Dist. 24, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 24
QUAESTIO II. Utrum nomina numeralia in divinis secundum substantiam, an secundum relationem dicantur.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum nomina praedicta dicantur1 secundum substantiam, aut secundum relationem. Et quod secundum substantiam, videtur.
1. Sicut dicit Boethius et Augustinus2: « Quantitas in substantiam transit »; sed numerus quantitatem dicit, ergo transit in substantiam: ergo dictiones numerales secundum substantiam dicuntur.
2. Item, omne nomen, quod dicitur ad se, dicitur secundum substantiam3; sed duo et tres est nomen, quod dicitur ad se, non ad aliud: ergo dicuntur secundum substantiam.
3. Item, cum dicitur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus sunt tres4, hoc quod est tres aut dicitur notionaliter, aut essentialiter; non notionaliter, quia nulla est notio, quae communiter dicatur de tribus: ergo dicitur essentialiter.
4. Item, notiones sunt quinque; sed si5 termini numerales important pluralitatem notionum, ergo erit quinarius in divinis: ergo non tres, sed quinque sunt. Sed hoc falsum: ergo non dicuntur notionaliter, ergo dicuntur essentialiter sive substantialiter.
Contra:
1. Omne nomen pertinens ad substantiam non dicitur pluraliter, sed6 singulariter; sed tres tantum dicitur pluraliter: ergo nullo modo dicitur secundum substantiam, ergo dicitur secundum relationem.
2. Item, omne nomen substantiale praedicatur de qualibet persona; sed tres de nulla persona praedicatur: ergo etc.
3. Item, si hoc nomen tres secundum substantiam dicitur, ergo licet ei7 addere terminum substantialem: ergo possumus dicere tres deos vel tres substantias, quorum utrumque est contra fidem.
Conclusio. Nomina numeralia in divinis dicuntur secundum relationem et important [ipsas notiones].
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod aliqui dicere voluerunt, quod huiusmodi termini numerales in Deo nihil aliud dicant quam hoc nomen personae pluraliter. Unde si dicatur: personae sunt tres, idem subiicitur et praedicatur. Et ratio et modus intelligendi hic est: quia si ponerentur formae esse ab aeterno, sicut imponitur Platoni quod posuit8, tunc plures essent et in aliquo certo numero. Sed numerus ille non esset proprietas nec passio consequens, sed ipsae formae numerales9. Et per hunc modum dicere tres in divinis non est dicere nisi ipsas personas.
Sed illud non oportet dicere, quoniam si idem esset omnino, tunc videretur esse nugatio, si dicerentur tres personae, una persona; et videretur nihil10 plus dici, cum dicitur: tres sunt personae, quam: personae sunt personae.
Et propter hoc alius modus dicendi est, quod huiusmodi termini numerales dicuntur secundum relationem et important ipsas11 notiones. Et hoc patet, quia in divinis important distinctionem; distinctio autem est a proprietatibus: unde tres importat proprietatem trium personarum in concretione. Notio autem, in quantum convenit soli, dicit12 proprietatem; in quantum vero ab alio distinguit, dicit relationem: unde dicuntur personae tres proprietatibus suis distinctae. Et si tu quaeras, quid dicitur, quando dicitur: tres notiones; dicendum, quod se ipsis distinguuntur proprietates, ideo non dicit nisi notiones ipsas.
Ad 1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod quantitas transit in substantiam; dicendum, quod numerus in creaturis est quantitas, sed in Deo dicit relationem; et hoc patet sic. Distinctio in creaturis est per alicuius proprietatis vel qualitatis appositionem, et ita per additionem; ubi autem additio, ibi limitatio; ubi limitatio, ibi unius ab alio divisio, et ubi haec sunt, ibi aggregatio diversorum et mensuratio. Et quia quantitatis est mensurare, ad distinctionem in inferioribus sequitur numerus et est modus essendi consequens materiam cum forma. In divinis autem est distinctio solum13 per originem, non per additionem alicuius, et ideo nulla additio, nulla limitatio; et ubi hoc non est, nec mensuratio, et ideo nec quantitas. Sed ubi origo, ibi habitudo et relatio; et ideo in divinis numerus non dicit quantitatem, sed magis relationem. Et quoniam relatio non transit in substantiam, ideo nec termini numerales.
Ad 2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicuntur ad se; dicendum, quod nomen dici ad aliud14, hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel intra vel extra, vel implicite vel explicite. Et illud nomen substantialiter dicitur, quod non dicitur ad aliud, nec intra nec extra, nec implicite nec explicite. Sed terminus numeralis dicit relationem ad aliud intra, quia importat distinctionem numeratorum et implicat relationem.
Ad 3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nulla notio dicitur de tribus; dicendum, quod verum est: nulla notio determinata; sed commune ad notiones secundum rationem dicitur de tribus, ut hoc nomen relatus et hoc nomen distinctus et nomina consimilia.
Ad 4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod notiones sunt quinque; dicendum, quod tres non quascumque notiones importat, sed solum personales15. Illa enim notio, quae facit personam esse personam et ab omnibus distinctam, illa dicitur unitas personae, in quantum dat esse distinctum; et illa notio est una unius, sicut una est unitas unius; et illae sunt tantum tres. Et ideo cum tantum16 sint tres unitates in tribus personis, hinc est, quod personae solummodo tres dicuntur.
I. Quod nomina numeralia in Deo tantum secundum relationem dicantur, est doctrina certissima et communissima; sed controversia est de hoc, quid ista nomina in divinis importent; et de hac re in responsione agitur. Prima opinio ibi posita, quam S. Doctor reprobat, concedit quidem, haec nomina dici secundum relationem, sed ita, ut nihil aliud significet locutio: sunt tres personae, nisi hoc: sunt personae. Huius opinionis defensores timuisse videntur, ne, si diceretur, nomina numeralia importare aliquid distinctum ab ipsis personis divinis, inciderent in errorem Platoni impositum, quasi numerorum sint formae aeternae subsistentes. — Hic notandum, S. Bonav. favere mitiori explicationi idearum Platonicarum, quam etiam habet S. Augustinus libro 83 Quaest. q. 46. n. 2. Putat enim S. Augustinus, Platonem docuisse, ideas esse separatas a rebus, at subsistentes non in se, sed in mente Creatoris. Aristoteles vero vult, Platonem docuisse, ideas per se esse subsistentes. De vera sententia Platonis controversia nec nostris temporibus est composita.
Notiones seu proprietates personales se ipsis distingui, constans est doctrina Seraphici (hic in corp., supra d. 13. q. 2. 3. Schol., infra d. 26. q. 1. et 3.).
II. Communis sententia aliorum doctorum concordat cum Seraphico in conclusione. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 65. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; S. I. q. 31. a. I. — B. Albert, hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 3. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
---
Question II. Whether numeral names in divine matters are said according to substance or according to relation.
Secondly, it is asked whether the aforesaid names are said1 according to substance, or according to relation. And that [they are said] according to substance is shown.
1. As Boethius and Augustine say2: « Quantity passes over into substance »; but number expresses quantity, therefore it passes over into substance: therefore numeral terms are said according to substance.
2. Likewise, every name which is said of itself [ad se] is said according to substance3; but two and three is a name said of itself, not of another: therefore they are said according to substance.
3. Likewise, when it is said: The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three4, that which is three is said either notionally or essentially; not notionally, since there is no notion which is said in common of the three: therefore it is said essentially.
4. Likewise, the notions are five; but if5 the numeral terms import a plurality of notions, then there will be a fivefold [number] in divine matters: therefore not three, but five there are. But this is false: therefore they are not said notionally; therefore they are said essentially or substantially.
On the contrary:
1. Every name pertaining to substance is not said in the plural, but6 in the singular; but three is said only in the plural: therefore in no way is it said according to substance, therefore it is said according to relation.
2. Likewise, every substantial name is predicated of any [given] person; but three is predicated of no [single] person: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, if this name three is said according to substance, then it is permitted to it7 to add a substantial term: therefore we can say three gods or three substances, each of which is against the faith.
Conclusion. Numeral names in divine matters are said according to relation and import [the notions themselves].
I respond: It must be said that some wished to say that numeral terms of this kind in God express nothing other than this name person in the plural. Whence if it is said: the persons are three, the same thing is subject and predicate. And the reason and mode of understanding here is this: that, if forms were posited to be from eternity, as is imputed to Plato that he held8, then there would be many [forms] and in some certain number. But that number would not be a property nor a passion consequent [on form], but the very numeral forms themselves9. And in this way, to say three in divine matters is nothing other than to say the persons themselves.
But that need not be said, since if it were entirely the same, then it would seem to be a triviality, if it were said: three persons, one person; and it would seem that nothing10 more is being said, when it is said: three are persons, than: persons are persons.
And on account of this another mode of speaking is, that numeral terms of this kind are said according to relation and import the notions themselves11. And this is plain, because in divine matters they import distinction; but distinction is from properties: whence three imports the property of three persons in concretion. But a notion, insofar as it belongs to one alone, expresses12 property; insofar, however, as it distinguishes [it] from another, it expresses relation: whence the persons are called three as distinguished by their properties. And if you ask, what is being said when it is said: three notions; it must be said that the properties are distinguished by themselves, therefore it expresses nothing but the notions themselves.
To 1. To that, then, which is objected, that quantity passes over into substance; it must be said that number in creatures is quantity, but in God expresses relation; and this is plain thus. Distinction in creatures is through the apposition of some property or quality, and so through addition; but where addition, there limitation; where limitation, there division of one from another, and where these are, there aggregation of diverse things and measurement. And because measuring belongs to quantity, on distinction in lower [things] there follows number, and it is a mode of being consequent upon matter together with form. But in divine matters distinction is only13 through origin, not through addition of anything, and therefore there is no addition, no limitation; and where this is not, there is also no measurement, and therefore no quantity either. But where origin is, there is relation and disposition; and therefore in divine matters number does not express quantity, but rather relation. And since relation does not pass over into substance, therefore neither do the numeral terms.
To 2. To that which is objected, that they are said of themselves; it must be said that for a name to be said of another14, this can be in two ways: either within or outside, [and either] implicitly or explicitly. And that name is said substantially which is not said of another, neither within nor outside, neither implicitly nor explicitly. But a numeral term expresses relation to another within, since it imports a distinction of [things] numbered and implies relation.
To 3. To that which is objected, that no notion is said of the three; it must be said that this is true: no determinate notion; but a [name] common to the notions according to its account is said of the three, like this name related and this name distinct and similar names.
To 4. To that which is objected, that the notions are five; it must be said that three does not import any [and every] notion whatsoever, but only the personal [notions]15. For that notion which makes a person to be a person and distinct from all [others], it is called the unity of the person, insofar as it gives distinct being; and that notion is one of one, just as the unity of one is one; and these are only three. And therefore since16 there are only three unities in the three persons, hence it is that the persons are called only three.
I. That numeral names in God are said only according to relation is a most certain and most common doctrine; but the controversy is about this, what these names import in divine matters; and on this matter [the question] is treated in the response. The first opinion there set forth, which the holy Doctor rejects, concedes indeed that these names are said according to relation, but in such a way that the locution: there are three persons signifies nothing else than this: there are persons. The defenders of this opinion seem to have feared lest, if it were said that numeral names import something distinct from the divine persons themselves, they should fall into the error imputed to Plato, as though numbers were eternally subsisting forms. — Here it is to be noted that St. Bonaventure favors the milder explanation of the Platonic ideas, which St. Augustine also holds in book 83 Quaest., q. 46, n. 2. For St. Augustine thinks that Plato taught that the ideas are separate from things, but subsisting not in themselves, but in the mind of the Creator. Aristotle, however, will have it that Plato taught the ideas to be subsisting per se. The controversy about Plato's true judgement is not even in our times settled.
That the personal notions or properties are distinguished by themselves is the constant doctrine of the Seraphic [Doctor] (here in the body, above d. 13, q. 2, 3, Scholion; below d. 26, q. 1 and 3).
II. The common judgement of the other doctors concords with the Seraphic [Doctor] in the conclusion. Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 65, m. 2, a. 2. — St. Thomas, here q. 2, a. 2; Summa I, q. 31, a. I. — Bl. Albert, here a. 4. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2, q. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, here 1 princ. q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
---
- Auctoritate vetustiorum codd. et ed. I posuimus dicantur.On the authority of the older codices and ed. I we have placed dicantur ("they are said").
- Boeth., Libr. de Trin. c. 1. — August., V. de Trin. c. 1. n. 2, et passim.Boethius, Book on the Trinity, c. 1. — Augustine, V On the Trinity, c. 1, n. 2, and passim.
- Vide supra d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 1.See above d. XXII, Littera Magistri, c. 1.
- Vat. cum cod. cc, refragantibus aliis codd. et ed. I, male omittit tres. Mox plures codd. ut F G H I M W X sed pro hoc, at incongrue.The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc, the other codices and ed. I resisting, wrongly omits tres. Soon afterwards several codices such as F G H I M W X [read] sed in place of hoc, but unsuitably.
- Vat. sola omittit si, et paulo infra post erit adiicit numerus, et est ante falsum.The Vatican alone omits si, and a little below after erit it adds numerus, and est before falsum.
- Plures codd. ut A C R S Y Z cum ed. 1, omissa particula non, pro sed ponunt et, quae lectio explicari forte posset verbis Alani de Insulis, citatis supra pag. 423, nota 2: sed lectio in textum recepta concordat cum praedictis in d. XXII. lit. Magistri, c. 4. et dub. 2. circa lit., et exhibet generalem regulam.Several codices such as A C R S Y Z with ed. 1, with the particle non omitted, in place of sed place et, which reading could perhaps be explained by the words of Alan of Lille cited above on p. 423, note 2: but the reading received into the text concords with what was set forth in d. XXII, Littera Magistri, c. 4 and dub. 2 circa litteram, and exhibits the general rule.
- Vat. cum pluribus mss. omittit ei, quod tamen ab aliis codd. et ed. I exhibetur. Mox cod. X inconveniens, et cod. Y falsum pro contra fidem.The Vatican [edition] with several mss. omits ei, which however is exhibited by the other codices and ed. I. Soon, cod. X [reads] inconveniens ("unfitting"), and cod. Y falsum ("false") in place of contra fidem ("against the faith").
- Cfr. Timaeus, circa init. (ed. Basil. an. 1578, tom. III. pag. 28 seq.), et Parmenides, circa init. (ibid. pag. 132), ac de Anima mundi, in princ. (ibid. pag. 93). — Aristot., passim, praesertim VII. Metaph. text. 56. seqq., et XIII. c. 4. et 5. (VI. c. 16, et XII. c. 4. et 5.).Cf. Timaeus, near the beginning (Basel ed., year 1578, tom. III, p. 28 ff.), and Parmenides, near the beginning (ibid. p. 132), and On the Soul of the World, at the start (ibid. p. 93). — Aristotle, passim, especially VII Metaph., text 56 ff., and XIII, c. 4 and 5 (VI, c. 16, and XII, c. 4 and 5).
- Vat. contra mss. et sex primas edd. perperam numeratae. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc tres pro ipsas, sed praeter fidem plurimorum mss. et ed. 1; ceteri codd. legunt ipsas tres.The Vatican [edition], against the mss. and the first six editions, wrongly [reads] numeratae. Soon, the Vatican with cod. cc [reads] tres in place of ipsas, but contrary to the faith of very many mss. and ed. 1; the other codices read ipsas tres.
- Fide fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 substituimus hic nihil pro non, et paulo ante ex mss. et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 dicerentur loco diceretur. Plures codd. ut T X verbo videretur praemittunt iterum, et mox post quam codd. H K V X Z aa bb addunt si diceretur. Aliqui mss. ut A S V cum ed. 1 et pro quam.On the faith of nearly all the mss. and ed. 1 we have here substituted nihil ("nothing") in place of non ("not"), and a little before, from the mss. and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, dicerentur in place of diceretur. Several codices such as T X prepose iterum ("again") to the verb videretur, and soon after quam codices H K V X Z aa bb add si diceretur. Some mss. such as A S V with ed. 1 [read] et in place of quam.
- In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur ipsas, quod in aliis mss. et ed. 1 exstat.In the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc ipsas is missing, which is present in the other mss. and ed. 1.
- Explicationem huius vide infra in resp. ad 4. — Vat. cum cod. cc praemittit esse tum ante proprietas, tum ante unitas. Mox Vat., refragantibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1, tribus pro suis, et quaeris loco quaeras.For the explanation of this see below in the response ad 4. — The Vatican [edition] with cod. cc preposes esse both before proprietas and before unitas. Soon, the Vatican, with the older mss. and ed. 1 resisting, [reads] tribus in place of suis, and quaeris in place of quaeras.
- In Vat. et solo cod. cc minus bene omittitur solum. Paulo infra plures codd. ut A G H S T V Y bb post et ubi ponunt haec pro hoc. — Plura vide supra pag. 362, q. 4.In the Vatican [edition] and only in cod. cc solum is less suitably omitted. A little below, several codices such as A G H S T V Y bb after et ubi place haec in place of hoc. — See more above on p. 362, q. 4.
- Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. I hic supplevimus hoc, et mox post dupliciter substituimus vel pro uno modo, ac circa finem responsionis post relationem posuimus ad aliud loco ad aliquid.From the older mss. and ed. I we have here supplied hoc, and soon after dupliciter we have substituted vel in place of uno modo, and toward the end of the response, after relationem, we have placed ad aliud in place of ad aliquid.
- Cod. aa non quamcumque notionem importat, sed solum personalem; cod. T vere quamcumque relationem vel notionem importat. Mox post facit fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus illam.Cod. aa [reads] non quamcumque notionem importat, sed solum personalem ("does not import any [and every] notion whatsoever, but only the personal"); cod. T [reads] vere quamcumque relationem vel notionem importat. Soon after facit, on the faith of the older mss. and ed. 1, we have expunged illam.
- In Vat. et solo cod. cc indebite omittitur tantum. Paulo ante cod. Y post unitas unius addit in tribus personis.In the Vatican [edition] and only in cod. cc tantum is wrongly omitted. A little before, cod. Y after unitas unius adds in tribus personis ("in three persons").