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Dist. 19, Part 2, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 19

Textus Latinus
p. 365

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram et primo de hoc quod dicit: Oret, ut quod credit intelligat. Videtur enim improprie loqui, quia nullus orat quod non desiderat, nullus desiderat quod non considerat, nullus considerat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit: ergo a primo, si orat, ut intelligat, intelligit1. Item, nullus assentit rei, quam mente non intuetur sive concipit: ergo nullus assentit rei, quam non intelligit, quia intelligere est mente intueri.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod intelligere dupliciter dicitur: uno modo idem est quod cognoscere, quid est2 quod per nomen dicitur; alio modo idem est quod ratione comprehendere. Primo modo antecedit fidem, quae est ex auditu3; secundo modo consequitur, quia nulla ratio humana sufficit ad manifestanda credibilia, nisi intellectus fide4 illustretur et captivetur.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hac solutione Magistri, qua dicit: Aliqua differre numero, quae sibi in computatione non adiunguntur. Videtur enim male dicere, quia illi computationi aut respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si aliquid respondet: ergo non differt a praecedenti differentia; si nihil respondet: ergo distinctio sive computatio nostra super5 vanum fundata est.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod computationi nostrae, cum dicimus unus, duo, tres, aliquid respondet. Sed illud non est diversitas numeralis, sed distinctio personalis; unde in divinis non dicitur esse numerus nec differentia secundum numerum, nisi addatur secundum numerum personarum, qui dicit distinctionem in hypostasibus, non in natura; ideo quamvis dicantur tres personae, non tamen est ibi ternarius, sed trinitas6.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod cum Deus dicatur trinus, non debet dici triplex. Videtur enim contra illud quod dicitur Sapientiae septimo7, quod Spiritus sapientiae est multiplex, ergo duplex vel quadruplex: ergo etc. Item, Isidorus8 dicit, quod «Trinitas est multiplex et numerabilis». Item, ratione videtur, quia pannus unus, in substantia duplicatus, dicitur duplex, triplicatus triplex:

p. 366

ergo si una est substantia in tribus hypostasibus, videtur triplicari in eis et ita9 triplex dici.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod distinctio personarum non potest significari per additionem termini numeralis10 ad hoc nomen Deus nisi huius nominis trinus, quod specialiter ad hoc inventum est, ut significet pluralitatem in suppositis cum unitate formae. Quia ergo hoc nomen triplex dicit distinctionem simpliciter in termino cui additur, vel quantum ad formam, vel quantum ad partium multiplicationem, et quia11 in Deo non cadit multiplicatio nec quantum ad formam, nec quantum ad partes: ideo nullo modo potest dici triplex.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod12 dicitur multiplex; dicendum, quod istud est dictum causaliter, quia multorum et variorum donorum effectivum est principium13, in quibus est vera diversitas; non sic in personis. — Quod dicit Isidorus, improprie dictum est et exponendum est. — Ad illud, quod idem pannus dicitur triplex14; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen secundum alias et alias partes; et quia in Deo non est alietas partium nec formae, ideo non potest dici triplex15.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in rebus corporeis plus sunt duae quam una. Videtur enim instantia esse, quia ignis cum ferro non est16 maius quam ferrum per se, sive lux cum aere. Si tu dicas, quod non sunt corpora; obiicitur, quod corpus glorificatum simul est cum non glorificato, et tantum locum occupat non glorificatum per se, quantum cum glorioso: ergo non sunt maius, quia corpus maius maiorem occupat locum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus17 loquitur de rebus corporeis, quarum quaelibet est corpus; sed ignis in ferro et lux in aere non est corpus, sed proprietas corporis. Praeterea notandum, quod Augustinus non accipit hic18 maius extensive, sed accipit plus quantum ad veritatem existentiae vel essentiae. Cum enim non sit summa veritas in qualibet re, plus est de veritate existentiae in duabus rebus quam in una, quamvis non sit ibi plus de latitudine distantiae sive de extensione19 magnitudinis vel capacitatis contentivae.

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English Translation

DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first about what he says: Let him pray, that what he believes he may understand. For it appears to speak improperly, because no one prays for what he does not desire, no one desires what he does not consider, no one considers what he does not know or understand: therefore from the first, if he prays in order to understand, he [already] understands1. Likewise, no one assents to a thing which he does not gaze upon or conceive in mind: therefore no one assents to a thing which he does not understand, because to understand is to gaze with the mind.

I respond: It must be said that to understand is said in two ways: in one way it is the same as to know what it is2 which is said by the name; in another way it is the same as to comprehend by reason. In the first way it precedes faith, which is from hearing3; in the second way it follows, because no human reason suffices to manifest things to be believed, unless the intellect is illumined and made captive by faith4.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning this solution of the Master, by which he says: Some things differ in number, which are not joined to one another in counting. For it appears to say wrongly, because either something in the thing corresponds to that counting, or nothing. If something corresponds: therefore it does not differ from the preceding difference; if nothing corresponds: therefore our distinction or counting is founded upon5 the void.

I respond: It must be said that to our counting, when we say one, two, three, something does correspond. But that is not numerical diversity, but personal distinction; whence in the divine [persons] it is not said that there is number nor difference according to number, unless one adds according to the number of persons, which states a distinction in the hypostases, not in the nature; therefore although three persons are spoken of, yet there is not there a ternary, but a trinity6.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that since God is called trine, he ought not to be called triple. For it appears [to be] against what is said in the seventh [chapter] of Wisdom7, that the Spirit of wisdom is manifold (multiplex), therefore double or quadruple: therefore etc. Likewise, Isidore8 says that «Trinity is manifold and numerable». Likewise, it appears by reason, because one cloth, doubled in substance, is called double, tripled, triple:

[therefore] if one substance is in three hypostases, it appears to be tripled in them and so9 to be called triple.

I respond: It must be said that the distinction of persons cannot be signified by the addition of a numerical term10 to this name God, except by this name trine, which has been invented specifically for this, that it should signify plurality in the supposits with unity of form. Since therefore this name triple states distinction simply in the term to which it is added, either with respect to form, or with respect to the multiplication of parts, and since11 in God multiplication does not fall, neither with respect to form, nor with respect to parts: therefore in no way can [God] be called triple.

To that which is objected, that12 [the Spirit] is called manifold; it must be said that this was said causally, because [the Holy Spirit] is the effective principle13 of many and varied gifts, in which there is true diversity; not so in the persons. — As to what Isidore says, it was said improperly and is to be expounded [accordingly]. — To that [objection], that the same cloth is called triple14; it must be said that this is true, but yet according to other and other parts; and because in God there is no otherness of parts nor of form, therefore he cannot be called triple15.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that in corporeal things two are more than one. For an instance appears to be [available], because fire with iron is not16 greater than iron by itself, or light with air. If you say that they are not bodies; the objection is raised that a glorified body is together with a non-glorified [body], and the non-glorified [body] occupies just as much place by itself as [it does] with the glorious [body]: therefore they are not greater, because a greater body occupies a greater place.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine17 is speaking of corporeal things, of which each one is a body; but fire in iron and light in air is not a body, but a property of a body. Furthermore, it must be noted that Augustine does not here18 take greater extensively, but takes more with respect to the truth of existence or of essence. For since the highest truth is not in just any thing, there is more of the truth of existence in two things than in one, although there is not there more of the breadth of distance or of the extension19 of magnitude or of containing capacity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Ultimam partem huius argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 reluctantibus, sic mutilam exhibet: nullus desiderat quod non cognoscit vel intelligit. Item.
    The Vatican [edition] with codex cc, the other codices with edition 1 nevertheless resisting, exhibits the last part of this argument thus mutilated: no one desires what he does not know or understand. Likewise.
  2. Vat. et cod. cc aliquid loco quid est, sed contra communem Scholasticorum modum loquendi et contra mss. (quorum tamen aliqui ut K W ee minus apte aliquid est) et ed. 1. Mox auctoritate plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus comprehendere pro apprehendere. — Explicationem huius distinctionis accipe a S. Doctore, qui III. Sent. d. 24. dub. 3. eandem obiectionem resolvendo ait: Uno modo intelligere dicitur large nosse, quid est quod dicitur per nomen; et illud intelligere semper praecedit assensum fidei, nec aliquid creditur, quin isto modo prius intelligatur. Alio modo intelligere hoc est ratione praevia cogitare, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus: Quod intelligimus, debemus rationi; quod credimus, auctoritati. Et de isto intelligit Augustinus, quod quaedam sunt quae prius creduntur, et postea intelliguntur, sicut sunt articuli fidei, qui sunt supra rationem etc. — Paulo ante pauci codd. ut P Q est dupliciter pro dupliciter dicitur.
    The Vatican [edition] and codex cc [read] aliquid in place of quid est, but against the common manner of speaking of the Scholastics and against the manuscripts (of which yet some such as K, W, ee less aptly [read] aliquid est) and edition 1. Soon, on the authority of very many codices and edition 1, we have substituted comprehendere in place of apprehendere. — Receive the explanation of this distinction from the holy Doctor, who, in III Sent. d. 24, dub. 3, in resolving the same objection, says: In one way "to understand" is said broadly to know what it is that is said by the name; and that understanding always precedes the assent of faith, nor is anything believed which is not first understood in that way. In another way "to understand" is to think with reason going before, according to what Augustine says: What we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority. And concerning this Augustine understands that there are certain things which are first believed, and afterwards understood, as are the articles of faith, which are above reason etc. — A little before, a few codices such as P, Q [read] est dupliciter in place of dupliciter dicitur.
  3. Rom. 10, 17.
    Romans 10:17.
  4. Plures codd. ut G H P Q U cum ed. 1 luce fidei pro fide. — Plura de hoc dubio vide apud Alex. Hal., S. p. III. q. 68. m. 6. a. 6.
    Several codices such as G, H, P, Q, U, with edition 1, [read] luce fidei ("by the light of faith") in place of fide. — More on this doubt see in Alexander of Hales, Summa p. III, q. 68, m. 6, a. 6.
  5. Vat. addit nihil et, quod deest in fere omnibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
    The Vatican [edition] adds nihil et, which is missing in nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3.
  6. Cfr. hic q. 4.
    Cf. here q. 4.
  7. Vers. 22, ubi Vulgata loco sapientiae legit intelligentiae.
    Verse 22, where the Vulgate, in place of sapientiae, reads intelligentiae.
  8. Cfr. infra d. XXIV. lit. Magistri in fine, ubi tota Isidori propositio habetur.
    Cf. below d. XXIV, the text of the Master at the end, where the whole proposition of Isidore is found.
  9. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus ita. Mox plures codd. cum ed. 1 tripliciter loco triplex. Paulo supra cod. Z est duplex pro dicitur duplex.
    From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied ita. Soon several codices with edition 1 [read] tripliciter in place of triplex. A little above, codex Z [reads] est duplex in place of dicitur duplex.
  10. Vat., quae habet numerabilis pro numeralis, emendatur ex mss. et ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. T cum ed. 1 significaret loco significet.
    The Vatican [edition], which has numerabilis in place of numeralis, is corrected from the manuscripts and edition 1. A little below, codex T with edition 1 [reads] significaret in place of significet.
  11. In pluribus mss. ut A S T W V etc. et ed. 1 omittitur quia, ac dein ponitur nec loco non.
    In several manuscripts such as A, S, T, W, V etc., and edition 1, quia is omitted, and then nec is put in place of non.
  12. Hic et paulo infra post quia supple: Spiritus sapientiae.
    Here and a little below, after quia supply: Spiritus sapientiae ("the Spirit of wisdom").
  13. Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, in hac propositione post quia addit est causa, ac mox post et contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 repetit quia. Dein aliqui codd. ut A L S Z divinorum effectuum loco donorum effectivum, aliqui autem ut G H K O ee ff omisso donorum legunt variorum effectuum est etc. Mox post non sic cod. V adiungit est.
    The Vatican [edition], the manuscripts and edition 1 contradicting [it], in this proposition after quia adds est causa, and soon after et, against very many codices and edition 1, repeats quia. Then some codices such as A, L, S, Z [read] divinorum effectuum in place of donorum effectivum, but some such as G, H, K, O, ee, ff, with donorum omitted, read variorum effectuum est etc. Soon after non sic codex V adjoins est.
  14. Vat. et cod. cc multiplex, sed contra alios codd. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican [edition] and codex cc [read] multiplex, but against the other codices and edition 1.
  15. Plura de hoc videsis infra d. 24. a. 3. q. 1. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. a. 4. — B. Albert., hic a. 18.
    More on this you may see below d. 24, a. 3, q. 1. — Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 66, m. 1, a. 4. — B. Albert, here a. 18.
  16. Fide mss. et sex primarum edd. expunximus additum quid, et mox ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 post Si supplevimus tu.
    On the faith of the manuscripts and the first six editions we have struck out the added quid, and soon, from very many manuscripts and edition 1, after Si we have supplied tu.
  17. Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 10. n. 12, ex quo sumtus est textus huius dubii. — Paulo infra auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 post ferro adiecimus et.
    Book VI On the Trinity c. 10, n. 12, from which the text of this doubt is taken. — A little below, on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, after ferro we have added et.
  18. Vat. ibi, obnitentibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1.
    The Vatican [edition reads] ibi, very many manuscripts and edition 1 striving against [it].
  19. Ita fere omnes codd., dum Vat. loco de extensione ponit extensivae, cum qua convenit ed. 1, quae post magnitudinis cum cod. M addit dimensivae.
    So nearly all the codices, while the Vatican [edition], in place of de extensione, puts extensivae, with which edition 1 agrees, which after magnitudinis, with codex M, adds dimensivae.
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