Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XLVIII.

Cap. I.

Quod homo aliquando bona voluntate aliud vult quam Deus, et mala idem quod Deus.

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation that follows. Each note is given first in Latin (`La.`), then in literal English (`En.`).

Sciendum quoque est, quod aliquando mala est voluntas hominis idem volentis, quod Deus vult fieri; et aliquando bona est voluntas hominis aliud volentis quam Deus. Ut enim bona sit hominis voluntas, oportet attendere, quid congruat ei velle et quo fine. Tantum enim interest inter voluntatem Dei et voluntatem hominis, ut in quibusdam aliud congruat Deo velle, aliud homini. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio¹: « Aliquando, inquit, bona voluntate homo vult aliquid, quod Deus non vult bona multo amplius multoque certius voluntate — nam illius mala voluntas esse nunquam potest — tanquam si bonus filius patrem velit vivere, quem Deus bona voluntate vult mori. Et rursus fieri potest, ut hoc velit homo voluntate mala, quod Deus vult bona, velut si malus filius velit mori patrem, velit etiam hoc Deus. Nempe ille vult quod non vult Deus, iste vero id vult quod vult et Deus; et tamen bonae Dei voluntati pietas illius potius consonat, quamvis aliud volentis, quam huius idem volentis impietas. Multum enim interest, quid velle homini, quid² Deo congruat, et ad quem finem suam quisque referat voluntatem, ut approbetur vel improbetur ». Potest enim velle bonum, quod non congruit ei velle, et potest velle bonum, quod congruit, sed non refert ad finem rectum; et ideo non est bona voluntas.

Cap. II.

Quod Dei voluntas per malas hominum voluntates impletur[^3].

Illud quoque non est praetermittendum, quod aliquando Dei voluntas bona per malam hominis voluntatem impletur, ut in crucifixione Christi factum est, quem Deus bona voluntate mori voluit; Iudaei vero impia voluntate eum crucifixerunt. Et volebant Iudaei mala voluntate quiddam, quod Deus bona voluntate volebat, scilicet ut Christus pateretur et moreretur; sed volebant et aliquid aliud, quod Deus non volebat, scilicet occidere Christum, quod fuit mala actio et peccatum. Actum quippe Iudaeorum non voluit Deus, passionem vero Christi voluit, sicut et in Psalmo⁴ Christus ad Patrem ait: Tu cognovisti sessionem meam, « id est, voluisti et approbasti passionem meam »; tibi enim placuit. Voluit itaque tota Trinitas, ut Christus pateretur, nec tamen voluit, ut Iudaei occiderent: quia voluit poenam Christi, sed non voluit culpam Iudaeorum, nec tamen noluit; si enim noluisset, nec fuisset⁵.

Sed ad hoc opponitur sic: si voluit Deus, ut Christus pateretur, voluit utique, ut pateretur a Iudaeis, vel non. Si voluit, ut non pateretur a Iudaeis, cum passus sit, factum est itaque, quod voluit Deus non fieri. Si autem voluit, eum pati a Iudaeis, ergo voluit, eum occidi a Iudaeis: voluit itaque, ut Iudaei occiderent eum. — Ad quod respondentes dicimus, simpliciter concedendum esse, quod Deus voluit, Christum pati et mori, quia eius passio bonum fuit et causa nostrae salutis. Cum autem dicitur: volebat, eum pati vel occidi a Iudaeis; hic distinguendum est. Si enim intelligitur sic: volebat, eum sustinere passionem sive crucifixionem a Iudaeis illatam, verus est sensus; si vero intelligitur sic: volebat, ut Iudaei occiderent eum, falsum est. Non enim volebat Deus actionem Iudaeorum, quae mala erat, sed volebat passionem bonam; et haec voluntas per malas Iudaeorum voluntates impleta est. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio⁶: « Deus quasdam voluntates suas utique bonas implet per malorum hominum voluntates malas, sicut per malevolos Iudaeos bona voluntate Patris Christus pro nobis occisus est; quod tantum bonum fuit, ut Apostolus Petrus, quando id fieri nolebat, satanas ab ipso, qui occisus est, diceretur ». — Ecce manifeste habes, magnum bonum fuisse, quod Christus occisus est; et hoc bonum quia Petrus nolebat, ideo redargutus est.

Cap. III.

Utrum placuerit viris sanctis, quod Christus pateretur et moreretur.

Ex quo solvitur quaestio, qua quaeri solet, utrum viris sanctis placere debuerit, quod Christus pateretur vel occideretur. Debuit enim eis placere intuitu nostrae redemptionis, sed non intuitu ipsius⁷ cruciatus. Voluerunt ergo ac vehementer cupierunt, Christum mori propter liberationem hominis et impletionem p. 850 divinae voluntatis; sed non voluerunt delectatione⁸ ipsius afflictionis. De eodem ergo laetabantur et tristabantur, sed ob aliud gaudebant et propter aliud dolebant. Volebant igitur, Christum mori pro hominis redemptione, et tamen de morte ipsius diversis de causis corda eorum varie movebantur.

Cap. IV.

Utrum passiones Sanctorum debeamus velle.

Si vero quaeritur, utrum eodem modo sentiendum sit de passionibus et martyriis Sanctorum; dicimus, aliquam esse differentiam inter passionem capitis et membrorum. Christi namque passio causa est nostrae salutis, quod non est passio alicuius Sancti. Nullius enim passione redempti sumus nisi Christi. Profuerunt quidem non modo eis qui passi sunt, verum etiam aliis fidelibus ipsorum passiones; verumtamen nostra redemptio non sunt: hoc enim illius sola passio potuit, qui Deus est et homo. Illius ergo passionem credentium piae mentes voluerunt et optaverunt fieri, sicut futuram⁹ credebant; passiones vero Sanctorum possumus velle et nolle, et utrumque bona voluntate, si rectos nobis proponamus fines. Cui enim placuit Pauli passio eo fine, quia praemium eius per hoc auctum et paratum cernebat, bonam videtur habuisse voluntatem, quae voluntati eius congruebat, qua cupiebat dissolvi et esse cum Christo¹⁰. Qui autem voluit, eum declinare passionem et effugere manus iniquorum, compassione pietatis, et ille habuit bonam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio¹¹: « Bonae apparebant voluntates piorum fidelium, qui nolebant, Apostolum Paulum Ierusalem pergere, ne ibi pateretur mala, quae Agabus propheta praedixerat. Et tamen hoc illum Deus pati volebat pro annuntianda fide Christi, exercens martyrem Christi; neque ipse bonam voluntatem suam implevit per Christianorum voluntates bonas, sed per Iudaeorum malas; et ad eum potius pertinebant qui nolebant quod volebat, quam illi per quos volentes factum est quod volebat, quia id ipsum mala voluntate fecerunt, quod Deus bona voluntate voluit¹² ». Ita et in passione Christi factum est. Quod enim Deus voluit, hoc idem Iudas, Iudaeus et diabolus, sed illi mala voluntate, Deus vero bona voluntate, scilicet ut Christus moreretur. Verumtamen illi actum voluerunt, quem Deus non voluit.

Explicit liber primus¹³; incipit secundus.

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DISTINCTION XLVIII.

Chapter I.

That a man sometimes with a good will wills something other than [what] God [wills], and with an evil will the same [thing] which God [wills].

It must also be known that sometimes the will of a man is evil while willing the same thing which God wills to be done; and sometimes the will of a man is good while willing something other than [what] God [wills]. For in order that the will of a man may be good, one must attend to what is fitting for him to will, and to what end. For there is so great a difference between the will of God and the will of a man, that in certain matters it is fitting for God to will one thing, [and] for a man another. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹: « Sometimes, he says, a man with a good will wills something which God does not will with a will much more amply and much more certainly good — for his [God's] will can never be evil — as if a good son wills his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die. And again it can happen that a man wills with an evil will that which God wills with a good [will], as if an evil son wills his father to die, [and] God also wills this. Indeed the one wills what God does not will, the other wills that which God also wills; and yet the piety of the former, although willing something other [than God], harmonizes more with God's good will than the impiety of the latter, willing the same [as God]. For it makes much difference what it is fitting for a man to will, what² for God, and to what end each refers his will, so that it may be approved or disapproved ». For [a man] can will a good which it is not fitting for him to will, and he can will a good which is fitting, but not refer [it] to the right end; and therefore [his] will is not good.

Chapter II.

That the will of God is fulfilled through the evil wills of men[^3].

That also is not to be passed over, that sometimes the good will of God is fulfilled through the evil will of a man, as was done in the crucifixion of Christ, whom God with a good will willed to die; the Jews however with impious will crucified him. And the Jews with an evil will willed a certain thing which God with a good will was willing, namely that Christ should suffer and die; but they also willed something else, which God was not willing, namely to kill Christ, which was an evil action and a sin. The deed of the Jews indeed God did not will; but the passion of Christ he did will, just as also in the Psalm⁴ Christ says to the Father: Thou hast known my sitting — « that is, thou hast willed and approved my passion »; for it pleased thee. The whole Trinity therefore willed that Christ should suffer, yet did not will that the Jews should kill [him]: because [God] willed the punishment of Christ, but did not will the guilt of the Jews, nor yet was he unwilling [it]; for if he had been unwilling [it], it would not have come to pass⁵.

But against this it is objected thus: if God willed that Christ should suffer, he willed either that he should suffer at the hands of the Jews, or not. If he willed that he should not suffer at the hands of the Jews — since he did suffer — then it has come to pass which God willed not to be done. But if he willed him to suffer at the hands of the Jews, then he willed him to be killed by the Jews: he therefore willed that the Jews should kill him. — Responding to which we say that it must simply be conceded that God willed Christ to suffer and to die, because his passion was a good and the cause of our salvation. But when it is said: he willed him to suffer or to be killed by the Jews; here a distinction must be made. For if it is understood thus: he willed him to undergo the passion or crucifixion inflicted by the Jews, the sense is true; but if it is understood thus: he willed that the Jews should kill him, it is false. For God was not willing the action of the Jews, which was evil, but he was willing the good passion; and this will was fulfilled through the evil wills of the Jews. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion⁶: « God indeed fulfills certain of his own good wills through the evil wills of evil men, just as through the malevolent Jews, with the good will of the Father, Christ was killed for us; which was so great a good, that the Apostle Peter, when he was unwilling that it should happen, was called Satan by him who was killed ». — Behold, plainly thou hast it that it was a great good that Christ was killed; and because Peter was unwilling [for] this good, therefore he was rebuked.

Chapter III.

Whether it pleased holy men that Christ should suffer and die.

From which is resolved the question which is wont to be asked, whether it ought to have pleased holy men that Christ should suffer or be killed. For it ought to have pleased them with a view to our redemption, but not with a view to his⁷ torment. They therefore willed and vehemently desired Christ to die for the deliverance of man and the fulfillment p. 850 of the divine will; but they did not [will it] with delight⁸ in his affliction itself. Concerning the same thing therefore they rejoiced and were saddened, but on account of one thing they rejoiced, and on account of another they grieved. They willed therefore that Christ should die for the redemption of man, and yet concerning his death their hearts were variously moved by diverse causes.

Chapter IV.

Whether we ought to will the passions of the Saints.

But if it be asked whether the same is to be thought concerning the passions and martyrdoms of the Saints; we say that there is some difference between the passion of the head and [that] of the members. For the passion of Christ is the cause of our salvation, which is not [true of] the passion of any Saint. For we are redeemed by the passion of no one save Christ. Their passions indeed profited not only those who suffered, but also other faithful; nevertheless they are not our redemption: for this his passion alone could [do], who is God and man. The pious minds therefore of believers willed and desired his passion to come to pass, just as they believed [it] was to come⁹; but the passions of the Saints we can will and not will, and both with a good will, if we set before ourselves right ends. For he to whom Paul's passion was pleasing on this account, that he discerned his reward to be thereby increased and prepared, seems to have had a good will, which harmonized with [Paul's] own will, by which he was desiring to be dissolved and to be with Christ¹⁰. But he who willed [him] to decline the passion and to escape the hands of the wicked, out of the compassion of piety, he also had a good will. Whence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹¹: « The wills of pious faithful appeared good, who were unwilling that the Apostle Paul should go to Jerusalem, lest he should there suffer the evils which the prophet Agabus had foretold. And yet God was willing him to suffer this for the proclaiming of the faith of Christ, training [him as] a martyr of Christ; nor did [God] himself fulfill his good will through the good wills of Christians, but through the evil [wills] of the Jews; and those rather pertained to him who were unwilling [for] what he was willing, than those by whose willing was done that which he was willing, because they did the very same thing with an evil will which God with a good will willed¹² ». So also it was done in the passion of Christ. For that which God willed, this same thing [willed] Judas, the Jew, and the devil, but they with an evil will, [and] God with a good will, namely that Christ should die. Nevertheless they willed the deed which God did not will.

Here ends the first book¹³; the second begins.

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