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Dist. 20, Dubia

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 20

Textus Latinus
p. 375

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de prima ratione, quam ponit Magister: Omnia quae habet Pater, habet Filius: ergo quantam potentiam habet Pater, habet Filius. Istud argumentum non videtur valere, quia mutatur quid in quantum: nam omnia distribuit pro substantia, quantum autem dicit quantitatem.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod quamvis talis modus arguendi1 non valeret, si differret quantitas et substantia, tamen ubi idem est, omnimodam habet necessitatem; et quia hoc est in divinis, ideo argumentum bonum est.

Posset tamen dici, quod praedictum argumentum in qualibet materia est bonum. Habere enim non dicitur aliquis solum substantialia, sed etiam proprietates: ergo sequitur, cum omnia distribuat pro omnibus habitis2, quod habeat etiam proprietates: ergo cum nullam potentiam habeat unus, quam non habeat alter, ergo nihil potest unus, quod non potest alter: ergo si unus omnipotens est, et alter; et ita patet, quod hic non est figura dictionis, quia omnia distribuit hic pro rebus omnium generum3.

p. 376

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non potest qui accepit inaequalis esse ei qui dedit. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia si hoc, cum omnis creatura sit accipiens, nulla esset inaequalis Deo; sed hoc4 falsum: ergo et primum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Augustinus non loquitur generaliter5 de quolibet accipiente sive de quolibet modo, sed de eo qui accipit omnia; et talis accipiens non potest esse inaequalis.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de alia ratione: Si non potuit, ergo fuit impotens. Videtur enim male arguere, quia similiter posset argui de Filio et Spiritu sancto: si non potuit Filium aequalem producere: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum ad hoc, quod non competit generatio nisi hypostasi Patris, sicut alibi tactum est6; ideo non valet nec est simile.

DUB. IV.

Item dubitatur de alia parte auctoritatis7, quia illud argumentum non videtur valere: Potuit producere aequalem, et non produxit sive genuit: ergo invidus fuit, quia similiter8 potest argui: potuit istam creaturam facere meliorem, et non fecit: ergo invidit. Si tu dicas, quod invidia considerat semper parem vel superiorem, sicut dicit Gregorius super illud Iob quinto9: Parvulum occidit invidia; obiicitur tunc, quia si Filium genuisset minorem, non habuisset ibi locum invidia: ergo videtur quod ista solutio non solvit. Item, in creaturis non valet: iste artifex potuit facere istam rem meliorem et non fecit: ergo fuit invidus; quare ergo10 tenet in Deo?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod invidia artificis producentis non attenditur in productione rei inaequalis vel minus bonae, nisi11 ubi res de sui natura exigit tale esse; tunc enim necessario concluditur, quod aut producens non potuit, aut invidit, si potuit et non produxit, quia non fecit, ut debuit. Et quoniam filius, eo ipso quo filius est, natus est perfecte imitari, si non genuit filium in perfecta imitatione, concluditur, quod aut producens impotens fuit, aut invidit. Et ideo patet, quod non est simile de Creatore et creatura, arca et artifice12.

DUB. V.

Item dubitatur de tertia ratione, quam facit: Si homo pater potuit gignere filium sibi aequalem, ergo et Deus, quia illud argumentum non valet: homo habet alium hominem sibi aequalem vel habere potest: ergo et Deus similiter; quoniam Deus de sua nobilitate hoc habet, quod nullus potest ei aequari; et ita videtur ratio Augustini non valere.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod si aequalitas poneret de necessitate in aequalibus diversitatem in natura, quod tunc non valeret. Sed supposito, quod Deus generet Filium connaturalem sibi, de necessitate sequitur, quod si homo aequalem genuit, quod Deus multo fortius. Quamvis enim imperfectionis sit aequari diverso in natura, tamen aequari connaturali perfectionis est; alioquin divina natura esset in aliquo imperfecte13; quod si hoc est impossibile, patet, etc.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod quaestio aequalitatis est qualis aut quantus. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia quale dicit qualitatem, et secundum eam attenditur similitudo, non aequalitas, quia «proprium est qualitatis secundum eam simile vel dissimile dici14».

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod de qualitate est loqui dupliciter: uno modo, prout dicitur denominans15;

p. 377

alio modo, prout est dispositio nobilitatis; et secundum hanc attenditur maior et minor nobilitas, et ita melior res dicitur. Et quia «in spiritualibus idem est maius et melius16», ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad qualitatem, non ex propria ratione nominis, sed ex consequenti, ut visum est17.

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English Translation

DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.

Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first there is doubt concerning the first reasoning which the Master places: All things that the Father has, the Son has: therefore as great a power as the Father has, the Son has. This argument does not seem to be valid, because quid is changed into quantum: for all things distributes with respect to substance, while quantum states quantity.

I respond: It must be said that, although such a manner of arguing1 would not be valid if quantity and substance differed, nevertheless where they are the same, it has every kind of necessity; and because this is so in divine matters, therefore the argument is good.

It can yet be said, however, that the aforesaid argument is good in any matter. For someone is not said to have only substantial things, but also properties: therefore it follows, since all things distributes for all things had2, that he also has properties: therefore since one [person] has no power that the other does not have, therefore one can do nothing that the other cannot: therefore if one is omnipotent, the other [is] also; and so it is clear that here there is no figure of speech, because all things distributes here for things of all genera3.

Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: He who has received cannot be unequal to him who has given. For it appears to say wrongly, because if this [were so], since every creature is a receiver, none would be unequal to God; but this4 is false: therefore so is the first.

I respond: It must be said that Augustine does not speak generally5 of every receiver or of every mode, but of him who receives all things; and such a receiver cannot be unequal.

Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked about another reasoning: If he could not, therefore he was impotent. For it seems to argue wrongly, because similarly it could be argued of the Son and the Holy Spirit: if he could not produce an equal Son: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said to this that generation does not pertain except to the hypostasis of the Father, as has been touched on elsewhere6; therefore [the inference] is not valid, nor is it similar.

Doubt IV.

Likewise it is doubted concerning another part of the authority7, because that argument does not appear to be valid: He could produce an equal, and did not produce or beget: therefore he was envious; because similarly8 it can be argued: he could make this creature better, and did not make [it so]: therefore he envied. If you say that envy always regards an equal or a superior, as Gregory says on that [verse] of Job, chapter 59: Envy slays the little one; it is then objected that, if he had begotten a lesser Son, envy would not have had a place there: therefore it appears that this solution does not solve [the problem]. Likewise, in creatures it does not hold: this craftsman could have made this thing better and did not: therefore he was envious; why therefore10 does it hold in God?

I respond: It must be said that the envy of the producing craftsman is not regarded in the production of an unequal or less good thing, except11 where the thing of its own nature demands such being; for then it is necessarily concluded that either the producer could not, or he envied, if he could and did not produce, because he did not do as he ought. And since a son, by the very fact that he is a son, is born to imitate perfectly, if he did not beget a son in perfect imitation, it is concluded that either the producer was impotent, or he envied. And therefore it is clear that it is not similar in the case of the Creator and the creature, the chest and the craftsman12.

Doubt V.

Likewise it is doubted concerning the third reasoning which he makes: If a man as father could beget a son equal to himself, therefore so could God too, because that argument is not valid: a man has another man equal to himself, or can have [one]: therefore so also God; because God has from his nobility that no one can be equal to him; and so the reasoning of Augustine seems not to be valid.

I respond: It must be said that if equality posited of necessity in equals diversity in nature, then it would not be valid. But, supposing that God begets a Son connatural to himself, it follows of necessity that if a man begot an equal, then God much more strongly. For although it pertains to imperfection to be equalled by [something] diverse in nature, yet to be equalled by [something] connatural is of perfection; otherwise the divine nature would be in some respect imperfectly13; and since this is impossible, it is clear, etc.

Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that the question of equality is "of what kind" or "how great" (qualis aut quantus). For it appears to say wrongly, because quale states quality, and according to it likeness is regarded, not equality, since «it is proper to quality that according to it like or unlike are said14».

I respond: It must be said that one may speak of quality in two ways: in one way, insofar as it is said to be denominating15;

in another way, insofar as it is a disposition of nobility; and according to this greater and lesser nobility is regarded, and so a thing is said to be better. And because «in spiritual things the same thing is greater and better16», therefore the question of equality looks to quality, not from the proper account of the name, but as a consequence, as has been seen17.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Supplevimus hic et mox post horum ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 est. Paulo ante loco arguendi nonnulli codd. ut S W Y argumentandi.
    We have supplied here and soon after horum, from nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, est. A little before, in place of arguendi some codices such as S, W, Y [read] argumentandi.
  2. Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice perperam habitibus.
    The Vatican [edition] with only one or another codex wrongly [reads] habitibus.
  3. Aristot., I. Elench. c. 3. (c. 4.) fallaciam figurae dictionis ita definit: «Quae autem propter figuram dictionis sunt accidunt, quando (propter similitudinem unius dictionis cum alia) non idem ut idem interpretatur, ut masculinum femininum, vel femininum masculinum, vel quod inter haec est (scil. neutrum) alterum horum, vel rursus quale quantum, vel quantum quale, vel faciens patiens» etc. — Dupliciter fieri potest distributio termini omnis, nempe pro singulis generum i. e. pro singulis individuis, quae sub eodem genere et sub eadem specie continentur, et pro generibus singulorum i. e. pro solis generibus vel speciebus, non autem pro individuis sub generibus vel speciebus.
    Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations I, c. 3 (c. 4) defines the fallacy of figure of speech thus: «Those [fallacies] which arise on account of the figure of speech occur when (on account of the likeness of one word to another) what is not the same is interpreted as the same, as the masculine [as] feminine, or the feminine [as] masculine, or what is between these (namely, the neuter) [as] one of the two, or again "of what kind" [as] "how much", or "how much" [as] "of what kind", or "doing" [as] "undergoing"» etc. — The distribution of the term omnis ("all") can be made in two ways, namely for the singulars of the genera, i.e. for the individual things which are contained under the same genus and under the same species, and for the genera of the singulars, i.e. for the genera or species alone, not however for the individuals under the genera or species.
  4. In cod. V adiicitur est.
    In codex V est is added.
  5. Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additam coniunctivam particulam et. Paulo infra post omnia cod. O non male addit naturaliter.
    On the faith of the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have struck out the conjunctive particle et added here. A little below, after omnia, codex O not badly adds naturaliter.
  6. Dist. 7. q. 2. — Paulo ante ex mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus Dicendum.
    Distinction 7, q. 2. — A little before, from the manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied Dicendum.
  7. Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 rationis.
    The Vatican [edition], against the manuscripts and edition 1, [reads] rationis.
  8. Cod. dd eodem modo pro similiter, qui et mox, omisso istam, post meliorem addit tali; cod. V posset loco potest et paulo post pro invidit ponit invidus fuit.
    Codex dd [reads] eodem modo in place of similiter, which also soon, omitting istam, after meliorem adds tali; codex V [reads] posset in place of potest, and a little later in place of invidit puts invidus fuit.
  9. Vers. 2; Libr. V. Moral. c. 46. n. 84: Invidere enim non possumus, nisi eis quos nobis in aliquo meliores putamus.
    Verse 2; Book V Moralia c. 46, n. 84: For we cannot envy, except those whom we judge in some way better than ourselves.
  10. Ita fere omnes codd. cum ed. 1, dum Vat. etiam non loco ergo.
    So nearly all the codices with edition 1, while the Vatican [edition] also [reads] non in place of ergo.
  11. Praeferimus lectionem plurium mss. ut F G T Z aa bb lectioni Vat. ponendo nisi pro sed, quae lectio iam ex grammaticali constructione commendatur; aliqui codd. ut S Y cum ed. 1 modo affirmativo, omissis particulis non et nisi, propositionem exhibent, in qua pauci codd. ut S V loco producentis legunt potentis. Mox plures codd. ut F G H I X Y cc dd cum edd. 1, 2, 3 talis pro tale.
    We prefer the reading of several manuscripts such as F, G, T, Z, aa, bb to the reading of the Vatican [edition], putting nisi in place of sed, which reading is already commended by the grammatical construction; some codices such as S, Y with edition 1, in the affirmative mode, with the particles non and nisi omitted, exhibit the proposition, in which a few codices such as S, V in place of producentis read potentis. Soon, several codices such as F, G, H, I, X, Y, cc, dd, with editions 1, 2, 3, [read] talis in place of tale.
  12. Concordant B. Albert., hic a. 6. — S. Thom., hic circa lit. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.
    B. Albert agrees, here a. 6. — St. Thomas, here on the littera. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.
  13. Cod. X imperfecta, qui dein cum cod. V habet et loco quod.
    Codex X [reads] imperfecta, which then with codex V has et in place of quod.
  14. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Qualitate. Cfr. etiam supra pag. 342 nota 6.
    Aristotle, Categories, ch. on Quality. Cf. also above p. 342, note 6.
  15. Nempe forma aliqua accidentalis, secundum quam, ut ait Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Quali, quales quidam esse dicuntur. — Et paulo infra dicit idem: Qualia ergo dicuntur quae denominative a dictis qualitatibus dicuntur (v. g. a candore candidus et a grammatica grammaticus). — Cod. T voci denominans praefigit particulam ut. Paulo post ex multis mss. ut FGHSTWYZ aa bb cum ed. 1 nomini dispositio praemisimus est loco dicitur, ac dein fide plurimorum codd. et ed. 1 substituimus melior[?] pro nobilior.
    Namely, some accidental form, according to which, as Aristotle says, Categories, ch. on Quale, certain things are said to be of-a-certain-quality. — And a little below he says the same: Things therefore are called of-a-quality which are said denominatively from the said qualities (e.g., from whiteness, white and from grammar, grammarian). — Codex T prefixes to the word denominans the particle ut. A little later, from many manuscripts such as F, G, H, S, T, W, Y, Z, aa, bb, with edition 1, we have prefixed to the noun dispositio the word est in place of dicitur, and then on the faith of very many codices and edition 1 we have substituted melior[?] in place of nobilior.
  16. Augustin., VI. de Trin. c. 8. n. 9. — In immediate sequenti propositione praestamus lectionem veram et contextui conformiorem, quam integre exhibent codd. XZ; Vat. cum ed. 1 et aliquibus mss. ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem, alii codd., inter quos est etiam cod. T, perperam ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem, qui etiam cum edd. 1, 5 in principio responsionis incongrue ponunt de aequalitate est loqui pro de qualitate etc.
    Augustine, VI On the Trinity c. 8, n. 9. — In the immediately following proposition we prefer the true reading and the one more conformable to the context, which codices X, Z exhibit in full; the Vatican [edition] with edition 1 and some manuscripts [reads] ideo quaestio de qualitate spectat ad aequalitatem; other codices, among which is also codex T, wrongly [read] ideo quaestio de aequalitate spectat ad aequalitatem, which also with editions 1, 5 in the beginning of the response incongruously put de aequalitate est loqui in place of de qualitate etc.
  17. Vide d. 19. p. I. q. 1. et 2. — Cfr. et B. Albert., hic a. 6. in fine et S. Thom., hic in expos. lit.
    See d. 19, p. I, qq. 1 and 2. — Cf. also B. Albert, here a. 6, at the end, and St. Thomas, here in the expositio litterae.
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