Bonaventure — Opera Omnia

Dist. 8

Book I: On the Mystery of the Trinity · Distinction 8

Textus Latinus

DISTINCTIO VIII.

Cap. I. De veritate ac proprietate divinae essentiae.

Nunc de veritate sive¹ proprietate, et incommutabilitate atque simplicitate divinae naturae vel substantiae sive essentiae agendum est. «Est itaque Deus, ut ait Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate², sine dubitatione substantia vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci usiam vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia; ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis est quam ille, qui in Exodi tertio³ dixit famulo suo Moysi: Ego sum qui sum. Et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos». Ipse vere ac proprie dicitur essentia, cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Unde Hieronymus ad Marcellam⁴ scribens ait: «Deus solus, qui exordium non habet, verae essentiae nomen tenuit, quia in eius comparatione, qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, quasi non sunt quae mutabilia sunt. De quo enim dicitur fuit, non est; et de quo dicitur erit, nondum est. Deus autem tantum est, qui non novit fuisse vel futurum esse⁵. Solus ergo Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est».

Hic diligenter advertendum est, quomodo intelligi debeant illa verba Hieronymi, scilicet: «Deus tantum est et non novit fuisse vel futurum esse», tanquam non possit dici de Deo fuit vel erit, sed tantum est, cum de eo scriptum frequenter reperiamus: fuit ab aeterno, fuit semper, et erit in saecula, et huiusmodi; unde videtur, quia non est tantum dicendum de Deo fuit, vel est, vel erit. Si enim diceretur tantum fuit, putaretur, quod desierit esse; si diceretur tantum est, putaretur, quod non semper fuerit, sed esse coeperit; si tantum diceretur erit, putaretur non esse modo. Dicatur ergo, quia semper fuit, est et erit, ut intelligatur, quia nec coepit nec desiit nec desinit⁶ nec desinet esse. De hoc Augustinus super Ioannem⁷ ita ait: «Cum de sempiterna re proprie dicatur est, secundum nos bene dicitur fuit et erit et est: fuit, quia nunquam desiit; erit, quia nunquam deerit; est, quia semper est: non praeteriit, quasi quod non maneat; non orietur⁸, quasi quod non erat. Cum ergo nostra locutio per tempora varietur, de eo vere dicuntur verba cuiuslibet temporis, qui nullo tempore defuit vel deest vel deerit; et ideo non est mirum, si de Spiritu veritatis Veritas loquens dixit per futurum: Quaecumque audiet loquetur⁹; audiet, scilicet ab eo a quo procedit. Audire illius est scire, idem etiam¹⁰ esse. A quo ergo est illi essentia, ab illo audientia, id est scientia, quae non est aliud quam essentia. Audiet ergo dixit de eo quod audivit et audit, id est, quod semper scivit, scit et sciet». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, verba cuiuslibet temporis dici de Deo, sed tamen¹¹ proprie est. Illud ergo quod Hieronymus dicit, ita intelligendum est: non novit fuisse vel futurum esse, sed tantum esse, id est, cum dicitur de Deo, quod fuit vel erit, non est intelligendum, quod praeterierit vel futurus sit¹², sed quod existat simpliciter sine aliquo temporali motu. Licet enim verba substantiva diversorum temporum de Deo dicantur, ut fuit, erit, est, erat, non tamen temporales motus tunc¹³ distinguunt, scilicet praeteritum vel futurum vel praeteritum imperfectum vel praeteritum perfectum vel praeteritum plus quam perfectum, sed essentiam sive existentiam divinitatis simpliciter insinuant. Deus ergo solus proprie dicitur essentia vel esse; unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate¹⁴ ait: «Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas».

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Cap. II. De incommutabilitate eiusdem.

Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur, quia nec mutatur nec mutari potest. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate¹⁵: «Aliae, inquit, essentiae vel substantiae capiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola substantia vel essentia, quae est Deus, incommutabilis est, cui profecto maxime ac verissime competit esse. Quod enim mutatur non servat ipsum esse; et quod mutari potest, etiam si non mutetur, potest quod fuerat non esse; ideoque illud solum, quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, verissime dicitur esse», id est substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Ideoque Apostolus loquens de Deo ait: Qui solus habet immortalitatem¹⁶. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro primo de Trinitate¹⁷: «Cum anima quodam modo immortalis esse dicatur et sit, non diceret Apostolus: Solus Deus habet immortalitatem, nisi quia vera immortalitas incommutabilitas est, quam nulla potest habere creatura, quoniam solius Creatoris est». Unde Iacobus ait¹⁸: Apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. Et David: Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es. Ideo Augustinus super Genesim¹⁹ dicit, quod Deus nec per loca nec per tempora movetur, creatura vero per tempora et loca. Et per tempora moveri est per affectiones commutari; Deus autem nec loco nec affectione mutari potest, qui per Prophetam ait²⁰: Ego Deus, et non mutor; qui est immutabilis solus. Unde recte solus dicitur habere immortalitatem. «In omni enim mutabili natura, ut ait Augustinus contra Maximinum²¹, nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio, quia facit aliquid in ea non esse, quod erat. Unde et ipsa anima humana, quae ideo dicitur immortalis, quia secundum modum suum nunquam desinit vivere, habet tamen quandam mortem suam; quia si iuste vivebat et peccat, moritur iustitiae; si peccatrix erat et iustificatur, moritur peccato, ut alias eius mutationes taceam, de quibus modo longum est disputare. Et creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum est diabolus princeps; et qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Et ideo solus Deus, ut ait Apostolus, habet immortalitatem, qui non cuiusquam gratia, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest aliqua conversione mutari, nec potuit nec poterit aliqua mutatione peccare». «Proinde, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate²², substantiam Dei sine ulla sui commutatione mutabilia facientem et sine ullo suo temporali motu temporalia creantem intueri et nosse, licet sit difficile, oportet». Vere ergo ac proprie incommutabilis est sola Divinitatis essentia, quae sine sui mutatione cunctas condidit naturas.

Cap. III. De simplicitate eiusdem.

Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est, ubi nec partium nec accidentium seu²³ quarumlibet formarum ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo. Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex sit illa substantia, ut te docet Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate²⁴, «animadverte primo, quare omnis creatura sit multiplex et nullo modo vere simplex, et primo de corporali, postea de spirituali creatura. Corporalis utique creatura partibus constat, ita ut sit ibi alia pars minor, alia maior, et maius sit totum quam pars quaelibet; et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim, et minuta magnitudine, manere idem color et eadem figura; et colore mutato, manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo. Ac per hoc multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis, simplex autem nullo modo».

Cap. IV. De corporali et spirituali creatura, quomodo sit multiplex, et non simplex.

«Creatura quoque spiritualis, ut est anima, in comparatione quidem corporis est simplex, sine comparatione vero corporis multiplex est, et non simplex. Quae ideo simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore et in toto tota est et in qualibet eius parte tota est. Et ideo, cum fit²⁵ aliquid in quavis exigua particula corporis, quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit, quia totam non latet. Sed tamen nec in ipsa anima vera simplicitas

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est. Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia, possintque haec et alia huiusmodi innumerabilia in animae natura inveniri, et alia sine aliis et alia magis²⁶, alia minus, manifestum est, non simplicem, sed multiplicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis est»: nulla ergo creatura vere simplex est. «Deus vero, etsi multiplex dicatur, vere tamen et summe simplex est. Dicitur enim magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur, sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quae sapientia. Non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute, et eadem bonitas, quae sapientia et magnitudo et veritas; et non est ibi aliud ipsum beatum esse, et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino esse».

Cap. V. Quod Deus, cum sit simplex, tamen multipliciter dicitur.

Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Augustinus, solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat, eundem multipliciter dici. Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum, quae de Deo dicuntur; quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam. Haec enim non ita accipiuntur, cum de illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore, quam est humanus animus, dicuntur, quemadmodum cum de creaturis dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate²⁷: «Deo est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse vel sapientem esse vel iustum esse, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significetur. Humano autem animo non est hoc esse, quod est fortem esse aut prudentem aut iustum; potest enim esse animus et nullam istarum habere virtutum».

Cap. VI. Quod Dei simplicitas nulli praedicamentorum subiicitur.

Quod autem in natura divina nulla sit accidentium diversitas nullaque penitus mutabilitas, sed perfecta simplicitas, ostendit Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate²⁸ dicens: «Intelligamus Deum, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentem, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi nondum potest omnino invenire quid sit, pie tamen caveat, quantum potest, aliquid de illo sentire, quod non sit». Ecce, si subtiliter intendas, ex his atque praedictis aperitur, illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae Dei naturae minime convenire, quae nullis subiecta est accidentibus.

Cap. VII. Quod Deus abusive dicitur substantia.

Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro septimo de Trinitate²⁹: «Sicut ab eo quod est esse appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsistere substantiam dicimus, si tamen dignum est, ut Deus dicatur subsistere. Hoc enim de his rebus recte intelligitur, in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur, sicut in corpore color aut forma. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est. Res ergo³⁰ mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae. Deus autem, si subsistit, ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tanquam in subiecto, et non est simplex. Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat Deus et subsit bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tanquam in subiecto. Unde manifestum est, Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiori intelligatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est».

Cap. VIII. Quod non sit in Deo aliquid, quod non sit Deus.

Huius autem essentiae simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod non est in ea aliquid, quod non sit ipsa; sed idem est habens et quod habetur. Unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate³¹ ait: «Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit, neque qui virtus est, ex infirmis continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur, neque qui spiritus est, ex disparibus formalis est: totum quod in eo est, unum est». Idem in octavo libro de Trinitate³² ait: «Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est, ut in eo aliud sit quod ab eo habetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeat, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum». De hoc eodem Boethius in primo libro de Trinitate ait: «Quocirca hoc vere unum est, in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeter id quod est; neque enim subiectum fieri potest». Augustinus quoque in libro de Fide et Symbolo dicit: «In Dei substantia non est aliquid, quod non sit substantia, quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, aliud quod accidat substantiae. Sed quidquid ibi intelligi potest, substantia est. Verum haec dici possunt facile et credi, videri autem nisi puro corde omnino non possunt». Item Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate: «Sic habetur in natura uniuscuiusque trium, ut qui habet hoc sit, quod habet, sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia». Unde Isidorus ait: «Deus simplex dicitur, sive non amittendo quod habet, seu quod aliud non est ipse, et aliud quod in ipso est». Et cum tantae simplicitatis atque sinceritatis sit natura divina, est tamen in ea personarum Trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro undecimo de Civitate Dei ait: «Non propter hoc naturam summi boni simplicem dicimus, quia est Pater in ea solus, aut Filius in ea solus, aut Spiritus sanctus in ea solus, aut quia sola est ista nominum trinitas sine substantia personarum, sicut Sabelliani putaverunt: sed ideo simplex dicitur, quia est hoc quod habet, excepto quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur, nec est ipsa. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, ad quem relative dicitur, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen ipse est Pater. In quo vero ad semetipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet, sicut ad semetipsum dicitur vivus, habendo vitam, et eadem vita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque natura haec dicitur simplex, quod non sit aliud habens, et aliud id quod habet, sicut in ceteris rebus est. Non enim habens liquorem liquor est, nec corpus color, nec anima est sapientia». Ecce, quanta est identitas, quanta est unitas, immutabilitas, simplicitas, puritas divinae substantiae, iuxta infirmitatis nostrae valitudinem assignavimus.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION VIII.

Chap. I. On the truth and propriety of the divine essence.

Now we must treat of the truth or propriety, and the immutability and simplicity of the divine nature or¹ substance or essence. «God is, therefore, as Augustine says in the fifth book On the Trinity², without doubt substance or, if this is better called so, essence, which the Greeks call usia. For just as from what is to be wise the word wisdom is derived, and from what is to know the word knowledge is derived; so from what is to be the word essence is derived. And who is more than he who in the third [chapter] of Exodus³ said to his servant Moses: I am who am. And you shall say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you». He himself is truly and properly called essence, whose essence does not know past or future. Hence Jerome, writing to Marcella⁴, says: «God alone, who has no beginning, has held the name of true essence, because, in comparison with him who truly is — for he is unchangeable — the things which are changeable are as though not. For of that which is said was, it is not; and of that which is said will be, it is not yet. But God only is, who does not know to have been or to be about to be⁵. Therefore God alone truly is, in comparison with whose essence our being is not».

Here it must be carefully noted how those words of Jerome are to be understood, namely: «God only is and does not know to have been or to be about to be», as though it could not be said of God he was or he will be, but only he is, although we frequently find it written of him: he was from eternity, he was always, and he will be unto ages, and the like; whence it seems, that not only was, or is, or will be must be said of God. For if only was were said, it would be supposed that he had ceased to be; if only is were said, it would be supposed that he had not always been, but had begun to be; if only will be were said, it would be supposed that he is not now. Therefore let it be said that he always was, is, and will be, so that it may be understood that he neither began nor ceased nor ceases⁶ nor will cease to be. Concerning this Augustine on John⁷ thus says: «Although of an everlasting thing it is properly said is, according to us was and will be and is are well said: was, because he never ceased; will be, because he will never fail; is, because he always is: he has not passed away, as though something that does not remain; he has not arisen⁸, as though something that was not. Therefore, although our manner of speaking is varied through times, words of any time are truly said of him who at no time has failed or fails or will fail; and so it is not surprising if, of the Spirit of truth, the Truth speaking said by the future tense: Whatsoever he shall hear, he will speak⁹; he shall hear, namely from him from whom he proceeds. For him to hear is to know, the same also¹⁰ to be. From him therefore from whom essence comes to him, from him hearing, that is knowledge, which is no other than essence. He shall hear therefore he said of that which he has heard and hears, that is, that which he always knew, knows and will know». Behold, here Augustine says that words of any time are said of God, but yet¹¹ properly is. That, therefore, which Jerome says is to be thus understood: he does not know to have been or to be about to be, but only to be, that is, when it is said of God that he was or he will be, it is not to be understood that he has passed by or is about to be¹², but that he exists simply without any temporal motion. For although substantive verbs of various tenses are said of God, as was, will be, is, was [imperfect], they do not then¹³ distinguish temporal motions, namely past or future or imperfect past or perfect past or pluperfect past, but simply convey the essence or existence of divinity. Therefore God alone is properly called essence or being; whence Hilary in the seventh book On the Trinity¹⁴ says: «Being is not an accident to God, but a subsisting truth and an abiding cause and a natural property of his kind».

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Chap. II. On the immutability of the same.

Of God alone also the essence is properly called immutable, because it neither is changed nor can be changed. Hence Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity¹⁵: «Other essences or substances, he says, admit accidents, by which there occurs in them either great or whatever change; but to God nothing of this sort can happen; and so the substance or essence alone, which is God, is immutable, to which assuredly most and most truly belongs being. For what is changed does not keep being itself; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can be what it had been not to be; and therefore that alone, which not only is not changed, but also cannot at all be changed, is most truly said to be», that is, the substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Apostle, speaking of God, says: Who alone has immortality¹⁶. For as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity¹⁷: «Although the soul is in a certain way said to be and is immortal, the Apostle would not say: God alone has immortality, unless because true immortality is immutability, which no creature can have, since it belongs to the Creator alone». Hence James says¹⁸: With whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration. And David: Thou shalt change them, and they shall be changed; but thou art the selfsame. Therefore Augustine on Genesis¹⁹ says, that God is moved neither through places nor through times, but the creature [is moved] through times and places. And to be moved through times is to be changed through affections; but God can be changed neither by place nor by affection, who through the Prophet says²⁰: I am God, and I am not changed; who is unchangeable alone. Hence rightly he alone is said to have immortality. «For in every changeable nature, as Augustine says against Maximinus²¹, some death is the very change itself, because it makes something in it not to be, which was. Whence also the human soul itself, which is therefore called immortal, because in its own mode it never ceases to live, has nevertheless a certain death of its own; for if it was living justly and sins, it dies to justice; if it was sinful and is justified, it dies to sin, to be silent about its other changes, of which it is now long to dispute. And the nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because they could sin. For the Angels also sinned and were made demons, of whom the devil is prince; and those who did not sin, were able to sin; and to whatever rational creature it is granted that it cannot sin, this is not from its own nature, but from God's grace. And therefore God alone, as the Apostle says, has immortality, who not by anyone's grace, but by his own nature could not nor can be changed by any turning, nor could nor will be able to sin by any change». «Accordingly, as Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity²², the substance of God making changeable things without any change of himself, and creating temporal things without any temporal motion of his own, to behold and to know, although it is difficult, is necessary». Truly, therefore, and properly the essence of the Divinity alone is immutable, which without change of itself founded all natures.

Chap. III. On the simplicity of the same.

And that same essence alone is properly and truly simple, where there is no diversity nor variation nor multitude of parts nor of accidents nor²³ of any forms whatsoever. But that you may know how that substance is simple, as Augustine teaches you in the sixth book On the Trinity²⁴, «consider first why every creature is multiple and in no way truly simple, and first concerning the corporeal, afterwards concerning the spiritual creature. The corporeal creature certainly consists of parts, so that there is in it one part smaller, another greater, and the whole is greater than any part; and in each body one thing is magnitude, another color, another figure. For it is possible, the magnitude being diminished, that the same color and the same figure remain; and the color being changed, that the same figure and the same magnitude remain. And through this the nature of body is shown to be multiple, but simple in no way».

Chap. IV. On the corporeal and spiritual creature, how it is multiple, and not simple.

«The spiritual creature also, as the soul, in comparison indeed with body is simple, but without comparison with body is multiple, and not simple. Which is therefore called simple with respect to the body, because it is not diffused by bulk through the space of place, but in each body and in the whole is whole, and in any part of it is whole. And therefore, when something occurs²⁵ in any small particle whatever of the body, which the soul perceives, although it does not occur in the whole body, yet the soul perceives it as a whole, because it is not hidden from the whole. But yet not even in the soul itself is there true simplicity

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. For since one thing is to be skilled, another to be unskilled, another to be acute, another to be mindful, another desire, another fear, another joy, another sadness, and these and other innumerable things of this sort may be found in the nature of the soul, and some without others and some more²⁶, some less, it is manifest that the nature is not simple, but multiple. For nothing simple is changeable; but every creature is changeable»: therefore no creature is truly simple. «But God, even though he be called multiple, is yet truly and supremely simple. For he is called great, good, wise, blessed, true and whatever else does not seem unfittingly to be said, but the same is his magnitude, which is his wisdom. For he is great not by bulk, but by power, and the same is his goodness which is his wisdom and magnitude and truth; and there is not there one thing his being blessed, and another his being great or wise or true or good or being at all».

Chap. V. That God, although he is simple, is yet said multiply.

Here it must be carefully noted, since Augustine says that God alone is truly simple, why he says that he is said multiply. But he says this not on account of diversity of accidents or parts, but on account of the diversity and multitude of names which are said of God; which, although they are multiple, yet signify one thing, namely the divine nature. For these are not so received, when they are said of that immutable and eternal substance, incomparably more simple than is the human mind, as when they are said of creatures. Hence Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity²⁷: «For God, to be is the same as to be strong or to be wise or to be just, and whatever you may say of that simple multiplicity or multiple simplicity by which his substance is signified. But for the human mind, to be is not the same as to be strong or prudent or just; for the mind can be and have none of these virtues».

Chap. VI. That God's simplicity is subject to none of the predicaments.

But that in the divine nature there is no diversity of accidents and no mutability at all, but perfect simplicity, Augustine shows in the fifth book On the Trinity²⁸ saying: «Let us understand God, as much as we are able, good without quality, great without quantity, creator without need, presiding without situation, containing all things without habit, everywhere whole without place, eternal without time, making changeable things without any change of himself and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks of God thus, even if he is not yet able fully to find what he is, let him piously beware, as much as he is able, of feeling anything of him which he is not». Behold, if you attend subtly, from these and the foresaid it is opened, that those predicaments of the dialectical art do not at all fit the nature of God, which is subject to no accidents.

Chap. VII. That God is improperly called substance.

Hence neither is he properly called substance, as Augustine shows in the seventh book On the Trinity²⁹: «Just as from what is to be is called essence, so from what is to subsist we call substance, if however it is fitting that God be said to subsist. For this is rightly understood of those things in which the subjects are those things which are said to be in some subject, as in body color or figure. For body subsists, and so is substance. Therefore³⁰ changeable and non-simple things are properly called substances. But God, if he subsists, so that he may be properly called substance, there is in him something as in a subject, and he is not simple. But it is unlawful to say that God subsists and is subject to his own goodness, and that that goodness is not substance or rather essence, and that God himself is not his own goodness, but that it is in him as in a subject. Hence it is manifest that God is improperly called substance, so that by a more usual name essence may be understood, which is truly and properly said, so that perhaps only God ought to be called essence. For he alone truly is, because he is immutable».

Chap. VIII. That there is not in God anything which is not God.

But the simplicity and sincerity of this essence is so great, that there is not in it anything which is not it itself; but the same is the one having and that which is had. Hence Hilary in the seventh book On the Trinity³¹ says: «Not from composites does God, who is life, subsist, nor does he who is strength consist of weak things, nor is he who is light fitted together from dark things, nor is he who is spirit formed³² of disparate things: the whole which is in him is one». The same in the eighth book On the Trinity says: «Not in human manner is God from composites, so that in him one thing should be that which is had by him, and another thing he himself who has, but the whole is life, namely a perfect and infinite nature and not constituted from disparate things, but living itself through the whole». Concerning this same matter Boethius in the first book On the Trinity says: «Wherefore this is truly one, in which there is no number, nothing in it other than that which it is; for it cannot become a subject». Augustine also in the book On Faith and the Creed says: «In God's substance there is not anything which is not substance, as though one thing were there substance, another what would accident to substance. But whatever can be there understood is substance. Truly these things can easily be said and believed, but to be seen [they] cannot be at all except by a pure heart». Likewise Augustine in the fifteenth book On the Trinity: «So it is held in the nature of each of the three, that he who has this should be that which he has, like the immutable and simple substance». Hence Isidore says: «God is called simple, either because he does not lose what he has, or because he himself is not one thing, and another thing what is in him». And although the divine nature is of so great simplicity and sincerity, yet there is in it the Trinity of persons. Hence Augustine in the eleventh book On the City of God says: «We do not therefore call the nature of the highest good simple, because the Father is in it alone, or the Son in it alone, or the Holy Spirit in it alone, or because it is only a trinity of names without the substance of persons, as the Sabellians supposed: but it is therefore called simple, because it is what it has, except that each person is said relatively to the other, and is not it itself. For the Father indeed has the Son, to whom he is said relatively, but yet he himself is not the Son; and the Son has the Father, but yet he himself is not the Father. But in what it is said to itself, not to another, this is what it has, as it is said to itself living, by having life, and the same life it itself is. On this account, therefore, this nature is called simple, because it is not one thing having, and another that which it has, as it is in other things. For the one having liquor is not liquor, nor body color, nor soul wisdom». Behold, how great is the identity, how great the unity, immutability, simplicity, purity of the divine substance, according to the measure of our weakness we have set forth.

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Apparatus Criticus

Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 8 sive.
The Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 3, 8, [reads] sive.
Cap. 2. n. 3. Cfr. etiam XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2.
Chapter 2, no. 3. Compare also On the City of God XII, c. 2.
Vers. 14, ubi Vulgata: Ego sum qui sum. Ait: Sic dices etc. — Immediate ante Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8 omittit Moysi.
Verse 14, where the Vulgate has: I am who am. He said: Thus shalt thou say, etc. — Immediately before, the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 5, 6, 8, omits Moysi.
Edd. 6, 7, 8 ad Damasum, attamen neutro in loco haec sententia ad verbum invenitur, sed apud Isidorum, VII. Etymolog. c. 1. n. 10–13, ubi in ed. Migne (Patr. lat. tom. 82.) recte observatur, locum istum potius conflatum esse ex Augustini et Gregorii variis locis, et primam partem, scil. usque ad non sint, sumtam esse ex August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. — Vide etiam Rabanum, Comment. in Exod. libr. I. c. 6. — In ipso textu Vat. cum cod. A et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 tenet loco tenuit, et mox cum edd. 1, 4, 7 quasi non sint pro quasi non sunt.
Editions 6, 7, 8 [read] to Damasus, although in neither place is this sentence found verbatim, but in Isidore, Etymologies VII, c. 1, nn. 10–13, where in the Migne edition (Patrologia Latina tome 82) it is rightly observed that that passage is rather a conflation from various places of Augustine and Gregory, and that the first part, namely as far as non sint, was taken from Augustine, On the City of God VIII, c. 11. — See also Rabanus, Comment. on Exodus book I, c. 6. — In the text itself the Vatican edition with codex A and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 [reads] tenet in place of tenuit, and shortly after with editions 1, 4, 7 quasi non sint in place of quasi non sunt.
Codd. et ed. 1 omittunt vel futurum esse, et paulo infra cod. D cum edd. 1, 8 ponunt de Deo pro de eo.
The codices and edition 1 omit vel futurum esse, and a little below codex D with editions 1, 8 read de Deo in place of de eo.
In Vat. et cod. D nec non in edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 desiderantur verba nec desinit.
In the Vatican edition and codex D, and also in editions 4, 5, 6, 7, the words nec desinit are missing.
Tract. 99. n. 4–5; est tamen aliqua differentia verborum in principio.
Tractate 99, nn. 4–5; yet there is some difference of wording at the beginning.
Fide codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 necnon originali consentiente substituimus orietur pro erit. Paulo supra codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 omittunt contra contextum et est.
On the authority of the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 and the original [Augustine] agreeing, we have substituted orietur for erit. A little above, the codices with editions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 omit, against the context, et est.
Ioan. 16, 13.
John 16:13.
Codd. B C D E est loco etiam; cod. A etiam est.
Codices B C D E [read] est in place of etiam; codex A [reads] etiam est.
Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt tamen.
The codices with edition 1 omit tamen.
Vat. contra codd. B C D E et fere omnes edd. praeteriit vel futurum sit.
The Vatican edition, against codices B C D E and almost all editions, [reads] praeteriit vel futurum sit.
Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, esse pro tunc. Paulo infra Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, verbo divinitatis praefigit suae.
The Vatican edition with the editions, except edition 1, [reads] esse in place of tunc. A little below, the Vatican edition with the editions, except edition 1, prefixes suae to the word divinitatis.
Num. 11. — Paulo ante Vat., dempta 1, addunt suae post existentiam.
Number 11. — A little before, the Vatican edition, with the exception of edition 1, adds suae after existentiam.
Cap. 2. n. 3. — In quo textu post non servat ipsum contra originale, codd. et ed. 1 Vat. cum aliis edd. addit verum.
Chapter 2, no. 3. — In which text, after non servat ipsum, against the original, the codices, and edition 1, the Vatican edition with the other editions adds verum.
I. Timoth. 6, 16; idem textus infra bis occurrit.
1 Timothy 6:16; the same text occurs twice below.
Cap. 1. n. 2.
Chapter 1, no. 2.
Cap. 1, 17. Sola Vat. Apud Deum. — Sequens textus est Psalm. 101, 28.
Chapter 1, 17. Only the Vatican edition [reads] Apud Deum. — The following text is Psalm 101:28.
Super Genes. ad litteram VIII. c. 20. n. 39. secundum sensum; cfr. etiam c. 21. 22. 23. 26.
On Genesis according to the Letter VIII, c. 20, n. 39, according to the sense; compare also cc. 21, 22, 23, 26.
Malach. 3, 6. Vulgata: Ego Dominus etc.
Malachi 3:6. The Vulgate [reads]: I am the Lord, etc.
Libr. II. c. 12. n. 1.
Book II, c. 12, n. 1.
Cap. 1. n. 3.
Chapter 1, no. 3.
Edd., exceptis 1, 8, nec.
The editions, except 1 and 8, [read] nec.
Cap. 6. n. 8. — Paulo ante restituimus ex codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8 ut ante docet Augustinus. In ipso textu ante de corporali Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 4, primum pro primo. Deinde ante partibus Vat. cum plurimis edd. et cod. B addit ex. Mox post ibi Vat. ponit aliqua pro alia. Paulo infra ante figura. Potest Vat. cum plurimis edd. adiicit est, et immediate post omissa particula et ponit imminuta pro minuta contra codd. B C D et fere omnes edd.; Augustinus diminuta.
Chapter 6, no. 8. — A little before, we restored from the codices and editions 1, 6, 8 the word ut before docet Augustinus. In the text itself, before de corporali, the Vatican edition with the other editions, except 1, 4, [reads] primum in place of primo. Then, before partibus, the Vatican edition with most editions and codex B adds ex. Shortly after ibi the Vatican edition reads aliqua in place of alia. A little below, before figura. Potest, the Vatican edition with most editions adds est, and immediately after, with the particle et omitted, reads imminuta in place of minuta, against codices B C D and almost all editions; Augustine [reads] diminuta.
Codd. A B D E et edd. 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 male sit. — Infra Vat. cum paucis edd. non bene adiicit tota legendo in ipsa tota anima vera; et immediate post edd. 2, 3, 7 vere pro multiplicem vera.
Codices A B D E and editions 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 wrongly [read] sit. — Below, the Vatican edition with a few editions not well adds tota, reading in ipsa tota anima vera; and immediately after, editions 2, 3, 7 [read] vere in place of multiplicem vera.
Vat. sola repetit hic et nec non minus post manifestum est; eadem cum edd. 2, 6, 8 addit animae; cod. D vero post multiplicem ponit eius.
The Vatican edition alone repeats here et nec and minus after manifestum est; the same with editions 2, 6, 8 adds animae; but codex D after multiplicem places eius.
Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8. Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 6. et 7. Circa finem huius textus post eadem bonitas Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 adiicit eius est. Denique nonnullae edd. aliud sapientem aliud pro aut sapientem aut.
Book VI On the Trinity, c. 6, n. 8. What follows is taken from cc. 6 and 7. Toward the end of this text, after eadem bonitas, the Vatican edition, against the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, adds eius est. Finally, some editions [read] aliud sapientem aliud in place of aut sapientem aut.
Cap. 1. n. 6. — Vat. et ceterae edd. in principio post Deo addunt inquit.
Chapter 1, no. 6. — The Vatican edition and the other editions, at the beginning after Deo, add inquit.
Cap. 1. n. 2. — In principio huius cap. pro divina codd. B C D deitatis, A E divinitatis. In ipso textu post situ edd. 1, 8 praesentem loco praesidentem; circa finem eiusdem Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 8, 9 post quid sit addunt ipse.
Chapter 1, no. 2. — At the beginning of this chapter, for divina the codices B C D [read] deitatis, A E [read] divinitatis. In the text itself, after situ, editions 1, 8 [read] praesentem in place of praesidentem; toward the end of the same, the Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 8, 9 after quid sit add ipse.
Cap. 4. in fine et c. 5. in principio. — In textu ante subiectis Vat. et edd. 1, 9 addunt ut; edd. 1, 6, 8 hic et paulo infra ante subiecto adiiciunt ut in contra originale, codd. et ceteras edd. Deinde edd. praeter fidem codd. et originalis post Res ponunt vero pro ergo.
Chapter 4, at the end, and c. 5, at the beginning. — In the text before subiectis, the Vatican edition and editions 1, 9 add ut; editions 1, 6, 8, here and a little below before subiecto, add ut in against the original, the codices, and the other editions. Then the editions, against the fidelity of the codices and the original, after Res read vero in place of ergo.
Num. 27. Non enim ex compositis atque immunis Deus... ex infirmibus continetur.... ex disparibus formabilis est, ubi cod. A disparibus formatur. Pro formalis in textu Magistri legendum videtur formabilis. Hunc textum explicat S. Bonaventura, hic p. II. dub. 6.
Number 27. For God is not from composites... contained out of weak things... formable from disparate things, where codex A [reads] disparibus formatur. For formalis in the text of the Master one ought rather to read formabilis. St. Bonaventure explains this text here in pars II, dubium 6.
Num. 43. — In hoc textu Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 et cod. B corrupte pro vita est natura legunt una est natura, ubi Hilarius clarius: sed totum, quod est, vita est.
Number 43. — In this text the Vatican edition and editions 4, 8, 9 and codex B corruptly, instead of vita est natura, read una est natura, where Hilary more clearly: but the whole, which is, is life.

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