Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 22, Art. 1, Q. 1

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus

p. 390

ARTICULUS UNICUS. De nominibus divinis.

QUAESTIO I. Utrum Deus sit nominabilis.

Circa primum, quod Deus sit innominabilis, ostenditur auctoritatibus et rationibus. Auctoritatibus sic:

1. Dionysius de Divinis Nominibus¹: «Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est». Et iterum: «Dei neque nomen est neque verbum neque ratio neque opinio neque phantasia»: ergo Deus est omnino innominabilis.

2. Item, Philosophus in libro de Causis²: «Prima causa superior est omni narratione»; sed quod est superius omni narratione est inenarrabile, et omne tale innominabile: ergo etc.

3. Item, ratione ostenditur sic: nomen proportionem et similitudinem aliquam habet ad nominatum, ut vox ad significatum; sed Deus est infinitus omnino, vox autem omnis finita: ergo cum nulla sit proportio³, nulla per vocem erit expressio: ergo nec nominatio.

4. Item, omne nomen imponitur a forma aliqua⁴; sed in Deo non est ponere certam formam; unde Augustinus⁵: «Deus, qui omnem formam subterfugit, intellectui pervius esse non potest»: ergo etc.

5. Item, omne nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate⁶; sed in Deo est substantia mera sine quantitate et qualitate: ergo non contingit Deum significare per nomen.

6. Item, quod nec⁷ per pronomen. Pronomen enim non habet significationem determinatam nisi per demonstrationem vel relationem⁸. Demonstratio autem fit mediantibus accidentibus, quae possunt oculis conspici; sed haec non sunt in Deo: ergo videtur, quod Dei neque sit nomen, neque pronomen.

Contra:

1. In Psalmo⁹: Dominus nomen illi. Et iterum¹⁰: Quam admirabile est nomen tuum in universa terra: ergo Deus habet nomen.

2. Item, Dionysius fecit librum de divinis nominibus: aut ergo Deus est nominabilis, aut scientia ibi tradita cassa¹¹ est et inutilis.

3. Item, ratione videtur: quia omne quod se exprimit verbo, potest se exprimere signo verbi; sed signum verbi est vox¹²: ergo cum Deus se suo verbo exprimat, potest exprimi voce; sed quod potest voce exprimi, potest nominari: ergo etc.

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4. Item, quod contingit intelligere contingit significare sive enuntiare; sed contingit Deum a nobis cognosci; hoc certum est et supra probatum¹³: ergo etc.

5. Item, quod contingit laudare contingit et nominare; sed Deum contingit laudare, immo ipse est¹⁴ summe laudabilis: ergo et nominabilis.

Conclusio. Deus est nominabilis, sicut est intelligibilis, non quidem perfecte, sed imperfecte.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut intelligere dicitur dupliciter, sic¹⁵ effabile et nominabile. Uno enim modo intelligere dicitur per perfectam comprehensionem; alio modo per semiplenam cognitionem. Sic¹⁶ effabile dupliciter dicitur: uno modo per perfectam expressionem, alio modo per semiplenam narrationem. Sic etiam nominabile.

Si dicatur effabile sive nominabile secundum perfectionem expressionis, sic dicendum, quod sicut Deus sibi soli est intelligibilis, sic sibi soli est effabilis et nominabilis, non¹⁷ alio nomine, quam ipse sit, nec alio verbo, quam ipse sit; et sicut nobis est incomprehensibilis, ita et ineffabilis, ita etiam et innominabilis; et per hunc modum loquitur Dionysius et Philosophus.

Si vero dicatur effabile et nominabile secundum qualemcumque narrationem¹⁸, sic, quemadmodum Deus est nobis cognoscibilis, ita et effabilis et nominabilis; et qui melius cognoscit melius effatur et melius nominat et expressius. Unde expressius nominat fidelis quam infidelis¹⁹, et scriptura, quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura, quam ratio vel philosophia. Et hoc modo procedunt rationes et auctoritates ad secundam partem.

Ad 1, 2. Ad illud ergo quod²⁰ obiicitur de Dionysio et Philosopho, iam patet responsio per hoc quod loquuntur de nominatione, in qua est perfecta expressio.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vox in nomine²¹ est proportionabilis verbo interiori sive significato; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de nominatione, quae totam rei significationem includit; aliter non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur esse proportio ad rem sub ratione cognoscibilis; et sic potest esse nominabilis. Quamvis enim Deus sit infinitus, tamen finite cognoscitur a nobis.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non habet formam; dicendum, quod non habet formam perviam nostro intellectui, cuiusmodi est forma, cuius est²² imago in sensu; habet tamen formam, quia ipse est forma, quae est ratio cognoscendi, quam²³ etsi nos non cognoscimus in se, ipse cognoscit se in se, et nos eum in forma creata. Unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus.

Ad 5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam et qualitatem; dicendum, quod substantia et qualitas non accipiuntur ibi²⁴ proprie, sed communiter; substantia dicitur quod cognoscitur, qualitas dicitur quo cognoscitur²⁵, et hoc per modum quietis; et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dispositio verbi. Et quoniam in creaturis, ut plurimum differt quod cognoscitur et quo, ideo nomen in creaturis ut plurimum haec²⁶ importat per diversitatem. In Deo vero idem est cognitum et ratio cognoscendi quantum est de se: ideo significat nomen divinum illa duo per indifferentiam secundum rem; et ita salvatur ibi ratio substantiae et qualitatis, ut congruit nomini²⁷.

Scholion

I. Distinctio et duae conclusiones in corp. positae per se sunt manifestae. — In solut. ad 1. conceditur, aliquam proportionem esse inter vocem et rem nominatam, sed tantum quatenus cognoscibilis est. Infinitus autem Deus tantum finite a nobis est cognoscibilis. Huic finitae cognitioni proportionabile potest esse etiam nomen positum, «loquendo de proportione, quae est inter aliqua duo sub ratione, qua unum est signum et aliud signatum». Ita Richard. a Med., hic q. I. ad 3. — Notanda est sententia in solut. ad 3, quod nos Deum cognoscimus «in forma creata; unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus»; de quo cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. Addit Alex. Hal. (loc. infr. cit.), quod a creaturis secundum Ioan. Damascenum tribus modis nomina imponimus, scil. «imaginibus et formis et notis. Notis nominatur Deus privationibus, cum dicitur immensus Deus, infinitus, incircumscriptibilis; imaginibus, cum nominatur dispositionibus spiritualium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur spiritus, sapiens, intelligens; formis, cum nominatur similitudinibus corporalium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur leo, ignis et huiusmodi».

II. Solut. ad 6. 7.[?] in eodem sensu magis explicatur a S. Thom. (S. I. q. 13. a. 1. ad 3.), et ab Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad ult.), qui verba ob brevitatem subobscura: «Et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dispositio verbi», sic explanat: «Licet verbum et participium significent cum tempore, nihilominus tamen Deus quodammodo notificabilis est, non quia ipse cadit sub tempore, sed quia iuxta possibilitatem intellectus nostri, qui intelligit cum motu et tempore, intelligimus et significamus. Unde et hoc verbum est, dictum de Deo, non significat cum motu et tempore. Unde Augustinus super illud Ioan. 1: In principio erat Verbum, dicit: Verbum substantivum (nempe est) duplicem habet significationem: aliquando enim temporales motus secundum analogiam aliorum verborum declarat; aliquando substantiam uniuscuiusque rei, de qua praedicatur, sine ullo temporali motu designat; ideo et substantivum vocatur. Tale est quod dicitur: In principio erat Verbum» etc. — Cfr. etiam hic dub. 3.

III. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. I. — Scot., de hac et seqq. hic q. I. 2; Report. hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. I. a. 1; S. I. q. 13. a. 1. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 16; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 16. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. I. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic q. I. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. I. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. I. — Durand., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. I. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. I. — Biel, de hac et seqq. hic q. unic.

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English Translation

ARTICLE UNIQUE. On the divine names.

Question I. Whether God is nameable.

Concerning the first [point], that God is unnameable, is shown from authorities and reasons. From authorities thus:

1. Dionysius, On the Divine Names¹: «Of God it is possible neither to speak nor to understand». And again: «Of God there is neither name nor word nor account nor opinion nor phantasm»: therefore God is altogether unnameable.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher in the book On Causes²: «The first cause is above all narration»; but what is above all narration is unnarratable, and everything such is unnameable: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, by reason it is shown thus: a name has some proportion and likeness to the thing named, as the voice [has] to what is signified; but God is altogether infinite, while every voice is finite: therefore since there is no proportion³, there will be no expression by voice: therefore neither naming.

4. Likewise, every name is imposed from some form⁴; but in God there is no positing of a determinate form; whence Augustine⁵: «God, who escapes every form, cannot be accessible to the intellect»: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every name signifies substance with quality⁶; but in God there is pure substance without quantity and quality: therefore it does not happen that God is signified by a name.

6. Likewise, that neither⁷ [is He signified] by a pronoun. For a pronoun has no determinate signification except by demonstration or relation⁸. But demonstration takes place by means of accidents which can be looked upon by the eyes; but these are not in God: therefore it seems that of God there is neither a name nor a pronoun.

On the contrary:

1. In the Psalm⁹: The Lord is His name. And again¹⁰: How admirable is Your name in the whole earth: therefore God has a name.

2. Likewise, Dionysius made a book On the Divine Names: therefore either God is nameable, or the science there handed down is empty¹¹ and useless.

3. Likewise, by reason it appears: since everything that expresses itself by a word can express itself by a sign of the word; but the sign of the word is the voice¹²: therefore since God expresses Himself by His own Word, He can be expressed by voice; but what can be expressed by voice can be named: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, what it is possible to understand it is possible to signify or enounce; but it is possible for God to be known by us — this is certain and proved above¹³: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, what it is possible to praise it is also possible to name; but it is possible to praise God — nay, He Himself is¹⁴ supremely praiseworthy: therefore also nameable.

Conclusion. God is nameable, just as He is intelligible, not indeed perfectly, but imperfectly.

I respond: It must be said that just as "to understand" is said in two ways, so [is] "speakable" and "nameable"¹⁵. For in one way "to understand" is said by perfect comprehension; in another way by half-full cognition. So¹⁶ "speakable" is said in two ways: in one way by perfect expression, in another way by half-full narration. So also "nameable."

If [something] is called speakable or nameable according to perfection of expression, then it must be said that just as God alone is intelligible to Himself, so He alone is speakable and nameable to Himself, not¹⁷ by another name than He Himself is, nor by another word than He Himself is; and just as He is incomprehensible to us, so also ineffable, so also unnameable; and in this way Dionysius and the Philosopher speak.

If, however, [it] is called speakable and nameable according to any narration whatever¹⁸, then, just as God is knowable to us, so also speakable and nameable; and he who knows better speaks better and names better and more expressly. Whence the believer names more expressly than the unbeliever¹⁹, and Scripture, which supports faith, such as Sacred Scripture, [more so] than reason or philosophy. And in this way the reasons and authorities for the second part proceed.

To 1, 2. To that, then, which²⁰ is objected from Dionysius and the Philosopher, the response is already plain by the fact that they speak of [that] naming in which there is perfect expression.

To 3. To that which is objected, that the voice in the name²¹ is proportionable to the interior word or to what is signified; it must be said that this is understood of [that] naming which includes the whole signification of the thing; otherwise it has no truth, unless it be understood that there is a proportion to the thing under the aspect of the knowable; and thus it can be nameable. For although God is infinite, yet He is known finitely by us.

To 4. To that which is objected, that God does not have form; it must be said that He does not have a form accessible to our intellect, of the kind which is the form whose²² image [is] in sense; yet He has form, since He Himself is the form which is the ground of knowing, which²³, although we do not know it in itself, He Himself knows Himself in Himself, and we [know] Him in a created form. Whence from a created form we impose names — [the form] which we understand and see.

To 5. To that which is objected, that a name signifies substance and quality; it must be said that substance and quality are not taken there²⁴ properly, but commonly; substance is called that which is known, quality is called that by which it is known²⁵, and this in the manner of rest; and I say this on account of the verb and the participle and the adverb, which is a disposition of the verb. And since in creatures, for the most part, that which is known and that by which differ, therefore a name in creatures, for the most part, imports these two²⁶ through diversity. But in God the known and the ground of knowing are the same, as far as concerns Himself: therefore the divine name signifies those two with indifference as to the thing; and so the character of substance and of quality is preserved there, as befits a name²⁷.

Scholion

I. The distinction and the two conclusions placed in the body are by themselves manifest. — In the solution to [objection] 1 it is conceded that there is some proportion between the voice and the thing named, but only insofar as it is knowable. Now infinite God is knowable by us only finitely. Proportionable to this finite cognition can also be a name imposed, «speaking of proportion which is between any two things under the aspect by which one is sign and the other thing signified». So Richard of Mediavilla, here q. I, ad 3. — To be noted is the saying in the solution to [objection] 3, that we know God «in a created form; whence from a created form we impose names — [the form] which we understand and see»; concerning which cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2. Alexander of Hales adds (in the place cited below) that, according to John Damascene, we impose names from creatures in three ways, namely by «images and forms and notes. By notes God is named through privations, as when He is called immense God, infinite, uncircumscribable; by images, when He is named through the dispositions of spiritual creatures, as when He is called spirit, wise, intelligent; by forms, when He is named through likenesses of corporeal creatures, as when He is called lion, fire, and the like».

II. The solution to [objections] 6, 7[?] is more fully explained in the same sense by St. Thomas (Summa I, q. 13, a. 1, ad 3), and by Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below, ad ult.), who explains the words [of Bonaventure], obscure on account of brevity: «And I say this on account of the verb and the participle and the adverb, which is a disposition of the verb», thus: «Although the verb and the participle signify with time, nevertheless God is in some way notifiable, not because He Himself falls under time, but because, according to the possibility of our intellect, which understands with motion and time, we understand and signify. Whence also this verb is, said of God, does not signify with motion and time. Whence Augustine, on that [text] of John 1: In the beginning was the Word, says: The substantive verb (namely est) has a twofold signification: for sometimes it declares temporal motions according to analogy with other verbs; sometimes it designates the substance of each thing of which it is predicated, without any temporal motion; and so it is also called substantive. Such is what is said: In the beginning was the Word» etc. — Cf. also here dub. 3.

III. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 48, m. I. — Scotus, on this and the following, here q. I, 2; Reportata here q. unic. — St. Thomas, here q. I, a. 1; Summa I, q. 13, a. 1. — Bl. Albert, I Sent. d. 2, a. 16; Summa p. I, tr. 3, q. 16. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. I, a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. I. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1st principium, q. I. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 73, q. I. — Durandus, on this and the two following, here q. I. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. I. — Biel, on this and the following, here q. unic.

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Apparatus Criticus

Cap. I. circa med. Cfr. supra pag. 67. nota 6. — Verba, quae immediate post ex Dionysio allegantur, reperies loc. cit., ac juxta translationem Scoti Erigenae sic exhibentur: Et neque sensus eius est, neque phantasia, neque opinio, neque nomen, neque verbum, neque tactus, neque scientia.
Chapter I, near the middle. Cf. above page 67, note 6. — The words which are immediately afterwards alleged from Dionysius you will find in the place cited, and according to the translation of Scotus Eriugena are presented thus: And there is neither sense of Him, nor phantasy, nor opinion, nor name, nor word, nor touch, nor knowledge.
Prop. 6.
Proposition 6.
Nempe inter vocem et Deum. Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. I addit finiti ad infinitum. — De maiori huius argumenti vide Boethium in prima et secunda editione super I. Periherm. c. I, ubi inter alia dicit: Omnis vox animi sensa significat, quare ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenerit vocibus indicatur. Ergo nunc hoc dicit (Aristoteles): Similitudo est, inquit, quaedam inter se intellectuum atque vocum; quemadmodum enim sunt quaedam simplicia, quae ratione animi concipiuntur et constituuntur intelligentia mentis, in quibus neque veritas ulla neque falsitas invenitur, ita quoque in vocibus est.
Namely, between voice and God. The Vatican [edition], incongruously and against the older codices and ed. I, adds finiti ad infinitum ("of the finite to the infinite"). — On the major [premise] of this argument, see Boethius in the first and second editions on book I of the Peri Hermeneias, c. I, where among other things he says: Every voice signifies the perceptions of the mind, wherefore from the understandings of the mind whatever has come about is indicated by voices. Therefore now [Aristotle] says this: There is, he says, a certain likeness among themselves of understandings and voices; for just as there are certain simple things which are conceived by reason of the mind and constituted by the intelligence of the mind, in which neither any truth nor falsity is found, so also is it in voices.
Alanus ab Insulis, Theolog. regulae, reg. 17, ait: Cum omne nomen secundum primam institutionem datum sit a proprietate sive a forma, unde Boethius ait: Rebus ex materia formaque constantibus solus humanus animus exstitit, qui prout voluit, nomina rebus impressit etc.
Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 17, says: Since every name, according to its first institution, is given from a property or from a form, whence Boethius says: Of things consisting of matter and form, the human mind alone has stood out, which, as it willed, has imposed names on things, etc.
Cfr. Serm. 117. de verbis Evang. Ioan. 1: In principio erat Verbum etc., c. 2, n. 3: Ineffabiliter potest intelligi, non verbis hominis fit, ut intelligatur. Verbum Dei tractamus et dicimus, quare non intelligatur. Non nunc dicimus, ut intelligatur, sed dicimus quid impediat, ne intelligatur. Est enim forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum; forma incommutabilis, sine lapsu, sine defectu, sine tempore, sine loco, superans omnia, existens omnibus et fundamentum quoddam in quo sint, et fastigium sub quo sint... Dicimus, quam incomprehensibile sit quod lectum est; tamen lectum est, non ut comprehenderetur ab homine, sed ut doleret homo, quia non comprehendit... Ergo est forma omnium rerum, forma infabricata, sine tempore, ut diximus, et sine spatiis locorum. Quidquid enim loco capitur, circumscribitur. Forma circumscribitur finibus, habet metas, unde et quousque sit. Deinde quod loco capitur et mole quadam et spatio distenditur, minus est in parte, quam in toto. Faciat Deus, ut intelligatis.
Cf. Sermon 117, on the words of the Gospel of John 1: In the beginning was the Word etc., c. 2, n. 3: Ineffably can He be understood; it does not come about by the words of man that He is understood. We treat and speak of the Word of God, [explaining] why He is not understood. We do not now speak so that He may be understood, but we speak [of] what prevents His being understood. For He is a certain form, a form not formed, but the form of all formed things; an unchangeable form, without lapse, without defect, without time, without place, surpassing all things, existing to all things and a certain foundation in which they are, and a summit under which they are... We say how incomprehensible is what has been read; yet it has been read, not that it might be comprehended by man, but that man might grieve because he does not comprehend... Therefore He is the form of all things, an unfabricated form, without time, as we have said, and without the spaces of places. For whatever is contained by place is circumscribed. A form is circumscribed by limits, has bounds whence and how far it extends. Furthermore, what is contained by place and is extended by some bulk and space is less in a part than in the whole. May God grant that you understand.
Priscian., II. Grammat. c. 5, ait de nomine: Nomen quasi notamen, quod hoc nomine notamus uniuscuiusque substantiae qualitatem. Plura de hoc vide apud Scotum, Grammat. speculativa c. 8. — Mox in cod. Z omittitur quantitate et. In fine argumenti ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus significare pro significari.
Priscian, II Grammar c. 5, says of the name: Nomen [is] as if notamen, since by this nomen we mark (notamus) the quality of each substance. See more on this in Scotus, Speculative Grammar c. 8. — Soon after, in cod. Z quantitate et is omitted. At the end of the argument, from the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted significare for significari.
Supple: contingit Deum significare, vel etiam cum Vat. Deus sit nominabilis, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. I.
Supply: it happens that God is signified, or also with the Vatican [edition] that God is nameable, which however is absent from the manuscripts and ed. I.
Respicitur divisio pronominum, scil. in demonstrativa et relativa; quae iuxta Priscianum, XII. Grammat. c. 1, in eo differunt, quod demonstratio interrogationi reddita primam cognitionem ostendit. Quis fecit? ego. Relatio vero secundam cognitionem significat, ut is, de quo iam dixi. Cfr. Scotus, Grammat. speculativa c. 22.
[The] division of pronouns is referred to, namely into demonstrative and relative; which according to Priscian, XII Grammar c. 1, differ in this, that demonstration given in answer to a question shows the first cognition. Who did [it]? I. But relation signifies a second cognition, as is ("he"), of whom I have already spoken. Cf. Scotus, Speculative Grammar c. 22.
67, 5.
[Psalm] 67:5.
Psalm. 8, 2.
Psalm 8:2.
Cod. KV superflua.
Cod. KV [reads] superflua ("superfluous").
Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1: Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, notae. — Mox post Deus Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. I omittit se, deinde post verbo exprimatur loco exprimat.
Aristotle, I Peri Hermeneias c. 1: Therefore those things which are in the voice are notes of the affections which are in the soul. — Soon after Deus, the Vatican [edition], against the older manuscripts and ed. I, omits se, then after verbo [reads] exprimatur in place of exprimat.
Dist. 3. p. I. a. I. q. 1. — Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus paulo supra verba activa intelligere, significare, enuntiare pro passivis intelligi etc. Dein cod. Y et supra loco et supra.
Distinction 3, p. I, a. I, q. 1. — On the demand of very many manuscripts and ed. 1, we have substituted a little above the active verbs intelligere, significare, enuntiare ("to understand, to signify, to enounce") for the passives intelligi etc. Then cod. Y [reads] et supra in place of et supra.
Ex plurimis mss. et ed. I supplevimus est.
From very many manuscripts and ed. I we have supplied est ("is").
Ed. 1 addit et.
Ed. 1 adds et ("and").
Pauci codd. ut PQX Similiter loco Sic.
A few codices such as PQX [read] Similiter ("likewise") in place of Sic ("so").
In cod. V particulae non praefigitur et.
In cod. V et is prefixed to the particle non.
Restituimus lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. I, ponendo narrationem pro nominationem, quae lectio et divisioni paulo supra allatae respondet. Mox post effabilis cod. Z et ed. 1 repetunt ita.
We have restored the reading of the older manuscripts and ed. I, putting narrationem ("narration") in place of nominationem ("naming"), which reading also corresponds to the division adduced a little above. Soon after effabilis, cod. Z and ed. 1 repeat ita.
Sequimur codd. T et bb, dum ceteri codd. cum edd. omittunt quam, infidelis, et Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice substituit insuper fides loco fidelis. Lectionem codd. T et bb praeferimus, tum quia regulis grammaticae conformior est, tum quia indirecte auctoritate fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. ponentium fidelis comprobatur. Dein in paucis mss. ut SV omittuntur verba quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura.
We follow codices T and bb, while the other codices with the editions omit quam, infidelis ("than the unbeliever"), and the Vatican [edition], with only one or another codex, substitutes moreover fides ("faith") in place of fidelis ("the believer"). We prefer the reading of codices T and bb, both because it is more conformable to the rules of grammar, and because it is indirectly confirmed by the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and the first six editions which place fidelis. Then in a few manuscripts such as SV the words quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura ("which supports faith, such as Sacred Scripture") are omitted.
In plurimis codd. (exc. Y) et Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 indebite hic additur secundo, et paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et sex primas edd. incongrue ponit loquitur pro loquuntur.
In very many codices (except Y) and the Vatican [edition] with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, secundo ("secondly") is unduly added here, and a little below the Vatican [edition], against nearly all the codices and the first six editions, incongruously places loquitur in place of loquuntur.
Lectio Vat. et cod. cc homine pro nomine est contra ea quae in obiectione ipsa afferuntur et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.
The reading of the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc homine ("man") in place of nomine ("name") is against those things which are adduced in the objection itself and against the older codices and ed. 1.
Plures codd. ut GHIM Z etc. cum ed. 1 adiiciunt aliqua.
Several codices such as GHIM Z etc. with ed. 1 add aliqua ("some").
Ex fere omnibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus quam pro minus congruo quoniam. Mox cod. V cognoscamus loco cognoscimus, et paulo infra post Unde in codd. Y additur et.
From nearly all the older manuscripts and ed. 1 we have substituted quam ("which") for the less fitting quoniam ("since"). Soon after, cod. V [reads] cognoscamus in place of cognoscimus, and a little below, after Unde, in codd. Y et is added.
Vat. et cod. cc omittunt ibi, quod tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo supra cod. W cum qualitate loco et qualitatem.
The Vatican [edition] and cod. cc omit ibi ("there"), which however is had in other manuscripts and ed. 1. A little above, cod. W [reads] cum qualitate in place of et qualitatem.
Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. I. ad ult. idem his verbis exprimit: «Non enim substantia et qualitas, cum dicitur: nomen significat substantiam etc., distinguunt sicut in praedicamentis, sed substantia dicitur ipsum signatum nominis, qualitas illud idem, in quantum capabile est ab intellectu». Aliis verbis: substantia et qualitas hic non accipiuntur, in quantum sunt praedicamenta seu res aliquae, sed secundum modum significandi; in quantum scil. substantia significat illud, cui nomen imponitur, qualitas vero illud, a quo imponitur, seu respectum, sub quo imponitur. — Paulo ante fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus prout, quod Vat. post communiter addit. Mox post verbum in pluribus mss. et ed. 1 deest particula et.
Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 48, m. I, ad ult., expresses the same in these words: «For substance and quality, when it is said: a name signifies a substance etc., do not distinguish as in the categories, but substance is called the very thing signified by the name, quality the same thing insofar as it is graspable by the intellect». In other words: substance and quality are not taken here insofar as they are categories or some realities, but according to the mode of signifying; insofar, namely, as substance signifies that on which the name is imposed, [and] quality that from which it is imposed, that is, the respect under which it is imposed. — A little before, on the authority of the manuscripts and ed. 1, we have expunged prout, which the Vatican [edition] adds after communiter. Soon after verbum, in several manuscripts and ed. 1, the particle et is missing.
Vat. cum pluribus mss. minus bene hoc.
The Vatican [edition] with several manuscripts [reads], less well, hoc ("this").
Ad ultimam obiectionem, quae est de pronomine, non est explicite data solutio; quia sufficienter in praedictis continetur. — Paulo ante praestamus lectionem planiorem, quae est et lectio maioris numeri codd. et ed. 1, ponendo secundum rem pro rei, quod Vat. cum paucis mss. habet; alii demum omittunt vel secundum vel secundum rem.
To the last objection, which is concerning the pronoun, no solution is explicitly given; since it is sufficiently contained in what has been said. — A little before, we have offered the plainer reading, which is also the reading of the greater number of codices and ed. 1, putting secundum rem ("according to the thing") in place of rei ("of the thing"), which the Vatican [edition] with a few manuscripts has; others, finally, omit either secundum or secundum rem.

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