← Back to Distinction 27

Dist. 27

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27

Textus Latinus
p. 464

DISTINCTIO XXVII.

Pars I.

Cap. I. Quae sint illae proprietates, quibus distinguuntur personae.

Hic quaeri potest, utrum proprietates, quas Hilarius supra1 assignavit, scilicet quod Pater semper est Pater, et Filius semper est Filius, sint illae eaedem proprietates, quas Augustinus superius distinxit dicens, proprium esse Patris, quod genuit Filium; et proprium Filii, quod genitus est a Patre; et Spiritus sancti, quod ab utroque procedit. Ac deinde, utrum et istae sint illae quae dicuntur paternitas, filiatio, processio. Videtur quod non sint eaedem proprietates, quas ponit Hilarius, et illae, quas ponit Augustinus. Si enim eaedem sunt, idem est ergo Patri esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; quod utique quidam concedunt. Si autem hoc est, cui ergo convenit ut sit Pater, ei convenit genuisse Filium. Natura ergo divina si Pater est, genuit Filium; si vero non genuit, Pater non est. Sed quis audeat dicere, aut quod ipsa genuit Filium, aut quod ipsa Pater non sit. Si autem ipsa Pater est, nec Filium genuit, non est ergo idem dicere, aliquid esse Patrem et gignere Filium. Et ita non videtur2 una eademque esse proprietas.

Ad quod sine praeiudicio aliorum dicimus, quod easdem proprietates notavit uterque, licet diversis verbis. Quod enim Hilarius ait, ita intelligi debet: proprium Patris est, quod semper Pater est, id est, proprietas Patris est, qua semper Pater est; semper vero Pater est, quia semper genuit Filium. Ita et proprium Filii est, quod semper Filius est, id est, proprietas Filii est, qua semper Filius est; Filius vero semper est, quia semper genitus est. Ergo proprietas, qua Pater est Pater, est quia semper genuit; et haec eadem dicitur paternitas vel generatio. Et proprietas, qua Filius semper est filius, est quia semper genitus est a Patre; et haec eadem dicitur filiatio vel genitura vel nativitas vel origo vel nascibilitas. Sic et proprietas, qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus vel donum, est quia procedit ab utroque; et haec eadem dicitur processio. In praemissis ergo locutionibus eaedem significatae sunt proprietates.

Cap. II. Quod non est omnino idem dicere, esse Patrem, et genuisse vel habere Filium.

Nec tamen videtur nobis, omnino esse idem dicere aliquid esse Patrem et genuisse Filium; vel aliquid esse Filium et habere Patrem, vel esse Spiritum sanctum et procedere ab utroque. Alioquin Pater non esset nomen hypostasis, id est personae, sed proprietatis tantum; similiter Filius et Spiritus sanctus: et ita non per3 tria nomina significarentur tres personae. Ideoque dicimus, quia Patris nomen non tantum relationem notat, sed etiam hypostasim, id est subsistentiam significat, ita et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Relationum vero vocabula, scilicet paternitas, filiatio, processio, vel gignere, gigni, procedere, ipsas tantum relationes, non hypostases significant, sive habere filium et habere patrem. Ut verbi gratia, cum dicimus: Deus est pater, nomine patris et relationem notamus et divinam hypostasim significamus, ut sit intelligentia talis: Deus vel divina essentia est Pater, id est ille qui genuit, scilicet4

p. 465

hypostasis, quae habet filium. Similiter: Deus est filius, id est hypostasis genita vel habens patrem. Ita etiam Deus est Spiritus sanctus, id est hypostasis procedens ab utroque, sive ille qui procedit. Cum vero nomina relationum ponimus in praedicatis, notiones ipsas tantum significamus5, non hypostases, ut cum dicitur: Deus genuit, id est habet filium; et Deus genitus est, id est habet patrem. Et tunc oportet intelligi in subiectis hypostases tantum, non essentiam, quae illis proprietatibus determinantur.

Cap. III. Quod proprietates determinant hypostases, non substantiam, id est naturam.

Illae enim proprietates singulae singulis proprie conveniunt personis, et per eas personae determinantur et a se invicem differunt, sed a se non secedunt. Unde Ioannes Damascenus6: «Non differunt ab invicem hypostases secundum substantiam, sed secundum characteristica idiomata, id est determinativas proprietates. Characteristica vero, id est determinativa, sunt hypostaseon, et non naturae; etenim hypostases determinant». Item7: «Esse quidem intemporaliter et aeternaliter dicimus divinam Verbi hypostasim, simplicem, omnia habentem, quae habet Pater, ut eius homoousion, id est consubstantialem, nativitatis modo et habitudine a paternali hypostasi differentem, nunquam vero a paternali hypostasi secedentem». Idem, apertius exprimens personales proprietates, in eodem ait8: «Differentiam hypostaseon, id est personarum, in tribus proprietatibus, id est paternali et filiali et processibili, recognoscimus, insecessibiles autem ipsas hypostases et indistabiles invicem — et unitas quidem inconfusibiliter — tres enim sunt, etsi unitae — divisas autem indistanter. Etenim singula perfecta est hypostasis et propriam proprietatem, scilicet existentiae modum, proprium possidet; sed unitae sunt substantia et non distant neque secedunt a paternali hypostasi». Ecce hic habes distinctas tres illas proprietates, quae supra9 diversis significatae sunt modis.

Pars II.

Cap. I.

Hic non est praetermittendum, quod sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus nomina personarum sunt et proprietates personales designant, ita etiam sunt et alia nomina personarum, id est, quae ipsas personas significant et earum proprietates denotant, et easdem quas et nomina praedicta, unde et relative dicuntur, scilicet genitor, genitus, verbum, imago. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate10: «Videndum est, inquit, hoc significari, cum dicitur genitus, quod significatur, cum dicitur filius. Ideo enim filius, quia genitus, et quia filius, utique genitus». «Sicut autem filius ad patrem, sic genitus ad genitorem refertur, et sicut pater ad filium, ita genitor ad genitum». Idem in sexto libro de Trinitate11: «Verbum quidem solus Filius accipitur, non simul Pater et Filius, tanquam ambo sint unum verbum. Sic enim verbum dicitur, quomodo imago, non autem Pater et Filius simul ambo imago, sed Filius solus est imago Patris, quemadmodum et filius». Idem in septimo libro de Trinitate: «Verbum, secundum quod sapientia est et essentia, hoc est quod Pater; secundum quod verbum, non hoc est quod Pater, quia verbum non est pater, et verbum relative dicitur, sicut filius». Item in eodem: «Sicut filius ad patrem refertur, ita et verbum ad eum cuius est verbum, refertur, cum dicitur verbum. Et propterea non eo verbum, quo sapientia dicitur; quia verbum non ad se dicitur, sed tantum relative ad eum cuius est verbum, sicut filius ad patrem». «Eo quippe est filius, quo verbum, et eo est verbum, quo filius; sapientia vero, quo essentia, et ideo, quia12 Pater et Filius sunt una essentia et una sapientia». Item in eodem13: «Non est Pater ipse verbum, sicut nec filius nec imago». «Quid autem absurdius quam imaginem ad se dici»? Idem in quinto14: «Dicitur relative filius, relative etiam dicitur verbum et imago, et in omnibus his vocabulis ad Patrem refertur, nihil autem horum pater dicitur».

Epilogus.17

Aperte ostensum est, quod sicut filius vel genitus relative dicitur ad patrem, ita verbum et imago; et quod eo dicitur verbum sive imago, quo filius, id est, eadem proprietate sive notione dicitur verbum et imago, qua filius; sed non eo quo verbum, dicitur sapientia vel essentia, quia non notione, qua dicitur verbum, dicitur sapientia. Nam sapientia dicitur secundum essentiam, non secundum relationem.

p. 466

Cap. IV. De generali regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur.

Et est hic advertenda quaedam generalis regula eorum quae ad se, et eorum quae relative dicuntur de Patre et Filio. «Quidquid enim ad se dicuntur, ut ait Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate15, non dicitur alter sine altero, id est, quidquid dicuntur quod substantiam eorum ostendat, ambo simul dicuntur. Ergo nec Pater est Deus sine Filio, nec Filius sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus», sed non ambo simul pater, non ambo simul filius vel verbum vel imago.

Cap. V. An secundum substantiam dicatur Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi.

Hic quaeritur, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, et huiusmodi, utrum dicantur secundum substantiam. Nam secundum relationem constat ista non dici. Si vero secundum substantiam dicuntur, simul ambo, scilicet Pater et Filius, possunt dici Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine, secundum praedictam regulam. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet Deus secundum substantiam dicatur et lumen et sapientia et huiusmodi, et nunquam relative accipiantur; aliquando tamen pro relativis, id est pro personis, sed non relative accipiuntur, ut, cum dicitur: Deus genuit Deum, alterum pro Patre, alterum pro Filio ponimus; similiter, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine. In aliis quoque locutionibus saepe reperiuntur nomina essentiae ad significationem personarum deducta, ut cum dicitur: Deus natus, Deus mortuus, Deus passus, ubi Filius tantum significatur. Ita et de solo Filio intelligitur, cum dicitur: Deus de Deo, et huiusmodi. Unde Augustinus quaerens, quomodo huiusmodi dicantur, in sexto libro de Trinitate ait16: «Quomodo Deus de Deo, lumen de lumine dicitur? Non enim simul ambo Deus de Deo, sed solus Filius de Deo, scilicet Patre; nec ambo simul lumen de lumine, sed solus Filius de lumine Patre». Et est sciendum, quod secundum nomina substantiae tantum dicitur illud de illo, licet ibi illa nomina substantiam non significent. Secundum vero eadem nomina personarum nunquam dicitur illud de illo, sicut Verbum de Verbo, vel Filius de Filio, quia huiusmodi nomina diversis personis convenire non possunt. Quod Augustinus, licet obscure, in eodem libro ita dicit: «Hoc solum de eis dici non potest illud de illo, quod simul ambo non sunt»: id est, illo solo nomine non possumus uti ad ostendendum unum de uno, quod simul ambobus non convenit, «sicut Verbum de Verbo dici non potest, quia non simul ambo Verbum, nec Imago de Imagine, nec Filius de Filio, quia non simul ambo Filius, vel Imago». — Et sicut nomina substantiae aliquando intelligentiam personarum distincte faciunt, ita etiam interdum totius Trinitatis simul. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro ait: «In Patris nomine ipse Pater per se pronuntiatur, in Dei vero nomine et ipse Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ut cum dicitur: Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus, quia Trinitas est unus

---

English Translation

DISTINCTION XXVII.

Part I.

Cap. I. What those properties are by which the persons are distinguished.

Here it can be asked whether the properties which Hilary above1 assigned, namely that the Father is always Father, and the Son is always Son, are those same properties which Augustine above distinguished, saying that it is proper to the Father that He has begotten the Son; and proper to the Son that He is begotten from the Father; and to the Holy Spirit, that He proceeds from both. And then, whether these in turn are those which are called paternity, filiation, procession. It seems that those properties which Hilary posits and those which Augustine posits are not the same. For if they are the same, then it is the same for the Father to be Father and to have begotten the Son; which indeed some concede. But if this is so, then to whom it belongs to be Father, to him it belongs to have begotten the Son. The divine nature, therefore, if it is Father, has begotten the Son; but if it has not begotten, it is not Father. But who would dare to say either that it itself begot the Son, or that it itself is not Father. But if it itself is Father, and did not beget the Son, then it is not the same to say that something is Father and that it begets the Son. And so it does not seem2 to be one and the same property.

To which we say, without prejudice to others, that each one noted the same properties, although in different words. For what Hilary says ought to be understood thus: it is proper to the Father that He is always Father, that is, the property of the Father is that by which He is always Father; but He is always Father, because He has always begotten the Son. So too it is proper to the Son that He is always Son, that is, the property of the Son is that by which He is always Son; the Son indeed is always [Son], because He is always begotten. Therefore the property by which the Father is Father, is that He has always begotten; and this same is called paternity or generation. And the property by which the Son is always Son, is that He is always begotten from the Father; and this same is called filiation or being-born or nativity or origin or nascibility. So too the property by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit or Gift, is that He proceeds from both; and this same is called procession. In the foregoing locutions, therefore, the same properties were signified.

Cap. II. That it is not entirely the same to say "to be Father" and "to have begotten" or "to have a Son".

Yet it does not seem to us to be entirely the same to say that something is Father and to have begotten the Son; or that something is Son and to have a Father, or to be the Holy Spirit and to proceed from both. Otherwise Father would not be a name of a hypostasis, that is, of a person, but only of a property; likewise Son and Holy Spirit: and so the three persons would not3 be signified by three names. And therefore we say, that the name of Father not only notes a relation, but also signifies a hypostasis, that is, a subsistence, and so too Son and Holy Spirit. But the vocabulary of relations, namely paternity, filiation, procession, or to beget, to be begotten, to proceed, signifies only the relations themselves, not the hypostases — or [signifies] to have a son and to have a father. By way of example, when we say: God is Father, by the name of Father we both note a relation and signify a divine hypostasis, so that the understanding is this: God or the divine essence is Father, that is, He who has begotten, namely4

the hypostasis which has a son. Likewise: God is Son, that is, the hypostasis begotten or having a father. So also God is Holy Spirit, that is, the hypostasis proceeding from both, or He who proceeds. But when we put the names of the relations in the predicate, we signify only the notions themselves5, not the hypostases — as when it is said: God has begotten, that is, He has a son; and God is begotten, that is, He has a father. And then the hypostases alone, not the essence, must be understood in the subjects, [the hypostases] which are determined by those properties.

Cap. III. That the properties determine the hypostases, not the substance, that is, the nature.

For those properties belong properly each to each of the persons, and through them the persons are determined and differ from one another, but do not depart from one another. Whence John Damascene6: "The hypostases do not differ from one another according to substance, but according to characteristic idioms, that is, determinative properties. But the characteristic [marks], that is, the determinative [marks], are of the hypostases, and not of the nature; for indeed they determine the hypostases." Likewise7: "We say that the divine hypostasis of the Word is timelessly and eternally — simple, having all things which the Father has, as His homoousion (that is, consubstantial), differing from the paternal hypostasis by the mode and condition of [His] being-born, but never departing from the paternal hypostasis." The same, more openly expressing the personal properties, says in the same place8: "We acknowledge the difference of the hypostases, that is, of the persons, in three properties, that is, the paternal and the filial and the processible, [acknowledging] the hypostases themselves to be inseparable and not distant from one another — and the unity indeed unconfusedly: for they are three, although united — and the divisions [to be] without distance. For each is a perfect hypostasis and possesses its own property, namely a proper mode of existence; but they are united in substance and do not stand apart nor depart from the paternal hypostasis." Behold here you have distinguished those three properties, which above9 were signified by various modes.

Part II.

Cap. I.

Here it is not to be passed over that, just as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are names of the persons and designate the personal properties, so also there are other names of the persons, that is, [names] which signify the persons themselves and denote their properties, and the same [properties] as the aforementioned names, whence they too are said relatively, namely begetter, begotten, word, image. Whence Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity10: "It must be seen, he says, that the same is signified when it is said begotten, that is signified when it is said son. For therefore [He is] son, because [He is] begotten, and because [He is] son, He is certainly begotten." "But just as son is referred to father, so begotten to begetter, and just as father to son, so begetter to begotten." The same in the sixth book On the Trinity11: "Word is taken as the Son alone, not the Father and the Son together, as if both were one word. For word is said in the way image [is], for it is not that the Father and the Son together are both image, but the Son alone is the image of the Father, just as also son." The same in the seventh book On the Trinity: "Word, according as it is wisdom and essence, is that which the Father is; according as it is word, it is not that which the Father is, since the word is not father, and word is said relatively, just as son." Likewise in the same: "Just as son is referred to father, so also word [is referred] to him whose word it is, when it is called word. And on this account it is not [called] word by that [account] by which it is called wisdom; because word is not said with reference to itself, but only relatively to him whose word it is, just as son to father." "For He is son by that very [account] by which [He is] word, and He is word by that [account] by which [He is] son; but [He is] wisdom by that [account] by which [He is] essence, and therefore, since12 the Father and the Son are one essence and one wisdom." Likewise in the same13: "The Father is not Himself word, just as neither son nor image." "What however is more absurd than to say that an image [is] with reference to itself"? The same in the fifth [book]14: "Son is said relatively, word and image are also said relatively, and in all these vocabularies He is referred to the Father, but none of these is called father."

Epilogue.17

It has been openly shown that, just as son or begotten is said relatively to father, so [are] word and image; and that He is called word or image by that [account] by which [He is called] son, that is, by the same property or notion is He called word and image by which [He is called] son; but not by that [account] by which [He is] word, is He called wisdom or essence, since not by the notion by which He is called word, is He called wisdom. For wisdom is said according to essence, not according to relation.

Cap. IV. On the general rule of those things which are said with reference to self and of those which are said relatively.

And here a certain general rule must be observed concerning those things which are said with reference to self and those which are said relatively of the Father and the Son. "For whatever they are said [to be] with reference to self, as Augustine says in the sixth book On the Trinity15, the one is not said without the other — that is, whatever they are said [to be] which shows their substance, both are said together. Therefore neither is the Father God without the Son, nor the Son without the Father, but both together [are] God"; but they are not both together Father, nor both together Son or Word or Image.

Cap. V. Whether God of God, and the like, is said according to substance.

Here it is asked whether, when it is said: God of God, light of light, and the like, they are said according to substance. For according to relation it is established that these are not said. But if they are said according to substance, then both together, namely Father and Son, can be called God of God, light of light, according to the aforesaid rule. — To which we say, that although God is said according to substance and [so too] light and wisdom and the like, and they are never taken relatively; yet sometimes [they are taken] for relatives, that is, for persons, but not [taken] relatively — as when it is said: God begot God, where we put one [God] for the Father, the other for the Son; likewise, when it is said: God of God, light of light. In other locutions too, the names of the essence are often found drawn over to the signification of the persons, as when it is said: God born, God dead, God suffering, where the Son alone is signified. So also it is understood of the Son alone, when it is said: God of God, and the like. Whence Augustine, asking how such things are said, in the sixth book On the Trinity says16: "How is it said: God of God, light of light? For not are both together God of God, but only the Son of God, namely [of] the Father; nor both together light of light, but only the Son of the light [which is] the Father." And it must be known that according to the names of substance only is it said this of that, although there those names do not signify substance. But according to the same names of the persons, it is never said this of that, as Word of Word, or Son of Son, since names of this sort cannot belong to different persons. Which Augustine, although obscurely, in the same book says thus: "This alone cannot be said of them, this of that, [namely that] which both together are not": that is, by that name alone we cannot use [the formula] to show one of one, [a thing] which does not belong to both together; "as Word of Word cannot be said, since both together are not Word, nor Image of Image, nor Son of Son, since both together are not Son or Image." — And just as the names of substance sometimes give an understanding of the persons distinctly, so too sometimes [they give an understanding] of the whole Trinity together. Whence Augustine in the fifth book says: "In the name of Father the Father Himself is pronounced by Himself, but in the name of God both the Father Himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit [are pronounced], as when it is said: None is good but God alone, since the Trinity is one

---

Apparatus Criticus
  1. Dist. praeced. c. 3, et est XII. de Trinitate n. 23. — Codd. BE assignaverat pro assignavit. — Locus Augustini habetur ibid., et est V. de Trinitate c. 3. n. 6.
    Preceding distinction, c. 3; and it is in book XII of On the Trinity, n. 23. — Codices B, E [read] assignaverat in place of assignavit. — The Augustine passage is in the same place, and is in book V of On the Trinity, c. 3, n. 6.
  2. Sic maior pars codd. cum ed. 1; aliqui ut LPQ WZ si videt et; Vat. cum cod. cc et sic. — Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 8 videbitur.
    Thus the greater part of the codices with edition 1; some such as L, P, Q, W, Z [read] si videt et; the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] et sic. — The Vatican with editions 4, 6, 8 [reads] videbitur.
  3. Vat. addit haec. — De ipsa huius capitis quaestione cfr. Comment. hic p. I. q. I.
    The Vatican adds haec. — On the question itself of this chapter, cf. the Commentary here, Pars I, q. I.
  4. Vat. et omnes aliae edd. id est contra codd.
    The Vatican and all the other editions [read] id est, against the codices.
  5. Vat. et aliae edd., excepta 1, dicimus contra codd.
    The Vatican and the other editions, edition 1 excepted, [read] dicimus, against the codices.
  6. De Fide orthodoxa, III. c. 6. In nova versione legitur: «Quo fit, ut personae inter se non differant ratione essentiae, sed accidentium, quae quidem sunt propriae et certae notae quibus sigillatur hypostasis, non natura; hypostasis enim definitur essentia cum accidentibus» (ἅτινά εἰσι τὰ χαρακτηριστικὰ ἰδιώματα· χαρακτηριστικὰ δὲ ὑποστάσεως, καὶ οὐ φύσεως. Καὶ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὁρίζονται, οὐσίαν μετὰ συμβεβηκότων).
    On the Orthodox Faith, III, c. 6. In the new translation [the passage] reads: "Whence it comes about that the persons do not differ from one another by reason of essence, but [by reason] of accidents, which indeed are the proper and fixed marks by which a hypostasis is sealed, not [by which] a nature [is sealed]; for a hypostasis is defined as essence with accidents" (which are the characteristic idioms; and the characteristic [marks] are of a hypostasis and not of a nature; for they define the hypostasis as essence with accidents).
  7. Ibid. c. 7, paucis hic omissis; ceterum versio fere ad verbum originali respondet.
    Ibid., c. 7, with a few [words] omitted here; for the rest, the [Latin] translation corresponds almost word-for-word to the original.
  8. Ibid. c. 5. Antiqua versio fidelis est; aliqua tamen omittuntur: pro paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus legitur in originali τῇ ἀναιτίῳ καὶ πατρικῇ καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ υἱικῇ, καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ ἐκπορευτῇ ἐπιγινώσκομεν (versio in Patrolog. Migne: «quod unus sine causa sit et Pater, alter a causa et Filius, alter idem a causa et procedens esse positum agnoscimus»).
    Ibid., c. 5. The old [Latin] translation is faithful; nevertheless some things are omitted: in place of paternali et filiali et processibili recognoscimus ("we acknowledge as paternal and filial and processible"), the original reads τῇ ἀναιτίῳ καὶ πατρικῇ καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ υἱικῇ, καὶ τῇ αἰτιατῇ καὶ ἐκπορευτῇ ἐπιγινώσκομεν (the version in Migne's Patrologia: "we acknowledge it as set down that the one is uncaused and Father, the other from a cause and Son, and the other likewise from a cause and proceeding").
  9. Dist. XXVI. c. 2, et hic c. I.
    Distinction XXVI, c. 2, and here c. I.
  10. Cap. 7, n. 8. Sequens locus est ibid. c. 6, n. 7.
    Chapter 7, n. 8. The following passage is in the same place, c. 6, n. 7.
  11. Cap. 2, n. 3.
    Chapter 2, n. 3.
  12. Cap. 3, n. 4; et sequens textus est ibid. c. 2, n. 3, ex quo capitulo etiam sequens textus depromptus est. In secundo textu post tantum relative Vat. et plurimae edd. addunt dicitur; in tertio post ideo sola Vat. omittit quia.
    Chapter 3, n. 4; and the following passage is in the same place, c. 2, n. 3, the chapter from which also the next passage is drawn. In the second passage, after tantum relative, the Vatican and most editions add dicitur; in the third [passage], after ideo, the Vatican alone omits quia.
  13. Ibid. c. 1, n. 1. Ultima propositio est ibid. n. 2.
    Ibid., c. 1, n. 1. The last proposition is in the same place, n. 2.
  14. Cap. 13, n. 14; in quo textu Vat. cum cod. C et edd. 4, 5 omittit etiam ante dicitur verbum; in originali dicitur et verbum.
    Chapter 13, n. 14; in which text the Vatican with codex C and editions 4, 5 omits etiam before dicitur verbum; in the original [it reads] dicitur et verbum.
  15. Cap. 2, n. 3. In originali legitur: Ergo nec Deus est Pater sine Filio, nec Filius Deus sine Patre, sed ambo simul Deus.
    Chapter 2, n. 3. In the original [it] reads: Therefore neither is God Father without the Son, nor the Son God without the Father, but both together [are] God.
  16. Cap. 2, n. 3.
    Chapter 2, n. 3.
  17. Editorial note. In the printed Quaracchi (p. 465 col. b), the rubric Epilogus appears in the margin at Aperte ostensum est…, marking this paragraph as the epilogue of Pars II Cap. I. The chapter-numbering then jumps to Cap. IV at the head of p. 466, with no separately-numbered Cap. II or Cap. III in between; this reflects the Quaracchi editors' typesetting of Lombard's text and is not an OCR loss.
    Editorial note. In the printed Quaracchi (p. 465 col. b), the rubric Epilogue appears in the margin at Aperte ostensum est…, marking this paragraph as the epilogue of Pars II Cap. I. The chapter-numbering then jumps to Cap. IV at the head of p. 466, with no separately-numbered Cap. II or Cap. III in between; this reflects the Quaracchi editors' typesetting of Lombard's text and is not an OCR loss.
Dist. 27, Part 1, Divisio Textus→