Dist. 28, Dubia
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 28
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.
DUB. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo de hoc quod dicit Augustinus, quod, si Filium non genuisset, nihil prohiberet eum dicere ingenitum. Videtur enim secundum hoc, quod accidat personae Ingeniti1 generare et ita esse patrem. — Item, ex hoc videtur sequi, quod remota paternitate, adhuc remaneat persona Patris; et ita paternitas non est proprietas personalis.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de intentione huius nominis ingenitus et pater vel simpliciter, vel prout ponuntur in persona divina. Si loquamur simpliciter, sic diversae sunt intentiones, et una praeter aliam est intelligibilis et separabilis secundum rem2, sicut patet in generatione hominum.
Alio modo est loqui de his, prout ponuntur circa personam divinam, et sic dicunt aliam et aliam rationem innotescendi; et illae duae secundum rem omnino sunt inseparabiles, tamen secundum intellectum una potest accipi praeter alteram. Et sic loquitur Augustinus, non quod re separari possint, sed quantum ad intelligere3 nostrum.
Sed quod possit intelligi aliquid praeter alterum, hoc potest esse multipliciter: aut quantum ad intellectum apprehendentem, aut quantum ad intellectum resolventem. Si primo modo, sic non potest intelligi aliquid sine aliquo, quod est ei ratio intelligendi, sicut Deus praeter deitatem et homo praeter humanitatem; potest tamen intelligi effectus, non intellecta causa, et inferius, non intellecto superiori, quia potest quis apprehendere hominem, non intellecto aliquo superiorum. Et sic dicit Philosophus4, quod qui unum dicit, quodam modo multa dicit, non simpliciter, sed quodam modo, quia implicite.
Alio modo contingit aliquid intelligere praeter alterum, intellectu resolvente; et iste intellectus considerat ea quae sunt rei essentialia, sicut potest intelligi subiectum sine propria passione. Et hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte, aut intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene5. Intellectu resolvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellecto primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo ente non intellecto.
Secundum hunc triplicem intellectum de comparatione Patris et Ingeniti contingit loqui tripliciter. Si enim loquamur de intellectu apprehendente, possibile est haec duo6 intelligi, altero non apprehenso, eo quod aliud est significatum unius, aliud alterius. Si loquamur de intellectu resolvente, adhuc si semiplene resolvat7, accipiendo intellectum huius nominis ingenitus solum privative, sicut accipiunt gentiles; sic potest intelligi unum sine altero. Si loquamur de intellectu plene resolvente, cum ingenitus, secundum quod est proprietas Patris, non dicatur solum privative, immo ponat respectum positivum, de necessitate ponit paternitatem. Et sic verum est, quod, dicendo aliquid8 esse ingenitum, necessario ponitur esse pater, cum ponatur plenitudo fontalis per ipsum tantum.
Quando ergo dicit Augustinus, quod non ideo dicitur pater, quia ingenitus, ipse loquitur de intellectu apprehendente, quia unum non est propria ratio et prima intelligendi alterum, immo utrumque, scilicet ingenitus et pater, dicunt aliam rationem innotescendi; tamen secundum plenam9 resolutionem una ponit aliam necessario. Unde distinctio personae Patris quasi inchoatur in innascibilitate et consummatur in paternitate; et ideo, non intellecta paternitate, non potest intelligi persona illa complete distincta. Et ideo paternitas est notio personalis, quamvis in ratione intelligendi prius cadat innascibilitas10.
DUB. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Negativa porro particula non id efficit, ut quod sine illa etc. Videtur enim falsum, quia homo dicitur secundum substantiam, tamen albedo potest dici non-homo: ergo, quia homo et non-homo contradictorie opponuntur, et de quolibet affirmatio vel negatio11: ergo albedo est non-homo, et albedo est qualitas, ergo etc. Si tu dicas, quod Augustinus loquitur, secundum quod facit negationem in genere12; tunc obiicitur de hoc quod est non-substantia; constat, quod non potest facere negationem in genere: ergo, cum non-substantia non dicatur nisi de aliis generibus, patet etc.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod modus dicendi secundum substantiam circa terminum negatum13 sive infinitum dupliciter est accipere: aut quantum ad significatum, aut quantum ad suppositum. Si quantum ad significatum, quia terminus negatus trahit significationem ab affirmato, idem est modus dicendi quantum ad significationem in termino negato et affirmato. Unde sicut homo dicitur secundum substantiam quantum ad significationem, ita et non-homo. Quando enim dico: hic est homo, substantiam praedico; quando dico: hic est non-homo, substantiam removeo. Si autem loquamur quantum ad suppositum, tunc pro alio supponit terminus negatus et affirmatus. Sic opponit, et sic non intelligit Augustinus14.
DUB. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod non-genitus refertur ad non-genitorem. Videtur enim dicere falsum, quia omnis relatio ponit duo extrema: ergo si non-genitus refertur ad non-genitorem, necesse est, ad hoc quod aliquis sit ingenitus, quod sint duo, quorum unus sit non-genitus, alter non-genitor15. Contra: esto per impossibile, quod nullus esset nisi unus solus, ille utique esset non-genitor.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod referri ad aliquem hoc potest esse dupliciter: aut secundum rationem existendi, aut secundum rationem intelligendi; secundum rationem existendi, quando importatur habitudo realis; secundum rationem intelligendi, quando privatur habitudo realis. Ad hoc enim, quod intelligatur privatio habitudinis, necesse est intelligere habitudinem; et ad hoc, quod habitudo intelligatur, necesse est intelligi duo extrema ut affirmata; et ita ad hoc, ut intelligatur privatio habitudinis sive relationis, necesse est intelligi duo extrema negata. Et quantum ad hoc dicit Augustinus, non-genitum referri ad non-genitorem, quia non potest capi intellectus eius nisi per intellectum illius; et ita quantum ad rationem dicendi dicitur secundum relationem, sicut non-homo dicitur secundum substantiam.
DUB. IV.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod, cum dicitur nata sapientia, sapientia essentiam significat. Ergo secundum hoc licebit loco sapientiae ponere essentiam, cum faciat eius intellectum; quod falsum est.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de nomine sapientiae quantum ad significatum, vel quantum ad suppositum. Quantum ad significatum dicit essentiam, sed tamen supponit personam; et ita adiectivum respicit ipsum ratione suppositi, cum dicitur sapientia nata, non ratione significati. Nec sequitur propter hoc, quod loco sapientiae poni possit essentia, quia cum sapientia sit de nominibus mediis, potest supponere pro persona et trahi ad suppositum; sed essentia, cum sit nomen abstractissimum, non16.
DUB. V.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod imago aliquando intelligentiam essentiae facit, et tunc ad se dicitur. Videtur enim falsum, quia imago semper connotat imaginatum; sed non potest esse idem imago et imaginatum: ergo semper dicitur relative.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod imago semper dicit respectum vel ad creatum, vel ad increatum; et quando dicit respectum ad increatum, dicitur personaliter et relative secundum rem; quando autem respectum creaturae, essentialiter dicitur et ad se, non quantum ad modum dicendi, sed quia toti Trinitati convenit17.
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DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.
Doubt I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the littera, and first concerning what Augustine says: that, if [the Father] had not begotten the Son, nothing would have prevented him from being called unbegotten. For according to this it seems that it would befall the person of the Unbegotten1 to beget and so to be Father. — Likewise, from this it seems to follow that, paternity having been removed, the person of the Father would still remain; and so paternity is not a personal property.
I respond: It must be said that one can speak of the meaning of the names unbegotten and father either simply, or insofar as they are placed in [reference to] a divine person. If we speak simply, then the meanings are diverse, and the one apart from the other is intelligible and separable in reality2, as is plain in the generation of human beings.
In another way one can speak of these [names] insofar as they are placed concerning a divine person, and so they state different and different accounts of being made known; and those two are altogether inseparable in reality, yet according to the intellect one can be taken apart from the other. And so Augustine speaks, not [in the sense] that they could be separated in reality, but with regard to our manner of understanding3.
But that something can be understood apart from another can occur in many ways: either with regard to the apprehensive intellect, or with regard to the resolving intellect. If in the first way, then something cannot be understood without [that which] is its ground of being understood, as God [cannot be understood] apart from deity, and man apart from humanity; yet an effect can be understood without the cause being understood, and an inferior without the superior being understood, because someone can apprehend a man without understanding any of the superiors. And thus the Philosopher says4 that he who says one [thing] in some way says many — not simply, but in some way, because implicitly.
In another way it happens that something is understood apart from another, by the resolving intellect; and this intellect considers the things which are essential to the thing, just as a subject can be understood without [understanding] its proper attribute. And this can be in two ways: either by an intellect resolving fully and perfectly, or by an intellect deficient and resolving half-fully5. By an intellect resolving half-fully, something can be understood to be, the first being not [yet] understood. But by an intellect resolving perfectly, something cannot be understood without the first being having been understood.
According to this threefold understanding it happens to speak in three ways concerning the comparison of the Father and the Unbegotten. For if we speak of the apprehensive intellect, it is possible for these two6 [names] to be understood with the other not having been apprehended, because the [thing] signified by the one is one [thing] and that of the other is another. If we speak of the resolving intellect, still, if it resolves half-fully7, taking the meaning of this name unbegotten only privatively, as the gentiles take it, in this way one can be understood without the other. If we speak of the fully resolving intellect, then since unbegotten, insofar as it is a property of the Father, is not said only privatively, but rather posits a positive relation, it of necessity posits paternity. And so it is true that, in saying that something8 is unbegotten, it is necessarily posited to be father, since fontal fullness is posited through him alone.
When therefore Augustine says that [the Father] is not for that reason called father because [he is] unbegotten, he is speaking of the apprehensive intellect, because the one is not the proper and primary ground for understanding the other; rather, both — namely, unbegotten and father — state different accounts of being made known; yet according to a full9 resolution the one of necessity posits the other. Whence the distinction of the person of the Father is, as it were, begun in unbegottenness and consummated in paternity; and therefore, paternity not being understood, that person cannot be understood as completely distinct. And therefore paternity is a personal notion, although in the order of understanding unbegottenness10 falls first.
Doubt II.
Likewise it is asked about what he says: Furthermore, the negative particle does not effect this, that what without it etc. For it seems false, because man is said with regard to substance, yet whiteness can be called not-man: therefore, since man and not-man are contradictorily opposed, and of any [given thing] there is [either] affirmation or negation11: therefore whiteness is not-man, and whiteness is a quality, therefore etc. If you say that Augustine is speaking insofar as he makes a negation within a genus12, then it is objected concerning that which is not-substance; it is plain that it cannot make a negation within a genus: therefore, since not-substance is said only of other genera, it is plain etc.
I respond: It must be said that the manner of speaking with regard to substance concerning a negated13 or infinite term is to be taken in two ways: either with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. If with regard to the [thing] signified, then because a negated term draws its signification from the affirmed [term], the manner of speaking with regard to signification is the same in the negated term and the affirmed [term]. Hence just as man is said with regard to substance as far as signification, so also not-man. For when I say: this is a man, I predicate substance; when I say: this is a not-man, I remove substance. But if we speak with regard to the supposit, then the negated and affirmed terms supposit for different [things]. So [the term] is opposed [to its contradictory], and so Augustine14 does not [intend it differently].
Doubt III.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that not-begotten is referred to not-begetter. For it seems to say what is false, because every relation posits two extremes: therefore if not-begotten is referred to not-begetter, it is necessary, in order that someone be unbegotten, that there be two, of whom one is not-begotten and the other not-begetter15. On the contrary: suppose by the impossible that there were no one but one alone, he would certainly still be not-begetter.
I respond: It must be said that to be referred to someone can be in two ways: either according to the account of existing, or according to the account of understanding; according to the account of existing, when a real relation is imported; according to the account of understanding, when a real relation is denied. For in order that the privation of a relation be understood, it is necessary to understand the relation; and in order that the relation be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as affirmed; and so in order that the privation of a relation or relationship be understood, it is necessary that the two extremes be understood as negated. And as far as this Augustine says that not-begotten is referred to not-begetter, because the understanding of the one cannot be grasped except through the understanding of the other; and so as far as the manner of speaking it is said according to relation, just as not-man is said according to substance.
Doubt IV.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that, when it is said born wisdom, wisdom signifies the essence. Therefore according to this it will be permitted to put essence in place of wisdom, since [wisdom] makes the understanding of [the essence] — which is false.
I respond: It must be said that one can speak of the name wisdom with regard to the [thing] signified, or with regard to the supposit. With regard to the [thing] signified it states the essence, but yet it supposits for the person; and so the adjective regards [the wisdom] by reason of the supposit, when it is said born wisdom — not by reason of the [thing] signified. Nor does it follow on this account that essence can be put in place of wisdom, because, since wisdom is among the middle names, it can supposit for the person and be drawn to the supposit; but essence, since it is a most abstract name, [can]not16.
Doubt V.
Likewise it is asked about what he says, that image sometimes makes [us] understand the essence, and then it is said as toward itself. For it seems false, because image always connotes [that] of which [it is] the image; but the image and that of which it is the image cannot be the same: therefore it is always said relatively.
I respond: It must be said that image always states a relation either to a created [thing] or to an uncreated [thing]; and when it states a relation to an uncreated [thing], it is said personally and relatively in reality; but when [it states] a relation to a creature, it is said essentially and as toward itself — not with regard to the manner of speaking, but because it belongs to the whole Trinity17.
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- Vat. ingenitae.The Vatican edition [reads] ingenitae.
- Fere omnes codd. cum sex primis edd. rationem pro rem; sed perperam, ut ex subnexis patet. Cfr. supra q. 2. fundam. 2.Nearly all the codices, together with the first six editions, [read] rationem in place of rem; but wrongly, as is plain from what follows. Cf. above q. 2, fundamentum 2.
- Ita codd. A C F G H R S T U Y ee fi cum ed. 1; Vat. cum paucis codd. intellectum.Thus codices A, C, F, G, H, R, S, T, U, Y, ee, fi, with edition 1; the Vatican edition with a few codices [reads] intellectum.
- Libr. I. Phys. text. 21. (c. 2.). — Proxime superius pro Et sic plures codd. et edd. et sicut, Vat. sicut, et codd. P Q S V W superiori pro aliquo superiorum.Book I, Physics, text 21 (c. 2). — Just before, in place of Et sic very many codices and editions [read] et sicut, the Vatican edition [reads] sicut, and codices P, Q, S, V, W [read] superiori in place of aliquo superiorum.
- Sic cod. (cod. L in marg.); ceteri codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt et perfecte, et dein et resolvente semiplene. Idem facit Vat., quae tamen interiicit post intellectu verba semipleno et. Paulo superius post essentialia Vat. cum cod. cc sic pro sicut. Paulo inferius verbo resolvente antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 praemittunt particulam autem. Dein post non intellecto primo ente codd. S T addunt esse, quod verbum, scil. esse, ed. 1 paulo post voci aliquid adiungit. — Notamus, quod haec divisio intellectus habetur etiam in S. Doctoris Itinerario mentis in Deum, c. 3. et 5.Thus a codex (codex L in the margin); the other codices with editions 1, 2, 3 omit et perfecte, and then et resolvente semiplene. The Vatican edition does the same, although it inserts after intellectu the words semipleno et. A little above, after essentialia, the Vatican edition with codex cc [reads] sic in place of sicut. A little below, the older codices with edition 1 prefix the particle autem to the word resolvente. Then after non intellecto primo ente codices S and T add esse, which word, namely esse, edition 1 attaches a little later to the word aliquid. — We note that this division of the intellect is also found in the Holy Doctor's Itinerarium mentis in Deum, c. 3 and 5.
- Sola Vat. unum istorum pro haec duo.The Vatican edition alone [reads] unum istorum in place of haec duo.
- Vat., refragantibus mss. et ed. 1, omissa vocula si, pro resolvat habet resolvit.The Vatican edition, the manuscripts and edition 1 dissenting, with the little word si omitted, has resolvit in place of resolvat.
- Pro dicendo aliquid, quod auctoritate codd. I dd posuimus, sola Vat. ad; maior pars codd. cum ed. 1 incongrue dicit aliquid; verius cod. R quando dicit aliquid, et cod. T cum dicit aliquid; codd. V Y solummodo aliquid; demum codd. L dicit secundum quod ad. Mox pro fontalis multi codd. ut F G I K P Q T Y Z etc. cum ed. 1 fontalitatis, et subinde pro tantum codd. P Q terminum.In place of dicendo aliquid, which we have placed on the authority of codices I and dd, the Vatican edition alone [has] ad; the greater part of the codices with edition 1 incongruously [read] dicit aliquid; more truly codex R [reads] quando dicit aliquid, and codex T cum dicit aliquid; codices V and Y [read] only aliquid; finally codices L [read] dicit secundum quod ad. Soon, in place of fontalis, many codices such as F, G, I, K, P, Q, T, Y, Z, etc., with edition 1, [read] fontalitatis, and thereafter in place of tantum codices P and Q [read] terminum.
- Verbum plenam in antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 omittitur.The word plenam is omitted in the older codices and edition 1.
- Plura de hoc invenies in tribus primis quaest. huius dist., et d. 27. p. 1. q. 2. ad 1. et 3.You will find more on this in the first three questions of this distinction, and in d. 27, p. 1, q. 2, ad 1 and 3.
- Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 13. (III. c. 4.).Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 13 (III, c. 4).
- Cfr. hic q. 1. in corp.Cf. here q. 1 in the body.
- Aliqui codd., in quibus cod. T, cum ed. 1 negativum.Some codices, among which is codex T, with edition 1 [read] negativum.
- Cfr. supra pag. 496, nota 3.Cf. above p. 496, note 3.
- Huius dubii solutionem invenis etiam apud B. Albertum, [hic]. — Ed. 1 quod. Paulo inferius codd. S V W aa ingenitum pro genitum.You will find the solution of this doubt also in B. Albert, [here]. — Edition 1 [reads] quod. A little below, codices S, V, W, aa [read] ingenitum in place of genitum.
- Cfr. supra d. 8. a. 1. q. 1. in corp., ubi triplex genus nominum significantium essentiam proponitur, scil. quae significant ipsam in concretione, in omnimoda abstractione et medio modo.Cf. above d. 8, a. 1, q. 1, in the body, where a threefold genus of names signifying the essence is proposed, namely those which signify it in concretion, in every-way abstraction, and in the middle mode.
- Fusius hoc exponitur infra d. 31. a. 1. q. 1. in corp. — Paulo ante pro respectum creaturae multi codd. ut P G H I K S T Y etc. cum ed. 1 respectu creaturae; lectio incongrua.This is more fully expounded below in d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, in the body. — A little before, in place of respectum creaturae many codices such as P, G, H, I, K, S, T, Y, etc., with edition 1, [read] respectu creaturae; an incongruous reading.