Dist. 19, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19
ARTICULUS UNICUS. De divinarum personarum aequalitate et eius proprietatibus.
### QUAESTIO I. Utrum in divinis ponenda sit aequalitas.
Circa primum, quod sit ibi aequalitas, ostenditur:
1. Primo per illud quod dicitur in Symbolo1: «Totae tres personae coaeternae sibi sunt et coaequales».
2. Item, hoc ipsum ostenditur ratione sic: omnis multitudo reducitur ad unitatem; ergo omnis inaequalitas ad aequalitatem; sed unitas, a qua est omnis multitudo, est unitas increata: ergo et aequalitas, ad quam reducitur omnis inaequalitas, est aequalitas increata2: ergo etc.
3. Item, omne quod perfectionis est, transferendum est ad divina: sed aequalitas est perfectionis in creatura: ergo etc.
4. Item, unum in substantia facit identitatem, unum in quantitate aequalitatem, unum in qualitate facit similitudinem3; sed in divinis non tantum est unitas in substantia, sed etiam in quantitate, alioquin non esset ibi perfecta unitas: ergo non tantum est ibi identitas substantiae, sed et4 aequalitas.
Contra: 1. Ubi aequalitas, ibi divisibilitas, quia simplex simplici non aequatur; sed in divinis non est ponere divisibilitatem: ergo nec aequalitatem.
2. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi quantitas, quia «proprium est quantitatis, secundum eam aequale vel inaequale dici»5; sed in divinis non est ponere quantitatem, quia secundum Augustinum6 «Deus est magnus sine quantitate»: ergo etc.
3. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi finitas, quia ibi est commensuratio7, ergo mensura et finitas; sed in divinis est infinitas: ergo etc.
4. Item, ubi aequalitas, ibi diversitas, quoniam nihil est sibi aequale; sed in divinis est omnimoda unitas: ergo non est ibi aequalitas.
Conclusio. Ponenda est in divinis aequalitas, quae consequitur quantitatem virtutis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aequalitas ponitur in divinis, secundum quod dicitur in Symbolo, et dicit Augustinus8.
Et ad hoc intelligendum notandum9, quod aequale et inaequale est propria passio consequens quantitatem. Quantitas autem dicitur dupliciter: proprie, scilicet quantitas molis, et translative, quantitas virtutis. Et quia illa10 est propria passio quantitatis, consequitur utramque quantitatem: ubi ergo est ponere quantitatem virtutis, ibi est ponere aequalitatem vel inaequalitatem. Haec autem quantitas virtutis ponitur in spiritualibus et summe reperitur in divinis, quia haec quantitas non repugnat simplicitati, sed consonat; similiter nec aequalitas consequens istam quantitatem. Et quia altera pars contradictionis completior attribuenda est Deo, et aequalitas praeit inaequalitatem: ideo ponenda est aequalitas in divinis; et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc.
1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod, ubi aequalitas, ibi divisibilitas: dicendum, quod verum est de aequalitate, quae consequitur quantitatem molis.
2. Ad illud quod secundo obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi quantitas; dicendum, quod verum est vel11 secundum genus, vel secundum speciem; et quamvis nomen quantitatis non transferatur, transfertur tamen nomen speciei, ut magnitudo12.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi finitas; dicendum, quod aequalitas in creaturis duo importat, scilicet conterminationem13 et excessus privationem; primum est incompletionis ratione limitationis, secundum perfectionis: ideo transfertur ratione secundi, non primi.
Posset tamen dici, quod infinitum, quod est incomprehensibile, secundum veritatem est ab infinito comprehensibile, et ideo commensurabile infinito et est sibi finitum14. Et ex hoc non sequitur: est commensurabile infinito, ergo finitum; immo magis infinitum: et15 est ibi quid et simpliciter.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur: ubi aequalitas, ibi diversitas: dicendum, quod est diversitas suppositorum et diversitas formae16. Ad aequalitatem et similitudinem requiritur diversitas suppositorum, non autem formae diversitas, sed unitas. Quod autem consequitur in inferioribus ad diversitatem suppositorum numeratio formae vel quantitatis, hoc est imperfectionis; et ideo totum, quod est perfectionis, transfertur in Deum. Non tamen est in suppositis proprie loquendo diversitas, sed distinctio17.
I. Ex sententia communi hae tres communes relationes identitatis, aequalitatis et similitudinis correspondent his tribus generibus: substantiae, quantitati et qualitati. Hanc doctrinam explicat Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.): «In his inferioribus ex unitate in substantia causatur identitas, ex unitate in quantitate aequalitas, ex unitate in qualitate similitudo, unde identitas, aequalitas, similitudo dicunt relationes fundatas super tria praedicamenta. Iuxta istam similitudinem, quoniam est significare divinam substantiam ut essentiam et ut quantam et ut qualem, est ponere in divinis identitatem, aequalitatem et similitudinem. Sed quantitas in divinis transit in genus substantiae, et qualitas similiter, quia in divinis non est ponere nisi duo genera, scil. substantiae et ad aliquid. Aequalitas et similitudo dicunt relationes ut fundatas in substantia». Insuper, sicut est duplex quantitas, propria scilicet sive quantitas molis, et impropria sive quantitas virtutis vel perfectionis (cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 42. a. 1. ad 1.), ita etiam duplex distinguitur aequalitas, «quatenus consequitur utramque quantitatem». Et sicut quantitas virtutis (quam S. Augustinus maluit nominare nomine magnitudinis, quam nomine quantitatis, ne insipientes accipiant occasionem errandi, existimando in Deo esse quantitatem molis orbem replentem) nobilior est quantitate molis, ita nobilior est aequalitas fundata super quantitatem virtutis, quam quae fundatur super quantitatem molis. Dici etiam potest, quod altera est aequalitas proprie dicta, altera vero improprie. Aequalitas proprie sumta est quaedam relatio praedicamentalis, fundata super unitate, quam res habent in genere quantitatis. Aequalitas vero large sumta est relatio extra genus quantitatis et potest fundari in quolibet ente, tam finito quam infinito, quatenus habet certum gradum in entibus. De Deo autem, qui est extra omne genus, relationes identitatis, aequalitatis et similitudinis praedicantur tantum in sensu transcendentali.
II. Quoad solut. ad 2. et assertionem ibi positam, quod[?] «quamvis nomen quantitatis non transferatur, transfertur tamen nomen speciei», cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 1. — Quoad vero loquendi modum «non est in divinis suppositis proprie diversitas, sed distinctio», cfr. infra d. 24. dub. 1.[?] Magis autem explicat Alex. Hal. (loc. cit. ad 2.) his verbis: «Ad aequalitatem et similitudinem in suppositis requiritur diversitas suppositorum secundum essentiam in suppositis; non sic est in divinis, propter quam diversitatem suppositorum concomitatur identitas essentiae; et propter hanc unitionem non est ponere diversitatem, sed distinctionem, ut dicit Ambrosius. Unde aequalitas in divinis personis non dicit diversitatem, sed distinctionem; distinctio enim non tollit unitatem, sive identitatem; unde licet in divinis sit summa identitas, quia illam concomitatur distinctio, huiusmodi identitas non tollit aequalitatem».
III. Plura de aequalitate vide infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1, 2, 3. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 41, m. 1. — Scot., de hac et duabus seqq. in utroque scripto hic q. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1, a. 1, et d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; S. I, q. 42, a. 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 1; S. p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1, a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 70, q. 1. — Durand., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. 1. — Riel., hic q. 1, a. 1.
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ARTICLE UNIQUE. On the equality of the divine persons and on its properties.
### Question I. Whether equality is to be posited in divine things.
As to the first [question], that there is equality there, it is shown:
1. First, by what is said in the Creed1: «All three persons are coeternal to one another and coequal».
2. Likewise, this very thing is shown by reason thus: every multitude is reduced to unity; therefore every inequality to equality; but the unity from which every multitude [arises] is uncreated unity: therefore also the equality to which every inequality is reduced is uncreated equality2: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, everything which is of perfection is to be transferred to divine things: but equality is of perfection in the creature: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, oneness in substance makes identity, oneness in quantity equality, oneness in quality makes likeness3; but in divine things there is not only unity in substance, but also in quantity — otherwise there would not be there a perfect unity: therefore there is there not only identity of substance, but also4 equality.
On the contrary: 1. Where there is equality, there is divisibility, since the simple is not made equal to the simple; but in divine things divisibility is not to be posited: therefore neither equality.
2. Likewise, where there is equality, there is quantity, since «it is the property of quantity that according to it [a thing] is called equal or unequal»5; but in divine things quantity is not to be posited, since according to Augustine6 «God is great without quantity»: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, where there is equality, there is finitude, because there is commensuration7, therefore measure and finitude; but in divine things there is infinity: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, where there is equality, there is diversity, since nothing is equal to itself; but in divine things there is unity in every mode: therefore there is no equality there.
Conclusion. Equality is to be posited in divine things — [the equality] which follows upon the quantity of virtue [quantitatem virtutis].
I respond: It must be said that equality is posited in divine things, according to what is said in the Creed, and Augustine says8.
And for the understanding of this it must be noted9 that equal and unequal is a proper accident following upon quantity. But quantity is said in two ways: properly, namely the quantity of mass [quantitas molis], and by transference, the quantity of virtue [quantitas virtutis]. And because that10 is a proper accident of quantity, it follows upon both [kinds of] quantity: where therefore one is to posit quantity of virtue, there one is to posit equality or inequality. But this quantity of virtue is posited in spiritual things and is found supremely in divine things, because this quantity is not repugnant to simplicity, but is consonant with it; and likewise neither is the equality which follows upon this quantity. And because the more complete part of the contradiction is to be attributed to God, and equality precedes inequality: therefore equality is to be posited in divine things; and the reasons in favor of this are to be conceded.
1. To that, therefore, which is objected to the contrary, that where there is equality, there is divisibility: it must be said that this is true of the equality which follows upon the quantity of mass.
2. To that which is objected secondly: where there is equality, there is quantity; it must be said that it is true either11 according to genus, or according to species; and although the name of quantity is not transferred, nevertheless the name of the species is transferred, as magnitude12.
3. To that which is objected: where there is equality, there is finitude; it must be said that equality in creatures imports two things, namely conterminātion13 and the privation of excess; the first is of incompletion by reason of limitation, the second of perfection: therefore it is transferred by reason of the second, not of the first.
Yet it could be said that the infinite, which is incomprehensible, in truth is comprehensible by [another] infinite, and is therefore commensurable to [that] infinite and is finite to it14. And from this it does not follow: it is commensurable to the infinite, therefore [it is] finite; rather, the more infinite: and15 there is there a "[finite] in some respect" and "[finite] simply".
4. To that which is objected: where there is equality, there is diversity: it must be said that there is a diversity of supposits and a diversity of form16. For equality and likeness, diversity of supposits is required, but not diversity of form, but unity. But [the fact] that in inferior things there follows upon a diversity of supposits a numeration of form or of quantity — this is of imperfection; and therefore the whole, which is of perfection, is transferred into God. Yet there is not, in the supposits properly speaking, diversity, but distinction17.
I. According to the common opinion, these three common relations of identity, equality, and likeness correspond to these three genera: substance, quantity, and quality. Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below) explains this doctrine: «In these inferior things, from unity in substance is caused identity, from unity in quantity equality, from unity in quality likeness — whence identity, equality, likeness express relations founded upon the three predicaments. According to this likeness, since [it is possible] to signify the divine substance as essence and as quantified and as qualified, equality is to be posited in divine things, [along with] identity and likeness. But quantity in divine things passes over into the genus of substance, and quality likewise, since in divine things only two genera are to be posited, namely substance and ad aliquid (relation). Equality and likeness express relations as founded in substance». Furthermore, just as there is a twofold quantity — proper, namely quantitas molis (quantity of mass), and improper, namely quantitas virtutis (quantity of virtue) or of perfection (cf. St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1) — so also a twofold equality is distinguished, «inasmuch as it follows upon both [kinds of] quantity». And just as the quantity of virtue (which St. Augustine preferred to name by the name of magnitude rather than by the name of quantity, lest the foolish take occasion of erring by supposing that there is in God a quantity of mass filling the universe) is more noble than the quantity of mass, so the equality founded upon the quantity of virtue is more noble than that which is founded upon the quantity of mass. It can also be said that one [equality] is equality properly so called, the other improperly. Equality properly taken is a certain predicamental relation, founded upon a unity which things have in the genus of quantity. But equality broadly taken is a relation outside the genus of quantity, and can be founded upon any being, both finite and infinite, inasmuch as it has a determinate grade in beings. But of God, who is outside every genus, the relations of identity, equality, and likeness are predicated only in the transcendental sense.
II. As to the solution to [objection] 2 and the assertion there set down, that[?] «although the name of quantity is not transferred, nevertheless the name of the species is transferred», cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 1. — As to the manner of speaking «in the divine supposits there is not, properly speaking, diversity, but distinction», cf. below d. 24, dub. 1.[?] Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. ad 2) explains it more fully in these words: «For equality and likeness in supposits, a diversity of supposits according to essence in the supposits is required; this is not so in divine things, on account of which diversity of supposits there accompanies an identity of essence; and on account of this union, one is not to posit diversity, but distinction, as Ambrose says. Hence equality in the divine persons does not express diversity, but distinction; for distinction does not destroy unity, or identity; whence, although in divine things there is the highest identity, since distinction accompanies it, an identity of this kind does not destroy equality».
III. For more on equality see below d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, 2, 3. — Alex. of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 41, m. 1. — Scotus, on this and the two following [questions] in both writings here q. 1. — St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, and d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; Summa I, q. 42, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1; Summa p. I, tr. II, q. 47, m. 1. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st principium, q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 70, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the two following here q. 1. — Dionysius the Carthusian, on this and the two following here q. 1. — Ricl[Riellus / Gabriel Biel?], here q. 1, a. 1.
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- Athanasiano.[The Athanasian Creed.]
- Vide Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 3. et 13; Boeth., de Arithmetica, ubi diversimode haec propositio occurrit. Boeth. loc. cit. praesertim II. c. 1. etiam ostendit, omnem numerorum inaequalitatem reduci ad aequalitatem.See Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 3 and 13; Boethius, On Arithmetic, where this proposition occurs in various ways. Boethius, loc. cit. — especially II, c. 1 — also shows that every inequality of numbers is reduced to equality.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate et Qualitate, et V. Metaph. text. 15. (16.) et 20. (IV. c. 9. et 10.): Eadem enim sunt quorum substantia una; similia vero quorum qualitas una; aequalia autem quorum quantitas una.Aristotle, Categories, c. on Quantity and on Quality, and Metaphysics V, text 15 (16) and 20 (IV, c. 9 and 10): For those things are the same whose substance is one; like, those whose quality is one; equal, those whose quantity is one.
- Multi codd. ut AFGHKVWX etc. cum ed. 1 minus bene omittunt et.Many codices such as A, F, G, H, K, V, W, X, etc., with ed. 1, less well omit et.
- Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quantitate. — Paulo ante in pluribus antiquis mss. ut A C R S T V Y et ed. 1 perperam sed loco quia.Aristotle, Categories, c. on Quantity. — A little before, in several ancient manuscripts such as A, C, R, S, T, V, Y, and ed. 1, sed is wrongly placed in place of quia.
- Libr. V. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2, in quo textu fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus est.On the Trinity V, c. 1, n. 2 — in which text, on the authority of the older manuscripts and ed. 1, we have supplied est.
- B. Albert. et Richard. a Med., hic a. 1, probant hoc per definitionem ex Geometria (Euclidis) sumtam et infra d. 31. p. I. q. 1. arg. 2. ad opp. citatam: Aequale est, quod alteri suppositum non excedit nec exceditur. — Mox Vat., fere omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 repugnantibus, ergo ubi est mensura, ibi est finitas, quo posito processus argumentationis tollitur.Bl. Albert and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, prove this through the definition taken from the Geometry (of Euclid) and cited below at d. 31, p. I, q. 1, arg. 2 ad oppositum: That is equal which, when set under another, neither exceeds nor is exceeded. — Next, the Vatican edition, against nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, [reads] therefore where there is measure, there is finitude, which posited, the course of the argumentation is destroyed.
- Vide hic lit. Magistri, in qua dicta Augustini allegantur.See here the text of the Master, in which the sayings of Augustine are alleged.
- Unus alterque codex praemittit verum est.One or another codex prefixes verum est ("it is true").
- Referas illa ad paulo supra posita aequale et inaequale, vel potius subintellige: aequalitas vel inaequalitas; cum quo concordat lectio cod. X, qui mox post quantitatis addit scilicet aequalitas vel inaequalitas, ideo; lectio autem Vat. et cod. cc, in qua verbo consequitur praefigitur aequalitas, incompleta est et contra antiquiores codd. nec non contra ed. 1.Refer those [words] to aequale et inaequale set down a little above, or rather understand: equality or inequality; with which the reading of cod. X agrees, which soon after quantitatis adds namely, equality or inequality, therefore; but the reading of the Vatican and of cod. cc, in which aequalitas is prefixed to the verb consequitur, is incomplete and is against the older codices and also against ed. 1.
- Supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 particulam vel.From the manuscripts and ed. 1 we have supplied the particle vel.
- Cfr. supra d. 8. p. II. dub. 1.Cf. above d. 8, p. II, dub. 1.
- Codd. aa bb addunt vel commensurationem.Codices aa and bb add or commensuration.
- Exhibemus lectionem maioris partis codd. ut AGHILO TQSTVY etc. et ed. 1, dum ceteri codd. cum edd. 2, 3 loco sibi ponunt ibi, vel falso infinitum pro finitum; Vat. autem omittit et est sibi finitum.We display the reading of the greater part of the codices such as A, G, H, I, L, O, T, Q, S, T, V, Y, etc., and ed. 1, while the other codices with editions 2, 3 in place of sibi put ibi, or falsely infinitum for finitum; the Vatican, moreover, omits et est sibi finitum.
- Vat. male et praeter fidem mss. et sex primarum edd. omittit et. Mox cod. X loco quid habet magis distincte secundum quid; complete diceretur: et est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter (cfr. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 4. 5.); ut siquidem transitus a finito sub aliquo respectu ad finitum simpliciter. Nam licet infinitum obiectum ab infinito intellectu comprehendatur eique sit commensurabile, propter hoc tamen dici non potest, ipsum esse finitum simpliciter, sed tantum secundum quid; quia potentiae in ratione intelligendi infinitae respondet solummodo obiectum infinitum in ratione intelligibilis.The Vatican wrongly and against the authority of the manuscripts and the six first editions omits et. Next, cod. X in place of quid has more distinctly secundum quid; fully it would read: and there is there a fallacy of [the] secundum quid and simpliciter (cf. Aristotle, I Sophistical Refutations, c. 4–5) — namely a transition from [what is] finite under some respect to [what is] finite simply. For although an infinite object is comprehended by an infinite intellect and is commensurable to it, nevertheless on account of this it cannot be said that it is finite simply, but only secundum quid; because to a power infinite in the account of understanding there corresponds only an object infinite in the account of intelligibility.
- Praeter lectionem in textum receptam reperiuntur in mss. variae lectiones; cod. K post verba dicendum quod addit verum est ubi; dein plures codd. ut ACRSUW (alio): ibi aequalitas suppositorum loco diversitas suppositorum, cod. T vero primitus dicendum, quod est ibi aequalitas suppositorum et unitas formae, sed postea mutatum in dicendum, quod est inaequalitas suppositorum et diversitas formae. Lectio primitiva codicis T non est spernenda. Mox cod. K post aequalitatem addit autem, et post similitudinem adiungit in divinis.Besides the reading received into the text, various readings are found in the manuscripts; cod. K after the words dicendum quod adds verum est ubi; then several codices such as A, C, R, S, U, W (otherwise): ibi aequalitas suppositorum in place of diversitas suppositorum; but cod. T originally dicendum, quod est ibi aequalitas suppositorum et unitas formae, but later changed into dicendum, quod est inaequalitas suppositorum et diversitas formae. The original reading of codex T is not to be despised. Next, cod. K after aequalitatem adds autem, and after similitudinem appends in divinis.
- Vide supra d. 1. q. 2. et dubia circa litteram; item Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 1.See above d. 1, q. 2, and the dubia circa litteram; likewise Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 65, m. 1.