Dist. 23, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 23
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit: Una usia, tres hypostases. Videtur enim hoc esse contra illud quod dicit Hieronymus1: «Taceamus tres hypostases; non bonae suspicionis nomen est»: ergo non debet dici. — Praeterea videtur, quod nomen hypostasis nullo modo debeat recipi vel nomen usia, quia Boethius dicit super librum Praedicamentorum2 quod hypostasis est materia, usiosis forma, usia compositum; sed in divinis non recipitur materia nec compositum: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Hieronymus non dicit, non dicendum3 esse tres hypostases, quia falsum esset vel erroneum, sed quia nomen erat inconsuetum, et videbatur sonare idem quod substantia; et substantia secundum communem acceptionem non dicitur pluraliter de personis: et ideo volebat tunc taceri, ne haeretici occasionem acciperent malignandi. Nunc autem illud nomen specificatum est et expressum; ideo modo conceditur.
Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, dicendum, quod huiusmodi nomina aliter accipiuntur in philosophia, aliter in theologia; et hoc patet per ipsum4 Boethium, qui aliter accipit loquens ut philosophus, et aliter loquens ut theologus in libro de Duabus naturis et una persona Christi5.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod verius est Deus, quam cogitatur. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis fidelis cogitat, Deum esse trinum et unum, et nihil est verius isto: ergo non est verius, quam cogitatur. Item videtur falsum quod dicit, quod verius cogitatur, quam dicatur; multa enim dicimus, quae non intelligimus: ergo plus se extendit veritas sermonis quam interioris cogitationis. Item, ego dico, Deum esse summe verum; sed nihil potest verius hoc cogitari nec esse maius6 summe vero: ergo etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sermo Augustini est duplex. Potest enim esse comparatio entis ad ipsam[?] veritatem, quia unus et idem est Deus, qui est, cogitatur et dicitur7, et aequaliter verus.
Potest iterum fieri comparatio ad actum essendi et cogitandi et loquendi; et sic habet sermo Augustini veritatem: quoniam Deus in suo esse habet summam veritatem; cogitatio vero nostra, cum sit creata et exemplata a summa veritate, non potest esse summe vera; similiter nec locutio, et ideo minus de veritate habet. — Et rursus, cum magis assimiletur summe8 vero actus cogitandi interior quam actus loquendi exterior, magis habet de veritate cogitatio quam locutio, quia Deo est similior. Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt secundum primam viam9.
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, quia Scriptura non contradicit; sed similiter, si dicantur non esse tres personae, Scriptura non contradicit: ergo licet dicere, Patrem, Filium et Spiritum sanctum non esse tres personas; sed non licet dicere nisi verum: ergo huius oppositum est10 falsum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod ista non fuit tota ratio dicti, sed Augustinus subticet partem causae. Ratio enim fuit, sicut ipse aperit in sequentibus, quia ratio consonabat, et Scriptura non contradicebat. Nam et si Scriptura contradiceret, quantumcumque ratio dictaret, non esset dicendum. Et propterea non licuit dicere tres essentias, quia ratio non consonabat. Quare autem ratio magis consonet in hoc nomine persona quam in hoc nomine essentia, patet, si attendatur significatum utriusque. Ex verbis igitur11 Augustini quae Magister ponit, quare dictum est ab Ecclesia tres personae, patet, quod triplex fuit ratio. Prima fuit, quia necessitas imminebat; secunda, quia ratio consonabat; tertia, quia Scriptura in nullo contradicebat, immo etiam consonabat. Unde minus dicit et plus intelligit, quando dicit, quod Scriptura non contradicit.
DUB. IV.
Item obiicitur contra illud quod ibi nulla penitus est diversitas, sicut nec singularitas; quia si hoc est verum, ergo ibi est omnis identitas: ergo naturae et personae.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod facienda est vis in verbo13. Diversitas enim attenditur quantum ad principia essentialia sive substantialia. Quia ergo in divinis quantum ad substantialia nulla cadit differentia; ideo dicit, quod nulla diversitas; ideo non sequitur, quod penitus omnimoda12 est14 identitas, nisi addatur determinatio, scilicet quoad essentialia; et sic patet illud.
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DOUBTS ON THE MASTER'S TEXT.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what he says: One usia, three hypostases. For this seems to be against what Jerome says1: «Let us be silent about three hypostases; it is not a name of good repute»: therefore it ought not to be said. — Moreover, it seems that the name hypostasis in no way ought to be received, nor the name usia, because Boethius says on the book of the Categories2 that hypostasis is matter, usiosis form, usia the composite; but in divine [things] neither matter nor composite is received: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that Jerome does not say that it ought not to be said3 that there are three hypostases, because [that] would be false or erroneous, but because the name was unaccustomed and seemed to sound the same as substance; and substance according to the common acceptation is not said in the plural of the persons: and therefore he then wished it to be silenced, lest the heretics receive an occasion of speaking maliciously. But now that name has been specified and made express; therefore it is now conceded.
To that which is objected in the second [place], it must be said that names of this kind are taken otherwise in philosophy, otherwise in theology; and this is clear from Boethius himself4, who takes [them] otherwise speaking as a philosopher, and otherwise speaking as a theologian in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ5.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that God is more truly [so] than he is thought. For he seems to say something false, because every faithful person thinks that God is three and one, and nothing is truer than this: therefore he is not more truly [so] than he is thought. Likewise it seems false what he says, that he is more truly thought than he is spoken; for we say many [things] which we do not understand: therefore the truth of speech extends itself further than that of inner thought. Likewise, I say that God is supremely true; but nothing can be thought truer than this nor be greater6 than the supremely true: therefore etc.
I respond: It must be said that the discourse of Augustine is twofold. For there can be a comparison of being to truth itself[?], because one and the same is God, who is, is thought, and is spoken7, and equally true.
Again, a comparison can be made to the act of being and of thinking and of speaking; and thus the discourse of Augustine has [its] truth: since God in his being has the highest truth; but our thought, since it is created and exemplated from the highest truth, cannot be supremely true; likewise neither speech, and therefore it has less of truth. — And again, since the interior act of thinking is more assimilated to the supremely8 true than the exterior act of speaking, thought has more of truth than speech, because it is more similar to God. But the arguments to the opposite proceed according to the first way9.
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what Augustine says, that it was permitted by the necessity of speaking and disputing to say three persons, because Scripture does not contradict [it]; but likewise, if they be said not to be three persons, Scripture does not contradict [that either]: therefore it is permitted to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three persons; but it is not permitted to say [anything] except what is true: therefore the opposite of this is10 false.
I respond: It must be said that this was not the whole reason for what was said, but Augustine keeps silent a part of the cause. For the reason was, as he himself discloses in what follows, that reason was in agreement, and Scripture did not contradict. For even if Scripture were to contradict, however much reason might dictate, it would not be [right] to be said. And on this account it was not permitted to say three essences, because reason was not in agreement. Why, however, reason is more in agreement in this name person than in this name essence is clear, if the signified of each is attended to. From the words, therefore11, of Augustine which the Master sets down, [it is clear] why it was said by the Church [that there are] three persons, [and] it is clear that the reason was threefold. The first was that necessity pressed; the second, that reason was in agreement; the third, that Scripture in no way contradicted, nay rather was even in agreement. Whence he says less and understands more, when he says that Scripture does not contradict.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is objected against [the saying] that there is no diversity at all there, as neither singularity; because if this is true, then there is every identity there: therefore [identity] of natures and of persons.
I respond: It must be said that emphasis must be put on the word13. For diversity is regarded as to essential or substantial principles. Since therefore in the divine [things] as to substantials no difference falls; therefore he says that there is no diversity; [but] therefore it does not follow that there is altogether all-encompassing12 [identity], nor is14 [it the case that] identity [is so simply], unless a determination be added, namely as to essentials; and so that [saying] is clear.
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- Epist. 15. ad Damasum, n. 4, ubi in originali Taceantur ponitur pro Taceamus et nomen omittitur.Letter 15 to Damasus, n. 4, where in the original Taceantur (let them be silent) is set in place of Taceamus (let us be silent) and the word nomen is omitted.
- Cap. de Substantia, ubi occurrit quidem substantiae divisio, scil. materia, species (forma) et quae ex utrisque conficitur (compositum), sed non appropriatio nominum Graecorum, hypostasis etc. — Paulo ante cod. bb et ed. 1 nec pro vel.Chapter On Substance, where indeed there occurs the division of substance, namely matter, species (form), and that which is made up of both (composite), but not the appropriation of the Greek names, hypostasis etc. — A little earlier codex bb and edition 1 [read] nec in place of vel.
- Vat. cum uno alterove codice omittit dicendum. Mox pauci mss. ut W bb quod loco quia, ac dein aliqui codd. ut A S Y aa cum ed. 1 et ac cod. T aut pro vel.The Vatican [edition] with one or another codex omits dicendum. Soon a few manuscripts such as W bb [read] quod in place of quia, and then some codices such as A S Y aa, with edition 1, [read] et, and codex T [reads] aut in place of vel.
- Fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic ipsum, et mox post philosophus particulam et, cui cod. O praemittit in commentario.On the faith of the older manuscripts and of edition 1 we have supplied here ipsum, and soon after philosophus the particle et, to which codex O prefixes in commentario (in the commentary).
- Cap. 3. — Plura de hoc vide supra a. 1. q. 3, et a. 2. q. 1.Chapter 3. — On this see further above, a. 1, q. 3, and a. 2, q. 1.
- Praebemus communiorem lectionem mss. et ed. 1, substituendo maius loco magis verum; cod. cc cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 nec esse magis summe verum. Paulo ante aliqui codd. post verius omittunt hoc.We give the more common reading of the manuscripts and of edition 1, substituting maius in place of magis verum; codex cc with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 [reads] nec esse magis summe verum. A little earlier some codices, after verius, omit hoc.
- Vat. cum cod. cc et qui cogitatur et qui dicitur.The Vatican [edition] with codex cc [reads] et qui cogitatur et qui dicitur (and who is thought and who is spoken).
- Vat. absque auctoritate codd. et ed. 1 summo.The Vatican [edition], without the authority of the codices and of edition 1, [reads] summo.
- Scot., I. Sent. d. 22. q. 1. cum Ocham, Thoma ab Argentina et nonnullis modernis asserit, fieri posse, ut aliquid distinctius nominetur, quam cognoscatur, quod sub aliquo respectu concedi posse videtur, quatenus de facto aliquis confuse cognoscens interdum nomine praecise significante uti potest. Sed in hoc sensu sententiae et solutioni a S. Bonaventura datae non opponitur.Scotus, I Sentences d. 22, q. 1, with Ockham, Thomas of Strasbourg, and several moderns, asserts that it can come about that something be named more distinctly than it is known, which under some respect seems able to be conceded, insofar as in fact someone confusedly knowing can at times use a name that signifies precisely. But in this sense [their view] is not opposed to the opinion and solution given by St. Bonaventure.
- Verbum est desideratur in pluribus mss. Mox post Respondeo ex antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 supplevimus Dicendum.The word est is missing in several manuscripts. Soon after Respondeo we have supplied Dicendum from the older codices and edition 1.
- Codd. inter se dissentiunt; plures inter quos sunt G H Y Z aa cum ed. 1, exhibent lectionem in textum receptam; plures ut L T bb ee ff habent autem pro igitur; alii demum cum Vat. nullam particulam ponunt. Fide mss. et ed. 1 mutavimus insuper hoc loco interpunctionem; Vat. siquidem hanc propositionem Ex verbis usque ad ponit coniungit cum praecedente et a verbo quare novam format propositionem. Sed tunc sensus non convenit cum verbis Augustini, a Magistro (hic c. 3.) relatis, quae non explicant diversum significatum vocabulorum persona et essentia, sed rationes, quare tres personas confitetur Ecclesia. — Paulo superius cod. T consonabat pro consonet.The codices disagree among themselves; many — among which are G H Y Z aa with edition 1 — exhibit the reading received into the text; many such as L T bb ee ff have autem in place of igitur; others, finally, with the Vatican [edition], place no particle. On the faith of the manuscripts and of edition 1 we have moreover changed the punctuation in this place; the Vatican [edition] indeed joins this proposition Ex verbis up to ponit with the preceding and forms a new proposition from the word quare. But then the sense does not agree with the words of Augustine reported by the Master (here c. 3), which do not explain the diverse signification of the words persona and essentia, but the reasons why the Church confesses three persons. — A little above codex T [reads] consonabat in place of consonet.
- Cod. X omnino; forte melius et conformius cum ipsa responsione legeretur omnimoda.Codex X [reads] omnino; perhaps it would be better and more conformable with the response itself to read omnimoda.
- Id est, verbum diversitas in sensu stricto est accipiendum. Hoc modo accipit Aristot., X. Metaph. text. 12. (IX. c. 3.) dicens: Differentia vero et diversitas aliud est. Diversum namque et illud, a quo diversum, non est necesse aliquo esse diversum; omne etenim quodcumque sit ens aut idem aut diversum est. Differens vero ab aliquo aliquo differens est; quare necesse est aliquid idem esse quo differunt; hoc vero idem aut genus aut species est etc.That is, the word diversitas is to be taken in the strict sense. In this way Aristotle takes it, X Metaph. text 12 (IX. c. 3) saying: But difference and diversity are different. For the diverse and that from which it is diverse need not be diverse by something; for everything that is is either the same or diverse. But that which differs from something differs by something; whence it is necessary that there be something the same by which they differ; and this same is either genus or species, etc.
- E vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus omnimoda pro omnino. Dein plurimi codd. omittunt verbum est. — De hac solutione cfr. infra d. 24. dub. unic.From the older manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted omnimoda in place of omnino. Then several codices omit the word est. — On this solution cf. below d. 24, dub. unic.