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Dist. 23

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 23

Textus Latinus
p. 402

DISTINCTIO XXIII.

Cap. I. De hoc nomine quod est persona, quod secundum substantiam dicatur, non singulariter, sed pluraliter accipitur in summa.

Praedictis1 adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, singulariter et non pluraliter de omnibus in summa dicantur personis, ut supra ostensum est2, est tamen unum nomen, scilicet persona, quod secundum substantiam dicitur de singulis personis et pluraliter, non singulariter in summa accipitur. Dicimus enim: Pater est persona, Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, et hoc secundum substantiam dicitur. Nec tamen dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt una persona, sed tres personae. Hoc ergo nomen excipitur a praedicta3 regula nominum, quae secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, quia cum hoc ad se dicatur et secundum substantiam, pluraliter tamen, non singulariter in summa accipitur.

Quod autem persona secundum substantiam dicatur, Augustinus ostendit in septimo libro de Trinitate4 dicens: «Non est aliud Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem». Item5: «In hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, non aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris non aliud quam ipse Pater est; ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum, sicut ad se dicitur Deus et magnus et bonus et iustus et huiusmodi. Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse, quod Deum esse, quod magnum esse, quod bonum esse; ita hoc illi est esse, quod personam esse»6. Ecce expresse habes, quod persona secundum substantiam dicitur, ut cum dicitur: Pater est persona, hic sit sensus: Pater est essentia divina; similiter, cum dicitur: Filius est persona, Spiritus sanctus est persona, id est essentia divina.

Ideo oritur hic quaestio difficilis quidem, sed non inutilis, qua quaeritur, cur non dicantur hi tres una persona, sicut una essentia et unus Deus. Quam quaestionem Augustinus diligenter tractat atque congrue explicat in septimo libro de Trinitate7 ita dicens: «Cur non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus, sicut unam essentiam et unum Deum, sed dicimus tres personas, cum tres deos aut tres essentias non dicamus? Quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servare huic significationi, qua intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interroganti, quid tres essent, cum tres esse fateamur». «Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tres, ut ait Augustinus in libro quinto de Trinitate, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur omnino». Non enim rei ineffabilis eminentia hoc vocabulo explicari valet. Ecce ostendit, qua necessitate dicatur pluraliter personae, videlicet ut hoc uno nomine quaerentibus de tribus respondeamus8.

Cap. II. Qua necessitate dictum sit tres personae a Latinis, et a Graecis tres hypostases vel substantiae.

Qua necessitate non solum Latinus sermo, sed etiam Graecus eadem pene super hac re laborans nominum penuria coarctatur. Unde Augustinus, quid a Graecis vel a Latinis necessitate de ineffabili Trinitate dictum sit, aperiens, in septimo libro de Trinitate9 ait: «Loquendi causa de ineffabilibus, ut fari aliquo modo dictum est a Graecis una essentia, tres substantiae, id est una usia, tres hypostases. Aliter enim Graeci accipiunt substantiam quam Latini. A Latinis autem dictum est una essentia vel substantia, tres personae, quia non aliter in sermone nostro, id est Latino, essentia quam substantia solet intelligi. Et ut intelligatur saltem in aenigmate, placuit ita dici, ut diceretur aliquid, cum quaereretur, quid tria sint, quae tria esse10 fides vera pronuntiat, cum et Patrem non dicit esse Filium, et Spiritum sanctum, scilicet Donum Dei, nec Patrem dicit esse nec Filium. Cum ergo quaeritur, quid tria vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod nomen, quo complectamur haec tria. Neque occurrit animo, quia supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem excedit. Verius enim cogitatur Deus quam dicitur et verius est quam cogitatur».

«Pater ergo et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, quoniam tres sunt, quid tres sint quaeramus, et quid commune habeant. Non enim possunt dici tres patres, quia tantum Pater ibi Pater est, nec tres filii, cum nec Pater

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ibi sit Filius nec Spiritus sanctus, nec tres spiritus sancti, quia Spiritus sanctus propria significatione, qua etiam11 Donum Dei dicitur, nec Pater est nec Filius. Quid ergo tres? Si tres personae esse dicuntur, commune est eis id quod persona est». «Certe enim, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo dicuntur tres personae». «Propterea ergo dicimus tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est12». Ex praedictis aperte intelligi potest, qua necessitate dictum sit a Latinis tres personae, cum persona secundum substantiam dicatur. Unde et tribus commune est id quod persona est.

Cap. III. Quare non dicimus Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres deos, ut tres personas.

Sed quaeritur hic, cum dicamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis quod persona est, id est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona: cur non dicamus similiter tres deos, cum et Pater sit Deus, et Filius sit Deus, et Spiritus sanctus sit Deus? Quia scilicet illud Scriptura contradicit; hoc autem, etsi non dicit, non tamen contradicit. Unde Augustinus hanc movens quaestionem atque definiens in libro septimo de Trinitate13 ita ait: «Si ideo dicimus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum esse tres personas, quia commune est eis id quod persona est; cur non etiam tres deos dicimus? Certe, ut praedictum est, quia Pater est persona, et Filius est persona, et Spiritus sanctus est persona, ideo tres personae dicuntur. Quia ergo Pater Deus, et Filius Deus, et Spiritus sanctus Deus, cur non dicuntur tres dii?» Ecce proposuit quaestionem; attende, quid respondeat subdens14: «An ideo non dicuntur tres dii, quia Scriptura non dicit tres deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi Scripturae textus commemorat. An ideo licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit? Si autem diceremus tres deos, contradiceret Scriptura dicens15: Audi Israel, Deus tuus, Deus unus est». Ecce absolutio quaestionis, quare potius dicamus tres personas quam tres deos, quia scilicet illud non contradicit Scriptura.

Cap. IV. Cur non dicimus tres essentias, ut tres personas.

Verum et hic alia emergit quaestio, quam Augustinus consequenter annectit dicens16: «Cur, inquit, et tres essentias non licet dicere, quod similiter Scriptura sicut non dicit, ita non contradicit? At si dicis, quod propter unitatem Trinitatis non dicuntur tres essentiae, sed una essentia; quaero, cur non propter eandem unitatem Trinitatis dicantur una persona, et non tres personae. Ut enim est illis commune nomen essentiae, ita ut singulus quisque dicatur essentia, sic illis commune est personae vocabulum». «Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur, loquendi necessitate a Graecis et Latinis parta haec vocabula adversus insidias vel errores haereticorum? Cumque conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis de Deo tenet sive per piam fidem sive per qualemcumque intelligentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa aequalitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non poterat dicere, non esse tria quaedam; quod quia dixit Sabellius, in haeresim lapsus est. Quaesivit ergo, quid tria diceret, et dixit tres personas sive tres substantias secundum Graecos».

p. 404

«Quod enim de personis secundum nostram, hoc Graecorum de substantiis secundum Graecorum consuetudinem oportet intelligi. Sic enim dicunt illi tres substantias, unam essentiam, id est tres hypostases, unam usiam; quemadmodum nos dicimus tres personas, unam essentiam vel substantiam17»; «quamquam et illi, si vellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, tres hypostases, possent dicere tres personas, tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt dicere, quia fortasse secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius dicitur».

Cap. V. Quod in Trinitate non est diversitas vel singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas et distinctio et identitas.

Iam sufficienter, ut puto, ostensum est, qua necessitate dicamus tres personas, et quare non similiter tres deos vel essentias, quia scilicet in altero obviat Scriptura, in altero diversitatis intelligentia; quia ibi nulla penitus est diversitas, sicut nec singularitas vel solitudo, sed unitas et trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro septimo de Trinitate18 ait: «Humana inopia quaerens, quid diceret tria, dixit tres personas vel substantias, quibus nominibus non diversitatem voluit intelligi, sed singularitatem noluit, ut non solum ibi unitas intelligatur ex eo, quod dicitur una essentia, sed trinitas ex eo, quod dicuntur tres personae». Hilarius quoque in libro septimo de Trinitate19 ait: «Dominus dicit20: Qui me videt, videt et Patrem. Cum hoc dicitur, excluditur singularis atque unici, id est solitarii intelligentia. Nam nec solitarium sermo significat, et indifferentem tamen naturam professio docet. Visus est enim in Filio Pater per naturae unitam similitudinem. Unum sunt enim natus et generans, unum sunt neque unus. Non itaque solitarius Filius est nec singularis nec dispar». Item in eodem21: «Sicut in Patre et Filio credere duos deos impium est, ita Patrem et Filium singularem Deum praedicare sacrilegum est. Nihil in his novum, nihil diversum, nihil alienum, nihil separabile est». De hoc etiam Augustinus in libro Quaestionum veteris ac novae Legis22 ait: «Unus est Deus, sed non singularis». Item Ambrosius in libro de Fide23 ait: «Quod unius est substantiae separari non potest, etsi non sit singularitatis, sed unitatis». «Deus unus cum dicitur, nequaquam Deitatis trinitatem excludit et ideo non quod singularitatis, sed quod unitatis est praedicatur». Ecce ex praedictis ostenditur, quod nec singularis nec diversus nec unicus vel solitarius confitendus est Deus, quia singularitas vel solitudo personarum pluralitatem excludit, et diversitas unitatem essentiae tollit. Diversitas inducit separationem Divinitatis, singularitas adimit distinctionem Trinitatis. Ideo Ambrosius in secundo libro de Fide24 ait: «Non est diversa nec singularis aequalitas»; «nec iuxta Sabellianos Patrem Filiumque confundens, nec iuxta Arianos Patrem Filiumque secernens. Pater enim et Filius distinctionem habent, separationem vero non habent». Item in eodem25: «Pater et Filius divinitate unum sunt, nec est ibi substantiae differentia nec ulla diversitas; alioquin quomodo unum Deum dicimus? Diversitas enim plures facit». Constat ergo ex praedictis, quia in Trinitate nulla est diversitas; si tamen aliquando in Scriptura invenitur dictum tres diversae personae et huiusmodi, diversas dicit distinctas.

Cap. VI. Quod non debet dici Deus multiplex.

Et sicut in Trinitate non est diversitas, ita nec multiplicitas, et ideo non est dicendus Deus multiplex, sed trinus et simplex. Unde Ambrosius in primo libro de Fide26 ait: «Est in Patre et Filio non discrepans, sed una divinitas, nec confusum quod unum est, nec multiplex esse potest quod indifferens est». Multiplex itaque Deus non est27.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XXIII.

Cap. I. On this name, "person", which is said according to substance, but is taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum.

To the foregoing1 it must be added that, although all names which are said according to substance of God are said singularly and not plurally of all the persons together in sum, as has been shown above2, there is nevertheless one name, namely person, which is said according to substance of single persons and is taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum. For we say: the Father is a person, the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person — and this is said according to substance. Yet we do not say: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person, but three persons. This name, therefore, is excepted from the aforesaid3 rule of names which are said according to substance of God, since although it is said to itself and according to substance, it is nevertheless taken in the plural, not in the singular, in sum.

That person is said according to substance, Augustine shows in the seventh book On the Trinity4, saying: "It is not one thing for God to be, another for Him to be a person, but altogether the same". Likewise5: "In this Trinity, when we say the person of the Father, we say nothing other than the substance of the Father. Wherefore, just as the substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not by which He is Father, but by which He is; so also the person of the Father is nothing other than the Father Himself; for person is said to Himself, not to the Son or to the Holy Spirit, just as God and great and good and just and the like are said to Himself. And just as for Him to be is the same as to be God, the same as to be great, the same as to be good; so for Him to be is the same as to be a person"6. Behold, you have it expressed that person is said according to substance, so that when it is said: the Father is a person, the sense is: the Father is the divine essence; similarly, when it is said: the Son is a person, the Holy Spirit is a person, that is, the divine essence.

Hence there arises here a question difficult indeed, but not useless, by which it is asked why these three are not called one person, just as one essence and one God. Augustine carefully treats this question and fittingly explains it in the seventh book On the Trinity7, thus saying: "Why do we not call these three together one person, just as one essence and one God, but say three persons, when we do not say three gods or three essences? Because we wish to preserve at least some one term for this signification by which the Trinity is understood, lest we should be wholly silent before one inquiring what the three are, when we confess them to be three". "When therefore it is asked, what three? — as Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity — human eloquence labors under utter poverty. Yet three persons was said, not that this might be said, but that it might not be wholly passed over in silence". For the eminence of an ineffable thing cannot be expressed by this term. Behold, he shows by what necessity it is said in the plural persons, namely so that by this one name we may answer those who inquire about the three8.

Cap. II. By what necessity it is said three persons by the Latins, and three hypostases or substances by the Greeks.

By what necessity not only Latin speech, but also Greek, laboring almost equally on this matter, is constrained by a poverty of terms. Whence Augustine, opening up what has been said by the Greeks or by the Latins out of necessity concerning the ineffable Trinity, says in the seventh book On the Trinity:9 "For the sake of speaking about ineffable things, in order to express them in some way, it has been said by the Greeks: one essence, three substances, that is, one usia, three hypostases. For the Greeks understand substance otherwise than the Latins. By the Latins, however, it has been said: one essence or substance, three persons, since in our speech, that is in Latin, essence is not usually understood otherwise than substance. And so that it may be understood at least in an enigma, it pleased that it should be so said, that something might be said when it was asked what three things are, which the true faith pronounces to be10 three, since it neither says the Father is the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, namely the Gift of God, neither says the Father nor the Son. When therefore it is asked, what three or what three [persons], we betake ourselves to finding some name by which we may comprehend these three. Nor does any occur to the mind, since the supereminence of the divinity exceeds the faculty of customary speech. For God is more truly thought than spoken, and is more truly than He is thought".

"The Father therefore and the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they are three, let us inquire what the three are, and what they have in common. For they cannot be called three Fathers, since only the Father is there Father, nor three Sons, since neither the Father

ibi sit Filius nor the Holy Spirit [is Son], nor three Holy Spirits, since the Holy Spirit, in His proper signification, by which also11 He is called Gift of God, is neither Father nor Son. What therefore are the three? If they are said to be three persons, that which person is is common to them". "For surely, since the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons". "Therefore we say three persons, because that which person is is common to them12". From the foregoing it can be plainly understood by what necessity three persons has been said by the Latins, since person is said according to substance. Whence what person is is also common to the three.

Cap. III. Why we do not say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three gods, as [we say they are] three persons.

But it is asked here: when we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, because that which person is is common to them — that is, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person — why do we not similarly say three gods, since the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God? Because Scripture contradicts that; but although it does not say this, neither does it contradict it. Whence Augustine, raising this question and defining it, in the seventh book On the Trinity13 thus says: "If we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons because that which person is is common to them, why do we not also say three gods? Surely, as has been said, because the Father is a person, and the Son is a person, and the Holy Spirit is a person, therefore they are called three persons. Since therefore the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, why are they not called three gods?" Behold, he has set forth the question; mark what he answers, adding14: "Or are they not called three gods because Scripture does not say three gods? But neither does the text of Scripture anywhere mention three persons. Or has it been allowed by the necessity of speaking and disputing to say three persons, not because Scripture says it, but because Scripture does not contradict it? But if we were to say three gods, Scripture would contradict, saying15: Hear, O Israel, thy God, God is one". Behold the resolution of the question why we say rather three persons than three gods, namely because Scripture does not contradict that.

Cap. IV. Why we do not say three essences, as [we say] three persons.

But here also another question emerges, which Augustine consequently appends, saying16: "Why, he says, is it not also permitted to say three essences, since Scripture similarly, just as it does not say it, so does not contradict it? But if you say that on account of the unity of the Trinity three essences are not said, but one essence — I ask, why on account of the same unity of the Trinity are they not called one person, and not three persons? For just as the name essence is common to them, so that each individual is called an essence, so the term person is common to them". "What therefore remains, except that we should confess that these terms have been brought forth by the Greeks and Latins out of the necessity of speaking against the snares or errors of heretics? And when human poverty was striving to bring forth in speech to the senses of men what it holds in the inner chamber of the mind concerning God, whether through pious faith or through some sort of understanding, it feared to say three essences, lest in that supreme equality any diversity should be understood. On the other hand, it could not say that they were not three of some sort; which because Sabellius said, he fell into heresy. It sought therefore what to call the three, and said three persons or three substances according to the Greeks".

"For what concerns the persons according to our [usage], the same must be understood of the substances according to the custom of the Greeks. For thus they say three substances, one essence, that is three hypostases, one usia; just as we say three persons, one essence or substance17"; "although they too, if they wished, just as they say three substances, three hypostases, could say three persons, three prosopa. But they preferred to say [substances], because perhaps according to the custom of their language it is more aptly said".

Cap. V. That in the Trinity there is no diversity nor singularity nor solitude, but unity and trinity and distinction and identity.

It has now been sufficiently shown, as I think, by what necessity we say three persons, and why not similarly three gods or essences — namely because in the one case Scripture stands in the way, in the other the understanding of diversity; since there is no diversity at all there, just as there is no singularity nor solitude, but unity and trinity. Whence Augustine in the seventh book On the Trinity18 says: "Human poverty, seeking what it might call the three, said three persons or substances; by which terms it did not wish diversity to be understood, but did not wish singularity, so that there not only unity might be understood from the fact that one essence is said, but also trinity from the fact that three persons are said". Hilary likewise in the seventh book On the Trinity19 says: "The Lord says20: He who sees me, sees also the Father. When this is said, the understanding of the singular and unique, that is of the solitary, is excluded. For the speech does not signify a solitary, and yet the profession teaches an undifferentiated nature. For the Father was seen in the Son through the united likeness of nature. For the begotten and the begetter are one, they are one, yet not one [person]. Therefore the Son is not solitary, nor singular, nor unequal". Likewise in the same place21: "Just as in the Father and the Son to believe in two gods is impious, so to preach the Father and the Son as a singular God is sacrilegious. There is in these nothing new, nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable". Of this also Augustine in the book of the Questions of the Old and New Law22 says: "God is one, but not singular". Likewise Ambrose in the book On the Faith23 says: "What is of one substance cannot be separated, even though it be not of singularity, but of unity". "When God is called one, He in no way excludes the trinity of the Deity, and therefore He is predicated, not as of singularity, but as of unity". Behold, from the foregoing it is shown that God must be confessed as neither singular nor diverse nor unique nor solitary, since singularity or solitude excludes the plurality of the persons, and diversity removes the unity of the essence. Diversity induces separation of the Divinity; singularity takes away the distinction of the Trinity. Therefore Ambrose in the second book On the Faith24 says: "There is no diverse nor singular equality"; "neither in the manner of the Sabellians confounding the Father and the Son, nor in the manner of the Arians separating the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son have distinction, but not separation". Likewise in the same25: "The Father and the Son are one in divinity, nor is there a difference of substance there, nor any diversity; otherwise how do we call God one? For diversity makes many". It is established therefore from the foregoing that in the Trinity there is no diversity; if nevertheless sometimes in Scripture it is found said three diverse persons and the like, it calls diverse what are distinct.

Cap. VI. That God ought not to be called manifold.

And just as in the Trinity there is no diversity, so neither is there manifoldness, and therefore God is not to be called manifold, but threefold and simple. Whence Ambrose in the first book On the Faith26 says: "There is in the Father and the Son no discrepant, but one divinity, nor can what is one be confused, nor can what is undifferentiated be manifold". God therefore is not manifold27.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Codd. BE adiungunt tamen.
    Codices BE add tamen ("nevertheless").
  2. Dist. XXII. c. 3.
    Distinction XXII, chapter 3.
  3. Codd. ABE praescripta.
    Codices ABE read praescripta ("prescribed").
  4. Cap. 6. n. 11, ubi sola Vat. pro non est aliud Deo perperam legit non aliud Deum, ed. 8 et cod. C est Deum esse.
    Chapter 6, n. 11, where the Vatican edition alone wrongly reads non aliud Deum ("not another God") in place of non est aliud Deo ("it is not one thing for God"); edition 8 and codex C read est Deum esse ("is to be God").
  5. Ibid.
    Same place.
  6. Ibid. immediate post. — Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra codd., ed. I et originale post cum addunt tamen. Paulo post eadem Vat. et paucae edd. taceamus interrogati pro taceremus interroganti.
    Same place, immediately after. — Here the Vatican edition and other editions, against the manuscripts, edition 1, and the original, after cum add tamen ("nevertheless"). A little later the same Vatican edition and a few editions read taceamus interrogati in place of taceremus interroganti ("we should be silent before one inquiring").
  7. Cap. 9. n. 10.
    Chapter 9, n. 10.
  8. Codd. et ed. I responderemus, et paulo ante pro dicatur sola ed. 8 dicantur.
    Codices and edition 1 read responderemus ("we might answer"); and a little earlier in place of dicatur edition 8 alone reads dicantur.
  9. Cap. 4. n. 7. — Paulo ante Vat. cum nonnullis edd. omittit a ante Latinis. Verba in textu id est usque quam Latini inclusive a Magistro interpolata sunt.
    Chapter 4, n. 7. — A little earlier the Vatican edition with several editions omits a before Latinis. The words in the text from id est up to and including quam Latini have been interpolated by the Master.
  10. Solummodo Vat. et edd. 4, 6 post Quae tria esse male addunt tria: edd. 5, 9 quia tria esse fides.
    Only the Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 wrongly add tria after Quae tria esse: editions 5, 9 read quia tria esse fides ("since the faith [pronounces] three to be").
  11. Vat. et edd. 4, 8 omittunt etiam.
    The Vatican edition and editions 4, 8 omit etiam ("also").
  12. Tres loci Augustini leguntur loc. cit. n. 7. et 8.
    The three passages of Augustine are read at the place cited, n. 7 and 8.
  13. Hic Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. I et omnes codd. addunt: id est hoc nomen persona.
    Here the Vatican edition and other editions, against edition 1 and all the manuscripts, add: id est hoc nomen persona ("that is, this name person").
  14. Cap. 4. n. 8. — Ex codd. et plurimis edd. adiecimus ita ante ait. In fine textus Vat. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5 bis addunt est, scil. post Pater et post Filius.
    Chapter 4, n. 8. — From the manuscripts and most editions we have added ita ("thus") before ait. At the end of the text the Vatican edition and editions 2, 3, 4, 5 twice add est ("is"), namely after Pater and after Filius.
  15. Ibid. paucis interpositis. — Paulo ante Vat. contra codd. et plures edd. addit hanc ante quaestionem. In ipso textu cod. D post textus addit scilicet novi et veteris Testamenti.
    Same place, with a few words intervening. — A little earlier the Vatican edition, against the manuscripts and several editions, adds hanc ("this") before quaestionem. In the text itself codex D after textus adds scilicet novi et veteris Testamenti ("namely of the New and Old Testament").
  16. Deuter. 6, 4. Vulgata: Audi Israel, Dominus Deus noster, Dominus unus est. Cum Magistro et Augustino legunt Ambrosius, libr. I. de Fide ad Gratianum c. 1. n. 6. et c. 3. n. 23; et Hilarius, libr. IV. de Trinitate n. 8. — Immediate post cod. p solutio loco absolutio. Deinde pro illud ed. 6 illi.
    Deuteronomy 6:4. The Vulgate reads: Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God, the Lord is one. With the Master and Augustine, Ambrose reads thus, in book I On the Faith, to Gratian, c. 1, n. 6, and c. 3, n. 23; and Hilary, in book IV On the Trinity, n. 8. — Immediately after, codex p reads solutio ("solution") in place of absolutio ("resolution"). Then in place of illud ("that") edition 6 reads illi ("to him").
  17. Ibid. immediate post, et quod sequitur n. 9. — In fine primi textus ed. 1 post vocabulum addit et essentiam praedicat.
    Same place, immediately after, and what follows in n. 9. — At the end of the first text edition 1, after vocabulum, adds et essentiam praedicat ("and predicates the essence").
  18. Ibid. n. 8; sed verba id est usque usiam a Magistro inserta sunt. Locus sequens est ibid. c. 6. n. 11.
    Same place, n. 8; but the words from id est up to usiam have been inserted by the Master. The following passage is at the same place, c. 6, n. 11.
  19. Cap. i. n. 9. — Paulo infra post Item sola Vat. dicit pro dixit.
    Chapter 1, n. 9. — A little below, after Item, the Vatican edition alone reads dicit in place of dixit.
  20. Num. 38. et 39. — Sed textum hunc Magister ex septem locis Hilarii contexuit; quod, ut ipsius methodus exemplo aliquo illustretur, hic lectoris oculis subiicimus. Verba: Dominus dicit etc. sunt ex n. 38; Nam nec solitarium etc. ibid. paulo ante; Visus est etc. ibid. paulo post; Unum sunt enim natus et generans, n. 39. Unum sunt neque unus, n. 38; non itaque solitarius Filius est, n. 39; nec singularis nec dispar, n. 38.
    Numbers 38 and 39. — But the Master has woven this text together from seven passages of Hilary; which, that his method may be illustrated by some example, we here put before the reader's eyes. The words Dominus dicit etc. are from n. 38; Nam nec solitarium etc., same place a little before; Visus est etc., same place a little after; Unum sunt enim natus et generans, n. 39; Unum sunt neque unus, n. 38; non itaque solitarius Filius est, n. 39; nec singularis nec dispar, n. 38.
  21. Ioan. 14, 9. — Paulo infra post excluditur Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 1, omnes codd. et originale singularitas pro singularis.
    John 14:9. — A little below, after excluditur, the Vatican edition and other editions, against edition 1, all the manuscripts, and the original, read singularitas ("singularity") in place of singularis ("singular").
  22. Ibid. n. 39, sed ordine propositionum immutato. Pro sacrilegum aliqui codd. et edd. I, 2 habent sacrilegium.
    Same place, n. 39, but with the order of the propositions changed. In place of sacrilegum some codices and editions 1, 2 have sacrilegium.
  23. Quaestiones, scil. ex veteri et novo Testamento mixtim, quaest. 122. Non sunt Augustini, sed potius auctoris haeretici, fortasse Hilarii diaconi, de quo supra dist. XIX. locuti sumus. In textu Vat. cum originali, sed contra omnes codd. et alias edd., solitarius pro singularis.
    Questions, namely from the Old and New Testament intermixed, q. 122. They are not by Augustine, but rather by a heretical author, perhaps Hilary the deacon, of whom we have spoken above at distinction XIX. In the text the Vatican edition with the original, but against all the manuscripts and other editions, reads solitarius in place of singularis.
  24. Libr. V. c. 3. n. 46. — Locus sequens est loc. cit. II. c. 1. n. 18. Finito textu, post ostenditur omnes codd. et ed. 1 quod loco quia, quod habent Vat. et aliae edd.
    Book V, c. 3, n. 46. — The following passage is at the place cited, II, c. 1, n. 18. After the text is finished, after ostenditur, all the manuscripts and edition 1 read quod in place of quia, which the Vatican edition and other editions have.
  25. Cap. 8. n. 69. — Sequens textus est ibid. c. 3. n. 33.
    Chapter 8, n. 69. — The following text is at the same place, c. 3, n. 33.
  26. In eodem opere, sed libr. I. c. 2. n. 18. et 19.
    In the same work, but book I, c. 2, n. 18 and 19.
  27. Cap. 2. n. 17.
    Chapter 2, n. 17.
Dist. 23, Divisio Textus→