Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXV.

Cap. I.

De scientia, praescientia, providentia, dispositione et praedestinatione Dei.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 597–598) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Cumque supra¹ disseruerimus ac plura dixerimus de his quae communiter secundum substantiam de Deo dicuntur, eorum tamen quaedam specialem efflagitant tractatum; de quibus amodo tractandum est, id est de scientia, praescientia, providentia, dispositione, praedestinatione, voluntate et potentia. — Sciendum est igitur, quod sapientia vel scientia Dei, cum sit una et simplex, tamen propter varios rerum status et diversos effectus plura ac diversa sortitur nomina. Dicitur enim non tantum scientia, sed etiam praescientia vel praevidentia², dispositio, praedestinatio et³ providentia.

Cap. II.

De quibus sit praescientia vel praevidentia³.

Et est praescientia sive praevidentia de futuris tantum, sed de omnibus, de bonis scilicet et de malis.

Cap. III.

De quibus dispositio.

Dispositio vero de faciendis.

Cap. IV.

De quibus praedestinatio.

Praedestinatio de hominibus⁴ salvandis et de bonis, quibus et hic liberantur et in futuro coronabuntur. Praedestinavit enim Deus ab aeterno homines ad bona eligendo, et praedestinavit eis bona praeparando. Quod homines praedestinavit, Apostolus⁵ ostendit dicens: Praedestinavit quos praescivit fieri conformes imaginis Filii sui. Et alibi: Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus sancti et immaculati. Quod autem bona eis praeparaverit, propheta Isaias ostendit dicens: Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus vel exspectantibus te. Ergo ab aeterno praedestinavit quosdam futuros bonos et beatos, id est elegit, ut essent boni et beati, et bona eis praedestinavit, id est praeparavit.

Cap. V.

De quibus providentia.

Providentia autem est gubernandorum, quae utique eodem modo videtur accipi, quo dispositio. Interdum tamen providentia accipitur pro praescientia.

Cap. VI.

De quibus sapientia vel scientia.

Sapientia vero vel scientia de omnibus est, scilicet bonis et malis, et de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris, et non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis. Non enim ita scit Deus ista temporalia, ut se ipsum nesciat, sed ipse solus se ipsum perfecte novit, cuius scientiae comparatione omnis creaturae scientia imperfecta est.

Cap. VII.

Utrum praescientia, vel dispositio Dei esse potuerit, si nulla essent futura.

Hic considerari oportet, utrum scientia, vel praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio potuerit esse in Deo, si nulla fuissent futura. Cum enim praescientia sit futurorum, et dispositio faciendorum, et praedestinatio salvandorum, si nulla essent futura, si nihil esset facturus Deus, vel aliquos salvaturus, non videtur potuisse in Deo esse praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio; potuit autem Deus nulla praescire futura, potuit non creare aliquid, vel non salvare aliquos: potuit ergo non esse in Deo praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio. — Ad hoc autem ita a quibusdam opponitur: Si, inquiunt, potuit praescientia Dei non esse in Deo ab aeterno, et potuit non esse; si vero potuit non esse, cum praescientia Dei sit eius scientia,

et scientia sit eius essentia: potuit ergo non esse ab aeterno id quod est divina essentia. Ita et de dispositione et praedestinatione, quae est divina essentia, obiiciunt. Addunt quoque et alia, ita dicentes: Si potuit Deus non praescire aliqua, cum idem sit Deo⁶ praescire quod scire, et scire quod esse; potuit ergo non esse. Item, cum idem sit Deo praescium esse et Deum esse, si potuit non esse praescius, potuit non esse Deus; potuit autem non esse praescius, si potuit nulla praescire; at potuit nulla praescire, quia potuit nulla facere.

Ad hoc iuxta modulum nostrae intelligentiae ita dicimus: Praescientia, vel dispositio, vel praedestinatio ad aliquid dici videntur. Sicut enim creator ad creaturam relative dicitur, ita praescientia vel praescius ad futura referri videtur, et dispositio ad facienda, ac praedestinatio ad salvanda. Verumtamen creator ita relative dicitur, ut essentiam non significet. Praescientia vero vel praescius et in respectu futurorum dicitur, et essentiam designat; ita etiam dispositio et praedestinatio. Ideoque cum dicitur: si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset Deus praescius, quia varia est ibi causa dicendi, distingui oportet rationem dicti. Cum ergo dicis: si nulla essent futura, non esset in Deo praescientia, vel non esset praescius⁷, si in dicendo hanc causam attendis, scilicet quia nulla essent subiecta eius praescientiae, unde ipsa possit dici praescientia, vel ipse praescius, quod utrumque dicitur propter futura; verus est intellectus. Sin autem ea ratione id dicis, quod non sit in eo scientia, qua praescit futura, vel quod ipse non sit Deus, qui est futurorum praescius, falsa est intelligentia. Similiter et illae locutiones determinandae sunt: potuit non esse praescientia Dei, vel potuit non esse praescius, et potuit Deus non praescire aliqua; id est, potuit esse, quod nulla futura subiecta essent eius scientiae, et ita non posset dici praescius vel praescire, vel eius scientia praescientia; non tamen eo minus ipse esset vel eius scientia, sed non posset dici praescius vel praescire vel praescientia, si eius scientiae futura nulla forent subiecta. Similiter de dispositione et praedestinatione vel providentia. Haec enim, ut dictum est, ad temporalia referuntur et de temporalibus tantum sunt.

Cap. VIII.

Quod scientia Dei sit de temporalibus et aeternis.

Scientia vero vel sapientia non tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis est; ideoque, etsi nulla fuissent futura, esset tamen in Deo scientia eadem, quae modo est, nec minor esset quam modo nec maior⁸ quam esset. Scivit ergo Deus ab aeterno aeternum et omne quod futurum erat, et scivit immutabiliter. Scit quoque non minus praeterita vel futura quam praesentia, et sua aeterna sapientia et immutabili scit ipse omnia quae sciuntur. « Omnis enim ratio supernae et terrenae⁹ sapientiae, ut ait Ambrosius, in eo est, quia omnem sapientiam et essentiam capit sua immensa scientia ».

Cap. IX.

Quomodo omnia dicantur esse in Deo et vita in eo.

Propterea¹⁰ omnia dicuntur esse in Deo et fuisse ab aeterno. Unde Augustinus super Genesim¹¹: « Haec visibilia, inquit, antequam fierent, non erant. Quomodo ergo Deo nota erant quae non erant? Et rursus: Quomodo ea faceret quae sibi nota non erant? non enim quidquam fecit ignorans. Nota ergo fecit, non facta cognovit. Proinde, antequam fierent, et erant et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, non erant in sua natura. Ipsi autem Deo non audeo dicere alio modo innotuisse, cum ea fecisset, quam illo quo ea noverat, ut faceret, apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio ». — Ecce hic habes, quod haec visibilia, antequam fierent, in Dei scientia erant. Ex hoc igitur sensu omnia dicuntur esse in Deo, et omne quod factum est dicitur¹² esse vita in ipso: non ideo, quod creatura sit Creator, vel quod ista temporalia essentialiter sint in Deo, sed quia in eius scientia semper sunt, quae vita est.

Inde est etiam, quod omnia dicuntur ei praesentia esse, non solum ea quae sunt, sed etiam ea quae praeterierunt, et ea quae futura sunt, secundum illud¹³: Qui vocat ea quae non sunt, tanquam ea quae sunt: « quia, ut ait Ambrosius in libro de Trinitate¹⁴, ita cognoscit ea quae non sunt, ut ea quae sunt». Et hac ratione omnia dicuntur esse in eo vel apud eum sive ei praesentia. Unde Augustinus super illum locum Psalmi¹⁵: « Et pulchritudo agri mecum est, ideo, inquit, mecum est, quia apud Deum nihil praeteriit, nihil futurum est. Cum illo sunt omnia futura, et ei non detrahuntur praeterita. Cum illo sunt omnia cognitione quadam ineffabili sapientiae Dei». — Ecce hic aperit Augustinus, ex qua intelligentia accipienda sint huiusmodi verba: omnia sunt Deo praesentia, in Deo sunt omnia, vel cum Deo, vel apud Deum, vel in eo vita; quia ineffabilis omnium cognitio in eo est.

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DISTINCTION XXXV.

Chapter I.

On the science, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, and predestination of God.

Since we have above¹ discoursed and said many things about those things which are commonly said of God according to substance, certain of these nevertheless demand a special treatment; concerning which we must from now on treat — that is, of science, foreknowledge, providence, disposition, predestination, will, and power. — It must be known, therefore, that the wisdom or science of God, although it is one and simple, nevertheless on account of the various states of things and diverse effects obtains many and diverse names. For it is called not only science, but also foreknowledge or foresight², disposition, predestination, and³ providence.

Chapter II.

Of which things foreknowledge or foresight is³.

And foreknowledge or foresight is of future things only, but [is] of all of them, namely of good and of evil [things].

Chapter III.

Of which things disposition is.

Disposition, however, is of things to be done.

Chapter IV.

Of which things predestination is.

Predestination is of men⁴ to be saved, and of the goods by which they are both delivered here and shall be crowned in the future. For God from eternity predestined men to goods by electing [them], and predestined goods for them by preparing [them]. That He predestined men, the Apostle⁵ shows when he says: He predestined those whom He foreknew to be made conformable to the image of His Son. And elsewhere: He chose us before the foundation of the world, that we might be holy and unspotted. That He has prepared goods for them, the prophet Isaiah shows when he says: Eye has not seen, O God, besides You, what You have prepared for those who love You or wait for You. Therefore from eternity He predestined certain ones who were going to be good and blessed — that is, He chose [them], that they might be good and blessed — and predestined goods for them, that is, prepared [them].

Chapter V.

Of which things providence is.

Providence, however, is of things to be governed; which assuredly seems to be taken in the same way as disposition. Sometimes nevertheless providence is taken for foreknowledge.

Chapter VI.

Of which things wisdom or science is.

Wisdom, however, or science is of all things, namely of good and evil, and of present, past, and future things, and not only of temporal but also of eternal [things]. For God does not so know these temporal things that He should not know Himself, but He alone perfectly knows Himself; in comparison with whose science the science of every creature is imperfect.

Chapter VII.

Whether the foreknowledge or disposition of God could exist, if no future things were to be.

Here it must be considered whether science, or foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination could be in God, if no future things had been [going to be]. For since foreknowledge is of future things, and disposition of things to be done, and predestination of those to be saved — if no future things were [to be], if God were not going to do anything, or to save anyone, foreknowledge or disposition or predestination does not seem to have been able to be in God; but God could foreknow no future things, He could not create anything, or not save any: He could therefore not have foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination. — But to this it is thus objected by some: If, they say, God's foreknowledge could not be in God from eternity, and could not be; if indeed it could not be, since God's foreknowledge is His science,

and [His] science is His essence: therefore that which is the divine essence could not have been from eternity. So also concerning disposition and predestination, which are the divine essence, they object. They add yet other things, speaking thus: If God could not foreknow some things — since for God⁶ to foreknow is the same as to know, and to know is the same as to be — He could therefore not be. Likewise, since for God to be foreknowing is the same as to be God, if He could not be foreknowing, He could not be God; but He could not be foreknowing, if He could foreknow nothing; but He could foreknow nothing, because He could do nothing.

To this, according to the measure of our understanding, we say thus: foreknowledge, or disposition, or predestination seem to be said relative to something. For just as the creator is said relatively to the creature, so foreknowledge or [being] foreknowing seems to be referred to future things, and disposition to things to be done, and predestination to things to be saved. Yet creator is said relatively in such a way as not to signify the essence. But foreknowledge, or foreknowing, is said both with respect to future things, and signifies the essence; and so also disposition and predestination. And therefore when it is said: if no future things were [to be], there would be no foreknowledge in God, nor would God be foreknowing⁷ — since the cause of speaking is various here, the reason of the saying must be distinguished. Therefore when you say: if no future things were [to be], there would be no foreknowledge in God, nor would He be foreknowing, if in saying [this] you attend to this cause, namely that there would be no things subject to His foreknowledge, whence it could be called foreknowledge, or He foreknowing — both of which are said on account of future things — the understanding is true. But if you say it on this ground, that there would not be in Him the science by which He foreknows future things, or that He Himself would not be God who is foreknowing of future things, the understanding is false. Likewise also those locutions must be determined: there could be no foreknowledge of God, or He could not be foreknowing, or God could not foreknow some things; that is, it could be that no future things would be subject to His science, and so He could not be called foreknowing, or to foreknow, or His science foreknowledge; not, however, that He any the less would be, or His science [be], but [that] He could not be called foreknowing or to foreknow, or His [knowledge be called] foreknowledge, if no future things were subject to His science. Likewise concerning disposition and predestination or providence. For these, as has been said, are referred to temporal things, and are only of temporal things.

Chapter VIII.

That the science of God is of temporal and of eternal things.

But science or wisdom is not only of temporal but also of eternal things; and therefore, even if no future things had been [to be], there would still be in God the same science as there is now, neither would it be less than now nor greater⁸ than it would be. Therefore God knew from eternity the eternal and all that was to be, and knew immutably. He also knows past or future things no less than present, and by His eternal and immutable wisdom He Himself knows all things which are known. "For all the reason of supernal and earthly⁹ wisdom — as Ambrose says — is in this, that His immense science encompasses all wisdom and essence."

Chapter IX.

How all things are said to be in God and life in Him.

Therefore¹⁰ all things are said to be in God and to have been from eternity. Whence Augustine, on Genesis¹¹: "These visible things, he says, before they were made, were not. How then were they known to God which were not? And again: How would He have made those things which were not known to Him? for He did not make anything in ignorance. He therefore made known things, He did not [merely] come to know things [already] made. Accordingly, before they were made, both they were and they were not: they were in God's science, they were not in their own nature. As to God Himself, however, I dare not say that they became known to Him in any other way, when He had made them, than that by which He knew them in order to make them — with whom is no transmutation nor shadow of vicissitude." — Behold, here you have it, that these visible things, before they were made, were in the science of God. From this sense, therefore, all things are said to be in God, and everything that has been made is said¹² to be life in Him: not for the reason that the creature is the Creator, or that these temporal things are essentially in God, but because they are always in His science, which is life.

Hence it is also that all things are said to be present to Him — not only those things which are, but also those which have passed away, and those which are to come, according to that¹³: Who calls things that are not, as those that are: "because, as Ambrose says in his book On the Trinity¹⁴, He so knows the things that are not as the things that are." And by this reason all things are said to be in Him or with Him or to be present to Him. Whence Augustine, on that place of the Psalm¹⁵: "And the beauty of the field is with me: therefore, he says, it is with me, because with God nothing has passed away, nothing is to come. With Him are all future things, and past things are not taken from Him. With Him are all things by a certain ineffable knowledge of God's wisdom." — Behold, here Augustine opens up out of what understanding such expressions are to be received: all things are present to God, in God are all things, or with God, or near God, or in Him is life; because the ineffable cognition of all things is in Him.

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