Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XLIV.

Cap. I.

An Deus possit facere aliquid melius, quam facit, vel alio vel meliori modo.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Nunc illud restat discutiendum, utrum melius aliquid Deus¹ possit facere, quam facit. Solent enim illi scrutatores dicere, quod ea quae facit Deus, non potest meliora facere, quia si posset facere et non faceret, invidus esset summe bonus. Et hoc ex simili astruere conantur. Ait enim Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum²: « Deus quem genuit, quoniam meliorem se generare non potuit — nihil enim Deo melius — generare debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit et noluit, invidus. Ex quo conficitur aequalem genuisse filium ». A simili volunt dicere, quod si potest Deus rem meliorem facere, quam facit, invidus est. — Sed non valet huius similitudinis inductio, quia filium genuit de substantia sua; ideoque, si posset gignere aequalem et non gigneret, invidus esset. Alia vero, quae non de substantia sua facit, meliora facere potest.

Verum hic ab eis responderi deposco, cur dicant, rem aliquam sive etiam rerum universitatem, in qua maior consummatio expressa est, non posse esse meliorem, quam est: sive ideo, quia summe bona est, ita ut nulla omnino boni perfectio ei desit, sive ideo, quia maius bonum, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat. Sed si ita summe bona dicitur, ut nulla ei perfectio boni desit, iam creatura Creatori aequatur. Si vero ideo non potest melior esse, quia bonum amplius, quod ei deest, capere ipsa non valeat; iam hoc ipsum non posse defectionis est, non consummationis; et potest esse melior, si fiat capax melioris boni, quod ipse potest qui eam fecit. Potest ergo Deus meliorem rem facere, quam faciat³. Unde Augustinus super Genesim: « Talem potuit Deus hominem fecisse, qui nec peccare posset nec vellet; et si talem fecisset, quis dubitat, eum meliorem fuisse »? — Ex praedictis constat, quod potest Deus et alia facere, quam facit, et quae facit meliora ea facere, quam facit.

Post haec considerandum est, utrum alio modo vel meliori, quam facit, possit ea facere quae facit. Si modus operationis ad sapientiam opificis referatur, nec alius nec melior⁴ esse potest. Non enim potest facere aliquid aliter vel melius, quam facit, id est alia sapientia vel maiori sapientia; nihil enim sapientius potest facere, quam facit. Si vero referatur modus ad rem ipsam, quam facit Deus, dicimus, quia et alius et melior potest esse modus. Et secundum hoc concedi potest, quia ea quae facit, potest facere melius et aliter, quam facit, quia potest quibusdam meliorem modum existendi praestare, et quibusdam alium. Unde Augustinus in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate⁵: quod fuit et alius modus nostrae liberationis possibilis Deo, qui omnia potest; sed nullus alius nostrae miseriae sanandae fuit convenientior. Potest igitur Deus eorum quae facit, quaedam alio modo meliori, quaedam alio modo aeque bono, quaedam etiam minus bono facere, quam facit; ut tamen modus referatur ad qualitatem⁶ creaturae, non ad sapientiam Creatoris.

Cap. II.

Utrum Deus semper possit omne quod potuit.

Praeterea quaeri solet, utrum Deus semper possit omne quod olim potuit. Quod quibusdam non videtur dicentibus: Potuit Deus incarnari et potuit mori et resurgere, et alia huiusmodi, quae modo non potest. Potuit ergo quae modo non potest, et ita habuit potentiam, quam modo non habet. Unde videtur eius potentia imminuta. — Ad quod⁸ dicimus, quia sicut⁷ omnia semper scit, quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult, quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquam scientiam amittit, vel voluntatem mutat, quam habuit; ita omnia semper potest, quae aliquando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus potentia incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enim potuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo incarnatus esse, in quo eiusdem rei potentia monstratur. Ut enim olim scivit, se resurrecturum, et modo scit, se resurrexisse, nec est alia scientia illud olim scivisse, et hoc modo scire, sed eadem omnino; et sicut voluit olim resurgere, et modo resurrexisse, in quo unius rei voluntas exprimitur; ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, et modo potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse; et est eiusdem rei potentia. Si enim posset modo nasci et resurgere, non esset idem posse. Verba enim diversorum temporum, diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum: ut modo loquentes dicimus: iste potest legere hodie, cras autem dicemus: iste potest legisse, vel potuit legere heri, ubi⁹ p. 780 unius rei monstratur potentia. Si autem diversis temporibus loquentes eiusdem temporis verbis et adverbiis utamur, dicentes hodie: Iste potest legere hodie, et dicentes cras: iste potest hodie legere; non idem, sed diversa dicimus eum posse. Fateamur igitur, Deum semper posse quidquid semel potuit, id est habere omnem illam potentiam, quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiam, cuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud, quod aliquando potuit facere; potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit. Similiter quidquid voluit, et vult, id est, omnem quam habuit voluntatem et modo habet; et cuiuscumque rei voluntatem habuit, et modo habet; non tamen vult esse vel fieri omne, quod aliquando voluit esse vel fieri, sed vult fuisse vel factum esse. Ita et de scientia Dei dicendum est.

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DISTINCTION XLIV.

Chapter I.

Whether God can make anything better than he makes [it], or in another or a better way.

Now this remains to be discussed, whether God¹ can make anything better than he makes. For those searchers are wont to say that the things which God makes, he cannot make better, because if he could make [them better] and did not do so, he would not be supremely good, but envious. And this they strive to establish from a similar case. For Augustine in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions² says: « God, whom he begot, since he could not generate one better than himself — for nothing is better than God — he had to generate an equal. For if he willed and could not, he is weak; if he could and would not, he is envious. From which it is concluded that he begot an equal Son. » By a similar [reasoning] they wish to say that if God can make a thing better than he makes it, he is envious. — But the inference of this similitude does not hold, because he begot the Son from his own substance; and therefore, if he could have begotten an equal and did not, he would have been envious. But the other things, which he does not make from his own substance, he can make better.

But here I demand a response from them: why do they say that any thing, or even the totality of things, in which a greater perfection has been expressed, cannot be better than it is — either because it is supremely good, so that no perfection of good is altogether lacking to it; or because the greater good which is lacking to it, it cannot receive? But if it is said to be supremely good in such a way that no perfection of good is lacking to it, then the creature is equated to the Creator. But if it cannot be better because the greater good which is lacking to it, it cannot receive — then this very not-being-able is of defect, not of perfection; and it can be better, if it is made capable of a better good, which he himself who made it can [do]. Therefore God can make a better thing than he makes³. Whence Augustine on Genesis: « God could have made man such, that he should be unable and unwilling to sin; and if he had made him such, who doubts that he would have been better »? — From the foregoing it is established that God can both make other [things] than he makes, and can make those which he makes better than he makes them.

After this it must be considered, whether in another or better way than he does, he can make those things which he makes. If the manner of operation is referred to the wisdom of the operator, it can neither be other nor better⁴. For he cannot do anything otherwise or better than he does — that is, with another wisdom or with greater wisdom; for he cannot do anything more wisely than he does. But if the manner is referred to the thing itself which God makes, we say that the manner can be both other and better. And according to this it can be conceded that the things he makes, he can make better and otherwise than he makes them, because he can grant to some a better mode of existing, and to others another. Whence Augustine in the thirteenth book On the Trinity⁵: that there was another mode of our liberation possible to God, who can do all things; but no other was more fitting for the healing of our misery. Therefore God can make some of the things he makes in another and better way, some in another way equally good, and some even in a less good way than he makes them; provided, however, that the mode be referred to the quality⁶ of the creature, not to the wisdom of the Creator.

Chapter II.

Whether God always has the power to do everything he once could do.

Furthermore, it is wont to be asked whether God can always [do] everything he once could do. To some it does not seem so, who say: God could become incarnate, and could die and rise again, and other things of this kind, which now he cannot. Therefore he could [do] things which now he cannot, and so he had a power which now he does not have. Whence his power seems to have been diminished. — To which⁸ we say that, just as⁷ he always knows all things which at some time he knew, and always wills [those] which at some time he willed, nor ever loses any knowledge nor changes a will which he had; so he can always [do] all the things which at some time he could, nor is he ever deprived of any of his power. Therefore he is not deprived of the power of becoming incarnate or of rising again, although he cannot now become incarnate or rise. For as he once could become incarnate, so even now he can have-been incarnate, in which the power of the same thing is shown. For as he once knew that he was going to rise, and now knows that he has risen — nor is it another knowledge to have once known that, and now to know this, but altogether the same; and as he once willed to rise, and [now wills] now to have risen, in which the will of one [and the same] thing is expressed — so he could once be born and rise, and now can have-been-born and have-risen; and it is the power of the same thing. For if he could now be born and rise, it would not be the same power. For the words of different tenses, uttered at different times and joined with different adverbs, make the same sense: as speaking now we say: this one can read today, but tomorrow we shall say: this one can have-read, or he could read yesterday, where⁹ p. 780 the power of one [and the same] thing is shown. But if, speaking at different times, we use words and adverbs of the same tense — saying today: this one can read today, and saying tomorrow: this one can read today — we do not say that he can [do] the same, but different things. Let us confess therefore that God can always [do] whatever he once could — that is, [he can] have every power which he once had, and the power of every thing of which he once had [the power]; but not that he can always do everything which he at some time could do; he can indeed do, or have done, that which at some time he could. Similarly, whatever he willed, he also wills — that is, [he has] every will which he had, and now has; and of whatever thing he had the will, he now also has it; nevertheless he does not will every [thing] which at some time he willed to be or to come-to-be, [now] to be or to come-to-be, but he wills it to have-been or to have-come-to-be. And so it must be said also of God's knowledge.

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