Dist. 28
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 28
DISTINCTIO XXVIII.
Cap. I. [Conclusio capituli praecedentis: ingenitus relative dicitur et de solo Patre.]
...et ingenitus, non tamen indicat diversam substantiam, quia sicut filius ad patrem, et non-filius ad non-patrem refertur, ita genitus ad genitorem, et non-genitus ad non-genitorem referatur necesse est1». Ecce evidenter ostendit, quod ingenitus relative dicitur et de solo Patre accipitur, aliaque notio est, qua dicitur ingenitus, alia, qua pater. Atque tantum valet, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum non-genitus vel non-filius.
Cap. II. An solus Pater debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, sicut dicitur ingenitus.
Ideo solet quaeri: utrum, sicut solus Pater dicitur ingenitus, ita ipse solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius, ut nec etiam Spiritus sanctus possit dici non-filius vel non-genitus. Quibusdam videtur, quod Pater solus debeat dici non-genitus vel non-filius; Spiritus vero sanctus, sicut non dicitur ingenitus, ita, inquiunt, non est dicendus non-genitus vel non-filius. Debet quidem dici et credi Spiritus sanctus non esse genitus, vel non esse filius, sed non debet dici esse non-genitus vel non-filius. — Aliis autem videtur, quod cum Spiritus sanctus non possit dici ingenitus, potest tamen dici non-genitus vel non-filius. Quod vero Augustinus supra ait, tantum valere, cum dicitur ingenitus, quantum, cum dicitur non-genitus vel non-filius, etymologiam nominis ostendendo eum hoc dicunt, non ratione praedicationis.
Cap. III. De proprietate, quam notat ingenitus.
Si autem vis scire, quae sit proprietas, secundum quam Pater dicitur ingenitus, audi Hilarium ipsam vocantem innascibilitatem, in quarto libro de Trinitate ita aientem: «Est unus ab uno, scilicet ab Ingenito Genitus, proprietate videlicet in unoquoque et innascibilitatis et originis. Significata ergo in Scripturis personarum intelligentia, et distincto innascibilitatis nativitatisque sensu, solitarius Deus non est opinandus. Discretio ergo vel distinctio personarum in Scripturis posita est, in nullo autem naturae distinctio2».
Cap. IV. Responsio Ambrosii contra Arianos de Ingenito.
Illud etiam taceri non oportet, quod Ariani ex eo probare nitebantur, alterius substantiae esse Patrem, alterius Filium, quia ille ingenitus, et iste genitus dicitur, cum diversum sit esse ingenitum, et esse genitum. Unde Ambrosius eorum quaestioni respondens dicit, se in divinis Scripturis hoc nomen, scilicet ingenitus, non legisse, ita inquiens in libro de Incarnationis dominicae sacramento3: «Cum dudum audierint quidam, dicentibus nobis, Filium Dei, qui generatus est, Patri, qui generavit, inaequalem esse non posse, quamvis ille generatus sit, iste generaverit, quia generatio non potestatis, sed est naturae; adversus quidem illam quaestionem vocem sibi arbitrantur occlusam, sed tergiversatione damnabili in eodem loco vestigium vertunt, ut putent, mutationem fieri quaestionis mutatione sermonis, dicentes: Quomodo possunt ingenitus et genitus esse unius naturae atque substantiae? Ergo ut respondeam mihi propositae quaestioni, primo omnium in divinis Scripturis ingenitum nusquam invenio, non legi, non audivi. Cuius ergo mutabilitatis sunt homines huiusmodi, ut nos dicant ea usurpare, quae non sunt scripta, cum ea quae sunt scripta dicamus, et ipsi obiiciant quod scriptum non sit? Nonne ipsi sibi adversantur et auctoritatem calumniae suae derogant»? Attende, lector, quoniam hoc nomine ingenitus nolebat uti Ambrosius propter haereticos. Ita et nos subticere quaedam oportet propter calumniantium insidias, quae catholicis ac piis lectoribus secure credi possunt. Sunt etenim quaedam, quae non tantae sunt religionis et auctoritatis, ut eis nos oporteat semper confitendo ac recipiendo inservire, verum silentio praeteriri queunt aliquando; nec illius tamen sunt perversitatis, quin, cum opportunum fuerit, eis uti liberum habeamus4.
Cap. V. An diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium.
Praeterea quaeri solet, cum supra5 dictum sit, quod aliud est dicere ingenitum, aliud patrem, et quod diversum sit genitus et ingenitus, utrum similiter diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium, an idem. Responsio. — Ad quod dicimus, quia ex eodem sensu, quo dicitur diversum genitus et ingenitus, et quo dicitur, non esse idem dicere genitum et ingenitum, potest dici, non esse idem, sed diversum esse patrem et esse filium, vel esse spiritum sanctum, quia non ea notione Pater est pater, qua Filius est filius, vel qua Spiritus sanctus est spiritus sanctus. Ideoque ex hoc sensu concedimus, quod aliud est esse patrem, et aliud est esse filium, quia alia notio est, qua Pater est pater, alia, qua Filius est filius. Sed si transponas, ut6 dicas, aliud est patrem esse, aliud filium esse, variatur intelligentia et ideo non conceditur. Est enim sensus talis, ac si dicatur, aliud est, quo Pater est, non quidem pater, sed est; aliud, quo Filius est, non quidem filius, sed est; quod penitus falsum est. Eo enim Pater est, quo
Pater Deus est, id est per essentiam vel naturam; Filius eo Deus est, quo Pater est Deus: eo igitur Filius est, quo Pater est, et ita idem est Patrem esse et7 Filium esse; sed non est idem esse patrem et esse filium. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate8 ait: «Quamvis diversum sit esse patrem et esse filium, non est tamen diversa substantia, quia non hoc secundum substantiam dicitur, sed secundum relativum; quod tamen relativum non est accidens, quia non est mutabile». Ecce diversum esse dicit esse patrem et esse filium; quod iuxta rationem praedictam accipi oportet, quia scilicet alia notio est, qua est pater, alia, qua est filius. Non enim secundum essentiam Pater dicitur pater, vel Filius filius, sed secundum relationem.
Cap. VI. In sapientia genita dicitur secundum relationem, vel secundum substantiam.
Sciendum quoque est, quod sicut solus Filius dicitur verbum vel imago, ita etiam ipse solus dicitur sapientia nata vel genita. Et ideo quaeritur, utrum hoc relative dicatur, et si relative dicitur, an secundum eandem relationem, qua dicitur verbum et imago. De hoc Augustinus in septimo libro de Trinitate ita ait: «Id dici accipiamus, cum dicitur verbum, ac si diceretur nata sapientia, ut sit et Filius et Imago; et haec duo cum dicuntur, id est nata sapientia, in uno eorum, eo quod est nata, et Verbum et Imago et Filius intelligatur — et in his omnibus nominibus non ostendatur essentia, quia relative dicuntur — at in altero, quod est sapientia, etiam essentia demonstretur, quoniam et ad se dicitur. Se ipsa enim sapiens est, et hoc est eius esse quod sapere; unde Pater et Filius simul una sapientia, quia una essentia». — Cave, lector, qualiter hoc intelligas, quod hic dicit Augustinus. Videtur enim dicere, quod cum dicitur nata sapientia, ibi sapientia essentiam significet, et nata relationem notet. Quod si ita est, cogimur dicere, essentiam divinam esse natam; quod superioribus repugnat. — Sed ad hoc dicimus, quod nata in altero, id est in eo quod nata est, eadem notio intelligitur9, quae notatur cum dicitur verbum et imago. In altero vero, scilicet sapientia, demonstratur essentia, id est, demonstratur, quod Filius sit essentia, quia sapientia secundum essentiam dicitur. Et ideo cum dicitur nata sapientia, intelligitur, quod ipse, quia natus est, essentia est. Ibi tamen sapientia non pro essentia, sed pro hypostasi facit intelligentiam, ut, sicut quando dicitur verbum vel filius, intelligitur hypostasis cum sua proprietate, ita, cum dicitur nata sapientia, idem intelligatur10, id est genita hypostasis. Ideo vigilanter ait, idem esse intelligendum, cum dicitur verbum, et cum dicitur nata sapientia, id est eadem relatio eademque hypostasis, cui inest illa proprietas. Et ex hoc adiuvatur illud quod supra11 diximus, scilicet quod cum dicitur Pater vel Filius vel Spiritus sanctus, non tantum illae proprietates significantur, ut cum dicitur paternitas, filiatio, sed etiam hypostases cum suis proprietatibus.
Cap. VII. De imagine.
Illud etiam sciri oportet, quia cum supra12 dictum sit, imaginem relative dici de Filio, sicut verbum vel filius, interdum tamen reperitur secundum substantiam dici. Unde Augustinus in libro de Fide ad Petrum13 dicit, quod una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter divinitas et imago, ad quam factus est homo. Hilarius etiam in quinto libro de Trinitate14 sic ait: «Homo fit ad communem imaginem. Nomen non discrepat, natura non differt. Una est enim ad quam homo creatus est species». Ex his verbis ostenditur, quod imago aliquando essentiae intelligentiam facit, et tunc ad se dicitur et non relative.
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DISTINCTION XXVIII.
Cap. I. [Conclusion of the preceding chapter: "unbegotten" is said relatively and of the Father alone.]
"...and unbegotten, yet it does not indicate a different substance, because just as son is referred to father, and non-son to non-father, so it is necessary that begotten be referred to begetter, and non-begotten to non-begetter1." Behold, he plainly shows that unbegotten is said relatively and is taken of the Father alone, and that the notion by which He is called unbegotten is one thing, and the notion by which [He is called] Father is another. And it has the same force, when unbegotten is said, as non-begotten or non-Son.
Cap. II. Whether the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-Son, just as He is called unbegotten.
Therefore it is wont to be asked: whether, just as the Father alone is called unbegotten, so He alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-Son, so that not even the Holy Spirit may be called non-Son or non-begotten. To some it seems that the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten or non-Son; but the Holy Spirit, just as He is not called unbegotten, so, they say, He is not to be called non-begotten or non-Son. The Holy Spirit must indeed be said and believed not to be begotten, or not to be Son, but He must not be said to be non-begotten or non-Son. — But to others it seems that, although the Holy Spirit cannot be called unbegotten, He can nevertheless be called non-begotten or non-Son. As to what Augustine says above, that it has the same force when unbegotten is said as when non-begotten or non-Son [is said], they say this by showing the etymology of the name, not on the ground of predication.
Cap. III. On the property which "unbegotten" denotes.
But if you wish to know what is the property according to which the Father is called unbegotten, hear Hilary calling it itself innascibility, in the fourth book On the Trinity speaking thus: "There is One from One, namely the Begotten from the Unbegotten, by a property, that is, in each one, both of innascibility and of origin. The understanding of the persons therefore having been signified in the Scriptures, and the sense of innascibility and of nativity having been distinguished, God is not to be thought of as solitary. The discretion therefore or distinction of the persons is set down in the Scriptures, but in no [way] a distinction of nature2."
Cap. IV. Ambrose's reply against the Arians concerning the Unbegotten.
This too must not be passed over in silence: that the Arians strove to prove from this that the Father is of one substance and the Son of another, because the one is called unbegotten and the other begotten, since to be unbegotten and to be begotten are different. Whence Ambrose, replying to their question, says that he has not read this name, namely unbegotten, in the divine Scriptures, speaking thus in the book On the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation3: "When some had recently heard, when we said that the Son of God who has been begotten cannot be unequal to the Father who has begotten, although the one was begotten and the other has begotten, because generation is not of power but of nature; against that question they think their voice has been silenced, but by a damnable evasion they twist their footing in the same place, supposing that a change of question can be effected by a change of words, saying: How can unbegotten and begotten be of one nature and substance? Therefore that I may answer the question put to me, first of all in the divine Scriptures I nowhere find unbegotten; I have not read it, I have not heard it. Of what mutability then are men of this sort, that they should say that we usurp things which are not written, when we say things which are written, and they themselves object what is not written? Do they not contradict themselves and undermine the authority of their own calumny?" Mark, reader, that Ambrose did not wish to use this name unbegotten on account of the heretics. So we too ought to keep silence about certain things on account of the snares of slanderers, [things] which can be safely believed by Catholic and pious readers. For there are certain matters which are not of such [weight of] religion and authority that we are bound always to confess and accept and serve them, but they can sometimes be passed over in silence; nor are they of such perversity that, when occasion requires, we may not have liberty to use them4.
Cap. V. Whether to be Father and to be Son differ.
Furthermore, it is wont to be asked, since it has been said above5 that to say "unbegotten" is one thing and [to say] "Father" another, and that begotten and unbegotten differ, whether likewise to be Father and to be Son differ, or are the same. Reply. — To which we say that, from the same sense by which begotten and unbegotten are called different, and by which it is said that to say "begotten" and "unbegotten" is not the same, it can be said that to be Father and to be Son, or to be Holy Spirit, are not the same, but different, since the Father is not Father by the same notion by which the Son is Son, or by which the Holy Spirit is Holy Spirit. And therefore in this sense we concede that to be Father is one thing and to be Son is another, because the notion by which the Father is Father is one, and that by which the Son is Son is another. But if you transpose, so that6 you say, Father to be is one thing, Son to be is another, the meaning is varied and therefore [this] is not conceded. For the sense is such, as if it were said, one thing is that by which the Father is, not indeed Father, but is; another is that by which the Son is, not indeed Son, but is; which is utterly false. For the Father is by that very [account] by which
the Father is God, that is, through essence or nature; the Son is God by that [account] by which the Father is God: therefore the Son is by that [account] by which the Father is, and so for the Father to be and7 for the Son to be is the same; but to be Father and to be Son is not the same. Whence Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity8 says: "Although to be Father and to be Son differ, the substance is yet not different, because this is not said according to substance, but according to a relative; which relative, however, is not an accident, since it is not mutable." Behold, he says that to be Father and to be Son are different; which must be taken according to the aforesaid reasoning, namely because the notion by which He is Father is one, and that by which He is Son is another. For the Father is not called Father according to essence, nor the Son [Son], but according to relation.
Cap. VI. That "begotten wisdom" is said either according to relation or according to substance.
It must also be known that, just as the Son alone is called Word or Image, so He alone is called born or begotten Wisdom. And therefore it is asked whether this is said relatively, and if it is said relatively, whether [it is so] according to the same relation by which Word and Image are said. On this Augustine in the seventh book On the Trinity speaks thus: "Let us take it that, when Word is said, what is signified is as if born Wisdom were said, so that He is also Son and Image; and when these two are said, that is, born Wisdom, in one of them, namely in born, both Word and Image and Son are understood — and in all these names essence is not shown, since they are said relatively — but in the other, which is Wisdom, essence too is shown, since [it] is said also with reference to self. For He is wise by Himself, and this is His being which is to be wise; whence Father and Son together are one Wisdom, since [they are] one essence." — Take care, reader, how you understand this which Augustine here says. For he seems to say that, when born Wisdom is said, Wisdom there signifies essence, and born notes the relation. Which if it is so, we are forced to say that the divine essence is born; which contradicts what was said above. — But to this we say, that born, in the one [term], that is, in the [word] born, is understood by the same notion by which it is noted when Word and Image are said9. But in the other, namely Wisdom, essence is shown, that is, it is shown that the Son is essence, since Wisdom is said according to essence. And therefore, when born Wisdom is said, it is understood that He, since He is born, is essence. Yet there Wisdom effects an understanding not for essence but for hypostasis, so that, just as when Word or Son is said, the hypostasis with its property is understood, so, when born Wisdom is said, the same is to be understood10, that is, the begotten hypostasis. Hence with vigilance he says that the same must be understood when Word is said and when born Wisdom is said — that is, the same relation and the same hypostasis, in which that property is. And by this is supported what we said above11, namely that, when Father or Son or Holy Spirit is said, not only those properties are signified — as when paternity, filiation [are said] — but also the hypostases together with their properties.
Cap. VII. On the Image.
This too must be known: that although it has been said above12 that image is said relatively of the Son, just as word or son, it is sometimes nevertheless found to be said according to substance. Whence Augustine in the book On the Faith to Peter13 says that the divinity of the Holy Trinity essentially is one, and the Image to which man was made [is one]. Hilary too in the fifth book On the Trinity14 thus says: "Man is made to a common image. The name does not differ, the nature does not differ. For one is the species to which man was created." From these words it is shown that image sometimes effects an understanding of essence, and is then said with reference to self and not relatively.
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- Omnia praecedentia a verbis Hoc exemplis sumta sunt ex V. de Trin. c. 7. n. 8, paucis mutatis. — Paulo post Vat. perperam alia pro aliaque, ed. 1 alia quoque.All the foregoing, from the words Hoc exemplis, are taken from book V of On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 8, with a few changes. — A little later the Vatican edition wrongly [reads] alia in place of aliaque; edition 1 [reads] alia quoque.
- Num. 33. Ultima propositio est ibi n. 35, et sic legitur: Discretio tantum personae in te et tuis posita est, in nullo tamen naturae distincta confessione.N. 33. The last proposition is in the same place, n. 35, and reads thus: Discretio tantum personae in te et tuis posita est, in nullo tamen naturae distincta confessione ("a distinction only of person is set in Thee and Thine, with the confession in no way distinguished as to nature").
- Codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8: IV. libro de Spiritu sancto, sed est liber de Incarnatione Domini, c. 8, n. 79. In quo textu post Scripturis Vat. cum ceteris edd. ingenitus pro ingenitum, refragantibus codd. et originali. Circa finem ante adversantur Vat. sola perperam omittit sibi.Codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 [read]: book IV On the Holy Spirit; but it is the book On the Incarnation of the Lord, c. 8, n. 79. In which text, after Scripturis, the Vatican with the other editions [reads] ingenitus in place of ingenitum, against the codices and the original. Near the end, before adversantur, the Vatican alone wrongly omits sibi.
- Codd. B C addunt arbitrium.Codices B, C add arbitrium.
- Cap. I.Chapter I.
- Codd. A D fc.Codices A, D [read] fc. [i.e. facias].
- Vat. et edd. 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 quod contra codd. et alias edd.The Vatican and editions 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 [read] quod, against the codices and the other editions.
- Cap. 5, n. 6.Chapter 5, n. 6.
- Vat. cum aliis edd. contra codd. et edd. 1, 8 intelligatur.The Vatican with the other editions [reads], against the codices and editions 1, 8, intelligatur.
- Vat. cum aliis edd. perperam intelligitur, refragantibus codd. et ed. 8.The Vatican with the other editions wrongly [reads] intelligitur, against the codices and edition 8.
- Dist. XXVII. pars II. in princip. — Vat. cum plurimis edd. superius pro supra, et post scilicet omittit quod.Distinction XXVII, Part II, at the beginning. — The Vatican with most editions [reads] superius in place of supra, and after scilicet omits quod.
- Ibid. pars II. c. 3, circa finem.Ibid., Part II, c. 3, near the end.
- Cap. 1, n. 5. Hunc librum non esse S. Augustini, sed Fulgentii Ruspensis, supra in Prolegomenis pag. LXXXIV dictum est.Chapter 1, n. 5. That this book is not by St. Augustine but by Fulgentius of Ruspe was stated above in the Prolegomena, p. LXXXIV.
- Num. 8.N. 8.