Dist. 47
Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 47
DISTINCTIO XLVII.
Cap. I.
Quod voluntas Dei de homine impletur, quocumque se vertat.
The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).
Voluntas quippe Dei semper efficax est, ut fiat omne quod velit, et nihil fiat quod nolit; quae de homine semper impletur, quocumque se vertat. Nihil enim, ut ait Augustinus1, in libero arbitrio constitutum superat voluntatem Dei; etsi faciat contra eius voluntatem, tamen contra eius voluntatem, quae ipse est, nihil putandum est ita fieri, tanquam velit fieri, et non fiat; vel nolit fieri, et fiat. Illa enim voluntas, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio2, semper impletur aut de nobis, aut a nobis. De nobis impletur, sed tamen non implemus eam, quando peccamus. A nobis impletur, quando bonum facimus; ideo enim facimus, quia scimus placere Deo. Ita et de homine semper Deus implet suam voluntatem, quia nihil facit homo, de quo Deus non operetur quod vult. Non enim vult Deus, ut peccet homo quilibet. Si autem peccaverit, poenitenti vult parcere, ut vivat, in peccatis vero perseverantem punire, ut iustitiae potentiam contumax non evadat. Sicut alios ab aeterno praeparavit ad poenam, ita alios praeparavit ad gloriam. « Et haec sunt magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius3, et tam sapienter exquisita, ut cum angelica et humana creatura peccasset, id est non quod ille, sed quod voluit ipsa fecisset, etiam per eandem creaturae voluntatem, qua factum est, quod Creator non voluit, impleret ipse quod voluit: bene utens etiam malis tanquam summe bonus ad eorum damnationem, quos iuste praedestinavit ad poenam, et ad eorum salutem, quos benigne praedestinavit ad gratiam4. Quantum enim ad ipsos attinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id facere valuerunt. Hoc quippe ipso, quod contra eius voluntatem fecerunt, de ipsis facta est voluntas eius. Propterea namque magna opera Domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius, ut miro et ineffabili modo non fiat praeter eius voluntatem quod etiam fit contra eius voluntatem: quia non fieret, si non sineret, nec utique nolens sinit, sed volens, nec sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens et de malo posset facere bene5 ». — His verbis evidenter monstratur, quod voluntas Dei aeterna semper impletur de homine, etiam si faciat homo contra Dei voluntatem. Sed attendendum est diligenter, quomodo in superioribus dicitur, fieri aliquid contra Dei voluntatem, quod tamen non fit praeter eam; et qualiter intelligendum sit illud: quantum ad se, fecerunt quod Deus noluit; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, nullo modo id facere valuerunt. Videntur enim ista superioribus obviare, ubi dictum est: Voluntati eius nihil resistere.
Verum, ut supra diximus, voluntas Dei diversis modis accipitur, quae diversitas in praedictis verbis si diligenter notetur, nihil ibi contradictionis reperitur. Ubi enim dicit, non fieri praeter eius voluntatem etiam quod fit contra eius voluntatem, dissimiliter accepit voluntatem, et non ipsam voluntatem, quae Deus est et sempiterna est, sed eius signa praedictis verbis intelligi voluit, id est prohibitionem sive praeceptionem et permissionem.
Cap. II.
Ex quo sensu quaedam dicuntur fieri contra Dei voluntatem.
Multa enim fiunt contra Dei praeceptum vel prohibitionem, quae tamen non fiunt praeter eius permissionem. Ipsius namque permissione omnia fiunt mala, quae tamen praeter eius voluntatem sempiternam fiunt. Sicut Augustinus dicit super illum locum Psalmi6: Ut non loquatur os meum opera hominum. Opera enim hominum dicit ea quae mala sunt, « quae praeter Dei voluntatem fiunt », quae ipse est, sed non praeter eius permissionem, quae ipse non est. Appellatur tamen ipsa Dei voluntas, quia Deus volens sinit mala fieri. Fiunt et contra eius praeceptionem vel prohibitionem, sed non contra eius voluntatem, quae ipse est, nisi dicantur contra eam fieri, quia praeter eam fiunt. Contra eam quippe nihil ita fit, ut velit fieri, et non fiat, vel nolit fieri et fiat. Quod evidenter ibi Augustinus notavit, ubi ait: Quantum ad ipsos attinet, quod Deus noluit fecerunt; quantum vero ad omnipotentiam Dei, p. 838 nullo modo id facere valuerunt; ac si dicam, fecerunt contra Dei praeceptum, quod appellatur voluntas, sed non fecerunt contra Dei voluntatem omnipotentem, quia hoc non valuerunt, illud valuerunt; et ita per hoc quod fecerunt contra Dei voluntatem, id est praeceptum, de ipsis facta est voluntas eius, id est, impleta est voluntas eius sempiterna, qua eos damnari volebat. Unde Gregorius super Iob7: « Multi voluntatem Dei peragunt, dum mutare contendunt, et consilio eius resistentes obsequuntur; quia hoc eius dispositioni militat, quod per humanum studium resultat ». — Hic aperte ostenditur, quia dum mali consilio ac praecepto Dei resistunt, quod voluntas Dei appellatur, ea faciunt, unde voluntas eius, quae ipse est, impletur, quae dispositio vel beneplacitum vocatur. « Nam, ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridio8, quantaelibet sint voluntates Angelorum vel hominum, bonorum vel malorum, vel illud quod Deus, vel aliud volentium quam Deus, Omnipotentis voluntas semper invicta est, quae mala esse nunquam potest, quae etiam, dum mala irrogat, iusta est, et profecto quae iusta est mala non est. Deus igitur omnipotens, sive per misericordiam cuius vult misereatur, sive per iudicium quem vult obduret, nec inique aliquid facit, nec nisi volens quidquam facit, et omnia quaecumque vult, facit ».
Cap. III.
Quare praecepit Deus omnibus bona facere et mala vitare, sed non id ab omnibus vult impleri.
Ex praedictis liquet, quod voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, semper impletur, nec in aliquo cassatur, sed per omnia impletur. Consilium vero eius atque praecepta sive prohibitio non ab omnibus implentur, quibus proposita et data sunt. Neque ideo praecepit omnibus bona vel prohibuit mala vel consuluit optima, quod vellet ab omnibus bona quae praecepit fieri vel mala quae prohibuit vitari — si enim vellet, utique et fierent, quia in nullo potest ab homine superari vel impediri eius voluntas — sed ut iustitiam suam hominibus ostenderet, et mali essent inexcusabiles; denique, ut boni ex obedientia gloriam, mali ex inobedientia poenam sortirentur, sicut utrisque ab aeterno praeparavit. Ea igitur, quae omnibus praecepit vel prohibuit, a quibusdam voluit fieri vel vitari, sed non ab omnibus; et quaedam personaliter praecepit et in veteri et in nova Lege, quae ab eis quibus praecepit, fieri noluit, ut Abrahae de immolatione9 filii, et in Evangelio quibusdam curatis, quibus praecepit, ne cui dicerent.
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DISTINCTION XLVII.
Chapter I.
That the will of God is fulfilled concerning man, whithersoever he turn himself.
The will of God indeed is always efficacious, so that whatsoever he wills comes to pass, and nothing comes to pass which he does not will; which [will] is always fulfilled concerning man, whithersoever he turn himself. For nothing, as Augustine says1, constituted in free choice surpasses the will of God; and although [a man] may act against his will, yet against his will, which is himself, nothing must be thought to come to pass in such a way as though he willed [it] to come to pass and it does not come to pass; or as though he willed [it] not to come to pass and it comes to pass. For that will, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion2, is always fulfilled either concerning us or by us. It is fulfilled concerning us, yet we do not fulfill it when we sin. It is fulfilled by us when we do good; for therefore we do it, because we know it pleases God. So also concerning man God always fulfills his own will, because man does nothing of which God does not work that which he wills. For God does not will that any man whatsoever should sin. But if [a man] sins, he wills to spare the penitent, that he may live; and to punish him who perseveres in his sins, that the contumacious may not escape the power of justice. As he prepared some from eternity unto punishment, so he prepared others unto glory. « And these are the great works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills3, and so wisely sought out, that when the angelic and human creature had sinned — that is, when it had done not what he, but what it itself willed — yet through that same will of the creature, by which has been done what the Creator did not will, he himself fulfilled what he willed: using even evils well, as supremely good, unto the damnation of those whom he justly predestined to punishment, and unto the salvation of those whom he kindly predestined to grace4. For as far as they themselves are concerned, what God willed not, they did; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, in no way could they do this. For by this very fact, that they acted against his will, his will was done concerning them. For this reason indeed [are] the great works of the Lord, sought out unto all his wills, that in a wondrous and ineffable manner there does not come to pass apart from his will that which even comes to pass against his will: because it would not come to pass, if he did not allow it; nor does he indeed allow it unwillingly, but willingly; nor would [he] the good [one] allow [it] to come to pass evilly, unless [he were] omnipotent and able to make good out of evil5 ». — By these words it is evidently shown that the eternal will of God is always fulfilled concerning man, even if man acts against God's will. But it must be diligently attended to, in what way it is said in the things above that something comes to pass against God's will, which nevertheless does not come to pass apart from it; and how that [saying] is to be understood: as far as they themselves are concerned, they did what God willed not; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, in no way could they do this. For these things seem to stand in the way of what has gone before, where it has been said: that nothing resists his will.
But, as we have said above, the will of God is taken in diverse modes; which diversity, if it be diligently noted in the foregoing words, no contradiction is found therein. For where he says that there does not come to pass apart from his will even that which comes to pass against his will, he took "will" in a different sense, and he willed not the will itself, which is God and is eternal, but his signs to be understood in the foregoing words — that is, prohibition or precept and permission.
Chapter II.
In what sense certain things are said to come to pass against the will of God.
For many things come to pass against the precept or prohibition of God, which nevertheless do not come to pass apart from his permission. For by his permission all evils come to pass, which nevertheless come to pass apart from his eternal will. As Augustine says upon that place of the Psalm6: That my mouth may not speak the works of men. For by "works of men" he calls those things which are evil, « which come to pass apart from God's will » — [the will] which is himself, but not apart from his permission, which is not himself. Yet that permission is itself called God's will, because God willingly permits evils to come to pass. They come to pass also against his precept or prohibition, but not against his will, which is himself, unless they be said to come to pass against it because they come to pass apart from it. For against it nothing so comes to pass that he wills it to come to pass and it does not come to pass, or that he wills it not to come to pass and it comes to pass. Which Augustine evidently noted there, where he says: As far as they themselves are concerned, they did what God willed not; but as far as the omnipotence of God is concerned, p. 838 in no way could they do this; as if I were to say, they acted against God's precept, which is called [his] will, but they did not act against God's omnipotent will, because this they could not, that they could; and so by that which they did against God's will, that is, [his] precept, of them was made his will — that is, his eternal will, by which he willed them to be damned, was fulfilled. Whence Gregory on Job7: « Many fulfill the will of God while they strive to change [it], and resisting his counsel they obey [it]; because this serves his disposition, that which rebounds through human effort ». — Here it is plainly shown, that while the wicked resist God's counsel and precept, which is called the will of God, they do those things whereby his will, which is himself, is fulfilled — which [will] is called disposition or good pleasure. « For, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion8, however great be the wills of angels or men, of the good or of the evil, [whether they will] that which God [wills], or [will] something other than [what] God [wills], the will of the Omnipotent is always unconquered, which can never be evil, which even, when it inflicts evils, is just; and surely that which is just is not evil. Therefore God almighty, whether through mercy upon whom he wills he shows mercy, or through judgment whom he wills he hardens, does nothing unjustly, nor does he do anything except willingly, and all things whatsoever he wills, he does ».
Chapter III.
Why God commanded all to do good things and to avoid evil things, but does not will this to be fulfilled by all.
From the foregoing it is clear, that the will of God, which is himself, is always fulfilled, and is in no respect frustrated, but through all things is fulfilled. But his counsel and his precepts or prohibition are not fulfilled by all to whom they have been set forth and given. Nor did he therefore command all good things, or forbid evils, or counsel the best things, because he willed by all the good things which he commanded to come to pass, or the evils which he forbade to be avoided — for if he willed [it], surely they would come to pass, because his will can in no respect be overcome or hindered by man — but [he did so] that he might show his justice to men, and that the wicked might be inexcusable; and finally, that the good might obtain glory by obedience, and the evil punishment by disobedience, just as he prepared for both from eternity. Those things therefore which he commanded or forbade for all, he willed to be done or to be avoided by some, but not by all; and certain things he commanded personally both in the Old and in the New Law, which he willed not to be done by those to whom he commanded — as to Abraham concerning the immolation9 of his son, and in the Gospel concerning certain healed persons, whom he commanded that they should tell no one.
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- Enchirid. c. 95; secundum sensum.Enchiridion, c. 95; according to the sense.
- Ipsa verba Augustini immediate sequuntur.The very words of Augustine immediately follow.
- Psalm. 110, 2.Psalm 110, 2.
- Codd. ABC et edd. 1, 6 (o in marg.) gloriam.Codices A, B, C and editions 1, 6 (with o in the margin) [read] gloriam ("glory") [in place of gratiam "grace"].
- Enchirid. c. 100. n. 26. Pro ultimo vocabulo bene codd. BE bonum, et edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 bonum bene.Enchiridion, c. 100, n. 26. In place of the final word bene ("well"), the codices BE [read] bonum, and editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 [read] bonum bene.
- Dist. XLVI.Distinction XLVI.
- Moral. VI. c. 18. n. 29. Codd. et edd., exceptis 7, 8, citant: Gregorius super Genesim. Textus tamen a Magistro non parum est mutatus.Moralia VI, c. 18, n. 29. The codices and editions, except 7 and 8, cite: Gregory on Genesis. The text however has been changed not a little by the Master.
- Enarrat. in Psalm. 16, 4. Post textum Vat. addit in sensu.Enarrationes in Psalmos, on Psalm 16, 4. After the text, the Vatican edition adds in sensu ("in [its] sense").
- Vide d. XLV. c. 7, nota 3.See Distinction XLV, chapter 7, note 3.