur[?] (variant partly garbled in the OCR).
- Dist. XXVI.Distinction XXVI.
- Prooem. n. 1. — Mox post aliquid Vat. et plures edd. cum cod. D contra ceteros codd. et originale non bene sunt pro sint.Proem, n. 1. — Then after aliquid, the Vatican edition and several editions with codex D, against the other manuscripts and the original, not well read sunt in place of sint.
- Ibid. et in principio cap. 1. n. 2.Ibid., and at the beginning of c. 1, n. 2.
- Lectio magnitudo ipsa in textu Augustini.The reading magnitudo ipsa is in Augustine's text.
- Vat. cum plerisque edd. contra 1, 2 et originale addunt est, quod edd. 5, 7 melius transponunt ingenito: Non est ergo maius. Immediate post codd. BCE et edd. 2, 3, 7 cum originali habent utrumque loco uterque.The Vatican edition with most editions, against 1, 2 and the original, add est, which editions 5, 7 better transpose to ingenito: Non est ergo maius. Immediately after, codices BCE and editions 2, 3, 7 with the original have utrumque in place of uterque.
- Quae praecedunt, leguntur ibid. c. 1. n. 2, sed non paucis a Magistro omissis, transpositis et mutatis.What precedes is read at the same place, c. 1, n. 2, but with not a few things omitted by the Master, transposed, and changed.
- Codd. ACD et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 nec duae quam una; codd. BE nec duae quam una (variant readings of order).Codices ACD and editions 1, 2, 3, 7 read nec duae quam una; codices BE the same, with variant ordering.
- Cap. 7. n. 9. — Sequens locus est ibid. c. 8.Chapter 7, n. 9. — The following passage is at the same place, c. 8.
- Ibid. cap. 10. n. 12. — Locus Scripturae est: Psalm. 16, 3.Ibid., chapter 10, n. 12. — The Scripture passage is: Psalm 16:3.
- Cap. 3, 4 in fine et 11. — Vat. cum pluribus edd. contra codd. superius dictum est loco supra diximus; item Vat. cum cod. C et aliis edd., excepta 1., omittit scilicet; denique post quomodo omittit et contra codd. ACDE et edd. 1, 8.Chapters 3, 4 at the end, and 11. — The Vatican edition with several editions, against the manuscripts, reads superius dictum est in place of supra diximus; likewise the Vatican edition with codex C and other editions, except edition 1, omits scilicet; finally after quomodo omits et against codices ACDE and editions 1, 8.