Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XLV.

Cap. I.

De voluntate Dei, quae essentia Dei est, et de signis eius.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Iam de voluntate Dei aliquid pro sensus nostri imbecillitate dicendum est. Sciendum est igitur, quia voluntas sive volens de Deo secundum essentiam dicitur. Non est enim ei aliud velle et aliud esse, sed omnino idem. Et sicut idem est ei esse bonum quod esse Deum, ita idem est ei esse volentem quod esse Deum. Nam voluntas, qua semper volens est, non affectus vel motus est, qui in Deum cadere non valet, sed divina usia, qua volens est, Deus est¹, et huiusmodi.

Cap. II.

Quod licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen potest dici Deus esse omnia quae vult.

Et licet idem sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen dicendum est Deum esse omnia quae vult. Quod quidam, de Dei voluntate non recte sentientes, nobis obiiciunt dicentes: Si idem est Deo velle quod esse, ergo cum dicimus, Deum velle omnia quae facit, dicimus, eum esse omnia quae facit; alioquin non ibi illo verbo² idem significatur quod significatur hoc verbo esse, cum de Deo dicitur. Et si ita est, non semper dicitur de Deo velle secundum essentiam. Si vero secundum essentiam non dicitur aliquando, quomodo ergo dicitur de Deo? Relative enim numquam dicitur. — Ad quod dicimus, quia licet idem penitus sit Deo velle quod esse, non tamen potest dici esse omnia quae vult; sicut idem est Deo esse quod scire, nec tamen sicut dicitur scire omnia, ita quoque potest dici esse omnia.

Cap. III.

De intelligentia harum locutionum: Deus scit, vel Deus vult, Deus scit omnia vel vult aliquid.

Et ubicumque Deus dicitur scire vel sciens, et velle vel volens, haec de eo³ secundum essentiam dicuntur. Cum enim dicitur: Deus scit vel Deus vult, sive Deus est sciens vel volens, essentia divina praedicatur et Deus esse⁴ enuntiatur. Cum autem additur omnia vel aliquid vel aliqua, et dicitur: Deus scit omnia, vel vult aliquid vel aliqua: essentia quidem divina praedicatur, non simpliciter et absolute, sed ita ut scientiae, quae ipse est, omnia subiecta monstrentur, et voluntati, quae ipsa eadem est, aliquid vel aliqua subiecta esse dicantur, ut talis fiat sensus: Deus scit omnia, id est, Deus est, cuius scientiae, quae ipsius essentia est, omnia subiecta sunt. Similiter: Deus vult haec vel illa, id est, Deus est, cuius voluntati, quae ipse est⁵, haec sive illa subiecta sunt. Volens ergo sive velle dicitur Deus secundum essentiam, cuius voluntas essentia est sempiterna et immutabilis — licet ea varientur et transeant, quae ei subiecta sunt — quae non potest esse iniusta nec mala, quia Deus est.

Cap. IV.

Quod Dei voluntas summe bona causa est omnium quae naturaliter sunt, cuius causa non est quaerenda, quia prima et summa causa est omnium.

Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt vel facta sive futura sunt, quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est. Ideoque causa ipsius quaerenda non est. Qui enim eius causam quaerit, aliquid maius ea quaerit, cum nihil ea maius sit. Unde Augustinus in libro Octoginta trium Quaestionum⁶: « Qui quaerit, quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Omnis autem causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur. Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei. Non ergo eius causa quaerenda est ». Idem in libro de Genesi contra Manichaeos⁷: « Si qui dixerint: Quid placuit Deo facere caelum et terram? respondendum est eis: qui voluntatem Dei nosse desiderant, causas voluntatis⁸ Dei scire quaerunt, cum voluntas Dei omnium quae sunt, ipsa sit causa. Si enim habet causam voluntas, est aliquid quod antecedat voluntatem Dei, quod nefas est credere. Qui ergo dicit: Quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? respondendum est illi: quia voluit⁹. Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae, et ideo maior est voluntas Dei quam caelum et terra. Qui autem dicit: Quare voluit facere caelum et terram? maius aliquid quaerit, quam est voluntas Dei; nihil autem maius inveniri potest. Compescat se ergo humana temeritas, et id quod non est, non quaerat, ne id quod est, non inveniat ». — Ecce his auctoritatibus aperte insinuatur, quod voluntatis Dei causa nulla est, et ideo quaerenda non est.

« Voluntas igitur Dei, ut ait Augustinus in tertio libro de Trinitate¹⁰, prima et summa causa est omnium specierum atque motionum. Nihil enim fit, quod non de interiori atque intelligibili aula summi Imperatoris egrediatur secundum ineffabilem iustitiam ». « Ubi enim non operatur quod vult Dei omnipotentis sapientia? quae pertingit a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter¹¹ », « et non solum facit ea quae perseverantia consuetudinis admirationem non admittunt », « sed etiam ea quae propter raritatem et insolitum eventum mira videntur, ut sunt defectus luminarium et terrae motus et monstruosi animantium partus et his similia, quorum nihil fit sine¹² voluntate Dei, sed plerisque non apparet. Ideoque placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam causis aliis ea tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, id est voluntatem Dei. Itaque non nisi Dei voluntas causa prima est sanitatis, aegritudinis, praemiorum atque poenarum, gratiarum et retributionum ». Haec igitur sola est, unde ortum est quidquid est, et ipsa non est orta, sed aeterna.

Cap. V.

Quibus modis accipitur Dei voluntas.

Hic non est praetereundum nobis, quod sacra Scriptura de voluntate Dei variis modis loqui consuevit; et tamen non est Dei voluntas diversa, sed locutio diversa est de voluntate, quia nomine voluntatis diversa accipit. Nam voluntas Dei vere ac proprie dicitur quae in ipso est et ipsius essentia est; et haec una est nec multiplicitatem recipit nec mutabilitatem, quae inexpleta esse non potest, de qua Propheta ait¹³: Omnia quaecumque voluit, Dominus fecit. Et Apostolus: Voluntati eius quis resistit? Et alibi: Ut probetis, quae sit voluntas Dei bona et beneplacens et perfecta. Et haec voluntas recte appellatur beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio.

Cap. VI.

Quod praeceptio, prohibitio, permissio, consilium, operatio nomine voluntatis interdum intelliguntur.

Aliquando vero secundum quamdam dicendi figuram voluntas Dei vocatur quod secundum proprietatem non est voluntas eius, ut praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, nec non permissio et operatio. Ideoque pluraliter aliquando Scriptura voluntates Dei pronuntiat. Unde Propheta¹⁴: Magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius. Cum non sit nisi una voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, pluraliter tamen dicit voluntates, quia voluntas Dei variis modis ac pro diversis accipitur, ut dictum est. Ita etiam idem Propheta propter multos effectus misericordiae et iustitiae pluraliter dicit¹⁵: Misericordias Domini in aeternum cantabo. Et alibi: Iustitiae Domini rectae, laetificantes corda, cum tamen in Deo una sit misericordia, una iustitia, eademque¹⁶ sit misericordia quae iustitia, scilicet divina usia.

Ideo autem praeceptio et prohibitio atque consilium, cum sint tria, dicitur tamen unumquodque eorum Dei voluntas, quia ista signa sunt divinae voluntatis: quemadmodum et signa irae dicuntur ira, et dilectionis signa dilectio appellantur; et dicitur iratus p. 796 Deus, et tamen non est ira in eo aliqua; sed signa tantum, quae foris fiunt, quibus iratus ostenditur, ira ipsius nominantur. Est figura dicendi, secundum quam non est falsum quod dicitur, sed verum, quod dicitur, sub tropi nubilo obumbratur. Et secundum hos tropos diversae voluntates Dei dicuntur, quia diversa sunt illa quae per tropum voluntas Dei dicuntur.

Pro praecepto Dei atque consilio potest accipi voluntas, ut ibi¹⁷: Fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra. Et alibi: Qui fecit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in caelis est, ipse frater meus et soror et mater est. Et contra hanc voluntatem multa fiunt. Unde Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et littera¹⁸: « Infideles, inquit, contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum eius Evangelio non credunt ».

Cap. VII.

Quod Deus velit ab omnibus fieri ea quae praecipit, vel non fieri quae prohibet.

Et si illa tria dicuntur Dei voluntas, ideo quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, non est tamen intelligendum, Deum omne illud fieri velle, quod cuicumque praecepit, vel non fieri quod prohibuit. Praecepit enim Abrahae immolare filium, nec tamen voluit; nec ideo praecepit, ut id fieret, sed ut Abrahae probaretur fides¹⁹. Et in Evangelio praecepit sanato, ne cui diceret; ille autem praedicavit ubique, intelligens, Deum non ideo prohibuisse, quin vellet opus suum praedicari, sed ut daret formam homini laudem humanam declinandi.

Permissio quoque Dei et operatio voluntas Dei appellantur, qualiter accipit Augustinus in Enchiridio²⁰ dicens: « Non fit aliquid, nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo, ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo. Nec dubitandum est, Deum facere bene etiam sinendo fieri, quaecumque fiunt male. Non enim hoc nisi iusto iudicio sinit, et profecto bonum est omne quod iustum est ». — Ecce manifeste hic habes²¹, Dei voluntatem appellari ipsius operationem vel permissionem, cum dicit, non fieri aliquid, nisi Omnipotens fieri velit, ubi includit et bona et mala omnia, quae fiunt. Ideoque aperte distinguit, quomodo Deum velle dixerit, ne eadem ratione intelligeretur velle bona et mala, subdens vel sinendo, ut fiat — hoc quantum ad mala — dicit vel ipse faciendo — hoc quantum ad bona. Mala enim sinit fieri, sed non facit; bona vero ipse facit. Ideoque dixit, eum velle, quia et volens²² mala sinit et volens bona operatur; et ob hoc permissio et operatio voluntas Dei dicuntur.

Quinque igitur supra posita sunt, quae dicuntur secundum tropum Dei voluntas, quia signa sunt divinae voluntatis, quae una est et immutabilis, scilicet Dei beneplacitum. Ideoque diligenter distinguat lector, ubi²³ de voluntate Dei Scriptura commemorat, iuxta quem modum accipi oporteat, utrum scilicet pro beneplacito Dei, an pro aliquo signorum eius. Magna enim est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinae voluntatis, quia et beneplacitum Dei est voluntas eius, et signum beneplaciti eius dicitur voluntas eius. Sed beneplacitum eius aeternum est, signum vero beneplaciti eius non; et consonat rerum effectibus beneplacitum ipsius, et ipsi effectus rerum ab illo non discordant. Fit enim omne quod beneplacito vult fieri, et omne quod non vult fieri, nequaquam fit. Non ita autem est de signis, quia praecepit Deus multis ea quae non faciunt, et prohibet quae non cavent, et consulit quae non implent²⁴.

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DISTINCTION XLV.

Chapter I.

On the will of God, which is the essence of God, and on its signs.

Now concerning the will of God something must be said, according to the feebleness of our understanding. It must be known therefore that will or willing is said of God according to essence. For to will and to be are not for him one thing and another, but altogether the same. And as for him to be good is the same as to be God, so for him to be willing is the same as to be God. For the will, by which he is always willing, is not an affect or motion — which cannot fall on God — but the divine substance, by which he is willing, is God¹, and the like.

Chapter II.

That although for God to will is the same as to be, yet it cannot be said that God is all the things which he wills.

And although for God to will is the same as to be, yet it must not be said that God is all the things which he wills. Which objection certain men, not rightly thinking concerning the will of God, raise against us, saying: If for God to will is the same as to be, then when we say that God wills all the things which he does, we are saying that he is all the things which he does; otherwise that word² [used] there does not signify the same as is signified by this word to be, when it is said of God. And if this is so, then willing is not always said of God according to essence. But if at some time it is not said according to essence, how then is it said of God? For relatively it is never said. — To which we say that, although for God to will is altogether the same as to be, yet he cannot be said to be all the things which he wills; just as for God to be is the same as to know, and yet just as he is said to know all things, he cannot in like manner be said to be all things.

Chapter III.

On the understanding of these expressions: God knows, or God wills; God knows all things, or wills something.

And wherever God is said to know or to be knowing, and to will or to be willing, these things are said of him³ according to essence. For when it is said: God knows or God wills, or God is knowing or willing, the divine essence is predicated and God is declared to be⁴. But when there is added all things or something or some things, and it is said: God knows all things, or wills something or some things — the divine essence is indeed predicated, not simply and absolutely, but in such a way that all things are shown to be subject to his knowledge, which he himself is, and something or some things are said to be subject to his will, which is itself the same — so that this is the sense: God knows all things, that is, God is [he] to whose knowledge, which is his essence, all things are subject. Likewise: God wills these things or those, that is, God is [he] to whose will, which he himself is⁵, these or those are subject. Therefore willing or to will is said of God according to essence, whose will is essence — eternal and immutable — although those things may be varied and pass away which are subject to it; [the will] which cannot be unjust nor evil, because it is God.

Chapter IV.

That God's supremely good will is the cause of all things which exist naturally, of which the cause is not to be sought, because it is the first and highest cause of all things.

This therefore supremely good will is the cause of all things which naturally come into being, or have been done, or are to come, which no preceding cause has anticipated, because it is eternal. And therefore its cause is not to be sought. For he who seeks its cause seeks something greater than it, since nothing is greater than it. Whence Augustine in the book Of the Eighty-three Questions⁶: « He who asks why God willed to make the world, seeks the cause of the will of God. But every efficient cause is greater than that which is effected. But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore its cause is not to be sought. » The same in the book On Genesis Against the Manichees⁷: « If any shall have said: What pleased God to make the heaven and the earth? it must be answered to them: those who desire to know the will of God seek to know the causes of God's will⁸, although the will of God is itself the cause of all the things that are. For if the will has a cause, there is something which precedes the will of God, which it is impious to believe. He therefore who asks: Why did God make the heaven and the earth? must be answered: because he willed it⁹. For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth, and therefore the will of God is greater than heaven and earth. But he who asks: Why did he will to make heaven and earth? seeks something greater than the will of God; but nothing greater can be found. Let human temerity therefore restrain itself, and let it not seek that which is not, lest it not find that which is. » — Behold, by these authorities it is openly intimated that the cause of God's will is nothing, and therefore is not to be sought.

« The will of God therefore, as Augustine says in the third book On the Trinity¹⁰, is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. For nothing comes to be, which does not go forth from the inner and intelligible hall of the supreme Emperor according to ineffable justice. » « For where does the wisdom of the omnipotent God not work that which it wills? — [that wisdom] which reaches mightily from end to end, and disposes all things sweetly¹¹ », « and not only does those things which by the perseverance of custom admit no wonder », « but also those things which on account of rarity and unusual occurrence seem wonderful — such as defects of the luminaries and earthquakes and monstrous births of living things and the like, none of which comes to be without¹² the will of God, although it does not appear so to most. And therefore the vanity of the philosophers chose to attribute these things to other causes also, since they were altogether unable to see the cause higher than all the rest — that is, the will of God. And so the will of God alone is the first cause of health, of sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and retributions. » This [will] therefore alone is that from which whatever is has sprung, and itself has not sprung but is eternal.

Chapter V.

In what ways the will of God is taken.

Here it must not be passed over by us, that sacred Scripture has been accustomed to speak of God's will in various ways; and yet the will of God is not diverse, but the manner of speaking concerning the will is diverse, because under the name of will it takes diverse things. For the will of God is truly and properly said [to be] that which is in him and is his essence; and this is one, and admits neither multiplicity nor mutability — [the will] which cannot be unfulfilled, of which the Prophet says¹³: All things whatsoever the Lord willed, he did. And the Apostle: Who resists his will? And elsewhere: That you may prove what is the good and well-pleasing and perfect will of God. And this will is rightly called the good pleasure of God or disposition.

Chapter VI.

That precept, prohibition, permission, counsel, and operation are sometimes understood under the name of "will."

But sometimes, according to a certain figure of speaking, that is called the will of God which according to propriety is not his will — such as precept, prohibition, counsel, and likewise permission and operation. And therefore Scripture sometimes pronounces the wills of God in the plural. Whence the Prophet¹⁴: Great are the works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills. Although there is but one will of God, which he himself is, yet [the prophet] says wills in the plural, because the will of God is taken in various ways and for diverse things, as has been said. Likewise also the same Prophet, on account of the many effects of mercy and of justice, says in the plural¹⁵: The mercies of the Lord I will sing forever. And elsewhere: The justices of the Lord are right, gladdening hearts — although in God there is one mercy, one justice, and the same¹⁶ is mercy as is justice, namely, the divine substance.

But precept and prohibition and counsel, since they are three, [yet] each one of them is called the will of God, because these are signs of the divine will: just as the signs of anger are called anger, and the signs of love are called love; and God is said to be angry — p. 796 and yet there is no anger at all in him; but only the signs, which come to pass outwardly, by which he is shown to be angry, are named his anger. It is a figure of speech, according to which what is said is not false, but the truth which is said is overshadowed under the cloud of a trope. And according to these tropes the diverse wills of God are spoken of, because diverse are the things which through a trope are called the will of God.

For the precept and counsel of God, will can be taken, as in this place¹⁷: Thy will be done, as in heaven so on earth. And elsewhere: He who does the will of my Father, who is in heaven, he is my brother and sister and mother. And against this will many things come to pass. Whence Augustine in the book On the Spirit and the Letter¹⁸: « Unbelievers, he says, act against the will of God, when they do not believe his Gospel. »

Chapter VII.

That God wills all to do those things which he commands, or not to do those which he forbids.

And if those three are called the will of God on the ground that they are signs of the divine will, it must not however be thought that God wills everything to be done which he commands to anyone, or [wills] anything not to be done which he forbids. For he commanded Abraham to immolate his son, and yet did not will [it]; nor did he command for this reason, that it should be done, but that the faith of Abraham might be tested¹⁹. And in the Gospel he commanded the healed [man] to tell no one; but he preached everywhere, understanding that God had not forbidden [it] for this reason — that he was unwilling that his work be preached — but that he might give to man a pattern of declining human praise.

The permission also of God and his operation are called the will of God, in the way Augustine takes it in the Enchiridion²⁰, saying: « Nothing comes to be, unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — either by allowing [it] to come to be, or by himself doing [it]. Nor must it be doubted that God does well even by allowing the things to be done, whatsoever come to be evilly. For he does not [allow] this except by a just judgment, and surely good is all that is just. » — Behold, here you plainly have²¹ [it], that the will of God is called his operation or his permission, when he says: nothing comes to be unless the Omnipotent wills it to be — where he includes both all good things and all evil things which come to be. And therefore he plainly distinguishes how he said that God wills, lest by the same reckoning it should be understood that he wills both good things and evil things, adding either by allowing it to come to be — this in respect of evil things — and saying or by himself doing — this in respect of good things. For he allows evil things to come to be, but does not do them; whereas good things he himself does. And therefore he said that he wills, because as willing²² he allows evil things, and as willing he works good things; and on this account permission and operation are called the will of God.

Five things therefore have been set forth above, which are said according to a trope [to be] the will of God, because they are signs of the divine will, which is one and immutable — namely, the good pleasure of God. And therefore let the reader diligently distinguish, when²³ Scripture makes mention of the will of God, in what way it must be taken — whether, namely, for the good pleasure of God, or for some sign of him. For great discretion must be employed in the knowledge of the divine will, because both the good pleasure of God is his will, and the sign of his good pleasure is called his will. But his good pleasure is eternal, but the sign of his good pleasure is not; and his good pleasure is in concord with the effects of things, and the effects of things do not disagree with it. For all that he wills by good pleasure to be done comes to be, and all that he does not will to be done in no way comes to be. But it is not so concerning the signs, because God has commanded to many [men] things which they do not do, and forbids what they do not avoid, and counsels what they do not fulfill²⁴.

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