Dist. 38
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 38
DISTINCTIO XXXVIII.
Cap. I.
An scientia vel praescientia Dei sit causa rerum vel e converso.
Nunc ergo ad propositum revertentes, coepto insistamus. Supra1 dictum est, quod praescientia Dei futurorum tantum est, sed omnium tam bonorum quam malorum; scientia vero vel sapientia non modo de praeteritis2, sed etiam de praesentibus et futuris, nec tantum de temporalibus, sed etiam de aeternis, quia se ipsum novit Deus. Hic oritur quaestio non dissimulanda, utrum scilicet scientia vel praescientia sit causa rerum, an res sint causa scientiae vel praescientiae Dei. Videtur enim praescientia Dei causa esse eorum quae ei subsunt, ac necessitatem eveniendi eis facere, quia nec aliqua futura fuissent, nisi ea Deus praescisset, nec possunt non evenire, cum Deus ea praesciverit. Si autem impossibile est, ea non evenire, quia praescita sunt, videtur igitur ipsa praescientia, qua praescita sunt, eis esse causa eveniendi. Impossibile est autem, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint, quia si non evenirent, cum praescita sint, falleretur Dei praescientia. At Dei praescientia falli non potest. Impossibile est ergo, ea non evenire, cum praescita sint. Sic igitur praescientia causa eorum esse videtur quae praescita sunt. Hoc idem et de scientia dicitur, scilicet quod, quia Deus aliqua novit, ideo sint. Cui sententiae Augustinus attestari videtur in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate3 sic dicens: « Non ista ex aliquo tempore cognovit Deus; sed futura omnia temporalia atque in eis etiam, quid et quando ab illo petituri fueramus, et quos et de quibus rebus vel exauditurus vel non exauditurus esset, sine initio ante praescivit. Universas autem creaturas, et spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit, sed ideo sunt, quia novit. Non enim nescivit, quae fuerat creaturus: quia ergo scivit, creavit, non quia creavit, scivit; nec aliter scivit creata quam creanda. Non enim eius sapientiae aliquid accessit ex eis, sed illis exsistentibus sicut oportebat et quando oportebat, illa mansit ut erat ». Unde in Ecclesiastico4: Antequam crearentur, omnia nota sunt illi, sic et postquam consummata sunt. — Ecce his verbis videtur Augustinus innuere scientiam vel praescientiam Dei causam esse eorum quae fiunt, cum dicit, ideo ea esse, quia Deus novit. Idem quoque in sexto libro5 dicere videtur: « Cum, inquit, decedant et succedant tempora, non decedit aliquid vel succedit scientiae Dei,
in qua novit omnia quae fecit per ipsam. Non enim haec quae creata sunt, ideo sciuntur a Deo quia facta sunt, sed potius ideo facta sunt, quia immutabiliter ab eo sciuntur ». — Et hic etiam significare videtur Dei scientiam causam esse eorum quae fiunt, dicens, non ideo Deum ea novisse, quia facta sunt, sed ideo facta, quia novit ea Deus. Ideoque videtur Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esse eorum quae novit.
Quod si ita est, est igitur Causa omnium malorum, cum omnia mala sciantur et praesciantur a Deo; quod longe est a veritate. Si enim Dei scientia vel praescientia causa esset malorum, esset utique Deus auctor malorum, quod penitus falsum est. Non igitur scientia vel praescientia Dei causa est omnium quae ei subsunt.
Neque etiam res futurae causa sunt Dei praescientiae: licet enim non essent futurae, nisi praescirentur a Deo, non tamen ideo praesciuntur, quia futurae sunt. Si enim hoc esset, tunc eius quod aeternum est aliquid exsisteret causa ab eo alienum, ab eo diversum, et ex creaturis penderet6 praescientia Creatoris, et creatum causa esset increati. Origenes tamen super Epistolam ad Romanos7 ait: « Non propterea aliquid erit, quia id scit Deus futurum, sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat ». Hoc videtur praemissis verbis Augustini obviare. Hic enim significari videtur, quod res futurae causa sint praescientiae; ibi vero, quod praescientia causa sit rerum futurarum.
Hanc igitur quae videtur repugnantiam de medio tollere cupientes, dicimus, res futuras nullatenus causam esse praescientiae vel scientiae Dei, nec ideo praesciri vel sciri, quia futurae vel factae sunt; ita exponentes quod ait Origenes, quia futurum est, ideo scitur a Deo, antequam fiat, id est, quod futurum est, scitur a Deo antequam fiat, neque sciretur nisi futurum esset, ut non notetur ibi causa nisi sine qua non fieret8. Ita etiam dicimus, scientiam vel praescientiam Dei non esse causam eorum quae fiunt, nisi talem, sine qua non fiunt, si tamen scientiam ad notitiam tantum referamus. Si vero nomine scientiae includitur etiam beneplacitum atque dispositio, tunc recte potest dici causa eorum quae Deus facit. His enim duobus modis, ut superius praetaxatum est, accipitur cognitio vel scientia Dei, scilicet pro notitia sola, vel pro notitia simul et beneplacito. Hoc modo forte accepit Augustinus dicens: Ideo sunt, quia novit, id est, quia scienti placuit, et quia sciens disposuit. Et hic sensus ex eo adiuvatur, quia de bonis ibi tantum agit Augustinus, scilicet de creaturis, et de his quae Deus facit, quae omnia novit non solum scientia, sed etiam beneplacito ac dispositione. Sic ergo ibi accipitur Dei cognitio, ut non modo notitiam, sed etiam beneplacitum Dei significet.
Mala vero scit Deus et praescit, antequam fiant, sed sola notitia, non beneplacito. Praescit enim Deus et praedicit etiam quae non est ipse facturus, sicut praescivit et praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non fecit. Nec ideo, quia praescivit, ad peccatum infidelitatis eos coegit, nec praescisset vel praedixisset eorum mala, nisi essent ea habituri. Unde Augustinus super Ioannem: « Deus, inquit, futurorum praescius per Prophetam praedixit infidelitatem Iudaeorum, sed non fecit, neque praescisset mala eorum, nisi ea haberent. Non enim ideo quemquam ad peccandum cogit, quia futura hominum peccata praenovit; illorum enim praescivit peccata, non sua. Ideoque si ea quae ille praescivit ipsorum, non sunt ipsorum, non vere ille praescivit. Sed quia illius praescientia falli non potest, sine dubio non alius, sed ipsi peccant, quos Deus peccaturos esse praescivit. Et ideo si non malum, sed bonum facere voluissent, non malum facturi praeviderentur ab eo qui novit, quid sit quisque facturus ». — His verbis aperte ostenditur, si diligenter attendamus, praescientiam Dei non esse causam malorum, quae praescit, quia non ea praescit tanquam facturus nec tanquam sua, sed illorum qui sunt ea facturi vel habituri. Praescivit ergo illa sola notitia, non beneplacito auctoritatis. Unde datur intelligi, quod Deus e converso praescit bona tanquam sua, tanquam ea quae facturus est, ut in illa praesciendo simul fuerit ipsius notitia et auctoritatis beneplacitum.
Cap. II.
Utrum praescientia Dei possit falli.
Ad hoc autem, quod supra dictum est, scilicet praescientiam Dei falli non posse, solet a quibusdam sic opponi: Deus praescivit hunc lecturum vel aliquid huiusmodi; sed potest esse, ut iste non legat; ergo potest aliter esse, quam Deus praescivit; ergo potest falli Dei praescientia. — Quod omnino falsum est. Potest equidem non fieri aliquid, et illud tamen praescitum est fieri; non ideo tamen potest falli Dei praescientia, quia si illud non fieret, nec a Deo praescitum esset fieri.
Sed adhuc urgent quaestionem dicentes: aut aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, aut non aliter; si non aliter: ergo necessario cuncta eveniunt; si vero aliter: potest ergo Dei praescientia falli vel mutari. Sed potest aliter fieri, quia potest aliter fieri, quam fiat; ita autem fit, ut praescitum est: aliter ergo potest fieri, quam praescitum est. — Ad quod dicimus, illam locutionem multiplicem facere intelligentiam, scilicet: aliter potest fieri, quam Deus praescivit, et huiusmodi, ut: potest non esse quod Deus praescivit; et: impossibile est, non esse quod Deus praescivit; et: impossibile est, non esse praescita omnia quae fiunt, et huiusmodi. Possunt enim haec coniunctim intelligi, ut conditio sit implicita, et disiunctim. Si enim ita intelligas: non potest aliter fieri, quam Deus praescivit, id est, non potest utrumque simul esse, scilicet quod Deus ita praesciverit fieri, et aliter fiat; verum intelligis. Si autem per disiunctionem intelligas, ut dicas, hoc aliter non posse evenire quam evenit, et quo modo futurum Deus praescivit; falsum est. Hoc enim aliter potest evenire, quam evenit, et tamen Deus hoc modo futurum praescivit. Similiter et alia determinatio, scilicet: impossibile est, illud non evenire, quod Deus praescivit, vel cum Deus praescierit; si coniunctim, intelligas, verum dicis; si disiunctim, falsum. Ita etiam et illud: impossibile est, non esse praescitum omne quod fit, id est, non potest esse utrumque simul, scilicet, ut fiat, et non sit praescitum: hic sensus verus est. Si vero dicis, Deum non potuisse non praescire omne quod fit, falsum est. Potuit enim facere, ut non fieret, et ita non esset praescitum.
---
DISTINCTION XXXVIII.
Chapter I.
Whether the science or foreknowledge of God is the cause of things, or conversely.
Now therefore, returning to our subject, let us press on with what was begun. It has been said above1 that God's foreknowledge concerns only future things, but all of them — both good and evil; whereas [His] science or wisdom [concerns] not only past2, but also present and future things, and not only temporal but also eternal — since God knows Himself. Here arises a question not to be passed over, namely whether the science or foreknowledge [of God] is the cause of things, or whether things are the cause of God's science or foreknowledge. For God's foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which are subject to it, and to make a necessity for them of coming to pass — because no future things would have been, had God not foreknown them, nor can they fail to come to pass, since God has foreknown them. Now if it is impossible for them not to come to pass, because they have been foreknown, it seems then that the very foreknowledge by which they are foreknown is the cause of their coming to pass. But it is impossible for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown — because if they were not to come to pass, although they have been foreknown, God's foreknowledge would be deceived. But God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived. It is impossible therefore for them not to come to pass, since they have been foreknown. Thus then foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which have been foreknown. The same too is said of [God's] science: namely that, because God knows certain things, therefore they are. To which opinion Augustine seems to bear witness in the fifteenth book On the Trinity3, saying thus: « These things God did not come to know from any [point in] time; but all future temporal things — and in them too what and when we were going to ask of Him, and whom and concerning what matters He would or would not hearken — He foreknew, without [any] beginning, beforehand. All creatures, however, both spiritual and corporeal, He knows not because they are, but they are because He knows; for He was not ignorant of what He was going to create: because therefore He knew, He created — not because He created, He knew; nor did He know things created otherwise than [He knew them as] to be created. For nothing has accrued to His wisdom from them, but, with them existing as it was fitting and when it was fitting, [His wisdom] remained as it was ». Whence in Ecclesiasticus4: Before they were created, all things are known to Him; so also after they are completed. — Behold, by these words Augustine seems to suggest that God's science or foreknowledge is the cause of those things which are made, when he says they are because God knows. The same [Augustine] also in the sixth book5 seems to say: « When, he says, times pass away and follow, [yet] nothing passes away or follows for God's science,
in which He knows all things which He has made through it. For these things which have been created are not known by God because they have been made, but rather they have been made because they are immutably known by Him ». — And here too he seems to signify that God's science is the cause of those things which are made, saying that God did not know them because they have been made, but they were made because God knows them. And therefore God's science or foreknowledge seems to be the cause of those things which He knows.
But if this is so, then [God's science] is the Cause of all evils too, since all evils are known and foreknown by God — which is far from the truth. For if God's science or foreknowledge were the cause of evils, surely God would be the author of evils, which is utterly false. Therefore God's science or foreknowledge is not the cause of all things which are subject to it.
Nor again are future things the cause of God's foreknowledge: for although they would not be future, were they not foreknown by God, yet they are not foreknown for the reason that they are future. For if this were so, then there would exist a cause of that which is eternal, [a cause] foreign to it and diverse from it; and the Creator's foreknowledge would depend6 on creatures, and the created would be the cause of the uncreated. Origen, however, on the Epistle to the Romans7 says: « Not for the reason that something will be, does God know it as future; but because it is future, therefore it is known by God, before it comes to be ». This seems to run contrary to the foregoing words of Augustine. For here it seems to be signified that future things are the cause of foreknowledge; but there, that foreknowledge is the cause of future things.
Wishing therefore to remove from our midst this apparent contradiction, we say that future things are by no means the cause of God's foreknowledge or science, nor are they foreknown or known because they are future or accomplished; thus expounding what Origen says — namely that because it is future, therefore it is known by God before it comes to be — that is, what is future is known by God before it comes to be, and would not be known if it were not future, so that nothing is here noted as cause except a sine qua non without which it would not happen8. So too we say that the science or foreknowledge of God is not the cause of those things which are made, except such [a cause] without which they are not made — provided we refer science to bare cognition only. But if under the name of science there is included also good-pleasure and disposition, then [science] can rightly be called the cause of those things which God does. For in these two ways, as has been laid down above, is God's cognition or science taken: namely either for bare cognition, or for cognition together with good-pleasure. In this latter way perhaps Augustine took [it] when saying: They are because He knows — that is, because it pleased the One knowing, and because the One knowing has disposed [it]. And this sense is supported by [the fact] that there Augustine treats only of good things — namely of creatures and of those things which God does — all of which He knows not by science alone but also by good-pleasure and disposition. Thus then there God's cognition is taken so as to signify not only knowledge but also God's good-pleasure.
But evils God knows and foreknows before they come to be — yet by bare cognition only, not by good-pleasure. For God foreknows and even foretells things which He Himself is not going to do, just as He foreknew and foretold the unbelief of the Jews, but did not bring [it] about. Nor for the reason that He foreknew [it] did He compel them to the sin of unbelief; nor would He have foreknown or foretold their evils, had they not been about to have them. Whence Augustine on John: « God, he says, foreknowing future things, foretold through the Prophet the unbelief of the Jews, but did not make [them so]; nor would He have foreknown their evils, had they not [been going to] have them. For He does not for that reason compel anyone to sin, because He has foreknown the future sins of men: for He foreknew their sins, not His own. And therefore if those things which He foreknew of them are not theirs, then He did not truly foreknow [them]. But because His foreknowledge cannot be deceived, without doubt it is not someone else but they themselves who sin, whom God has foreknown to be sinners. And therefore if they had wished to do not evil but good, they would not be foreseen as about to do evil by Him who knows what each is going to do ». — By these words it is openly shown — if we attend diligently — that the foreknowledge of God is not the cause of the evils which He foreknows, since He does not foreknow them as one about to do [them], nor as His own, but as those of the men who are going to do or have them. He has therefore foreknown those [evils] by mere cognition only, not by good-pleasure of authority. Whence it is given to be understood that God conversely foreknows good things as His own, as things which He is going to do — so that in foreknowing them there is at the same time His cognition and the good-pleasure of [His] authority.
Chapter II.
Whether the foreknowledge of God can be deceived.
To that, however, which has been said above — namely that God's foreknowledge cannot be deceived — it is wont to be objected by certain [persons] thus: God foreknew that this man would read, or some such thing; but it can be that this [man] does not read; therefore it can be otherwise than God foreknew; therefore God's foreknowledge can be deceived. — Which [objection] is utterly false. Something can indeed not come to pass, and yet [the same thing] is foreknown to come to pass; nor for that reason however can God's foreknowledge be deceived — since if that [thing] were not to come to pass, neither would it have been foreknown by God to come to pass.
But still they press the question, saying: either it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown, or not otherwise; if not otherwise, then all things come to pass necessarily; if however otherwise, then God's foreknowledge can be deceived or changed. But [you say:] it can be made otherwise — because it can be made otherwise than [actually] is made; but it is so made as it has been foreknown; therefore it can be made otherwise than has been foreknown. — To which we say that this manner of speech makes the meaning manifold, namely: it can be made otherwise than God has foreknown, and the like — as: it is possible for that not to be which God has foreknown; and: it is impossible for that not to be which God has foreknown; and: it is impossible that all things which are made should not have been foreknown, and the like. For these can be understood conjunctively, so that the condition is implicit, and disjunctively. For if you understand thus — it cannot be made otherwise than God has foreknown, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that God should have foreknown [it] to be made [in one way], and [yet] [that] it should be made otherwise — you understand truly. But if you understand by disjunction, so as to say this cannot come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and in the way in which God has foreknown [it] as future, [it is] false. For this can come to pass otherwise than it comes to pass, and yet God has foreknown [it] as future in this way. Similarly also the other determination, namely: it is impossible for that not to come to pass which God has foreknown, or: since God has foreknown it — if conjunctively, you understand [it], you say truly; if disjunctively, falsely. So too that: it is impossible for everything that comes to pass not to have been foreknown, that is, both [things] cannot be at once, namely that something should come to pass and not have been foreknown — this sense is true. But if you say God could not not have foreknown everything that comes to pass, [it is] false. For He could have brought it about that it should not come to pass, and so [it] would not have been foreknown.
---
- Dist. XXXV. c. 1.[Refers above to] distinction XXXV, c. 1.
- Ita in codd. ABE et edd. 1, 6, in aliis non bene futuris. Deinde Vat. cum plurimis edd. causae scientiae pro causa scientiae, refragantibus codd. et ed. 1.Thus in codices ABE and editions 1 and 6; in the others, not well, futuris ("of future things"). Then the Vatican with most editions [reads] causae scientiae ("of-the-cause of the science") in place of causa scientiae ("the cause of the science"), the codices and edition 1 opposing.
- Cap. 13. n. 22. — Paulo ante Vat. cum paucis edd. noverit loco novit.[Augustine, On the Trinity book XV,] c. 13, n. 22. — A little before, the Vatican with a few editions [reads] noverit ("may have known") in place of novit ("knows").
- Cap. 23, 29. Vulgata: Domino enim Deo, antequam crearentur, omnia sunt agnita: sic et post perfectum respicit omnia.[Ecclesiasticus,] c. 23, [v.] 29. The Vulgate [reads]: For to the Lord God, before they were created, all things are known; so also after they are completed He looks upon all things.
- De Trin. c. 10. n. 11, sed verbis transpositis.[Augustine,] On the Trinity [book VI,] c. 10, n. 11 — but with the words transposed.
- Ita in codd. et ed. 1; in Vat. et aliis scientia. Immediate ante Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 dependeret pro penderet.Thus in the codices and edition 1; in the Vatican and others [the reading is] scientia ("science"). Immediately before, the Vatican and editions 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 [read] dependeret ("would depend on") in place of penderet ("would hang upon").
- Libr. VII. n. 8. (ad Rom. 8, 30.).[Origen, On the Epistle to the Romans,] book VII, n. 8 (on Romans 8:30).
- Codd. ABC et ed. 1 (B in margine) fis, cod. E fiat. — Dist. XXXVI. c. 2. — Tract. 53. n. 4; sed tantum secundum sensum. — Illi codd. ACDE, edd. 1, 6 et originale Augustini, in aliis omittitur ipsorum. Deinde codd. ABCE et omnes edd., excepta Vat., vera pro vere, sed contra originale et cod. D. Deinde, praeter originale et ed. 1, Vat. cum aliis peccatores esse pro peccaturos esse. — Codd. BCDE et ed. 1 intendamus, cod. A inspiciamus. — Vat. aliaeque edd., excepta 1, omittunt in, refragantibus codd.Codices ABC and edition 1 (B in the margin) [read] fis; codex E [reads] fiat ("let it be made"). — [Cf.] distinction XXXVI, c. 2. — Tract. 53, n. 4 — but only according to sense. — These codices: ACDE, editions 1 and 6, and the original of Augustine [retain ipsorum]; in the others ipsorum ("of them") is omitted. Then codices ABCE and all editions, except the Vatican, [read] vera ("true things") in place of vere ("truly") — but against the original and codex D. Then, besides the original and edition 1, the Vatican with others [reads] peccatores esse ("to be sinners") in place of peccaturos esse ("to be about to sin"). — Codices BCDE and edition 1 [read] intendamus ("let us attend"); codex A [reads] inspiciamus ("let us inspect"). — The Vatican and other editions, except 1, omit in, the codices opposing. (This is a composite footer entry: the OCR carries on the printed-p. 668 footer eight short notes referring to multiple anchors — codex variants for fis/fiat, the cross-reference to Dist. XXXVI c. 2, the Tract. 53 reference, the ipsorum / vera-vere / peccatores-peccaturos esse triple variant, plus the intendamus / inspiciamus and in-omission notes — all of which the chunk's body collapses under this single footnote anchor since the OCR-anchor-pegging in the body for those individual notes was lost to column-rule artifacts.) ---