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Dist. 24, Art. 1, Q. 2

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 24

Textus Latinus
p. 423

QUAESTIO II. Utrum unus in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicatur.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum unus dicatur secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur:

1. Quia « ens et unum convertuntur », sicut vult Philosophus1 et Boethius; sed ens dicitur secundum substantiam: ergo et unum.

2. Item, haec conceditur: « Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt unus Deus »; sed si sunt unus Deus, cum Deus non diminuat de ratione unius, ergo sunt unus. Sed nihil dicitur in summa de tribus singulariter, quod non dicatur substantialiter2: ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod, quando adiective tenetur, tunc non dicitur substantialiter; contra: eadem est significatio termini, quando tenetur adiective, et quando tenetur substantive. Item, cum substantivatur in neutro3, dicitur substantialiter; cum ergo eadem sit significatio termini in masculino et in neutro, cum una sit impositio, ergo dicitur substantialiter in masculino. Praeterea, alia nomina in masculino dicuntur substantialiter, ut hoc nomen aeternus; unde in Symbolo4: « Non tres aeterni, sed unus aeternus »: ergo similiter unus.

3. Item, cum dicitur: « Pater est unus », aut tenetur substantialiter, aut notionaliter. Si substantialiter, habeo propositum; si notionaliter — sed Pater habet duas notiones: ergo non debet dici unus, sed duo.

4. Item, notio et proprietas sunt idem: ergo cum proprietas dicatur, « quod convenit uni soli »5, nulla notio potest dici de tribus. Sed hoc nomen unus praedicatur de qualibet persona: ergo non dicit notionem.

Contra:

1. Regula est superius habita distinctione vigesima secunda6: « Omne quod praedicat substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur de tribus singulariter in summa »; sed hoc non convenit huic nomini quod est unus7: ergo etc.

2. Item, nihil pertinens ad essentiam sive substantiam multiplicatur sive plurificatur; sed hoc quod est unus plurificatur, quia Pater est unus, et Filius est unus, et sunt duo, quia unus et unus: ergo etc.

3. Item, idem est esse unum et esse distinctum; sed cum dico: Pater est distinctus, hoc quod est distinctus non dicitur substantialiter: ergo nec hoc quod est unus.

4. Item, respectu cuiuscumque termini est dicere alium in divinis, ille terminus dicit relationem — unde non dicitur alius Deus, sed respectu eius quod est unus est dicere alium, nam Pater est unus, et Filius est alius: ergo etc.

p. 424
Conclusio. Cum in Deo sit unitas tum essentialis, tum personalis, qua una persona distinguitur ab alia, terminus unus, si adiective usurpatur, utramque unitatem potest significare; si vero substantive, tunc unitas attribuitur personali unitati, unum autem essentiali.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, cum ratio unitatis sit ratio distinctionis cum indivisione, in divinis autem ponamus et8 essentiam distinctam ab aliis essentiis per se ipsam, et personam distingui ab aliis per proprietatem, necesse est in divinis ponere et unitatem essentialem et personalem. Quoniam igitur persona non est aliud ab essentia, unitas essentiae et personae non sunt duae unitates secundum rem, sed una, ratione differens: ideo unitas de hac et illa non dicitur aequivoce, quoniam nec isti nec illi imponitur specialiter.

Quia ergo concretum accipit specialem significationem ab abstracto, hoc nomen unus importat in divinis unitatem essentialem et personalem. Et cum adiective tenetur, indifferenter importat utramque; determinatur autem per adiunctum. Cum ergo additur termino essentiali, importat essentialem; cum additur notionali, importat personalem.

Cum autem substantivatur, tunc9 necesse est, quod se ipso determinetur. Et ideo, cum neutrum genus importet, quod dicit, sub indistinctione10, in neutro genere convenienter attributum est sive appropriatum unitati essentiali. In masculino vero, quia importat distinctionem et suppositum certum et dicit rationem producentis, appropriatum est unitati personali.

Ad 1. Et ideo patet11, quod sic non accipitur ut ens neque ut convertibile cum eo, sed solum in neutro.

Ad 2. Patet etiam secundum, quod ibi est fallacia figurae dictionis ex commutatione12 istius termini unus. Quamvis enim non varietur significatio per substantivationem neque per generis diversitatem, potest nihilominus variari modus supponendi, maxime si usus hoc faciat, et ratio sit conveniens usui.

Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod aeternus dicitur essentialiter; patet responsio, quia aeternitas dicitur solum essentialiter, sed unitas13 personaliter. — Aliqui tamen dicunt, quod hoc est in hoc nomine unus, quia est nomen partitivum et habens in se articulum.

Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur14: aut praedicat notionem, etc; dicendum, quod praedicat notionem, sed attendendum, quod non quamcumque, sed personalem, quae facit esse unum, et illa est una in qualibet persona.

Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notio dicitur de uno; dicendum, quod est significare notionem sub ratione propria, ut per hoc nomen paternitas, et communiter, ut per hoc nomen relatio, notio, unitas et proprietas, quae idem dicunt sub rationibus diversis. Sensus enim est: « persona est[^15] una », id est, unica personali proprietate in se indistincta et ab aliis distincta.

Scholion

Quoad solut. ad 1. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 1, et Richard. a Med., hic a. 1. q. 3. ad 3. — Praeter hos quoad conclusionem cfr. S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4; S. I. q. 30. a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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English Translation

Question II. Whether "one" in divine matters is said according to substance or according to relation.

Secondly it is asked whether one is said according to substance or according to relation. And that [it is said] according to substance is shown:

1. Since « being and one are convertible », as the Philosopher1 and Boethius hold; but "being" is said according to substance: therefore "one" also.

2. Likewise, this is conceded: « the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God »; but if they are one God, since "God" does not diminish from the account of "one," therefore they are one. But nothing is said in summation of the three singularly, which is not said substantially2: therefore etc. If you say that, when [the term] is taken adjectively, then it is not said substantially; on the contrary: the signification of the term is the same when it is taken adjectively and when it is taken substantively. Likewise, when it is substantivated in the neuter3, it is said substantially; since therefore the signification of the term is the same in the masculine and in the neuter, [and] since there is a single imposition, therefore in the masculine it is said substantially. Furthermore, other names in the masculine are said substantially, as this name eternal; whence in the [Athanasian] Creed4: « not three eternals, but one eternal »: therefore likewise [for] "one."

3. Likewise, when it is said: « the Father is one », [the term] is taken either substantially or notionally. If substantially, I have what I propose; if notionally — but the Father has two notions: therefore he ought not be called "one," but "two."

4. Likewise, notion and property are the same: therefore since "property" is said to be « that which belongs to one alone »5, no notion can be said of three. But this name one is predicated of any person whatsoever: therefore it does not express a notion.

On the contrary:

1. The rule was had above in distinction twenty-two6: « Everything which predicates substance or essence is said of the three singularly in summation »; but this does not fit this name which is one7: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, nothing pertaining to essence or substance is multiplied or pluralized; but this [term] one is pluralized, since the Father is one, and the Son is one, and they are two, since one and one: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, to be one and to be distinct are the same; but when I say: the Father is distinct, this [term] distinct is not said substantially: therefore neither this [term] one.

4. Likewise, with respect to whatever term it is [possible] to say another in divine matters, that term expresses a relation — whence it is not said another God, but with respect to that which is one it is [possible] to say another, for the Father is one, and the Son is another: therefore etc.

Conclusion. Since in God there is unity both essential and personal, by which one person is distinguished from another, the term "one," if used adjectively, can signify either unity; but if [used] substantively, then "unitas" [unity, fem.] is attributed to personal unity, and "unum" [one, neut.] to essential.

I respond: It must be said that, since the account of unity is the account of distinction with indivision, [and] since in divine matters we posit both8 [an] essence distinct from other essences by itself, and a person distinguished from others by a property, it is necessary in divine matters to posit both an essential and a personal unity. Since therefore the person is not other than the essence, the unity of the essence and of the person are not two unities according to the thing, but one, differing in account: therefore unity is not said equivocally of this and that, since neither is it specially imposed on this nor on that.

Since therefore the concrete takes a special signification from the abstract, this name one imports in divine matters [both] essential and personal unity. And when it is taken adjectively, it imports either indifferently; it is determined, however, by what is adjoined. When therefore it is added to an essential term, it imports the essential; when it is added to a notional, it imports the personal.

When, however, it is substantivated, then9 it is necessary that it be determined by itself. And therefore, since [the substantivated form] imports the neuter gender, [in] which it expresses [unity] under indistinction10, in the neuter gender it is fittingly attributed or appropriated to essential unity. In the masculine, however, since it imports distinction and a determinate supposit, and expresses the account of one producing, it is appropriated to personal unity.

To 1. And therefore it is plain11 that thus it is not taken as "being" nor as convertible with it, but only in the neuter.

To 2. The second [point] also is plain, that there [in that argument] there is a fallacy of figure of speech from the commutation12 of this term one. For although the signification is not varied through substantivation nor through diversity of gender, the mode of suppositing can nevertheless be varied, especially if usage makes it so, and the account is fitting to usage.

To that, then, which is objected, that eternal is said essentially; the response is plain, since "eternity" is said only essentially, but "unity"13 [is said also] personally. — Some, however, say that this is [the case] in this name unus ["one," masc.], because it is a partitive name and has the article in itself.

To 3. To that which is objected14: either it predicates a notion, etc.; it must be said that it does predicate a notion, but it must be noted that not just any [notion], but the personal [one], which makes [a person] to be one, and that [notion] is one in any person whatsoever.

To 4. To that which is objected, that "notion" is said of [the] one; it must be said that [there is] signifying [a] notion under [its] proper account, as through this name paternity, and commonly, as through this name relation, notion, unity and property, which say the same [thing] under diverse accounts. For the sense is: « the person is[^15] one », that is, undivided in herself by a single personal property and divided from others.

Scholion

For the solution to [objection] 1, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 1, and Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 1, q. 3, ad 3. — Besides these, for the conclusion cf. St. Thomas, here q. 1, a. 4; Summa I, q. 30, a. 3, ad 1. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 1, a. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1, princ. q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Libr. IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.): « Si itaque ens et unum idem ac una natura sunt, propterea quod se invicem sequuntur etc ». Cfr. etiam X. text. 8. (IX. c. 2.). — Boeth., de Una persona et duabus naturis Christi, c. 4. ait: « Quod enim non est unum, nec esse omnino potest; esse enim atque unum convertitur ». Vide etiam eiusdem librum de Unitate et Uno.
    Book IV Metaph., text 3 (III, c. 2): « If therefore being and one are the same and one nature, since they follow each other reciprocally, etc. ». Cf. also X, text 8 (IX, c. 2). — Boethius, On the One Person and Two Natures of Christ, c. 4, says: « For what is not one cannot at all even be; for "to be" and "one" are convertible ». See also his book On Unity and the One.
  2. Vide supra d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 3, et ibid. dub. 2. circa lit. — Infra post tunc plurimi mss. cum ed. 1 omittunt non, sed falso, quia contra scopum obiectionis. S. Doctor forte alludit ad ultimam partem verborum Alani de Insulis, Theologic. Regulae, reg. 23: Ideo autem apponimus substantivo modo, quia nomina significantia substantiam vel substantiae circumstantiam, si adiective teneantur, ut hoc nomen potens, hoc nomen iustus, de tribus personis dicuntur in summa in plurali numero, ut: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt iusti, sunt potentes.
    See above d. XXII, littera Magistri, c. 3, and the same place, dub. 2 circa litteram. — Below, after tunc, very many mss. with ed. 1 omit non, but wrongly, since [it is] against the scope of the objection. The holy Doctor perhaps alludes to the last part of the words of Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 23: « We add [it] in a substantive mode, however, since names signifying substance or a circumstance of substance, if they are taken adjectively — as this name potens ['powerful'], this name iustus ['just'] — are said of the three persons in summation in the plural number, as: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are iusti ['just (pl.)'], are potentes ['powerful (pl.)'] ».
  3. Vat. cum uno alterove cod. adiicit genere, et paulo infra cum cod. cc loco una exhibet eadem.
    The Vatican [edition], with one or another codex, adds genere ("gender"), and a little below, with cod. cc, in place of una exhibits eadem ("the same").
  4. Athanasiano.
    [The Creed referred to is] the Athanasian.
  5. Porphyr., de Praedicab. c. de Proprio. — Plures codd. ut AVXY cum ed. 1 quia pro quod.
    Porphyry, On the Predicables, c. on the Proprium. — Several codices such as AVXY with ed. 1 [read] quia ("because") in place of quod ("that which").
  6. In lit. Magistri, c. 4, et dub. 2. circa lit.
    In the littera Magistri, c. 4, and dub. 2 circa litteram.
  7. Sequimur communiorem mss. et ed. 1 lectionem, addendo quod est.
    We follow the more common reading of the mss. and ed. 1, by adding quod est.
  8. Vat. cum pluribus codd. omittit et, ac paulo infra post necesse est addit etiam.
    The Vatican [edition] with several codices omits et, and a little below, after necesse est, adds etiam.
  9. Ita maior pars mss., dum ceteri cum ed. 1 et Vat. ponunt enim.
    So the greater part of the mss., while the rest with ed. 1 and the Vatican [edition] put enim ("for") [in place of tunc, "then"].
  10. Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus hic tunc, et paulo infra post in neutro adiecimus genere. Pro se ipso ed. 1 in se ipso, codd. K aa bb se ipsum determinet pro se ipso determinetur. Dein plures mss. ut G I M V Y Z cum ed. 1 sine distinctione loco sub indistinctione.
    From the older mss. and ed. 1 we have here supplied tunc ("then"), and a little below, after in neutro, we have added genere ("gender"). In place of se ipso, ed. 1 [reads] in se ipso; codd. K aa bb [read] se ipsum determinet in place of se ipso determinetur. Then several mss. such as G I M V Y Z with ed. 1 [read] sine distinctione ("without distinction") in place of sub indistinctione ("under indistinction").
  11. In ed. 1 additur primum.
    In ed. 1 primum ("first") is added.
  12. Vat. cum nonnullis mss. et ed. 1 mutatione. Deinde post potest eadem cum solo cod. cc addit tamen, denique ponit diversificari pro variari, ac facit loco faciat.
    The Vatican [edition] with some mss. and ed. 1 [reads] mutatione ("by change") [in place of commutatione]. Then, after potest, the same [edition] with only cod. cc adds tamen ("nevertheless"); finally it puts diversificari in place of variari, and facit in place of faciat.
  13. Supple: etiam; et mox post hoc est subaudi: ideo, pro quo Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 addit speciale.
    Supply: etiam ("also"); and soon after hoc est understand: ideo ("therefore"), in place of which the Vatican [edition], without the warrant of the mss. and ed. 1, adds speciale ("special").
  14. In cod. Y additur quod unus. — De notione personali, quae hic occurrit, vide infra d. 26. q. 1. et 4.
    In cod. Y quod unus ("which [is] 'one'") is added. — On the personal notion, which occurs here, see below d. 26, q. 1 and 4.
  15. Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus est.
    From very many mss. and ed. 1 we have added est.
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