Dist. 3
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 3
Distinctio III.
Pars I.
De cognitione Creatoris per creaturas, in quibus Trinitatis vestigium apparet.
Apostolus namque ait1, quod invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas. Per creaturam mundi intelligitur homo «propter excellentiam, qua excellit inter alias creaturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omni creatura». Homo ergo invisibilia Dei intellectu mentis conspicere potuit vel etiam conspexit per ea quae facta sunt, id est, per creaturas visibiles vel2 invisibiles. A duobus enim iuvabatur, scilicet a natura, quae rationalis erat, et ab operibus a Deo factis, ut manifestaretur homini veritas. Ideo Apostolus dixit3: quia Deus revelavit illis, scilicet dum fecit opera, in quibus artificis aliquatenus relucet indicium.
Nam sicut ait Ambrosius4: «Ut Deus, qui natura invisibilis est, etiam a visibilibus posset sciri, opus fecit, quod opificem visibilitate sui manifestavit, ut per certum incertum posset sciri, et ille Deus omnium esse crederetur, qui hoc fecit, quod ab homine impossibile est fieri». Potuerunt ergo cognoscere sive cognoverunt, ultra omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit, quae nulla creaturarum facere vel destruere valet5. Accedat, quaecumque vis, creatura et faciat tale caelum et talem terram, et dicam, quia Deus est. Sed quia nulla creatura talia facere valet, constat, super omnem creaturam esse illum qui ea fecit; ac per hoc, illum esse Deum, humana mens cognoscere potuit.
Alio etiam modo Dei veritatem ductu rationis cognoscere potuerunt vel etiam cognoverunt. Ut enim Augustinus ait in Libro de Civitate Dei6: «Viderunt summi philosophi nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt, quaerentes Deum; viderunt etiam, quidquid mutabile est non esse summum Deum omniumque principium, et ideo omnem animam mutabilesque spiritus transcenderunt; deinde viderunt, omne, quod mutabile est, non posse esse nisi ab illo, qui incommutabiliter et simpliciter est. Intellexerunt ergo, eum et omnia ista fecisse et a nullo fieri potuisse».
«Consideraverunt etiam, quidquid est in substantiis vel corpus esse vel spiritum, meliusque aliquid spiritum esse quam corpus, sed longe meliorem qui spiritum fecit et corpus».
«Intellexerunt etiam, corporis speciem esse sensibilem et spiritus speciem intelligibilem, et intelligibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt, intelligibilia, quae conspectu mentis intelligi7. Cum ergo in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent; si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: viderunt esse aliquid, quo illa speciosa facta sunt, ubi est prima et incommutabilis species, ideoque incomparabilis; et illud esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset, et ex quo cuncta facta essent». Ecce tot modis potuit cognosci veritas Dei. Cum ergo Deus una sit et simplex essentia, quae ex nulla diversitate partium vel accidentium consistit, pluraliter tamen dicit Apostolus: invisibilia Dei, quia pluribus modis cognoscitur veritas Dei per ea quae facta sunt. Ex perpetuitate namque creaturarum intelligitur Conditor aeternus; ex magnitudine creaturarum omnipotens; ex ordine et dispositione sapiens; ex gubernatione bonus. Haec autem omnia ad unitatem Deitatis pertinent monstrandam.
Cap. II.
(De cognitione Trinitatis per creaturas.)
Nunc restat ostendere, utrum per ea quae facta sunt aliquod Trinitatis vestigium vel indicium exiguum8 haberi potuerit. De hoc Augustinus in libro sexto de Trinitate9 ait: «Oportet, ut Creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intellectu conspicientes, Trinitatem intelligamus. Huius enim Trinitatis vestigium in creaturis apparet. Haec enim omnia10, quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem. Nam quodque horum creatorum et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt naturae corporum et animarum, et aliqua specie formatur, sicut sunt figurae vel qualitates corporum ac doctrinae vel artes animarum, et ordinem aliquem petit aut tenet, sicut sunt pondera vel collocationes corporum et amores vel delectationes animarum; et ita in creaturis praelucet vestigium Trinitatis. In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est omnium rerum et perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio». Summa autem origo, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro de Vera Religione11, intelligitur Deus Pater, a quo sunt omnia, a quo Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Perfectissima pulcritudo intelligitur Filius, scilicet veritas Patris, nulla ex parte ei dissimilis, quam12 cum ipso et in ipso Patre veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt et ad unum referuntur, quae tamen omnia nec fierent a Patre per Filium neque suis finibus salva essent, nisi Deus summe bonus esset, qui et nulli naturae, quae13 ab illo bona esset, invidit, et ut in bono ipso maneret, alia quantum vellet, alia quantum posset, dedit; quae bonitas intelligitur Spiritus sanctus, qui est donum Patris et Filii. Quare ipsum donum Dei cum Patre et Filio aeque incommutabile colere et tenere nos convenit. Per considerationem itaque creaturarum unius substantiae Trinitatem intelligimus, scilicet unum Deum Patrem, a quo sumus, et Filium, per quem sumus, et Spiritum sanctum, in quo sumus, scilicet principium, ad quod recurrimus, et formam quam sequimur, et gratiam qua reconciliamur: unum scilicet, quo auctore conditi sumus, et similitudinem eius, per quam ad unitatem reformamur, et pacem, qua Unitati adhaeremus: scilicet Deum, qui dixit14: fiat; et Verbum, per quod factum est omne, quod substantialiter et naturaliter est; et Donum benignitatis eius, qua placuit quod ab eo per Verbum factum est et reconciliatum est auctori, ut non interiret». Ecce ostensum est, qualiter in creaturis aliquatenus imago Trinitatis indicatur; non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi vel potuit sine doctrinae vel interioris inspirationis revelatione. Unde illi antiqui philosophi quasi per umbram et de longinquo viderunt veritatem, deficientes in contuitu Trinitatis, ut magi Pharaonis in tertio signo15. Adiuvamur tamen in fide invisibilium per ea, quae facta sunt.
Cap. III.
De imagine et similitudine Trinitatis in anima humana.
«Nunc vero16 ad eam iam perveniamus disputationem, ubi in mente humana, quae novit Deum vel potest nosse, Trinitatis imaginem reperiamus». Ut enim ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate17: «Licet humana mens non sit eius naturae, cuius Deus est, imago tamen illius, quo nihil melius est, ibi quaerenda et invenienda est, quo natura nostra nihil habet melius, id est in mente. In ipsa enim18 mente, etiam antequam sit particeps Dei, eius imago reperitur; etsi enim, amissa Dei participatione, deformis sit, imago tamen Dei permanet. Eo enim ipso imago Dei est mens, quo capax eius est eiusque particeps esse potest. Iam ergo in ea Trinitatem, quae Deus est, inquiramus. Ecce ergo19 mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed imaginem Dei. Hic enim quaedam apparet trinitas memoriae, intelligentiae et amoris». Haec ergo tria potissimum tractemus, memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem». «Haec igitur tria, ut Augustinus ait
in libro decimo de Trinitate20, non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, una essentia. Memoria vero dicitur ad aliquid, et intelligentia et voluntas sive dilectio similiter ad aliquid dicitur; vita vero dicitur ad se ipsam et mens et essentia. Haec igitur tria eo sunt unum, quo una vita, una mens, una essentia; et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur, etiam simul, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo vero tria sunt, quo ad se invicem referuntur».
«Aequalia etiam sunt non solum singula singulis, sed etiam singula omnibus; alioquin non se invicem caperent; se autem invicem capiunt. Capiuntur21 enim et a singulis singula et a singulis omnia. Memini enim, me habere memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem; et intelligo, me intelligere et velle atque meminisse; et volo, me velle et meminisse et intelligere».
«Totamque meam memoriam et intelligentiam et voluntatem simul memini. Quod enim memoriae meae non memini, illud non est in memoria mea; nihil autem tam in memoria est, quam ipsa memoria: totam ergo22 memini. Item, quidquid intelligo, intelligere me scio, et scio, me velle quidquid volo; quidquid autem scio memini. Totam ergo intelligentiam totamque voluntatem meam memini».
«Similiter, cum haec tria intelligo, tota simul intelligo. Neque enim quidquam intelligibilium est, quod non intelligam, nisi quod ignoro. Quod autem ignoro, nec memini nec volo. Quidquid igitur23 intelligibilium non intelligo, consequenter etiam nec memini nec volo. Quidquid ergo intelligibilium memini et volo, consequenter intelligo».
«Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum utor toto eo quod intelligo et memini. Cum itaque invicem a singulis et omnia et tota capiantur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis; et haec tria unum, una vita, una mens, una essentia». «Ecce illius summae Unitatis atque Trinitatis, ubi una est essentia et tres personae, imago est humana mens, licet impar24». Mens autem hic pro animo ipso accipitur, ubi est illa imago Trinitatis; «proprie vero mens dicitur, ut ait Augustinus25, non ipsa anima, sed quod in ea est excellentius», qualiter saepe accipitur. Illud etiam sciendum est, quod memoria non solum est absentium et praeteritorum, sed etiam praesentium, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate26, alioquin non se caperet.
Hic attendendum est diligenter, ex quo sensu accipiendum sit quod supra dixit, illa tria, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem esse unum, unam mentem, unam essentiam. Quod utique non videtur esse verum iuxta proprietatem sermonis. Mens enim, id est spiritus rationalis, essentia est spiritualis et incorporea. Illa vero tria naturales proprietates seu vires sunt ipsius mentis et a se invicem differunt, quia memoria non est intelligentia vel voluntas, nec intelligentia voluntas sive amor.
«Et haec tria etiam ad se ipsa referuntur», ut ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate27: «Mens enim amare se ipsam vel meminisse non potest, nisi etiam noverit se: nam quomodo amat vel meminit quod nescit»? Miro itaque modo tria ista inseparabilia sunt a semetipsis; et tamen eorum singulum et simul omnia una essentia est, cum et relative dicantur ad invicem.
Sed iam videndum est, quo modo haec tria dicantur una substantia; ideo scilicet, quia in ipsa anima vel mente substantialiter existunt, non sicut accidentia in subiectis, quae possunt adesse et abesse. Unde Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate28 ait: «Admonemur, si utcumque videre possumus, haec in animo existere substantialiter, non tanquam in subiecto, ut color in corpore, quia etsi relative dicuntur29 ad invicem, singula tamen substantialiter sunt in sua substantia». Ecce ex quo sensu illa tria dicantur esse unum vel una substantia. «Quae tria, ut Augustinus ait in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate30, in mente naturaliter divinitus instituta quisquis vivaciter perspicit, et quam magnum sit in ea, unde potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, concupisci (reminiscitur enim per memoriam, intuetur per intelligentiam, amplectitur per dilectionem), profecto reperit illius summae Trinitatis imaginem».
Cap. III. (sive secundum nostros titulos: De dissimilitudine.)
De similitudine creantis et creatae trinitatis.
«Verumtamen caveat, ne hanc imaginem ab eadem Trinitate factam ita ei comparet, ut omnino existimet similem, sed potius in qualicumque ista similitudine magnam quoque dissimilitudinem cernat31».
«Quod breviter ostendi potest. Homo unus per illa tria meminit, intelligit, diligit, qui nec memoria est nec intelligentia nec dilectio, sed haec habet. Unus ergo homo est, qui habet haec tria, non ipse est haec tria. In illius vero summa simplicitate naturae, quae Deus est, quamvis unus sit Deus, tres tamen personae
sunt, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus»32, et hae tres unus Deus. «Aliud est itaque Trinitatis res ipsa, aliud imago Trinitatis in re alia; propter quam imaginem etiam illud in quo sunt haec tria, imago dicitur, scilicet homo. Sicut imago dicitur et tabula et pictura, quae est in ea; sed tabula nomine imaginis appellatur propter picturam, quae in ea est33».
«Rursus ista imago, quae est homo habens illa tria, una persona est. Illa vero Trinitas non una persona est, sed tres personae, Pater Filii et Filius Patris et Spiritus Patris et Filii. Itaque in ista imagine Trinitatis non haec tria unus homo, sed unius hominis sunt. In illa vero summa Trinitate, cuius haec imago est, non unius Dei sunt illa tria, sed unus Deus; et tres sunt illae, non una persona34». «Illa enim tria non homo sunt, sed hominis sunt vel in homine sunt. Sed nunquid possumus dicere, Trinitatem sic esse in Deo, ut aliquid Dei sit, nec ipsa sit Deus35»? Absit ut hoc credamus. Dicamus ergo, in mente nostra imaginem Trinitatis36, sed exiguam et qualemcumque esse, quae summae trinitatis ita gerit similitudinem, ut ex maxima parte sit dissimilis. Sciendum vero est, quod «haec Trinitas mentis, ut ait Augustinus in decimo quarto libro de Trinitate37, non propterea tantum imago Dei est, quia sui meminit mens et intelligit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse et intelligere et amare illum, a quo facta est».
Potest etiam alio modo aliisque nominibus distingui trinitas in anima, quae est imago illius summae et ineffabilis Trinitatis. Ut enim ait Augustinus in nono libro de Trinitate38: «Mens et notitia eius et amor tria quaedam sunt. Mens enim novit se et amat se; nec amare se potest, nisi etiam noverit se. Duo quaedam sunt mens et notitia eius; item duo quaedam sunt mens et amor eius». «Cum ergo se novit mens et amat se, manet trinitas, scilicet mens, amor et notitia». «Mens autem hic accipitur non pro anima, sed pro eo quod in anima excellentius est». Haec autem tria, cum sint distincta a se invicem, dicuntur tamen esse unum, quia in anima substantialiter existunt.
Et est ipsa mens quasi parens, et notitia eius quasi proles eius. «Mens enim cum se cognoscit, notitiam sui gignit et est sola parens suae notitiae. Tertius est amor, qui de ipsa mente et notitia procedit, dum mens cognoscens se diligit se; non enim posset se diligere, nisi cognosceret se. Amat etiam placitam prolem, id est notitiam suam; et ita amor quidam complexus est parentis et prolis39».
«Nec minor est proles parente, dum tantam se novit mens, quanta est; nec minor est amor parente et prole, id est mente et notitia, dum tantum se diligit mens, quantum se novit et quanta est40».
«Sunt etiam haec singula in se ipsis, quia et mens amans in amore est, et amor in amantis notitia, et notitia in mente noscente est41». Ecce in his tribus qualecumque Trinitatis vestigium apparet.
Mens itaque rationalis considerans haec tria et illam unam essentiam, in qua ista sunt, extendit se ad contemplationem Creatoris et videt unitatem in trinitate et trinitatem in unitate. Intelligit enim, unum esse Deum, unam essentiam, unum principium. Intelligit enim, quia si duo essent, vel uterque insufficiens esset, vel alter superflueret; quia si aliquid deesset uni, quod haberet alter, non esset ibi summa perfectio; si vero nihil uni deesset, quod haberet alter, cum in uno essent omnia, alter superflueret. Intellexit ergo, unum esse Deum, unum42 omnium auctorem, et vidit, quia absque sapientia non sit, quasi res fatua; et ideo intellexit, eum habere sapientiam, quae ab ipso genita est; et quia sapientiam suam diligit, intellexit etiam, ibi esse amorem.
Cap. IV.
De Trinitatis unitate.
«Quapropter iuxta istam considerationem, ut ait Augustinus in libro nono de Trinitate43, credamus, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum unum esse Deum, universae creaturae conditorem et rectorem; nec Patrem esse Filium, nec Spiritum sanctum vel Patrem esse vel Filium, sed Trinitatem relatarum ad invicem personarum». Ut enim ait ipse in libro de Fide ad Petrum44: «Una est natura sive essentia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, non una persona. Si enim sic esset una persona, sicut est una substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, veraciter trinitas non diceretur. Rursus quidem trinitas esset vera, sed unus Deus Trinitas ipsa non esset, si quemadmodum Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti». «Fides autem Patriarcharum, Prophetarum atque Apostolorum unum Deum praedicat esse Trinitatem45». «In illa igitur sancta Trinitate unus est Deus Pater, qui solus essentialiter de se ipso Filium unum genuit; et unus Filius est, qui de uno Patre solus essentialiter natus; et unus Spiritus sanctus, qui solus essentialiter a Patre Filioque procedit. Hoc autem totum non potest una persona, id est, gignere se et nasci de se et procedere de se». Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate46: «Nulla res est, quae se ipsam gignat, ut sit».
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Distinction III.
Part I.
On the knowledge of the Creator through creatures, in which the vestige of the Trinity appears.
For the Apostle says1 that the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen through the things that have been made, also his eternal power and divinity. By creature of the world is understood man, "on account of the excellence by which he excels among other creatures, or on account of the affinity which he has with every creature." Man therefore was able to behold the invisible things of God with the understanding of the mind, or even did behold them, through the things that have been made, that is, through visible or2 invisible creatures. For he was helped by two things, namely by nature, which was rational, and by the works made by God, so that the truth might be made manifest to man. Therefore the Apostle said3: because God revealed it to them, that is, when he made the works in which there shines forth, to some extent, an indication of the craftsman.
For as Ambrose says4: "So that God, who by nature is invisible, might also be known from visible things, he made a work which manifested the workman by its own visibility, so that through the certain the uncertain might be known, and he be believed to be the God of all things who made this which by man is impossible to be made." They therefore were able to know, or did know, that beyond every creature is he who made those things which no creature has the power to make or to destroy5. Let any creature you please come forward and make such a heaven and such an earth, and I shall say that it is God. But since no creature has the power to make such things, it is plain that above every creature is he who made them; and through this, the human mind has been able to know that he is God.
In yet another way they were able, or did, come to know the truth of God by the lead of reason. For as Augustine says in the book On the City of God6: "The highest philosophers saw that no body is God, and therefore they transcended all bodies in seeking God; they saw also that whatever is mutable is not the highest God and the principle of all things, and therefore they transcended every soul and all mutable spirits; then they saw that everything that is mutable can have being only from him who is unchangeably and simply. They understood therefore that he both made all these things and could have been made by none."
"They considered also that whatever is in substances is either body or spirit, and that something is better as spirit than as body, but far better is he who made both spirit and body."
"They understood likewise that the species of body is sensible, and the species of spirit is intelligible, and they preferred the intelligible species to the sensible. We call sensible those things which can be perceived by the sight and touch of the body, intelligible those which are grasped by the gaze of the mind7. Since therefore in their view both body and soul were more or less beautiful, but if they could be wholly without form they would not exist at all: they saw that there is something by which those things are made beautiful, where there is the first and unchangeable species, and therefore incomparable; and they most rightly believed this to be the principle of things, which itself is not made, and from which all things are made." Behold, in so many ways the truth of God could be known. Since therefore God is one and a simple essence, which consists of no diversity of parts or accidents, nevertheless the Apostle says in the plural: the invisible things of God, because in many ways is the truth of God known through the things that have been made. For from the perpetuity of creatures the eternal Founder is understood; from their magnitude, his omnipotence; from their order and disposition, his wisdom; from their governance, his goodness. And all these belong to manifesting the unity of the Deity.
Ch. II.
(On the knowledge of the Trinity through creatures.)
Now it remains to show whether through the things that have been made some vestige or slight indication8 of the Trinity could have been had. On this Augustine says, in the sixth book On the Trinity9: "It behooves us that, beholding the Creator with the understanding through the things that have been made, we should understand the Trinity. For the vestige of this Trinity appears in creatures. For all these things10 which have been made by the divine art exhibit in themselves both a certain unity and a species and an order. For each of these created things is some one thing, as are the natures of bodies and souls, and is formed by some species, as are the figures or qualities of bodies and the disciplines or arts of souls, and seeks or holds some order, as are the weights or arrangements of bodies and the loves or delights of souls; and so in creatures the vestige of the Trinity shines forth. For in that Trinity is the supreme origin of all things and the most perfect beauty and the most blessed delight." Now the supreme origin, as Augustine shows in the book On True Religion11, is understood to be God the Father, from whom are all things, from whom are the Son and the Holy Spirit. The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son, namely the truth of the Father, in no part unlike him, whom12 together with him and in him, the Father, we venerate, who is the form of all things which have been made by the one and are referred to the one — which all things, however, neither would be made by the Father through the Son, nor would be preserved in their proper limits, unless God were supremely good, who neither envied any nature which13 from him was good, and so that it might remain in good itself, gave to some things as much as he willed, to others as much as they could receive; which goodness is understood to be the Holy Spirit, who is the gift of the Father and the Son. Wherefore it is fitting that we worship and hold this very gift of God, with the Father and the Son, as equally unchangeable. Through the consideration of creatures therefore we understand the Trinity of one substance, namely one God the Father, from whom we are, and the Son, through whom we are, and the Holy Spirit, in whom we are; that is, the principle to which we return, and the form which we follow, and the grace by which we are reconciled: namely, the one by whose authorship we have been founded, and his likeness through which we are re-formed to unity, and the peace by which we cleave to the Unity: namely, God who said14: let it be done; and the Word, through which was made every thing that substantially and naturally is; and the Gift of his kindness, by which it pleased him that what was made by him through the Word should also be reconciled to its author, that it might not perish." Behold, it has been shown how, in creatures, in some measure, the image of the Trinity is indicated; for through the contemplation of creatures a sufficient knowledge of the Trinity neither can be had nor could have been had without the revelation of doctrine or of interior inspiration. Hence those ancient philosophers, as through a shadow and from afar, saw the truth, falling short in their contuition of the Trinity, like the magicians of Pharaoh at the third sign15. We are nevertheless helped in the faith of invisible things through the things that have been made.
Ch. III.
On the image and likeness of the Trinity in the human soul.
"Now indeed16 let us come to that discussion, where in the human mind, which knows God or is able to know him, we may find the image of the Trinity." For as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity17: "Although the human mind is not of that nature of which God is, nevertheless his image — than whom nothing is better — must be sought and found there, where our nature has nothing better, that is, in the mind. For in the mind itself18, even before it shares in God, his image is found; for even if, having lost participation in God, it is deformed, yet it remains the image of God. For by this very fact is the mind the image of God: that it is capable of him and can be his participant. Now then let us seek in it the Trinity which is God. Behold therefore19: the mind remembers itself, understands itself, loves itself; if we discern this, we discern a trinity — not yet, indeed, God, but the image of God. For here there appears a certain trinity of memory, intelligence, and love." Therefore let us treat especially of these three: memory, intelligence, will. "These three therefore, as Augustine says
in the tenth book On the Trinity20, are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, one essence. But memory is said in relation to something, and intelligence and will or love are likewise said in relation to something; whereas life is said with reference to itself, and mind, and essence. These three therefore are one in this, that they are one life, one mind, one essence; and whatever else they are said singly with reference to themselves, even together they are said not in the plural but in the singular. But they are three in this, that they are referred to one another."
"They are equal also, not only severally to one another singly, but also severally to all together; otherwise they would not contain one another mutually; but they do contain one another mutually. For21 both singulars are contained by singulars, and the whole by singulars. For I remember that I have memory and intelligence and will; and I understand that I understand and will and remember; and I will that I will and remember and understand."
"And I remember together my whole memory and intelligence and will. For what I do not remember of my memory is not in my memory; nothing however is so much in memory as memory itself: therefore I remember it whole22. Likewise, whatever I understand I know that I understand, and I know that I will whatever I will; and whatever I know I remember. Therefore I remember my whole intelligence and my whole will."
"Likewise, when I understand these three, I understand the whole together. For there is not anything among intelligible things which I do not understand, except what I do not know. But what I do not know, I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore23 of intelligible things I do not understand, consequently I neither remember nor will. Whatever therefore of intelligible things I remember and will, I consequently understand."
"My will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory, when I use all that I understand and remember. Since then by singulars the whole and the wholes are mutually contained, the whole singulars are equal to the whole singulars and the whole singulars together are equal to all the wholes; and these three are one, one life, one mind, one essence." "Behold, of that supreme Unity and Trinity, where there is one essence and three persons, the human mind is the image, although unequal24." Here however "mind" is taken for the soul itself, where that image of the Trinity is; "but properly mind is said," as Augustine says25, "not of the soul itself but of what is more excellent in it," in which sense it is often taken. It must also be known that memory is not only of things absent and past, but also of things present, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity26; otherwise it would not contain itself.
Here it must be carefully attended to, in what sense it is to be taken which he said above, namely that those three — memory, intelligence, and will — are one, one mind, one essence. Which surely does not seem true according to the propriety of speech. For mind, that is, rational spirit, is a spiritual and incorporeal essence. But those three are the natural properties or powers of the mind itself and differ from one another, since memory is not intelligence or will, nor is intelligence will or love.
"And these three are also referred to themselves," as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity27: "For the mind cannot love or remember itself unless it also knows itself: for how does it love or remember what it does not know"? In a wondrous way therefore these three are inseparable from one another; and yet each of them, and all together, is one essence, though they are said relatively to one another.
But now it must be seen how these three are said to be one substance: namely, in this way, because they exist substantially in the soul or mind itself, not as accidents in subjects, which can be present and absent. Hence Augustine in the ninth book On the Trinity28 says: "We are admonished, if we can in any way see it, that these exist in the soul substantially, not as in a subject, as color in a body, because although they are said relatively29 to one another, yet singly they are substantially in their substance." Behold in what sense those three are said to be one or one substance. "Which three, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book On the Trinity30, in the mind naturally and divinely instituted, whoever vividly perceives, and how great a thing it is in it whereby even the eternal and unchangeable nature can be recalled, beheld, longed for (for it is recollected through memory, beheld through intelligence, embraced through love), certainly finds the image of that supreme Trinity."
Ch. III. (continued — On dissimilitude.)
On the likeness of the creating and created trinity.
"Yet nevertheless let one beware, lest he so compare this image made by that same Trinity to it, that he reckon it altogether similar, but rather, in any such likeness, let him discern a great dissimilitude also31."
"This can be briefly shown. One man, through those three, remembers, understands, loves, who is neither memory nor intelligence nor love, but has these. There is therefore one man who has these three; he himself is not these three. But in that supreme simplicity of nature which is God, although there is one God, nevertheless three persons
there are, Father and Son and Holy Spirit"32, and these three are one God. "It is one thing therefore, the very reality of the Trinity, and another, the image of the Trinity in another thing; on account of which image, even that in which these three are, is also called an image, namely man. Just as both the panel and the picture which is on it are called an image; but the panel is called by the name image on account of the picture which is on it33."
"Again, this image, which is man having those three, is one person. But that Trinity is not one person, but three persons, the Father of the Son, and the Son of the Father, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Therefore in this image of the Trinity these three are not one man, but they are of one man. But in that supreme Trinity, of which this is the image, those three are not of one God, but they are one God; and there are three of them, not one person34." "For those three are not man, but are of man or are in man. But can we say that the Trinity is so in God as to be something of God, and itself not to be God35"? Far be it from us to believe this. Let us say therefore that in our mind there is the image of the Trinity36, but a slight one of whatever kind, which bears the likeness of the supreme Trinity in such a way that for the greatest part it is unlike. But it must be known that "this Trinity of the mind, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity37, is not for this reason alone the image of God, because the mind remembers itself and understands and loves itself, but because it can also remember and understand and love him by whom it was made."
It is also possible to distinguish in another way and by other names the trinity in the soul, which is the image of that supreme and ineffable Trinity. For as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity38: "Mind and the knowledge of it and love are three something. For the mind knows itself and loves itself; nor can it love itself unless it also knows itself. Two something are mind and the knowledge of it; likewise, two something are mind and the love of it." "When therefore the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains, namely mind, love, and knowledge." "But mind is taken here not for the soul, but for that which is more excellent in the soul." These three, however, although they are distinct from one another, are nonetheless said to be one, because they exist substantially in the soul.
And the mind itself is as it were the parent, and its knowledge as it were its offspring. "For the mind, when it knows itself, begets its own knowledge and is the sole parent of its own knowledge. The third is love, which proceeds from the mind itself and the knowledge, while the mind, knowing itself, loves itself; for it could not love itself unless it knew itself. It loves also its pleasing offspring, that is, its own knowledge; and so a certain love is the embrace of parent and offspring39."
"Nor is the offspring less than the parent, while the mind knows itself in its full extent; nor is the love less than the parent and offspring, that is, than the mind and the knowledge, while the mind loves itself as much as it knows itself and as much as it is40."
"These are also each in themselves, since the loving mind is in love, and love is in the knowledge of the lover, and knowledge is in the knowing mind41." Behold, in these three some sort of vestige of the Trinity appears.
The rational mind therefore, considering these three and that one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator and sees unity in trinity and trinity in unity. For it understands that God is one, one essence, one principle. For it understands that, if there were two, either each would be insufficient, or one would be superfluous; because if anything were lacking to one which the other possessed, there would not be the highest perfection there; but if nothing were lacking to one which the other possessed, since in one would be all things, the other would be superfluous. It understood therefore that there is one God, one42 author of all, and it saw that he is not without wisdom, as it were a foolish thing; and therefore it understood that he has wisdom, which has been begotten from him; and because he loves his wisdom, it also understood that there is love there.
Ch. IV.
On the unity of the Trinity.
"Wherefore according to this consideration, as Augustine says in the ninth book On the Trinity43, let us believe that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one God, the founder and ruler of all creation; and that the Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit either the Father or the Son, but a Trinity of persons related to one another." For as he himself says in the book On the Faith, to Peter44: "One is the nature or essence of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, not one person. For if it were one person in the same way as the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit is one, the Trinity would not truly be spoken of. Again, the Trinity would indeed be true, but the one God would not be the Trinity itself, if as the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from one another by the property of the persons, so they were also distinct by a diversity of natures." "But the faith of the Patriarchs, the Prophets, and the Apostles preaches that one God is the Trinity45." "In that holy Trinity therefore there is one God the Father, who alone essentially has begotten one Son from himself; and there is one Son, who alone is essentially born from the one Father; and there is one Holy Spirit, who alone essentially proceeds from the Father and the Son. But all this one person cannot do, that is, to beget himself and to be born from himself and to proceed from himself." For as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity46: "There is no thing which begets itself, that it may be."
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- Rom. 1, 20; Vulgata: Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura... Glossa ordinaria, qua Magister, paucis variatis, mox utitur, verbum a creatura sic interpretatur: Ab homine per excellentiam, quia excellit inter alias creaturas, vel propter convenientiam, quam habet cum omnibus creaturis. Tum Vulgata eius virtus pro virtus eius, quod nostri mss. et edd. summo consensu exhibent. — Vat. contra antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 addit omnia.Rom. 1:20; the Vulgate reads Invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura... The Glossa ordinaria, which the Master, with a few variations, presently uses, interprets the word a creatura thus: "from man by excellence, because he excels among the other creatures, or on account of the affinity he has with all creatures." Also, the Vulgate has eius virtus for virtus eius, which our manuscripts and editions exhibit with the highest consensus. — The Vatican edition, against the older codices, with edition 1, adds omnia.
- Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1, constructione mutata, Vat. hic ita prosequitur: Describitur etiam per comparationem ad suum principium, a quo emanat. Paulo infra cod. R omittit praepositionem in et plures codd. ut K M X Y ee post emanantis addunt emanatione perfecta.Beyond the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1, with construction altered, the Vatican here continues thus: It is also described by comparison to its principle, from which it emanates. A little further on, codex R omits the preposition in, and many codices such as K, M, X, Y, ee after emanantis add emanatione perfecta.
- Respicit ad Rom. I, 19: Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis. Deus enim illis manifestavit. — Vat. cum aliis edd. Ideoque contra omnes codd. et edd. 1, 8.It refers to Rom. 1:19: That which is known of God is manifest in them. For God revealed it to them. — The Vatican with the other editions reads Ideoque, against all codices and editions 1, 8.
- In Epist. ad Rom. c. 1, 19, paucis a Magistro mutatis et omissis. In fine huius textus ante impossibile est Vat. sola repetit supervacanee: ait Ambrosius.In On the Epistle to the Romans, c. 1, 19, with a few things changed and omitted by the Master. At the end of this text, before impossibile est, the Vatican alone repeats superfluously: ait Ambrosius.
- Mss. BDE potest. Tum in Vat. sola: quaecumque vis creaturae; in textu accipe vis a velle et quaecumque ut neutrum in plurali. Subinde eadem Vat. cum plerisque excusis ante terram praetermittit talem contra codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8.Manuscripts BDE read potest. Then in the Vatican alone: quaecumque vis creaturae; in the text take vis from velle and quaecumque as a neuter plural. Thereafter the same Vatican, with most printed editions, omits talem before terram against the codices and editions 1, 6, 8.
- Libr. VIII. c. 6, nonnullis transpositis et omissis. Etiam infra tertia et quarta ratio inde sumtae sunt. Paulo ante solus cod. D potuerunt et pro potuerunt vel etiam.Book VIII, ch. 6, with some things transposed and omitted. Also the third and fourth reasons further below are taken from there. A little earlier, codex D alone reads potuerunt et for potuerunt vel etiam.
- Edd. contra codd. nostros et ed. Augustini, ponendo punctum ante intelligibilia, praemittunt hic possunt.The editions, against our codices and the edition of Augustine, placing a full stop before intelligibilia, here prefix possunt. Page 63 footer:
- Cod. A omittit exiguum; Codd. BCDE et ed. 1, omisso vestigium et transpositis verbis, satis bene legunt Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum, accepto vel pro saltem vel pro etiam.Codex A omits exiguum; codices BCDE and edition 1, with vestigium omitted and the words transposed, read fairly well Trinitatis indicium vel exiguum, taking vel for saltem or for etiam.
- Cap. 10, n. 12, sed transposito ordine propositionum. — In initio huius textus Vat. et ed. 4 male legunt intellecta pro intellectu; ed. Augustini intellectum.Ch. 10, n. 12, but with the order of propositions transposed. — At the beginning of this text, the Vatican and ed. 4 wrongly read intellecta for intellectu; the edition of Augustine reads intellectum.
- Omnes codd. et edd. praeter Vat. omittunt omnia, quod tamen et ed. Augustini et ipse S. Bonav. infra dub. 3 habent. — Paulo post codd. C E cum textu Augustini quidquid horum pro quodque horum. Deinde Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 cum textu Augustini ante animarum addunt ingenia, quod deest in codd. omnibus et aliis edd.All codices and editions except the Vatican omit omnia, which however both the edition of Augustine and St. Bonaventure himself below in dub. 3 retain. — A little later, codices C and E, with Augustine's text, have quidquid horum for quodque horum. Then the Vatican and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, with Augustine's text, before animarum add ingenia, which is absent in all codices and the other editions.
- Ex cap. 55, n. 113, passim collecta. — In prima propositione huius textus post omnia solus cod. C addit particulam et.Gathered passim from ch. 55, n. 113. — In the first proposition of this text, after omnia, codex C alone adds the particle et.
- Vat. et aliae edd. contra ed. 6 et omnes codd. quem pro quam et mox contra eosdem codd. et edd. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 qui forma pro quae forma. Lectio nostra confirmatur textu Augustini, qui habet: Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem, in ipso et cum ipso veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt. — Paulo post cod. C ab ipso et edd. 5, 6 ab initio loco ab uno. Deinde cod. D quae omnino non fierent pro quae tamen omnia nec fierent.The Vatican and other editions, against ed. 6 and all the codices, read quem for quam, and shortly after, against the same codices and editions 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, read qui forma for quae forma. Our reading is confirmed by the text of Augustine, who has: Quare ipsam quoque veritatem nulla ex parte dissimilem, in ipso et cum ipso veneramur, quae forma est omnium, quae ab uno facta sunt. — A little later, codex C reads ab ipso, and editions 5, 6 ab initio in place of ab uno. Then codex D reads quae omnino non fierent for quae tamen omnia nec fierent.
- Codd. ABCE satis bene quod, sed refragantibus edd. et textu Augustini. Immediate post codd. A B et edd. 9, 10 bono pro bona.Codices ABCE read, well enough, quod, but with the editions and Augustine's text disagreeing. Immediately after, codices A and B and editions 9, 10 read bono for bona.
- Gen. 1, 3. — Vat. cum edd. 4, 6, 7, 8 et codd. DE post fiat male addit lux, refragantibus ceteris edd. et codd. nec non textu Augustini.Gen. 1:3. — The Vatican, with editions 4, 6, 7, 8 and codices DE, after fiat wrongly adds lux, with the other editions and codices, and also Augustine's text, dissenting.
- Exod. 8, 18.Exodus 8:18.
- Cap. 8, n. 11, unde etiam accepta sunt, quae praecedunt, ab illis verbis: Nunc vero, sed de more non paucis omissis vel additis.Ch. 8, n. 11, whence likewise are taken the things which precede, from those words: Nunc vero, but in the customary way with not a few things omitted or added.
- (Heading: de Trinitate; reference partly merged with the preceding entry — see note 16.)(See note 16; the heading-citation for de Trinitate lib. xiv is implied; the Quaracchi footer treats both citations together.)
- Vat. et aliae edd., exceptis 1, 8, minus bene: In ipsa etiam mente antequam.The Vatican and other editions, except 1 and 8, less well read: In ipsa etiam mente antequam.
- Vat. contra codd. et ed. 1, 6 legit enim; et paulo post edd. 2, 3, 7 ante si cernimus habent haec pro hoc.The Vatican, against the codices and editions 1, 6, reads enim; and a little after, editions 2, 3, 7 before si cernimus have haec for hoc. Page 64 footer:
- Cap. 11, n. 17, 18. Ex eodem capite sumta sunt omnia, quae sequuntur usque ad: Ecce illius summae Unitatis.Ch. 11, nn. 17, 18. From the same chapter are taken all that follows up to: Ecce illius summae Unitatis.
- Vat. et ed. 9 corrupte Capiunt. Immediate post codd. D E etiam pro enim, sed contra textum Augustini et alios codd. et omnes edd.The Vatican and ed. 9 corruptly read Capiunt. Immediately after, codices D and E read etiam for enim, but against the text of Augustine and the other codices and all the editions.
- Codd. et textus Augustini igitur. Paulo post contra contextum et originale plures codd. et edd. habent memini, scio pro scio, memini.The codices and the text of Augustine read igitur. A little after, against the context and the original, several codices and editions have memini, scio for scio, memini.
- Edd. ergo; Augustinus itaque.The editions read ergo; Augustine reads itaque.
- Libr. X. de Trin. c. 12, n. 19: «Cuius impar imago est humana mens, sed tamen imago»; sed prima pars propositionis est ex libr. XV. de Trin. c. 7, n. 11. — Antea Vat. omittit est post ubi una. Paulo post cod. D anima ipsa pro animo ipso.Book X On the Trinity, c. 12, n. 19: "Of which the human mind is the unequal image, but yet an image"; but the first part of the proposition is from book XV On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 11. — Earlier the Vatican omits est after ubi una. A little after, codex D reads anima ipsa for animo ipso.
- Libr. XV. de Trin. c. 7, n. 11, secundum sensum.Book XV On the Trinity, c. 7, n. 11, according to the sense.
- Cap. 11, n. 14, ubi longiore discursu hanc sententiam a S. Bonaventura receptam probat (cfr. hic. p. II. a. I. q. I. ad 3.).Ch. 11, n. 14, where in a longer discussion he proves this proposition, received by St. Bonaventure (cf. here, pt. II, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3).
- Cap. 3, n. 3, sed de suo addidit Magister quae ad memoriam referuntur, nempe vel meminisses et vel meminerit. Verba praecedentia Et haec tria, iam supra citata, occurrunt libr. X. de Trin. c. 11, ubi edd. 1, 6, 8 habent ad se invicem pro ad se ipsa.Ch. 3, n. 3, but the Master added on his own account quae ad memoriam referuntur, namely vel meminisses and vel meminerit. The preceding words Et haec tria, already cited above, occur in book X On the Trinity, c. 11, where editions 1, 6, 8 have ad se invicem for ad se ipsa.
- Cap. 4, n. 5. Sed multo fusius Augustinus. Paulo ante pro et abesse Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 legit vel abesse.Ch. 4, n. 5. But Augustine much more fully. A little earlier, for et abesse, the Vatican with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 reads vel abesse.
- Cod. B et ed. 2 dicantur.Codex B and ed. 2 read dicantur.
- Cap. 20, n. 39, ubi post reminiscitur deest enim, quod et a mss. B C D abest; ceterum, etiam omisso enim, verba reminiscitur per memoriam etc. parenthesis esse videntur. — Ibid., sed cum nonnullis adiunctis.Ch. 20, n. 39, where after reminiscitur there is no enim, which is also absent from manuscripts B, C, D; for the rest, even with enim omitted, the words reminiscitur per memoriam, etc., seem to be a parenthesis. — Ibid., but with a few additions. Page 65 footer:
- (Quaracchi here refers to Augustine, de Trin. libr. XV; cf. note 30 above. The Master continues quoting Augustine on dissimilitude.)(Quaracchi here refers to Augustine, On the Trinity, book XV; cf. note 30 above. The Master continues quoting Augustine on dissimilitude.)
- Loc. cit. c. 22, n. 42, secundum sensum. — Pro per illa tria Vat. cum nonnullis edd. per ista tria, et infra edd. 1, 8 post non addunt tamen. Denique Vat. et plurimae edd. ante simplicitate legunt summa pro summae.The same place, c. 22, n. 42, according to the sense. — For per illa tria the Vatican with several editions reads per ista tria, and below editions 1, 8 after non add tamen. Finally the Vatican and most editions before simplicitate read summa for summae.
- Vat. cum multis edd. explicando addit personae sunt. — Ibid. n. 43.The Vatican with many editions, by way of explanation, adds personae sunt. — Ibid., n. 43.
- Loc. cit. — Edd. omnes, dempta 1, in fine textus post sunt illae adiciunt personae contra codd. et originale. Paulo ante modernae editiones Augustini, omisso non, legunt est, unius Dei sunt, sed haec lectio importat locutionem falsam nec correspondet contextui et tollit antithesim. Nam tria illa, scil. memoria, intellectus, voluntas, per appropriationem sumta pro tribus personis, stricte dici non possunt esse unius Dei, sed sunt Deus unius Deus, quia inter personas et essentiam non datur realis distinctio. Recte itaque Augustinus negat paritatem inter imaginem creatam et increatam. Nam unius hominis sunt illa tria, cum potentiae hominis non sint homo, sed habeantur ab homine. Tres vero personae stricto sensu sunt unus Deus. Ita ipse Augustinus in sequenti textu. — Vide infra dub. 10, ubi Seraphicus Doctor negantem particulam non solum cum Magistro admittit, sed defectu ipsius propositionem fieri simpliciter falsam ostendit.The same place. — All the editions, except 1, at the end of the text after sunt illae add personae against the codices and the original. A little earlier, the modern editions of Augustine, with non omitted, read est, unius Dei sunt; but this reading carries a false expression, does not correspond to the context, and destroys the antithesis. For those three — namely memory, intellect, will — taken by appropriation for the three persons, cannot strictly be said to be "of one God," but they are God himself who is one God, since between persons and essence there is no real distinction. Rightly therefore does Augustine deny parity between the created and uncreated image. For those three are of one man, since the powers of man are not man, but are had by man. But the three persons in the strict sense are one God. So Augustine himself in the following text. — See below dub. 10, where the Seraphic Doctor not only admits the negative particle along with the Master, but also shows that, were it lacking, the proposition would become simply false.
- Loc. cit. c. 7, n. 11, sed multo diffusius.The same place, c. 7, n. 11, but much more diffusely.
- Codd. BCDE et A (prima manu) et ed. 1 imaginis trinitatem, quae lectio nec in se commendatur nec cum verbis sed exiguam et qualemcumque bene cohaeret. Vat. sola immediate adiungit ita. — Haec conclusio Magistri quoad sensum invenitur in Augustino, loc. cit. c. 22, n. 43.Codices BCDE and A (first hand) and ed. 1 read imaginis trinitatem; this reading is neither commendable in itself nor does it cohere well with the words sed exiguam et qualemcumque. The Vatican alone immediately adds ita. — This conclusion of the Master, as to its sense, is found in Augustine, the same place, c. 22, n. 43.
- Cap. 12, n. 15. — Codd. ABDE et ed. 1 omittunt est post Sciendum vero. Mox in ipso textu Augustini codd., excepto D, et plurimae edd. incongrue legunt meminent pro meminit.Ch. 12, n. 15. — Codices ABDE and ed. 1 omit est after Sciendum vero. Soon afterwards, in the very text of Augustine, the codices, except D, and most editions incongruously read meminent for meminit.
- Cap. 4, n. 4: «Sicut autem quaedam sunt mens et amor eius, cum se amat; ita quaedam duo sunt mens et notitia eius, cum se novit. Igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius tria quaedam sunt, et haec tria unum sunt, et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt». Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 5, n. 8; de ultimo textu vide supra nota 6, p. 64.Ch. 4, n. 4: "But just as mind and its love are something, when it loves itself, so mind and its knowledge are two something, when it knows itself. Therefore the mind itself and its love and knowledge are three something, and these three are one, and when they are perfect, they are equal." What follows is taken from c. 5, n. 8; on the last text, see above note 6, p. 64.
- August., IX. de Trin. c. 12, n. 18, ubi autem multa adiecta et mutata leguntur. In quo textu cod. C verbo procedit praemittit eius. Mox Vat. cum paucis aliis edd. pro cognoscens se diligit habet cognoscit se et diligit. Paucis interjectis, codd. ADE pro Amat etiam legunt Amat enim, sed contra contextum, cum duplex distinguatur amor mentis, scil. erga se et suam prolem. — Codd. et edd. 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 animo (for anima).Augustine, IX On the Trinity, c. 12, n. 18, where however many things are read with additions and changes. In which text codex C before the verb procedit prefixes eius. Soon the Vatican with a few other editions, for cognoscens se diligit, has cognoscit se et diligit. A few words later, codices ADE for Amat etiam read Amat enim, but against the context, since a double love of the mind is distinguished, namely toward itself and toward its offspring. — The codices and editions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9 read animo (for anima).
- Loc. cit.The same place.
- August., libr. cit. c. 5, n. 8 [recte: 9].Augustine, the cited book, c. 5, n. 8 [correctly: 9].
- Abest in Vat. et paucis aliis edd. unum. Et paulo infra post absque sapientia Vat. contra auctoritatem codd. et edd., omissa particula non et inde variato sensu, absque sapientia sit quasi res fatua. In nostra et vera lectione supple esset post fatua. In fine capituli codd. ABD ibi etiam pro etiam ibi, quae lectio confirmat sensum nos[trum in]sinuatum.Unum is absent in the Vatican and a few other editions. And a little below, after absque sapientia, the Vatican against the authority of the codices and editions, with the particle non omitted and the sense thus varied, reads absque sapientia sit quasi res fatua. In our true reading, supply esset after fatua. At the end of the chapter, codices ABD read ibi etiam for etiam ibi, which reading confirms the sense we have suggested. Page 66 footer:
- Cap. 1, n. 1.Ch. 1, n. 1.
- Cap. 1, n. 4. — Auctor huius libri, S. Fulgentius, multo fusius de his tractat, in quo textu codd. CDE addendo non et mutando sed in si sic legunt: Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodum... Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti. Sed haec lectio duplicem suppositionem et argumentationem confundit. In fine textus Vat. fuissent quoque naturae pro fuissent naturarum quoque.Ch. 1, n. 4. — The author of this book, St. Fulgentius, treats these things much more fully; in which text codices CDE, by adding non and changing sed in to si, read thus: Rursus quidem Trinitas non esset vera, si unus Deus Trinitas non esset: si quemadmodum... Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus personarum sunt ab invicem proprietate distincti, sic fuissent naturarum quoque diversitate discreti. But this reading confuses the double supposition and the argument. At the end of the text the Vatican reads fuissent quoque naturae for fuissent naturarum quoque.
- Loc. cit.; auctoritas sequens ibid. n. 6.The same place; the authority that follows, in the same place, n. 6.
- Cap. 1, n. 1.Ch. 1, n. 1.