Dist. 21, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 21
ARTICULUS II.
De dictionibus exclusivis additis termino relativo.
Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secundo articulo quaestionis, scilicet utrum dictio exclusiva possit addi termino relativo. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo.
Primo quaeritur, utrum dictio exclusiva addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.
Secundo, utrum vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati communis, ut vere dicatur: solus Pater est Deus.
QUAESTIO I.
Utrum dictio exclusiva solus vere addatur termino personali respectu praedicati proprii.
Quod autem respectu praedicati proprii vere addatur, ut scilicet haec sit vera: solus Pater est Pater, videtur:
1. Per Augustinum sexto de Trinitate1: «In illa Trinitate solus Pater dicitur Pater, quia nullus nisi ipse ibi est Pater».
2. Item, hoc videtur per expositionem, quia persona Patris est Pater, et nulla alia est Pater: ergo haec est vera: solus Pater est Pater.
3. Item, nihil est magis proprium alicui, quam quod est idem sibi re et ratione; sed Pater est idem sibi re et ratione: ergo propriissime dicitur de se; sed quod proprie convenit alicui, convenit soli2: ergo Pater dicitur de solo Patre.
Contra: 1. «Solus, ut vult Philosophus3, idem est quod non cum alio»; sed impossibile est, Patrem non esse cum alio: ergo semper, quando additur huic termino Pater vel alii termino personali, est locutio falsa.
2. Item, solus excludit alium; sed alio est Deus, alio est Pater4: ergo addita huic termino Pater excludit Deum: ergo si haec est vera: solus Pater est Pater, et haec similiter: Deus non est Pater; quod si haec est falsa: ergo et prima.
3. Item, solus excludit5 hoc relativum alius; sed alius ita est relativum diversitatis, quod nihilominus implicat aliquam identitatem: unde sequitur: iste vadit cum alio homine, ergo iste est homo. Si ergo excludit alium ab hoc quod est Pater6, aut alium Patrem, aut alium Deum; sed quocumque modo dicatur, est locutio falsa et implicatio falsi: ergo etc.
CONCLUSIO.
Terminus solus in divinis recte dicitur respectu praedicati proprii, quatenus excludit associationem tum respectu formae termini subiecti, tum respectu praedicati, sive in participando, sive in comparticipando.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod haec dictio solus tenetur syncategorematice, importat privationem associationis; et locutio simpliciter est vera, excluso illo sensu, quo importat solitudinem, quia sic non accipitur in divinis, sicut supra dictum est.
Secundum enim quod importat privationem associationis, vera est, quia, cum tripliciter possit eam importare, in quolibet sensu locutio est vera. Potest enim haec dictio solus importare privationem associationis respectu formae termini subiecti7, ut dicatur solus Pater, id est, ille qui est solus Pater; et sic absque dubio veritatem habet: solus Pater est Pater. Vel potest importare privationem associationis respectu praedicati, et hoc dupliciter: vel in participando, ut quia alii non conveniat; et adhuc vera est, quia hoc praedicatum quod est Pater soli personae Patris convenit; illa enim proprietas Patri convenit, ita8 quod nulli alii; vel potest importare privationem associationis in comparticipando, ut cum dicitur: Petrus comedit solus, vel vadit Romam solus, non quia alius non vadat9 Romam, vel non comedat, sed quia nullus comparticipat cum eo, quamvis participet; et sic adhuc locutio est vera, quia persona Patris non participat vel comparticipat cum alia in proprietate paternitatis. Et ideo, secundum quod solus exclusive tenetur, iudicatur locutio vera.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod solus idem est quod non cum alio; dicendum, quod negatio illa non simpliciter excludit alium in coexistendo, sed excludit alium respectu formae subiecti vel praedicati10, ut visum est. Et quamvis Pater cum alio existat et non possit sine alio esse, quia tamen proprietatem paternitatis cum alio non communicat, ideo habet simpliciter locutio veritatem.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alio est Deus, alio est Pater; dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est saepe11, alius dicit diversitatem secundum rationem dicendi vel intelligendi in verbo proposito; sed in expositione huius dictionis solus dicit diversitatem sive distinctionem in supposito. Et quia Deus12 in supposito non differt a Patre, immo supponit pro Patre; ideo non sequitur, quod dictio exclusiva addita Patri excludat Deum.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod alius implicat formam aliquam, secundum quam conveniat13; dicendum, quod istud non oportet, quod ista sit forma per terminum importata — vere enim dicitur: homo est aliud ab asino — nisi quando advenit illi termino immediate, ut cum dicitur alius asinus, includitur convenientia in natura communi. Sed cum dicitur: solus Pater, non est dicere, quod Pater
et non alius Pater, sed, Pater et non alius a Patre; et ideo non importatur convenientia in forma proprietatis paternitatis cum alietate, sed sufficit, quod sit alia persona — Pater enim est14 — vel etiam alia essentia: et illa excludit hoc quod est solus; et sic patet illud.
I. Pro intelligentia 3. oppositi et solut. eiusdem notandum primo, quod terminus alius potest importare distinctionem vel circa formam (alium Deum), vel circa suppositum (alium Patrem). Secundo, alius potest addi alicui termino vel immediate vel mediante aliqua propositione, ut exemplo in textu illustratur. In primo casu ponit identitatem specificam inter extrema; in secundo vero casu haec identitas non importatur.
II. Auctores in substantia solutionis non dissentiunt. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — B. Albert., hic a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 2.
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ARTICLE II.
On exclusive words added to a relative term.
Consequently, in the second place, the question is concerning the second article of the question, namely whether an exclusive word can be added to a relative term. And concerning this two things are asked.
First it is asked whether the exclusive word is added to a personal term with respect to its proper predicate.
Secondly, whether it is truly added to a personal term with respect to a common predicate, as when it is truly said: the Father alone is God.
QUESTION I.
Whether the exclusive word solus is truly added to a personal term with respect to its proper predicate.
That with respect to the proper predicate it is truly added, namely so that this is true: the Father alone is Father, is seen:
1. Through Augustine, On the Trinity, book six1: «In that Trinity the Father alone is called Father, because no one but he himself is there Father».
2. Likewise, this is seen by exposition, because the person of the Father is Father, and no other is Father: therefore this is true: the Father alone is Father.
3. Likewise, nothing is more proper to anyone than what is the same with itself in reality and in account; but the Father is the same with himself in reality and in account: therefore he is most properly said of himself; but what properly belongs to anyone, belongs to him alone2: therefore Father is said of the Father alone.
On the contrary: 1. «Alone, as the Philosopher will have it3, is the same as not with another»; but it is impossible that the Father not be with another: therefore always, when [alone] is added to this term Father or to another personal term, the locution is false.
2. Likewise, alone excludes another; but it is by one [feature] that he is God, by another that he is Father4: therefore added to this term Father it excludes God: therefore if this is true: the Father alone is Father, then this likewise: God is not Father; and if this is false: therefore so also is the first.
3. Likewise, alone excludes5 this relative another; but another is so a relative of diversity that it nonetheless implies some identity: whence it follows: this man goes with another man, therefore this man is a man. If therefore [alone] excludes another from this which is Father6, either it [excludes] another Father, or another God; but in whatever way it is said, the locution is false and an implication of the false: therefore etc.
CONCLUSION.
The term alone in the divine is rightly said with respect to the proper predicate, inasmuch as it excludes association both with respect to the form of the subject term and with respect to the predicate, whether in participating or in co-participating.
I respond: It must be said that, insofar as this word alone is taken syncategorematically, it imports the privation of association; and the locution is simply true, that sense being excluded by which it imports solitude, because in this way it is not received in the divine, as has been said above.
For insofar as it imports the privation of association, [the locution] is true, because, since it can import [association] in three ways, in any sense the locution is true. For this word alone can import the privation of association with respect to the form of the subject term7, so that it is said the Father alone, that is, he who is the only Father; and thus without doubt it has truth: the Father alone is Father. Or it can import the privation of association with respect to the predicate, and this in two ways: either in participating, in that it does not belong to another; and still it is true, because this predicate which is Father belongs to the person of the Father alone; for that property belongs to the Father, in such a way8 that to no other; or it can import the privation of association in co-participating, as when it is said: Peter eats alone, or goes to Rome alone — not because another does not go9 to Rome, or does not eat, but because no one co-participates with him, although he [or another] participates; and thus still the locution is true, because the person of the Father does not participate or co-participate with another in the property of paternity. And therefore, insofar as alone is taken exclusively, the locution is judged true.
To 1. Therefore to that which is objected, that alone is the same as not with another; it must be said that that negation does not simply exclude another in co-existing, but excludes another with respect to the form of the subject or of the predicate10, as has been seen. And although the Father exists with another and cannot be without another, nevertheless because he does not communicate the property of paternity with another, therefore the locution simply has truth.
To 2. To that which is objected, that it is by one [feature] that he is God, by another that he is Father; it must be said that, as has often been said11, another expresses diversity according to the manner of speaking or of understanding in the proposed term; but in the exposition of this word alone, [another] expresses diversity or distinction in the supposit. And because God12 in supposit does not differ from the Father, indeed it stands for the Father; therefore it does not follow that an exclusive word added to the Father excludes God.
To 3. To that which is objected, that another implies some form according to which [the things compared] agree13; it must be said that this is not necessary, that that be a form imported through the term — for it is truly said: a man is other than an ass — except when [another] is joined to that term immediately, as when it is said another ass, agreement in a common nature is included. But when it is said: the Father alone, it is not [a matter of] saying, Father and not another Father, but, Father and not another from the Father; and therefore agreement in the form of the property of paternity together with otherness is not imported, but it suffices
that there be another person — for the Father is [a person]14 — or even another essence: and that excludes this which is alone; and so that [argument] is plain.
I. For the understanding of the third opposing argument and of its solution it is to be noted, first, that the term another can import a distinction either concerning the form (another God), or concerning the supposit (another Father). Secondly, another can be added to some term either immediately or mediated by some preposition, as is illustrated by the example in the text. In the first case it posits a specific identity between the extremes; but in the second case this identity is not imported.
II. The authors do not dissent in the substance of the solution. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 1, quaestiuncula 2. — Bl. Albert, here a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 2.
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- Cap. 9. n. 10. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1, ubi in hoc textu pro nullus nisi habetur nonnisi, cui concordant originale et cod. Z.Chapter 9, n. 10. See here the littera of the Master, c. 1, where in this text, in place of nullus nisi there is nonnisi, with which the original and codex Z agree.
- Cfr. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio.Cf. Porphyry, On the Predicables, chapter On the Proper.
- Libr. II. Elench. c. 3. (c. 22.). — Paulo infra nonnulli codd. ut T V Y cum pro quando.Book II [Sophistical] Refutations, c. 3 (c. 22). — A little below, some codices such as T V Y [read] cum in place of quando.
- August., VII. de Trin. c. 6. n. 11. et Sermo I. in Psalm. 68. n. 3. Videsis supra d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 1. — Mox post addita supple: dictio exclusiva solus, vel adde cum cod. aa haec dictio in principio argumenti post Item; minus congruam censuimus correctionem in cod. T a posteriori manu factam, qua scil. post addita subiungitur dictione exclusiva.Augustine, On the Trinity VII, c. 6, n. 11, and Sermon I on Psalm 68, n. 3. See above d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 1. — Next, after addita supply: dictio exclusiva solus ("the exclusive word alone"), or add with codex aa haec dictio ("this word") at the beginning of the argument after Item; we have judged less suitable the correction in codex T made by a later hand, by which, namely, after addita there is added dictione exclusiva ("by an exclusive word").
- Communissimam mss. et primarum edd. (excepta ed. 1) lectionem, qua habetur includit, licet in se spectata possit explicari (cfr. resp. ad 3. praec. q.), considerato tamen fine argumenti, minus aptam et incompletam iudicamus. Paulo infra post primum ergo cod. W addit particulam et.The most common reading of the manuscripts and of the earlier editions (except edition 1), in which there is includit ("includes"), although in itself it can be explained (cf. the response to argument 3 of the preceding question), nevertheless considering the goal of the argument, we judge less apt and incomplete. A little below, after primum ergo, codex W adds the particle et.
- Cod. V [primo] Pater pro quod est Pater, qui et mox post [iterum] interim [ponit?] semper. Dein ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus falsi pro falsa.Codex V [reads] Pater in place of quod est Pater, which [codex] also next, after [the second occurrence], [reads?] semper. Then, from the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted falsi in place of falsa. [OCR badly garbled at "C.fv\. V Iprmiiio... ilirahii inliirii .viiipei"; reading reconstructed.]
- In permultis codd. minus bene deest subiecti, melius in cod. X, omisso termini, retinetur subiecti.In very many codices, less well, subiecti is missing; better, in codex X, termini being omitted, subiecti is retained.
- Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 delevimus particulam et, quae in Vat. verbo ita praefigitur.On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have deleted the particle et, which in the Vatican edition is prefixed to the word ita.
- Vat., refragantibus mss. et sex primarum edd., eat; plures tamen mss. hic vadit et paulo infra comedit.The Vatican edition, with the manuscripts and the first six editions resisting, [reads] eat ("let him go"); however many manuscripts here [read] vadit ("goes") and a little below comedit ("eats").
- Ed. 1 cum Vat. addit in comparticipando, quod tamen abest a mss. et aliis quinque primis edd. Mox post cum Vat. praeter fidem plurimorum codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 propter subnexa minus congrue aliis pro alio, loco cuius pauci codd. ut S Y Z exhibent Filio.Edition 1 with the Vatican edition adds in comparticipando ("in co-participating"), which however is absent from the manuscripts and the other five earliest editions. Next, after cum, the Vatican edition, against the authority of very many codices and editions 1, 2, 3, on account of what follows less suitably [reads] aliis in place of alio, in place of which a few codices such as S Y Z present Filio ("with the Son").
- Dist. 6. dub. 2, et praesertim d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 1. — Vat. cum uno alterove codice supra pro saepe, et contra omnes codd. et ed. 1 aliud loco alius.Distinction 6, dubium 2, and especially d. 19, p. II, q. 2, ad 1. — The Vatican edition with one or another codex [reads] supra ("above") in place of saepe ("often"), and against all codices and edition 1 [reads] aliud in place of alius.
- In cod. T [adiungitur:] [Deus] Pater nullum dicit distinctionem.In codex T [there is added:] Deus Pater nullum dicit distinctionem ("'God the Father' expresses no distinction"). [OCR garbled at "iidiiiiipiiiiioi»)... iiilliim"; reading reconstructed.]
- Plures codd. ut V W convenirent. Mox cod. Y illud pro istud.Several codices such as V W [read] convenirent ("would agree"). Next codex Y [reads] illud in place of istud. [OCR garbled at "Piiiiii iml.l. lif V IV riiiiiiniiiinit"; reading reconstructed.]
- [Lacuna in OCR: textus desideratur post Pater enim est, ante — vel etiam alia essentia. Verisimiliter alia persona vel similiter supplendum.][Lacuna in OCR: the text after Pater enim est and before — vel etiam alia essentia is missing. Most likely alia persona ("another person") or similar is to be supplied.]