Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXXVI.

Cap. I.

Utrum omnia debeant dici esse in Dei essentia, ut in Dei cognitione vel praescientia esse dicantur.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation. Each entry gives the Quaracchi critical apparatus (Notae ad Libr. Sententiarum, reflowed from the two-column footer band on printed pp. 617–618; on each printed page the notes were renumbered from 1, but here they run consecutively 1–21) in Latin, followed by an English rendering.

Solet hic quaeri, cum omnia dicantur esse in Dei cognitione seu praescientia¹ vel in Deo per cognitionem, et eius cognitio vel praescientia sit divina essentia, utrum concedendum sit, omnia esse in divina essentia vel in Deo per essentiam. — Ad quod dicimus, quia Dei cognitio eius utique essentia est, et eius praescientia, in qua sunt omnia, ipsius cognitio est, nec tamen omnia, quae sunt in eius praescientia vel cognitione, in eius essentia esse dici debent. Si enim hoc diceretur, intelligerentur esse eiusdem cum Deo² essentiae. In Deo enim dicitur esse per essentiam, quod est divina essentia, quod est Deus. Habet ergo Deus apud se in praescientia sua quae non habet in sui natura. Unde Augustinus de verbis Apostoli³ ita ait: « Elegit nos ante mundi constitutionem. Quis sufficit hoc explicare? Eliguntur qui non sunt, nec errat qui eligit, nec vane eligit; eligit tamen et habet electos quos creaturus est eligendos, quos habet apud semetipsum non in natura sua, sed in praescientia sua ». Nondum erant quibus promittebatur⁴, sed et ipsi promissi sunt, quibus promittebatur. — Ecce hic aperte dicit, Deum apud semetipsum habere electos ante mundum, non in natura sua, sed in praescientia sua, cum tamen eius praescientia non sit aliud quam eius natura, quia ipsius praescientia est eius notitia. Potest tamen ad electos referri, cum ait: in natura sua, id est illorum. Illos quippe habuit ab aeterno apud se, non in natura sua⁵, id est illorum qui nondum erant, sed in sua praescientia, quia eos ita novit, ac si essent.

Cap. II.

Qua ratione bona dicantur esse in Deo, et non mala.

Post praedicta quaeritur, cum omnia dicantur esse in Deo, non per essentiam naturae, sed per cognitionem scientiae, et Deus sciat bona et mala, utrum concedendum sit simpliciter, mala esse in Deo, sive esse in Deo per cognitionem. Scit enim Deus et scivit semper omnia, tam bona quam mala, etiam antequam fierent, et praescivit ab aeterno ea futura. Ideoque cum omnia bona dixerimus esse in Deo propter praescientiam cognitionis, eadem ratione videtur dicendum, omnia mala esse in eo, cum ea semper noverit, et per cognitionem ei praesentia fuerint. Praecognovit enim Deus ab aeterno quosdam futuros malos et eorum malitiam, ut ait Augustinus⁶, praescivit, sed non praeparavit. Cum ergo peccata omnium sciat, nunquid intelligendum est, ea includi in illa generalitate locutionis, qua dixit Apostolus⁷, omnia esse in Deo? Ex ipso, inquit, et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia. — Sed quis, nisi insanus, dixerit mala esse in Deo? Illa enim esse in Deo intelliguntur, quae ex ipso et per ipsum sunt; ea vero per ipsum sunt et ex ipso, quorum auctor est; sed non est auctor nisi bonorum. Non ergo ex ipso et per ipsum sunt nisi bona; ita ergo non in ipso sunt nisi bona: non ergo mala in Deo sunt, quia, licet ea noscat, non tamen ita omnino noscit, ut bona. Mala quasi de longe cognoscit, ut ait Propheta⁸, et alta a longe cognoscit, id est superbiam. Et alibi ad Deum loquens de malis ait: De absconditis tuis adimpletus est venter eorum. Quod exponens Augustinus: « Abscondita, inquit, peccata sunt, quae a lumine tuae veritatis absconduntur ». Sed quomodo peccata a lumine veritatis divinae absconduntur, cum a Deo sciantur? Si enim non sciret, quomodo de illis iudicaret et pro illis malos damnaret? Alibi Propheta⁹: Quia neque ab Oriente, neque ab Occidente deest. Quod exponens Cassiodorus inquit: « Neque a bonis, neque a malis deest Deus, sed omnibus praesens et cognitor est ». Cognoscit ergo Deus et bona et mala per scientiam, sed bona cognoscit etiam per approbationem et per beneplacitum, mala vero non. Unde Cassiodorus super Psalmum dicit: « Peccata abscondita Deo sunt, quia non novit, id est non approbat ». Et ex eo sensu Augustinus dixit ea abscondita a lumine Dei. Qui etiam in Epistola ad Evodium¹⁰ insinuat, cognitionem Dei variis modis accipiendam, inquiens: « Si ad scientiam

referas, non ignorat Deus aliquos vel aliqua, qui tamen in iudicio quibusdam dicet: Non novi vos¹¹, sed eorum improbatio hoc verbo insinuata est ». — Ecce non cognoscere dicitur Deus quae¹² non approbat, quae ei non placent. Apparet itaque, verum esse quod diximus, scilicet quia quodam modo cognoscit Deus bona, quo non cognoscit mala. Pariter quidem utraque eodemque modo noscit quantum ad notitiam, sed bona etiam approbatione et beneplacito cognoscit.

Et inde est, quod bona tantum dicuntur esse in Deo, non mala, et illa prope, haec longe, quia licet in Deo aliqua dicantur esse propter cognitionis praesentiam, et Deus bona et mala cognoscat, mala tamen non cognoscit nisi per notitiam, bona vero non solum per scientiam, sed etiam per approbationem et beneplacitum. Et ob talem cognitionem aliqua dicuntur esse in Deo, scilicet quia ita ea scit, ut etiam approbet, et placeant, id est, ita scit, ut eorum sit auctor.

Cap. III.

Utrum idem sit omnia esse ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso.

Proinde si diligenter inspiciamus, idem videtur esse ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso. Unde Ambrosius in tertio libro de Spiritu sancto¹³: « Haec tria, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso, omnia unum esse, supra diximus. Cum dicit, per ipsum esse omnia, non negavit, in ipso esse omnia. Eandem vim habent omnia haec, scilicet cum ipso et in ipso et per ipsum, et unum in his atque consimile, non contrarium intelligitur ». — Ecce habes, quia ex eadem intelligentia Scriptura dicit, omnia esse in ipso et per ipsum et ex ipso vel cum ipso. Cum ergo ex ea¹⁴ ratione omnia dicantur esse ex Deo vel per ipsum, non solum quia scit, sed etiam quia auctor est eorum; consequitur, ut eadem ratione ea esse in Deo dicantur, scilicet quia scit¹⁵ et eorum auctor est: dicitur, quia in illo vivimus et movemur et sumus, quia eo auctore sumus, movemur et vivimus. Cum ergo non sit auctor nisi bonorum, merito sola bona in eo esse dicuntur, sicut ex ipso et per ipsum. Cum igitur in eius cognitione vel praescientia sint omnia, scilicet bona et mala, in eo tamen non dicuntur esse nisi bona, quorum auctor est. Unde Augustinus in libro de Natura boni¹⁶: « Cum audimus, inquit, ex Deo et per ipsum et in ipso esse omnia, omnes utique naturas intelligere debemus, et omnia quae naturaliter sunt. Neque enim ex ipso sunt peccata, quae naturam non servant, sed vitiant, quae ex voluntate peccantium nascuntur ». — Hic aperte dicitur, quod in illa generalitate locutionis bona tantum continentur.

Cap. IV.

Quod sunt in quolibet trium et per ipsum et in ipso.

Praeterea sciendum est, quod licet ibi indicetur distinctio personarum, cum dicitur: ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso, omnia tamen ex Patre et per Patrem et in Patre sunt; similiter de Filio et de Spiritu sancto accipiendum est. Unde Augustinus in libro de Trinitate¹⁷: « Non confuse, inquit, accipiendum est quod ait Apostolus, ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso: ex ipso dicens propter Patrem, per ipsum propter Filium, in ipso propter Spiritum sanctum ». Vigilanter autem attende, ne, quia Patrem volens intelligi dixit ex ipso, sic intelligas, omnia esse ex Patre, ut neges, omnia esse ex Filio vel ex Spiritu sancto, cum ex Patre et per Patrem et in Patre omnia esse sane dici possit, similiter et de Filio et de Spiritu sancto dicendum est.

Cap. V.

Quod non omnia quae ex Deo sunt, etiam de ipso sunt.

Illud etiam hic annectendum¹⁸ est, quod non omnia quae dicuntur esse ex Deo, etiam de ipso esse dici debeant; « quia, ut ait Augustinus in libro de Natura boni¹⁹, non hoc significat penitus ex ipso, quod de ipso. Quod enim de ipso est, potest dici esse ex ipso, sed non omne quod ex ipso est, potest dici esse de ipso, quia non est de sua substantia. Ex ipso enim sunt caelum et terra, quia ipse fecit ea, non autem de ipso, quia non de substantia sua. Sicut aliquis homo si generat²⁰ filium et facit domum, ex ipso est filius, ex ipso est et domus, sed filius de ipso, domus vero de terra et ligno », non de ipso.

In²¹ praemissis apertum est, quod in Dei cognitione sive praescientia sunt omnia, scilicet bona et mala, sed non omni modo sunt ibi mala, quo bona; et quod in Deo bona tantum sunt, sicut ex ipso et per ipsum, non mala; et ex quo sensu haec accipienda sint, assignatum est; et quod de ipso non dicitur esse proprie quod aliud est ab ipso; ex ipso autem esse dicuntur omnia quae eo auctore sunt.

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DISTINCTION XXXVI.

Chapter I.

Whether all things ought to be said to be in God's essence, in the way that they are said to be in God's cognition or foreknowledge.

It is wont to be asked here — since all things are said to be in God's cognition or foreknowledge¹, or in God by cognition, and His cognition or foreknowledge is the divine essence — whether it is to be conceded that all things are in the divine essence, or in God by essence. — To which we say that God's cognition is indeed His essence, and His foreknowledge, in which all things are, is His cognition; and yet not all things which are in His foreknowledge or cognition ought to be said to be in His essence. For if this were said, they would be understood to be of the same essence with God². For in God [a thing] is said to be by essence which is the divine essence, which is God. God therefore has with Himself in His foreknowledge what He does not have in His [own] nature. Whence Augustine, On the words of the Apostle³, thus says: « He chose us before the foundation of the world. Who is sufficient to expound this? Those are chosen who are not, nor does He err who chooses, nor does He choose in vain; He nevertheless chooses, and has the elect — those whom, as about-to-create, He is to choose — whom He has with Himself not in their nature, but in His foreknowledge ». They to whom [the kingdom] was promised⁴ were not yet, but they themselves were the promised ones, to whom it was promised. — Behold, here he openly says that God has the elect with Himself before the world, not in their nature, but in His foreknowledge — although His foreknowledge is nothing other than His nature, since His foreknowledge is His knowing. It can however be referred to the elect, when he says: in their nature, that is, of those [elect]. For He had them from eternity with Himself, not in their nature⁵, that is, of those who were not yet, but in His foreknowledge, because He so knew them as if they were.

Chapter II.

By what reason good things are said to be in God, and not evil ones.

After the foregoing it is asked — since all things are said to be in God, not by the essence of nature but by the cognition of [His] science, and God knows good and evil things — whether it is to be conceded simply that evils are in God, or are in God by cognition. For God knows, and has always known, all things, both good and evil, even before they were made, and from eternity foreknew them as future. And therefore, since we have said that all good things are in God on account of the foreknowledge of [His] cognition, by the same reason it seems to be said that all evil things are in Him, since He has always known them, and they have been present to Him by cognition. For God foreknew from eternity certain men [as] going to be evil and their malice, as Augustine says⁶ — He foreknew it, but did not prepare it. Since therefore He knows the sins of all, must it be understood that they are included in that generality of expression by which the Apostle said⁷ that all things are in God? From Him, he says, and through Him and in Him are all things. — But who, save a madman, would say that evils are in God? For those things are understood to be in God which are from Him and through Him; but those things are through Him and from Him of which He is the author; but He is not the author save of good things. Therefore there are not from Him and through Him save good things; thus therefore there are not in Him save good things: therefore evils are not in God, because, although He knows them, He does not nevertheless so altogether know them as good things. He knows evils as it were from afar, as the Prophet says⁸: and the lofty He knows from afar, that is, pride. And elsewhere, speaking to God of evils, he says: From Your hidden things their belly is filled. Augustine, expounding [this], says: « Hidden, he says, are the sins which are hidden from the light of Your truth ». But how are sins hidden from the light of divine truth, since they are known by God? For if He did not know, how would He judge concerning them and damn the wicked for them? Elsewhere the Prophet⁹: For [help comes] neither from the East nor from the West. Cassiodorus, expounding [this], says: « God is wanting neither to the good nor to the evil, but is present to all and a knower [of all] ». God therefore knows both good and evil things by [His] science, but the good He also knows by approval and by good pleasure, the evil ones not. Whence Cassiodorus on the Psalm says: « Sins are hidden from God, because He does not know [them], that is, does not approve [them] ». And in that sense Augustine said they were hidden from the light of God. Who also in the Epistle to Evodius¹⁰ suggests that God's cognition is to be taken in various ways, saying: « If you refer [it] to [His] science,

God is not ignorant of any persons or any things, [persons] who nevertheless in the judgment He will say to certain ones: I never knew you¹¹, but their reprobation has been suggested by this word ». — Behold, God is said not to know what¹² He does not approve, [the things] which are not pleasing to Him. It appears therefore that what we have said is true, namely that in a certain way God knows good things in a way in which He does not know evils. Both indeed He knows equally and in the same manner so far as concerns notice, but the good He also knows by approval and good pleasure.

And thence it is that good things alone are said to be in God, not evils — and the former near, the latter far — because, although in God some things are said to be on account of the presence of cognition, and God knows good and evil things, the evils nevertheless He does not know save by notice, but the goods not only by [His] science but also by approval and good pleasure. And on account of such a cognition some things are said to be in God, namely because He so knows them as also to approve [them], and they please [Him] — that is, He so knows them, that He is the author of them.

Chapter III.

Whether to be from God and through Him and in Him is the same.

Therefore, if we look diligently, to be from God and through Him and in Him seems to be the same. Whence Ambrose in the third book On the Holy Spirit¹³: « These three, from Him and through Him and in Him, [signify] all to be one, as we said above. When He says all things to be through Him, He has not denied all things to be in Him. All these have the same force, namely with Him and in Him and through Him; and one in these and consimilar, and not contrary, is understood ». — Behold, you have it, that out of the same understanding Scripture says all things to be in Him and through Him and from Him or with Him. Therefore, since by that¹⁴ reason all things are said to be from God or through Him — not only because He knows, but also because He is the author of them — it follows that by the same reason they are said to be in God, namely because He knows¹⁵ and is the author of them: it is said that in Him we live and move and are, because, with Him as author, we are, are moved, and live. Since therefore He is not the author save of good things, deservedly good things alone are said to be in Him, just as [they are] from Him and through Him. Since therefore in His cognition or foreknowledge there are all things, namely good and evil, in Him nevertheless they are not said to be save the good, of which He is the author. Whence Augustine in his book On the Nature of the Good¹⁶: « When we hear, he says, that from God and through Him and in Him are all things, we ought certainly to understand all natures, and all things which are naturally. For the sins which do not preserve nature but vitiate [it] are not from Him, [the sins] which are born from the will of those who sin ». — Here it is openly said that in that generality of expression good things alone are contained.

Chapter IV.

That [all things] are in [each one] of the three [Persons] and through Him and in Him.

Furthermore it must be known that, although there a distinction of Persons is indicated when it is said from Him and through Him and in Him, all things are nevertheless from the Father and through the Father and in the Father; the same is to be received concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine in his book On the Trinity¹⁷: « What the Apostle says, from Him and through Him and in Him, is not, he says, to be received confusedly: he says from Him on account of the Father, through Him on account of the Son, in Him on account of the Holy Spirit ». But take vigilant heed, lest, because, wishing the Father to be understood, he said from Him, you so understand all things to be from the Father as to deny that all things are from the Son or from the Holy Spirit — since from the Father and through the Father and in the Father all things can soundly be said to be; the same is to be said also concerning the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Chapter V.

That not all things which are from God are also of Him.

This too¹⁸ must here be added, that not all things which are said to be from God ought also to be said to be of Him; « because, as Augustine says in his book On the Nature of the Good¹⁹, from Him does not signify altogether the same as of Him. For what is of Him can be said to be from Him, but not all that is from Him can be said to be of Him, because it is not of His substance. For from Him are heaven and earth, because He made them, but not of Him, because not of His substance. Just as if some man begets²⁰ a son and makes a house — the son is from him, the house also is from him, but the son [is] of him, the house [is] of earth and wood », not of him.

In²¹ the foregoing it has been made plain that in the cognition or foreknowledge of God all things are, namely good and evil, but not in every manner are evils there in the way that goods are; and that in God there are good things alone, just as [they are] from Him and through Him, not evils; and out of what sense these are to be received has been assigned; and that of Him is not properly said to be that which is something other than Himself; but from Him are said to be all things which are by His authorship.

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