Dist. 27, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 27
QUAESTIO III. Quae sit comparatio Verbi ad sapientiam sive notitiam.
Tertio quaeritur de comparatione Verbi ad sapientiam. Et cum Filius sit verbum et sapientia, quaeritur, quod istorum sit prius secundum rationem intelligendi. Et quod sapientia prior sit, videtur.
1. Augustinus, nono de Trinitate capitulo decimo1: «Verbum est cum amore notitia»: ergo verbum secundum rationem intelligendi addit supra notitiam; sed quod se habet per additionem ad aliquid, praesupponit illud: ergo etc.
2. Item, notitia dicit essentiale, sed verbum personale: ergo cum essentiale sit communius, et omne communius secundum rationem intelligendi sit prius2: ergo etc.
3. Item, verbum dicit respectum ad creaturas, sapientia autem dicit quid absolutum de ratione sui nominis: ergo cum absolutum secundum rationem intelligendi sit prius respectivo3, ergo et sapientia [prior] quam verbum.
Contra: 1. Ecclesiastici primo4: Fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis; fons dicit rationem principii: ergo verbum est principium sapientiae. Sed quod est principium, est prius secundum rationem intelligendi: necessario ergo verbum prius quam sapientia.
2. Item, «Verbum, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum5, dicit operativam potentiam»; sed potentia, sicut dicit Richardus, secundum rationem intelligendi prior est quam sapientia: ergo etc.
3. Item, verbum dicit similitudinem interius conceptam, sapientia dicit habitum vel habilitatem ad cognoscendum6; sed conceptio similitudinis et speciei praecedit ipsam habilitatem: ergo et verbum praecedit sapientiam in intelligendo.
Iuxta hoc quaeritur, cum Filius dicatur verbum et sapientia, propter quid sapientia solum est appropriatum, non proprium, verbum autem est proprium. — Et iterum, cum Filius sit filius et imago et verbum proprie, quaeritur, quae sit differentia istorum nominum. Si enim non est differentia nisi in voce, tunc videntur esse nomina synonyma.
CONCLUSIO. Secundum rationem intelligendi intellectus sapientiae et notitiae est prior intellectu verbi.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in intellectu verbi importantur istae conditiones, scilicet intelligentis cognitio, similitudinis conceptio et alicuius expressio. Et hoc patet, si consideremus generationem verbi secundum Anselmum in suo Monologio7, qui dicit sic: «Cum cogito notum hominem absentem, formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem imaginem eius, qualem illam per visum oculorum in memoriam attraxi; quae imago in cogitatione verbum est eiusdem hominis, quem cogitando dico.
Habet igitur mens rationalis, cum cogitando se intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui, ad sui similitudinem quasi sua impressione formatam; quae imago eius verbum est. Hoc itaque modo quis neget summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem, id est Verbum suum?» Verbum autem non est aliud quam similitudo expressa et expressiva, concepta vi spiritus intelligentis, secundum quod se vel aliud intuetur.
Unde patet, quod intellectus verbi praesupponit intellectum notitiae et generationis et imaginis: intellectum notitiae in intuitu spiritus intelligentis, intellectum generationis in conceptione interiori, intellectum imaginis in similitudine per omnia conformi, et superaddit his omnibus intellectum expressionis.
Quoniam igitur intuitus intelligentis non dicit respectum, ideo ipsa sapientia et notitia non dicit proprium. Sed quoniam conceptio et similitudo dicunt respectum, ideo necesse est, tam nomen filii quam imaginis, quam etiam verbi proprie dici.
Et rursus patet ordo in dicendo, et patet etiam differentis modi dicendi ratio. Nam sapientia vel notitia dicit primum in intelligendo: deinde filius, qui dicit ipsam emanationem sive conceptionem, deinde imago, quae dicit modum expressum emanandi, et tertio loco verbum, quod dicit haec omnia, et superaddit rationem exprimendi et manifestandi.
His visis, facile est ad obiecta respondere. Concedo enim, quod secundum rationem intelligendi intellectus notitiae et sapientiae est prior.
1. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Verbum est fons sapientiae; dicendum, quod istud intelligitur de sapientia creata.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod dicit potentiam operativam; dicendum, quod Verbum, etsi habeat omnipotentiam, sicut Pater, tamen ipsum Verbum non dicit potentiam operativam de ratione sui nominis, nisi in quantum illa potentia est operativa praevia dispositione; et quoniam dispositio est actus sapientiae, ideo sapientia prior in intelligendo est.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod similitudo est prior habilitate in intelligendo; dicendum, quod istud verum est in quibus est sapientia per acquisitionem, sicut in nobis; sed non sic in Deo, immo e converso, quia ex intuitu mentis summe sapientis oritur Verbum, quod dicitur esse summa sapientia, ita quod similitudo concepta non dat sapientiam concipienti, immo magis accipit. Quod ultimo quaeritur, iam determinatum est.
Praeter solutionem propositae quaestionis in resp., tum accurate indagatur ratio verbi, tum asseritur, quod Verbum proprie dicitur, tum differentia describitur inter quatuor nomina secundae personae. De nomine sapientia cfr. infra d. 27, dub. 4, d. 32, dub. 1–5. De nomine imago cfr. infra d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, 2, et dub. 2, 3, 4. — De ipsa quaestione: Alex. Hal., S. p. I, q. 62, m. I, a. 2. — S. Thom. quaestionem tangit S. p. I, q. 34, a. I, ad 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2, a. I, quaestiunc. 3. — Richard. a Med., hic, a. 2, q. I. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 38, q. 2, n. 11 seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.
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QUESTION III. What the comparison of the Word to wisdom or knowledge is.
Thirdly the question is raised concerning the comparison of the Word to wisdom. And since the Son is both Word and wisdom, the question is raised which of these is prior according to the account of understanding. And that wisdom is prior, [it] seems thus.
1. Augustine, in book nine of On the Trinity, chapter ten1: «A word is knowledge with love»: therefore the word, according to the account of understanding, adds something over knowledge; but that which stands by addition to something, presupposes it: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, knowledge bespeaks something essential, but the word [something] personal: therefore since the essential is more common, and everything more common is, according to the account of understanding, prior2: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the word bespeaks a relation to creatures, while wisdom bespeaks something absolute according to the account of its name: therefore since the absolute is, according to the account of understanding, prior to the relative3, therefore wisdom too [is prior] to the word.
On the contrary: 1. Ecclesiasticus chapter one4: The fountain of wisdom is the Word of God on high; fountain bespeaks the account of a principle: therefore the Word is the principle of wisdom. But that which is a principle is prior according to the account of understanding: therefore necessarily the Word is prior to wisdom.
2. Likewise, «the Word, as Augustine says in the book of Eighty-three Questions5, bespeaks operative power»; but power, as Richard says, is according to the account of understanding prior to wisdom: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the word bespeaks a likeness inwardly conceived, [while] wisdom bespeaks a habit or aptitude for knowing6; but the conception of a likeness and species precedes the aptitude itself: therefore the word too precedes wisdom in [the order of] understanding.
Alongside this it is asked, since the Son is called Word and wisdom, why wisdom alone is appropriated and not proper, while word is proper. — And again, since the Son is properly Son and image and word, it is asked what the difference among these names is. For if there is no difference except in the spoken sound, then they seem to be synonymous names.
CONCLUSION. According to the account of understanding the understanding of wisdom and knowledge is prior to the understanding of the word.
I respond: It must be said that in the understanding of word these conditions are imported, namely the cognition of the one understanding, the conception of a likeness, and the expression of something. And this is plain if we consider the generation of the word according to Anselm in his Monologion7, who speaks thus: «When I think of a known man who is absent, the gaze of my thought is formed into such an image of him as I drew into memory through the sight of the eyes; and this image in thought is the word of the same man whom in thinking I speak. The rational mind therefore has, when by thinking it understands itself, with itself an image of itself born of itself, that is, a thought of itself, formed to its own likeness as if by its own impress; and this image of itself is its word. In this way then who would deny that the highest wisdom, when by speaking [itself] it understands itself, begets a likeness consubstantial with itself, that is, its Word?» But the word is nothing other than a likeness expressed and expressive, conceived by the power of the understanding spirit, according as it gazes upon itself or upon another.
Whence it is plain that the understanding of word presupposes the understanding of knowledge and of generation and of image: the understanding of knowledge in the gaze of the understanding spirit, the understanding of generation in the inward conception, the understanding of image in a likeness conformed in all things, and it superadds to all these the understanding of expression.
Since therefore the gaze of the one understanding does not bespeak a relation, on this account wisdom and knowledge themselves do not bespeak something proper. But since conception and likeness do bespeak a relation, on this account it is necessary that the name of son, of image, and also of word be said properly.
And again the order in speaking [these names] is plain, and the account of the differing mode of speaking is also plain. For wisdom or knowledge bespeaks what is first in [the order of] understanding; then son, which bespeaks the very emanation or conception; then image, which bespeaks the expressed mode of emanating; and in the third place word, which bespeaks all these, and superadds the account of expressing and manifesting.
These things seen, it is easy to reply to the objections. For I concede that according to the account of understanding the understanding of knowledge and of wisdom is prior.
1. To that which is objected, that the Word is the fountain of wisdom; it must be said that this is understood of created wisdom.
2. To that which is objected, that [the word] bespeaks operative power; it must be said that the Word, although he have omnipotence, as the Father does, nevertheless the Word himself does not bespeak operative power according to the account of his name, except insofar as that power is operative by a previous disposition; and since disposition is the act of wisdom, therefore wisdom is prior in [the order of] understanding.
3. To that which is objected, that the likeness is prior to the aptitude in [the order of] understanding; it must be said that this is true in those in whom wisdom comes by acquisition, as in us; but it is not so in God, but rather conversely, since from the gaze of a most wise mind there arises the Word, who is said to be the highest wisdom, in such a way that the conceived likeness does not give wisdom to the one conceiving but rather receives [it]. As to what is asked last, it has already been determined.
Beyond the solution of the proposed question in the response, the account of word is accurately investigated, [next] it is asserted that Word is said properly, [and finally] the difference among the four names of the second person is described. On the name wisdom see below d. 27, dub. 4, d. 32, dub. 1–5. On the name image see below d. 31, p. II, a. 1, q. 1, 2, and dub. 2, 3, 4. — On the question itself: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. I, q. 62, m. I, a. 2. — St. Thomas touches the question at Summa p. I, q. 34, a. I, ad 2. — Petrus a Tarantasia, here q. 2, a. I, quaestiuncula 3. — Richard of Mediavilla, here, a. 2, q. I. — Henry of Ghent, Summa a. 38, q. 2, n. 11 ff. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.
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- Num. 15. — Aliqui codd. cum Vat. paulo superius prius pro prior, et paulo inferius aliud pro aliquid.N. 15. — Some codices with the Vatican [edition] [read], a little above, prius in place of prior, and a little below aliud in place of aliquid.
- Sub hoc respectu Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 3 (c. 4.) ait: Haec (genus et differentiae) autem simpliciter notiora et priora sunt specie; interimit enim genus et differentia speciem, quare priora haec specie. Sunt autem notiora; nam specie quidem nota, necesse est genus et differentias cognosci; qui hominem enim cognoscit, et animal gressibile cognoscit; at genere et differentia notis, non necesse est et speciem cognosci; quare ignotior species. — Paulo ante pro omne, quod ex mss. B O P Q reposuimus, Vat. esse.Under this respect Aristotle, VI Topics c. 3 (c. 4), says: These (genus and differences) however are simply more known and prior to the species; for the genus and difference do away with the species, on which account these are prior to the species. And they are more known; for when the species is known, it is necessary that the genus and differences be known; for whoever knows man, also knows walking animal; but when the genus and difference are known, it is not necessary that the species also be known; on which account the species is the less known. — A little before, in place of omne, which we have restored from MSS. B O P Q, the Vatican [edition] [reads] esse.
- Vide supra pag. 487, nota 5.See above p. 487, n. 5.
- Vers. 5.Verse 5.
- Quaest. 63. — Richardi, qui mox citatur, verba sunt haec: Constat ergo, quod superius dictum iam est, quia potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi nulla potest esse sapientia [v. g. in rebus inanimatis et brutis]; e contra autem, ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest. Nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat itaque esse posse non sapientia potentiae, sed potentia sapientiae (VI. de Trin. c. 15.).Quaestio 63. — The words of Richard, who is cited just below, are these: It is established therefore, as has already been said above, that there can be a manifold power where there can be no wisdom [for example in inanimate things and brutes]; but on the contrary, where there is no power, no wisdom can be present. For to be able to be wise is, without doubt, to be able to do something. So it is not the wisdom of power that grants the being able [to be wise], but the power of wisdom (VI On the Trinity c. 15).
- Cfr. Aristot., VI. Ethic. c. 3, ubi quinque intellectuales habitus, scil. ars, scientia, prudentia, sapientia, intellectus afferuntur; et c. 7, ubi sapientia fusius explicatur. — Mox pro speciei in Vat. et cod. cc habetur specierum.Cf. Aristotle, VI Ethics c. 3, where the five intellectual habits, namely art, science, prudence, wisdom, [and] understanding, are brought forward; and c. 7, where wisdom is more fully explained. — Just below, in place of speciei, the Vatican [edition] and cod. cc have specierum.
- Cap. 33. — Mox Vat. afferens textum Anselmi, paucis tantum codd. suffragantibus, formal acies cognitionis in se talem pro formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem. Verba in se loco nostrae lectionis meae in non paucis mss. et in ed. 1 exstant, sed falso; nostrae lectioni suffragatur cod. [?] cum originali.Chapter 33. — Just below, the Vatican [edition], in giving the text of Anselm, with only a few codices in support, [reads] formal acies cognitionis in se talem in place of formatur acies cogitationis meae in talem. The words in se, in place of our reading meae in, are present in not a few manuscripts and in ed. 1, but falsely; our reading is supported by cod. [?] together with the original.