Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

COLLATIO V.

De prima visione tractatio secunda, quae est de tertio radio sive de veritate morum, et de sapientia contemplationis.

Summarium

Introductio; repetitio praecedentis coll.; divisio tertii radii, qui est de veritate morum et illustrat ad tria comprehendenda, 1. — Pars I. De comprehensione modestiarum quoad exercitationes consuetudinales; sex medietates eliguntur, 2. — Primo, de temperantia, 3-5. — Secundo, de munificentia, 6. — Tertio, de fortitudine, 7. — Quarto, de mansuetudine, 8. — Quinto, de benignitate, 9. — Sexto, de magnanimitate, 10. — Hae sex removent vitia, 11. — Pars II. De comprehensione industriarum quoad speculationes intellectuales. Hae sunt scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intelligentia; divisio speculationis duplex, 12. — De singulis, 13. — Pars III. De comprehensione moralium iustitiarum quoad leges politicas. Attenditur haec quoad quatuor, 14. — Primo, quoad ritum colendi Deum in sacrificio et laude, 15-17. — Secundo, quoad formam convivendi, 18. — Tertio, quoad normam praesidendi, 19. — Quarto, quoad censuram iudicandi, 20. — Abusus in his novem scientiis, 21. — Epilogus et repetitio, 22. — Pars IV. De sapientia a philosophis promissa, ubi est divisio lucis a tenebris. Triplex conversio, 23. — Primus gradus, conversio animae super se ipsam; animae potentiae tres et operationes sex, 24. 25. — Secundus gradus, conversio super Intelligentias spirituales, quae sunt lumina et specula, cum virtutibus infimis, mediis et supremis, 26. 27. — Tertius gradus, conversio super rationes aeternas, 28. — Haec fit tripliciter: primo ratiocinando, 29. — Secundo, experiendo, 30. — Tertio, intelligendo, 31. — De his tribus, 32. — Epilogus, 33.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris⁴ etc. Dictum est, quod intellectualis lux est veritas, quae est radians super intelligentiam sive humanam, sive angelicam; quae inexstinguibiliter irradiat, quia non potest cogitari non esse. Irradiat autem aliquid tripliciter: ut veritas

rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum: ut veritas rerum est indivisio entis et esse, ut veritas vocum est adaequatio vocis et intellectus, ut veritas morum est rectitudo vivendi. Quod patet ex parte principii, quod irradiat; ex parte subiecti, quod irradiationem suscipit; ex parte obiecti, ad quod irradiat. In quantum haec lux est causa essendi, est lux magna; in quantum est ratio intelligendi, est lux clara; in quantum est ordo vivendi¹, est lux bona; vidit, inquit, Deus lucem, quod esset bona. — Ut lux magna irradiat ad comprehensionem substantiarum sive essentiarum, figurarum et naturarum mundialium; ut lux clara irradiat ad comprehensionem locutionum, argumentationum, persuasionum rationalium; ut lux bona irradiat super intelligentiam vel illustrat ad comprehensionem modestiarum, industriarum, iustitiarum²: ad comprehensionem modestiarum quantum ad exercitationes consuetudinales; ad comprehensionem industriarum quantum ad speculationes intellectuales; ad comprehensionem iustitiarum quantum ad leges politicas. Primo habenda est modestia, secundo industria inquirenda, tertio exercenda iustitia. — Et hic ostenditur, praelatus qualis esse debet, scilicet perfectus in actione et contemplatione accipere debet leges. Ubi? In monte contemplationis cum Moyse³, ut sit modestus et industrius, non bestialis, quia talis in montem ascendere non potest; bestia enim, quae tetigerit montem, lapidabitur.

2. Primo igitur irradiat sive illustrat ad comprehensionem quantum ad exercitationem consuetudinalium virtutum. Unde Philosophus⁴ ponit duodecim medietates: fortitudinem circa timores et audacias; temperantiam circa delectationes et tristitias; liberalitatem circa dona mediocria; magnificentiam circa dona magna; magnanimitatem circa honorum magnorum appetitum; philotimiam⁵ circa mediocrium; mansuetudinem circa iras; veritatem circa locutiones; eutrapeliam circa ludi delectationem; amicitiam et duo media passionum, scilicet verecundiam et nemesin, quae est nulli obesse et alicui prodesse. De his autem eligamus sex praecipuas, scilicet primo temperantiam, secundo munificentiam, tertio fortitudinem, quarto mansuetudinem, quinto benignitatem, sexto magnanimitatem.

3. Primo incipiendum a temperantia. Haec necessaria est in-primis; non enim statim homo tentatur a timore mortis⁶, sed statim, quando natus est, delectatione secundum gustum; unde puer appetit dulce secundum gustum et postea delectabile secundum tactum, quando magnus est. Hanc passionem contemporaneam nobis⁷, quae incipit in pueris et terminatur in senibus, oportet primo domare; ista est concupiscentia, alia est cupiditas. Puer enim primo appetit manducare, postea pecuniam; unde mirabiliter delectatur in illa, et si puero offeras panem et denarium, accipit denarium et relinquit panem. Hoc inficit homines; concupiscunt enim habere et retinere. Appretiari haec ut felicissima malum est, aspernari ut exsecrabilia malum est.

4. Dicunt quidam: totaliter pauperes non tenent medium. Respondeo: immo vere tenent medium⁸. Haec enim medietas non est circa res, sed circa appetitum animae. Si enim appetis haec, ut sustenteris tuis vel alienis, medietatem tenes; sed si appretias, ut felicitas sit in eis, unum extremum est; si aspernaris ut profanum, alterum extremum est, sicut Manichaei profanum putant cum muliere iacere, sive cum uxore, sive cum alia. Similiter dicebant, quod nihil potest homo habere. Et dicit Augustinus⁹, quod hoc non fuit praeceptum, licet Apostolis dixerit Dominus: Nihil tuleritis in via. Medium ergo est sustentari sive suis, sive alienis.

5. Et dicebat beatus Franciscus¹⁰, quod « pauper magis potest esse largus quam dives: quia dives, si dat quidquid habet, deficiet et confusus est; si vero non dat, cum habeat, licet vellet dare, si sibi non deficeret; voluntas bona est, sed non reputatur sibi pro facto, quia adhuc habet substantiam. Sed pauperi, qui nihil habet, si vellet dare pauperi, et

nihil habet, quod det; et vellet aedificare hospitalia, non tamen habet unde; voluntas pro facto reputatur¹ ». — Quod autem dicunt, quod nimis pauperes non tenent medium; simile est illi quod dicebat quidam medicus Frederici, qui dicebat, quod ille qui abstinebat ab omni muliere, non erat virtuosus nec tenebat medium. Et ad hoc sequitur, quod si omnem mulierem cognoscere et nullam mulierem cognoscere extrema sunt: ergo medietatem omnium mulierum cognoscere medium est².

6. Haec cupiditas domari debet per munificentiam, quae comprehendit in se largitatem et magnificentiam. Iste est fons, qui aquas refundit; fons non retinet in se aquas. Secundum Philosophum³ difficile est ab hac perfecte curari, quia hoc valde delectabile est, quia reputat se homo magnum, et alii reputant. Si homo luxuriatur, dolet cerebrum; sed in divitiis homo delectatur, quia est ibi praesumtio et reputatio. — Unde haec cupiditas infecit Giezi⁴, et leprosus factus est, quia cucurrit post Naaman; istud simoniaci hodie reputant magnam curialitatem. Venit Simon magus et dixit Petro: Accipias de pecunia; satis habeo; et da mihi, ut per impositionem manus possim dare Spiritum sanctum; sed Petrus non reputavit curialitatem nec habuit patientiam: Pecunia tua, inquit, tecum sit in perditionem.

7. Tertia medietas est fortitudo, quae est circa timores et audacias⁵. Haec est necessaria homini, ut non sit pusillanimis, vel temerarius, sed sustineat terribilia et etiam mori sit paratus. Aliqui enim cadunt in ignaviam et pusillanimitatem. Unde Iob⁶: Nunquid fortitudo lapidum fortitudo mea, aut caro mea aenea est? Fortitudo enim in anima est, non in carne. Melior est patiens arrogante; et in Proverbiis: Melior est patiens viro forti, et qui dominatur animo suo, expugnatore urbium. Unde spiritualis homo multum debet cavere a moestitia.

8. Haec virtus facit animam nobilem; sed quia fortis aliquando dedignatur contra alios, ideo necessaria est mansuetudo, quae est contra irascibilitates et iracundias, non ut homo penitus non irascatur, sed ubi debet et quando debet⁷. Unde debet habere et faciem hominis et faciem leonis. — Tamen aliquando putas hominem mansuetum, qui tacet, alio peccante; hoc non est mansuetudo. Audi igitur: dicitur de Iesu, quod turbavit semetipsum⁸ et fecit flagellum de funiculis. Unde in primo Machabaeorum: Vae mihi, ut quid natus sum videre mala gentis meae et sanctorum? Unde Christus est agnus et leo.

9. Quinta medietas est benignitas, sive nemesis, sive amicitia, quae nihil habet malignitatis, sed homo vult bonum alii homini; et oportet, quod hic ratio dirigatur. Etsi dicat Philosophus⁹, quod oportet amicis benefacere, inimicis malefacere; Christus tamen dicit, ut omnis homo diligatur, et ut omni homini conferantur utilia, non nociva. Si ego te diligo et do tibi vel dignitatem vel libertatem, et tu male uteris ea, si dem tibi; benignus non sum, sed potius malignus; et ideo non dabo tibi, ut sim benignus. Habeo amicum, habeo inimicum; amicus male utetur aliqua praelatione vel dignitate ad damnum suum et reipublicae; si dem sibi, benignus non sum. Inimicus meus e contrario bene utetur; sibi dabo et faciam bonum meum de malo suo¹⁰. Pater non blanditur filio nec dicit verbum dulce, ne superbiat. Mundus hodie ignorat istam benignitatem; unde totus mundus in maligno positus est, quia homo non diligit nisi bonum privatum.

10. Sexta medietas est magnanimitas, ut appretientur magna, et despiciantur vilia. Haec est humilitas, quae despicit apparentia magna et appretiat ea quae videntur esse parva, sunt tamen magna vere. Philosophus¹¹ dicit, quod magnanimus est in appetitu honoris; quidquid dicat ipse, hoc non docet veritas, nisi cum honor est aeternorum. Sed econtra quidam appretiant unam vilissimam laudem alicuius, cum tamen veritas dicat in mente sibi, quod ipse est pessimus et nequam; et inde effert se!

11. Hae sex medietates sufficiunt; aliae enim quaedam innominatae¹² sunt. Has autem Philosophus

manifeste ponit, et in his veritati fidei ratio substernitur. Hae medietates removent vitia sive carnalia, sive spiritualia, ut temperantia gulam et luxuriam, munificentia avaritiam, cupiditatem, rapacitatem; fortitudo accidiam, ignaviam, pigritiam; mansuetudo iracundiam, odium, impatientiam; benignitas invidiam; magnanimitas superbiam, arrogantiam, vanitatem, iactantiam.

12. Secundus radius veritatis illustrat ad comprehensionem industriarum secundum speculationes intellectuales. Hae sunt quinque: scientia, ars, prudentia, sapientia, intelligentia¹. — Speculatio autem aut est consistens in se, aut transit in affectum et effectum. Primus modus non pertinet ad moralem, sed magis logici est; secundus autem spectat, quia virtuosus; et ideo, quia faciliter speculativus fit practicus, facile ex speculativo fit virtuosus.

13. Notitia igitur transiens in affectum est sapientia, quae est « cognitio causarum altissimarum et per causas altissimas² ». — Notitia autem transiens in effectum extrinsecum est ars, quae est « habitus cum ratione factivus », et hic iungitur notitia cum faciente, praevia tamen affectione. Medium inter haec est electio, quae iungitur affectui et ordinatur ad opus. Quod enim quis eligit amat et eligit ad opus; et haec est prudentia, quae est media inter sapientiam et artem. Intelligentia autem est in ascendendo a prudentia ad sapientiam, quae est cognitio principiorum et regularum certarum. — Necesse est similiter descendere ad artem per scientiam. Chirurgus, nisi habeat regulam medici, interficit hominem, ut si incidat eum qui est dispositus ad febrem. — Dicebat³ etiam de quodam mathematico, qui faciebat campanas optimas, et illas faciebat secundum proportiones musicales; tamen istas habuerat a quodam musico, qui dederat sibi formam et longitudinis et spissitudinis et martellum proportionatum ad pulsandum. — Nec est intelligendum, propter hoc quod dicitur⁴, quod virtutes quaedam sunt intellectuales, quaedam consuetudinariae, quod propter hoc virtutes sint in parte aliqua alia nisi in rationali, quia essentia omnis virtutis est in rationali; sed quaedam sunt in rationali secundum se et secundum quod est speculatrix; quaedam autem, secundum quod est exterioris hominis gubernatrix.

14. Tertius radius veritatis illustrat ad morales iustitias secundum dictamen legum politicarum. Hic non debeo loqui sicut theologus nec sicut iurista, sed sicut philosophus loquitur. Haec comprehensio est circa quatuor. Nullus autem philosophorum dedit hanc, sed si fuerit collecta ex multis, aliquid proveniet⁵. — Attenditur autem quantum ad ritum colendi, quantum ad formam convivendi, quantum ad normam praesidendi, quantum ad censuram iudicandi. Ad censuram iudicandi non pervenitur nisi per normam praesidendi; nec ad normam praesidendi nisi per formam convivendi; nec ad istam nisi per primam.

15. Omnes veri philosophi unum Deum coluerunt. Unde etiam Socrates⁶, quia prohibebat, sacrificium fieri Apollini, interfectus fuit, cum coleret unum Deum. Verum est, quod Plato suasit sibi fugam. « Absit, inquit Socrates, ut negem veritatem, quam asserui »; et ideo Plato non interfuit morti eius, erubescens, quod suasisset sibi fugam. Cultus Dei pietas est fidei. Unde dicit Tullius⁷, quod pietas consistit in cultu deorum. Non placet, quod dicit deorum. Scriptura nunquam vocat Angelos deos, ne venerentur sicut dii, sed homines dicuntur dii: Deus stetit in synagoga deorum⁸, id est hominum, non Angelorum. Cultus autem Dei consistit in laude et sacrificio.

16. Quomodo autem sacrificium introductum sit, videtur, quod per fidem Abel obtulit sacrificium⁹ et Noe, de quo dicitur: Odoratus est Dominus odorem suavitatis. Et significabant haec sacrificia sacrificium Christi, quod in cruce fecit; et ideo dicitur Dominus odorare, ut Deus placaretur per mortem Unigeniti. — Daemones autem propter superbiam suam volunt coli ut Deus, ut habeant in terra quod habere non potuerunt in caelo; et quia maxime alienantur homines a Deo¹⁰. — Sanguinem Christi offert qui facit talia sacrificia, eo quod effusus fuit ad placandum Patrem.

17. Sacrificium autem laudis¹¹ in corde naturale iudicatorium dictat, et est de dictamine naturae; et

in hoc consenserunt omnes veri philosophi. Unde dicit ille, quod « qui dubitat, utrum parentes honorandi sint, et Deus venerandus, poena dignus est ».

18. Secundus modus est forma convivendi, ut: « Quod tibi non vis fieri, ne facias alteri¹ ». Hoc in corde scriptum est per legem aeternam. Ex hac naturali lege emanant leges et canones, pullulationes pulcrae. Sed quid? Tu non vis suspendi, et latronem suspendis? Dicendum, quod latro prius debet suspendi, quam ut respublica laedatur; Ionas² contra se dedit sententiam, ut proiiceretur in mare.

19. Tertia est norma praesidendi, id est qualiter princeps ad populum debet se habere, et e converso. Et haec emanat a veritate prima: quia populus debet assistere punienti et vindicanti; princeps non debet suam utilitatem quaerere, sed reipublicae. Philosophus³ dicit, quod differt tyrannus et princeps: tyrannus quaerit propriam utilitatem, sicut Herodes, qui, timens privari regno suo, saevit in pueros; princeps autem communem utilitatem intendit. Tamen hodie magna abominatio est in his qui praesunt, quia in navi non ponitur rector, nisi habeat artem gubernandi; quomodo ergo in republica ponitur ille qui nescit regere? Unde quando per successionem praesunt, male regitur respublica. David fuit sanctissimus; Salomon, etsi lubricissimus, tamen sapiens; Roboam stultus, quia divisit regnum⁴. Romani per artem diaboli elegerunt Diocletianum. Debebant eligere comedentem super mensam ferream et invenerunt comedentem illum super vomerem; qui postmodum multa mala fecit. Unde quamdiu Romani illos qui praeessent, elegerunt, sapientissimos elegerunt; et tunc bene gubernata est respublica; sed postquam ad successionem venerunt, totum fuit destructum.

20. Ultimum est censura iudicandi, ut homo sciat, quid de quacumque re sit iudicandum, quod spectat ad personas, ad res, ad modum agendi. Haec omnia manant a veritate prima.

21. Sed in his omnibus luxuriata est ratio; luxuriata est metaphysica: quia quidam⁵ posuerunt mundum aeternum, quia, si causa aeterna, et effectus aeternus; et isti male senserunt de causa prima. Similiter mathematici primo sciverunt numeros et postea ad influentias et secreta cordium venerunt. Naturales sciverunt et de corporibus et mineralibus et dixerunt: « Ars imitatur naturam⁶ »; et nos scimus secreta naturae: ergo nos faciemus vobis aurum et argentum. Similiter grammatici poesibus et fabulis suis tenuerunt totum mundum, quousque venerunt Sancti contra eos. Similiter logici cum suis sophismatibus et suis falsis positionibus fecerunt mundum insanire. Similiter rhetores ita delectabantur in colore sermonis, ut non aliud esse regnum Dei dicerent; tamen sublata est modo de medio. Ars moralis non ita luxuriata est, quia non in sola speculatione stat; sed scientia iuris multum luxuriatur propter lucrum; et causae, quae deberent terminari per ius, modo per allegationem et subtilitatem iuris fiunt immortales, cum tamen intentio iuris sit causas rescindere.

22. Haec sunt novem lumina illustrantia animam, scilicet veritas rerum, vocum, morum: rerum, scilicet essentiarum, figurarum, naturarum quantum ad quidditatum differentias occultas, quantum ad quantitatum proportiones manifestas, quantum ad naturarum proprietates mixtas. Primo metaphysica, secundo mathematica, tertio naturalis seu physica. — Veritas vocum tripliciter: quantum ad locutiones, argumentationes, persuasiones; primo, quantum ad locutiones indicantes mentis conceptus; secundo, quantum ad argumentationes trahentes mentis assensus; tertio, quantum ad persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus; prima grammatica, secunda logica, tertia rhetorica. — Veritas morum tripliciter: quantum ad modestias, industrias, iustitias: modestias, quantum ad exercitationes consuetudinales; industrias, quantum ad speculationes intellectuales; iustitias, quantum ad leges politicas. Prima virtus consuetudinalis, secunda virtus intellectualis, tertia virtus iustitialis. — Has novem scientias dederunt philosophi et illustrati sunt. Deus enim illis revelavit⁷. Postmodum voluerunt ad sapientiam pervenire, et veritas trahebat eos; et promiserunt dare sapientiam, hoc est beatitudinem, hoc est intellectum adeptum; promiserunt, inquam, discipulis suis.

23. Quarta ergo consideratio est, quomodo venerunt ad hoc, in quo lux separata est a tenebris⁸; separando enim se a tenebris, converterunt se ad lucem. Sed hoc ita fit, ut anima convertat se primo super se; secundo, super Intelligentias spirituales; tertio, super rationes aeternas.

24. Primo ergo oportet se considerare, non sicut oculus carnis, qui non videt se nisi per quandam reflexionem a speculo, sed sicut oculus mentis, qui primo videt se et postmodum alia. Sed ad hoc

oportet, ut convertat se super potentias et super actus. Habet enim anima tres potentias: animalem, intellectualem, divinam, secundum triplicem oculum: carnis, rationis, contemplationis. Primus viget, secundus caligat, tertius excaecatus est¹. — Potentia animalis duplex est; vel in obiecta sensuum particularium et sensus communis, vel in phantasmata sensibilium, et sic est sensus et imaginatio. — Intellectualis etiam est duplex: aut ut considerat universales rationes abstractas, ut abstrahit a loco, tempore et dimensione; aut ut elevatur ad substantias spirituales separatas; et sic sunt duae potentiae, scilicet ratio et intellectus: per rationem confert, per intellectum cognoscit se et substantias spirituales; et tunc ingerit se Intelligentiis, et tunc intrat aeviternum ipsarum². — Similiter operatio vel potentia divina duplex est: una, quae se convertit ad contuenda divina spectacula; alia, quae se convertit ad degustanda divina solatia. Primum fit per intelligentiam, secundum per vim unitivam sive amativam, quae secreta est, et de qua parum vel nihil noverunt.

25. Ergo triplex est potentia, et sex sunt operationes; et quando haec omnia obiecta videt anima, sic rediens super se, fit speculum quoddam pulcherrimum et tersum, in quo videt quidquid est fulgoris et pulcritudinis, sicut in speculo polito videtur imago. Sed ad hoc requiritur opacitas naturalis, vel artificialis: naturalis, ut in speculo de chalybe; artificialis, ut in plumbo supposito vitro; secundo requiritur politio, per quam formam vel imaginem recipit; tertio requiritur splendor, quia in nocte speculum nihil reddit. Similiter in anima sunt virtutes inferiores tanquam tenentes lumen, ne defluat; mediae sunt sicut politiones; supremae sunt sicut splendores supervenientes: et sic est anima speculum.

26. Sed oportet, ut habeamus secundum gradum, quod apponatur pulcris formis, scilicet luminibus caelicis sibi proportionatis, ut Angelis, quia, si statim se elevaret ad divinos fulgores, reverberaretur. Angeli autem sunt et lumina et specula³; ad quos contemplandos tripliciter elevatur anima. — Habent enim Angeli virtutes infimas, per quas regulant motus nobilium corporum et influunt in mundialia; et hoc est positio philosophorum⁴. Constat enim, quod « causa nobilior est suo effectu »; et constat, quod ad influentiam corporum caelestium fit vel generatur vivum et animatum: ergo et anima. Si ergo animatum nobilius est non animato: ergo necesse est, ut habeat aliam causam quam illa corpora. Et illa est influentia angelica cum influentia corporum caelestium. Unde per regimen substantiae intellectualis, influentis super motum orbis, quem regit, fit hoc. — Alii posuerunt, quod Angeli essent numerati secundum numerum motuum propter inclinationem naturalem ad motum⁵. — Alii posuerunt decem Intelligentias solum, considerantes earum influentias; et fecerunt insanias et contentiones. Angelus bene potest esse sine motu.

27. Item, sunt virtutes in Angelis ad animas rationales, per quas regunt homines. Sunt enim delatores luminum et elevatores intellectuum ad suscipiendas illuminationes. Est ergo in eis virtus delativa, quia sunt quaedam lumina et quoddam pervium, et contemperant in se nobis divinum radium, ut proportionetur nobis. — Secundo modo est in eis virtus elevativa, qua nos aptant per condescensionem et sublevationem ad illum radium suscipiendum, non tanquam perficientes⁶. — Item, est in eis virtus suprema, qua se ad Deum convertunt in susceptione splendorum et aeternae lucis, quam amant; et omnia reducunt ad ipsam, ut tendant in Deum per amorem et laudem. Unde in Iob⁷: Ubi eras, cum me laudarent astra matutina, et iubilarent omnes filii Dei? Et hoc totum senserunt philosophi. Item, Angeli sunt ex hoc gratias acturi. — Quando hoc videt anima, ingerit se Angelis et intrat saeculum ipsorum.

28. Tertius gradus est, quod ipse intellectus, considerans conditiones entis secundum relationem causae ad causatum, transfert se ab effectu ad causas et transit ad rationes aeternas. Differt causa a causatis: quia prima causa est ens primum, causatum ens productum; causa prima est ens simplex, causatum compositum; causa prima est ens purum, et causatum permixtum; causa prima est ens fixum, et causatum variatum; causa prima est ens absolutum, et causatum alligatum; causa prima est ens perfectum, causatum diminutum. Haec ergo sunt certissima.

29. Intelligentia autem fertur in hanc lucem tripliciter: ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo; ratiocinabiliter, experimentaliter, intelligentialiter. — Per viam rationis sic¹. Si est ens productum: ergo est ens primum, quia effectus ponit causam. Si enim est ens ab alio, secundum aliud et propter aliud: ergo est ens a se, secundum se et propter se. — Item, si est ens compositum, necesse est, esse simplex, a quo habet esse, quia esse, quod recedit a simplicitate, cadit in compositionem. — Item, si est ens permixtum, necesse est, esse ens purum, creatum autem nullum purum. — Item, si est ens secundum se variatum, necesse est, esse fixum, quia mobile reducitur ad immobile. Mota enim manu, stat cubitus; et moto cubito, stat humerus; et sic semper quod movetur movebitur per aliquod fixum². — Item, si est dare alligatum: ergo et absolutum; omnis enim creatura alligata est alicui generi praedicamentorum; sed quod alligatum est, unum non dat alteri esse: ergo necesse est, absolutum esse, a quo recipiant esse. — Item, si est ens diminutum, necesse est, esse ens perfectum. — Et hac via procedit Philosophus³ ad ostendendum mundum aeternum, quia omnem motum et mutationem praecedit motus localis circularis, quia perfectus est. Sed respondeo: dicendum, quod verum est, quod perfectum est ante diminutum, loquendo de perfecto simpliciter, sed non de perfecto in genere, qualis est motus localis. — Et sic fertur intelligentia ratiocinando.

30. Fertur similiter experiendo sic: productum respectu primi defectivum est; similiter compositum respectu simplicis; similiter permixtum respectu puri, et sic de aliis; ergo dicunt privationes. Sed « privationes non cognoscuntur nisi per habitus suos⁴ ». « Iudex enim est rectum sui et obliqui ». Et si « omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione »: ergo necessario intelligentia experitur in se, quod habeat aliquod lumen, per quod cognoscat primum esse.

31. Sic igitur, his praesuppositis, intellectus intelligit et dicit, primum esse est, et nulli vere esse convenit nisi primo esse, et ab ipso omnia habent esse, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi primo esse. Similiter simplex esse est simpliciter perfectum esse: ergo est quo nihil intelligitur melius. Unde Deus non potest cogitari non esse, ut probat Anselmus⁵.

32. Quando anima videt hoc familiarius, primo ratiocinando, secundo experiendo, tertio intelligendo; ibi potest quiescere. Unde ratiocinando infert per oppositum: si est posterius, est prius; si est compositum, est simplex etc.; experimentaliter, quia privationes non cognoscuntur nisi in positione causae, et illa sex dicuntur per modum defectus et privationis; intelligentialiter, quia non possunt latere animam⁶, ut primum esse est, simplex esse est etc. — Item, considerat illud esse, ut habet substantiam, virtutem et operationem, ut primam, purissimam, simplicissimam, et sic de aliis sex; ut est in eo unitas, veritas, bonitas, ut prima, ut purissima, ut absolutissima, et sic de aliis sex; ut habet firmitatem, speciositatem, bonitatem, ut primam, purissimam et absolutissimam; ut habet memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, secundum illa sex; ut habet vitam, sapientiam, iucunditatem, secundum illa sex: et tunc intelligit, quod est bonum per essentiam, et omnia per illud beatificantur, et ideo summe appetibile et summe debet appeti; et hoc faciendo conquiescit.

33. Primo ergo anima videt se sicut speculum, deinde Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemperativo; deinde in luce aeterna tanquam in obiecto fontano, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intelligentialiter. — Dum haec igitur percipit et consurgit ad divinum contuitum, dicit, se habere intellectum adeptum, quem promiserunt philosophi; et ad hoc veritas trahit. — Sed tamen per virtutes oportet devenire, sicut fecerunt philosophi; quando viderunt, quod tam alte non posset perveniri nisi per virtutes, converterunt se ad docendum illas, ut fecit Socrates; unde reputatur minus bene dixisse, eo quod tantum de illis dixit; sed hoc fecit, quia videbat, quod ad illum intellectum non potest perveniri, nisi anima sit purgata⁷.

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COLLATION V.

On the first vision, the second treatment, which is on the third ray or on the truth of morals, and on the wisdom of contemplation.

Summarium

Introduction; a recapitulation of the preceding collation; the division of the third ray, which is of the truth of morals and gives light for three things to be comprehended, 1. — Part I. On the comprehension of the modesties as regards the exercises of custom; six means are chosen, 2. — First, on temperance, 3-5. — Second, on munificence, 6. — Third, on fortitude, 7. — Fourth, on meekness, 8. — Fifth, on benignity, 9. — Sixth, on magnanimity, 10. — These six remove vices, 11. — Part II. On the comprehension of the industries as regards intellectual speculations. These are knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding; the twofold division of speculation, 12. — On each of them, 13. — Part III. On the comprehension of the moral justices as regards political laws. This is attended to under four heads, 14. — First, as regards the rite of worshipping God in sacrifice and in praise, 15-17. — Second, as regards the form of living together, 18. — Third, as regards the norm of presiding, 19. — Fourth, as regards the censure of judging, 20. — The abuse of these nine sciences, 21. — Epilogue and recapitulation, 22. — Part IV. On the wisdom promised by the philosophers, wherein the light is divided from the darkness. The threefold conversion, 23. — The first step, the conversion of the soul upon itself; the soul's three powers and six operations, 24. 25. — The second step, the conversion upon the spiritual Intelligences, which are lights and mirrors, together with their lowest, middle and supreme powers, 26. 27. — The third step, the conversion upon the eternal grounds, 28. — This comes about in three ways: first by reasoning, 29. — Second, by experiencing, 30. — Third, by understanding, 31. — On these three, 32. — Epilogue, 33.

1. God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness⁴, etc. It has been said that the intellectual light is truth, which shines upon the understanding, whether human or angelic; and it irradiates inextinguishably, because it cannot be thought not to be. Now it irradiates something in three ways: as the truth

of things, as the truth of words, as the truth of morals: as the truth of things is the indivision of the being and its to-be, as the truth of words is the adequation of word and understanding, as the truth of morals is the rectitude of living. Which is clear from the side of the principle that irradiates; from the side of the subject that receives the irradiation; from the side of the object toward which it irradiates. Inasmuch as this light is the cause of being, it is a great light; inasmuch as it is the ground of understanding, it is a clear light; inasmuch as it is the order of living¹, it is a good light; God saw, he says, the light, that it was good. — As a great light it irradiates unto the comprehension of the substances or essences, the figures and the natures of the world; as a clear light it irradiates unto the comprehension of locutions, argumentations, rational persuasions; as a good light it irradiates upon the understanding, or gives light unto the comprehension of the modesties, the industries, the justices²: unto the comprehension of the modesties as regards the exercises of custom; unto the comprehension of the industries as regards intellectual speculations; unto the comprehension of the justices as regards political laws. First modesty is to be had, second industry is to be sought out, third justice is to be exercised. — And here it is shown what sort of man a prelate ought to be, namely that, perfect in action and in contemplation, he ought to receive the laws. Where? On the mountain of contemplation with Moses³, that he may be modest and industrious, not bestial, since such a one cannot ascend the mountain; for the beast that shall touch the mountain shall be stoned.

2. First, then, it irradiates or gives light unto comprehension as regards the exercise of the customary virtues. Hence the Philosopher⁴ posits twelve means: fortitude about fears and daring; temperance about delights and sorrows; liberality about middling gifts; magnificence about great gifts; magnanimity about the appetite for great honours; philotimy⁵ about middling ones; meekness about angers; truthfulness about locutions; eutrapelia about the delight of play; friendship, and the two means of the passions, namely shamefastness and nemesis, which is to injure no one and to profit someone. Now out of these let us choose six chief ones, namely first temperance, second munificence, third fortitude, fourth meekness, fifth benignity, sixth magnanimity.

3. First one must begin from temperance. This is necessary first of all; for a man is not tempted straightway by the fear of death⁶, but straightway, when he is born, by delight in respect of taste; whence a boy seeks what is sweet in respect of taste, and afterwards what is delightful in respect of touch, when he is grown. This passion, coeval with us⁷, which begins in boys and ends in old men, must first be tamed; the one is concupiscence, the other is cupidity. For a boy first desires to eat, afterwards money; whence he takes a wonderful delight in it, and if you offer a boy bread and a penny, he takes the penny and leaves the bread. This infects men; for they covet to have and to keep. To prize these things as most happy is an evil, to spurn them as execrable is an evil.

4. Some say: those who are wholly poor do not hold the mean. I answer: nay, they truly hold the mean⁸. For this mean is not about things, but about the appetite of the soul. For if you desire these things that you may be sustained by your own or by another's, you hold the mean; but if you prize them, so that happiness lies in them, that is the one extreme; if you spurn them as profane, that is the other extreme — as the Manichees hold it profane to lie with a woman, whether with a wife or with another. Likewise they used to say that a man can have nothing at all. And Augustine says⁹ that this was not a precept, although the Lord said to the Apostles: Take nothing for the way. The mean, therefore, is to be sustained either by one's own or by another's.

5. And blessed Francis used to say¹⁰ that « a poor man can be more bountiful than a rich one: because the rich man, if he gives whatever he has, will fail and is confounded; but if he does not give, since he has it — granted that he would be willing to give if it did not fail him — the will is good, but it is not reckoned to him for the deed, because he still has substance. But to a poor man, who has nothing, if he would be willing to give to a poor man, and

has nothing that he might give; and would be willing to build hospitals, yet has not the wherewithal; the will is reckoned for the deed¹ ». — But as for what they say, that the excessively poor do not hold the mean, it is like what a certain physician of Frederick's used to say, who said that he who abstained from every woman was not virtuous nor held the mean. And from this it follows that, if to know every woman and to know no woman are the extremes, then to know the half of all women is the mean².

6. This cupidity must be tamed by munificence, which comprehends within itself largesse and magnificence. This is the fountain that pours back its waters; a fountain does not keep its waters within itself. According to the Philosopher³ it is difficult to be perfectly cured of this, because it is exceedingly delightful, since a man reckons himself great, and others so reckon him. If a man is lustful, his brain aches; but in riches a man takes delight, because there is presumption and repute in them. — Hence this cupidity infected Giezi⁴, and he was made a leper, because he ran after Naaman; and this the simoniacs today reckon a great courtesy. Simon Magus came and said to Peter: Take of the money; I have enough; and give me that by the imposition of the hand I may be able to give the Holy Spirit; but Peter did not reckon it a courtesy nor did he have patience: Thy money, he said, be with thee unto perdition.

7. The third mean is fortitude, which is about fears and daring⁵. This is necessary for a man, that he be not faint-hearted, nor rash, but may endure terrible things and be ready even to die. For some fall into cowardice and faint-heartedness. Hence Job⁶: Is my strength the strength of stones, or is my flesh of brass? For fortitude is in the soul, not in the flesh. The patient man is better than the arrogant; and in Proverbs: The patient man is better than the valiant, and he that ruleth his spirit than he that taketh cities. Hence a spiritual man ought greatly to beware of sadness.

8. This virtue makes the soul noble; but because the brave man sometimes disdains others, therefore meekness is necessary, which is against irascibilities and angers — not that a man should not be angry at all, but where he ought and when he ought⁷. Hence he ought to have both the face of a man and the face of a lion. — Yet sometimes you think a man meek who keeps silent while another sins; this is not meekness. Hear, then: it is said of Jesus that he troubled himself⁸ and made a scourge of little cords. Hence in the first book of Maccabees: Woe is me, wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and of the saints? Hence Christ is a lamb and a lion.

9. The fifth mean is benignity, or nemesis, or friendship, which has nothing of malignity, but a man wills the good to another man; and it is needful that here reason should direct. Although the Philosopher says⁹ that one ought to do good to friends and evil to enemies, Christ nevertheless says that every man is to be loved, and that to every man useful things, not harmful, are to be conferred. If I love you and give you either a dignity or a liberty, and you use it ill — if I give it to you, I am not benign, but rather malignant; and therefore I shall not give it to you, that I may be benign. I have a friend, I have an enemy; the friend will use some prelacy or dignity ill, to his own harm and the commonwealth's; if I give it to him, I am not benign. My enemy, on the contrary, will use it well; I shall give it to him and shall make my own good out of his evil¹⁰. A father does not flatter his son nor speak a sweet word to him, lest he grow proud. The world today knows nothing of this benignity; whence the whole world is seated in wickedness, because a man loves nothing but his private good.

10. The sixth mean is magnanimity, that great things may be prized and vile things despised. This is humility, which despises the things that appear great and prizes those that seem small, yet are truly great. The Philosopher¹¹ says that the magnanimous man is in the appetite of honour; whatever he himself may say, truth does not teach this, save when the honour is of eternal things. But on the contrary some prize one most worthless bit of someone's praise, although truth tells them inwardly in their mind that the man is most wicked and worthless; and thereupon he exalts himself!

11. These six means suffice; for certain others are unnamed¹². And these the Philosopher

sets down plainly, and in them reason is laid under the truth of faith. These means remove vices, whether carnal or spiritual: as temperance removes gluttony and lust; munificence, avarice, cupidity, rapacity; fortitude, sloth, cowardice, laziness; meekness, wrath, hatred, impatience; benignity, envy; magnanimity, pride, arrogance, vanity, boasting.

12. The second ray of truth gives light unto the comprehension of the industries according to intellectual speculations. These are five: knowledge, art, prudence, wisdom, understanding¹. — Now speculation either stands still in itself, or passes over into affection and effect. The first mode does not belong to the moral part, but is rather the logician's; the second, however, does regard it, because it is virtuous; and therefore, since the speculative man readily becomes practical, from a speculative man one easily becomes a virtuous one.

13. Knowledge, then, passing over into affection is wisdom, which is « the cognition of the highest causes and through the highest causes² ». — But knowledge passing over into an extrinsic effect is art, which is « a habit productive with reason », and here knowledge is joined with the maker, an affection nevertheless going before. The middle between these is choice, which is joined to the affection and is ordered to the work. For what a man chooses he loves and chooses unto a work; and this is prudence, which is midway between wisdom and art. Understanding, however, lies in ascending from prudence to wisdom, which is the cognition of principles and of certain rules. — It is likewise necessary to descend to art through knowledge. A surgeon, unless he has the physician's rule, kills a man — as if he should lance one who is disposed to a fever. — He used also to say³ of a certain mathematician who made excellent bells, and made them according to musical proportions; yet he had had these from a certain musician, who had given him the form both of the length and of the thickness, and a hammer proportioned for striking. — Nor is it to be understood, because it is said⁴ that certain virtues are intellectual and certain customary, that on this account the virtues are in any part other than in the rational, since the essence of every virtue is in the rational; but some are in the rational according to itself and according as it is speculative, and others according as it is the governess of the outer man.

14. The third ray of truth gives light unto the moral justices according to the dictate of political laws. Here I ought to speak neither as a theologian nor as a jurist, but as a philosopher speaks. This comprehension is about four things. No one of the philosophers gave this whole, but if it be gathered out of many, something will come of it⁵. — Now it is attended to as regards the rite of worship, as regards the form of living together, as regards the norm of presiding, as regards the censure of judging. To the censure of judging one does not come save through the norm of presiding; nor to the norm of presiding save through the form of living together; nor to this save through the first.

15. All the true philosophers worshipped one God. Hence even Socrates⁶, because he forbade sacrifice to be made to Apollo, was put to death, since he worshipped one God. It is true that Plato urged flight upon him. « Far be it, said Socrates, that I should deny the truth which I have asserted »; and therefore Plato was not present at his death, blushing that he had urged flight upon him. The worship of God is the piety of faith. Hence Tullius says⁷ that piety consists in the worship of the gods. What he says — of the gods — is not pleasing. Scripture never calls the Angels gods, lest they be venerated as gods, but men are called gods: God hath stood in the synagogue of gods⁸, that is, of men, not of Angels. Now the worship of God consists in praise and in sacrifice.

16. As to how sacrifice was introduced, it appears that by faith Abel offered sacrifice⁹, and Noe, of whom it is said: The Lord smelled a sweet savour. And these sacrifices signified the sacrifice of Christ, which he made on the cross; and therefore the Lord is said to smell, in that God was appeased through the death of the Only-begotten. — But the demons, because of their pride, wish to be worshipped as God, that they may have on earth what they could not have in heaven; and because thereby men are most of all estranged from God¹⁰. — He offers the Blood of Christ who makes such sacrifices, in that it was poured out to appease the Father.

17. But the sacrifice of praise¹¹ the natural judicatory in the heart dictates, and it is of the dictate of nature; and

in this all the true philosophers agreed. Hence that man says that « whoever doubts whether parents are to be honoured and God to be venerated is worthy of punishment ».

18. The second mode is the form of living together, thus: « What you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another¹ ». This is written in the heart by the eternal law. Out of this natural law flow laws and canons, fair burgeonings. But what then? You do not wish to be hanged, and you hang the thief? It must be said that the thief ought rather to be hanged than that the commonwealth be harmed; Jonas² gave sentence against himself, that he should be cast into the sea.

19. The third is the norm of presiding, that is, how a prince ought to bear himself toward the people, and conversely. And this flows from the first truth: because the people ought to stand by him who punishes and avenges; the prince ought not to seek his own advantage, but the commonwealth's. The Philosopher says³ that a tyrant and a prince differ: the tyrant seeks his own advantage, like Herod, who, fearing to be deprived of his kingdom, raged against the little children; but the prince intends the common advantage. Yet today there is a great abomination among those who preside, since a steersman is not set over a ship unless he has the art of steering; how then is that man set over the commonwealth who does not know how to rule? Hence when men preside by succession, the commonwealth is ill ruled. David was most holy; Solomon, though most slippery, was nevertheless wise; Roboam was a fool, since he divided the kingdom⁴. The Romans by the devil's art chose Diocletian. They were to choose the man eating at an iron table, and they found him eating upon a ploughshare; and he afterwards did many evils. Hence as long as the Romans chose those who were to preside, they chose the wisest; and then the commonwealth was well governed; but after they came to succession, the whole was destroyed.

20. The last is the censure of judging, that a man may know what is to be judged about any matter whatever, which regards persons, things, and the manner of acting. All these flow from the first truth.

21. But in all these reason has run riot; metaphysics has run riot: because certain men⁵ posited the world to be eternal, since, if the cause is eternal, so is the effect; and these judged ill of the first cause. Likewise the mathematicians first knew numbers, and afterwards came to influences and the secrets of hearts. The natural philosophers had knowledge both of bodies and of minerals, and said: « Art imitates nature⁶ »; and we know the secrets of nature: therefore we shall make you gold and silver. Likewise the grammarians with their poems and fables held the whole world, until the Saints came against them. Likewise the logicians with their sophisms and their false positions made the world go mad. Likewise the rhetoricians so delighted in the colour of speech that they said the kingdom of God was nothing else; yet it has now been taken out of the way. The moral art has not so run riot, because it does not stand in speculation alone; but the science of law runs riot exceedingly for the sake of gain; and cases which ought to be brought to an end by law are now, through pleading and the subtlety of law, made immortal, although the intention of law is to cut cases short.

22. These are the nine lights that give light to the soul, namely the truth of things, of words, of morals: of things, namely of essences, figures, natures — as regards the hidden differences of quiddities, as regards the manifest proportions of quantities, as regards the mixed properties of natures. First metaphysics, second mathematics, third natural science or physics. — The truth of words in three ways: as regards locutions, argumentations, persuasions; first, as regards locutions indicating the mind's concepts; second, as regards argumentations drawing the mind's assent; third, as regards persuasions inclining the mind's affections; the first is grammar, the second logic, the third rhetoric. — The truth of morals in three ways: as regards the modesties, industries, justices: the modesties, as regards the exercises of custom; the industries, as regards intellectual speculations; the justices, as regards political laws. The first is the virtue of custom, the second the intellectual virtue, the third the virtue of justice. — These nine sciences the philosophers gave, and they were enlightened. For God revealed it to them⁷. Afterwards they wished to come through to wisdom, and the truth was drawing them; and they promised to give wisdom, that is, beatitude, that is, the acquired intellect; they promised, I say, to their disciples.

23. The fourth consideration, then, is how they came to this, in which the light was separated from the darkness⁸; for by separating themselves from the darkness they turned themselves to the light. But this comes about thus: that the soul turn itself first upon itself; second, upon the spiritual Intelligences; third, upon the eternal grounds.

24. First, then, one must consider oneself, not as the eye of the flesh, which does not see itself save by a certain reflection from a mirror, but as the eye of the mind, which first sees itself and afterwards other things. But for this

it is needful that it turn itself upon its powers and upon its acts. For the soul has three powers: the animal, the intellectual, the divine, according to the threefold eye: of the flesh, of reason, of contemplation. The first is vigorous, the second is dim, the third is blinded¹. — The animal power is twofold: either toward the objects of the particular senses and of the common sense, or toward the phantasms of sensible things, and thus there is sense and imagination. — The intellectual also is twofold: either as it considers universal abstract grounds, as it abstracts from place, time and dimension; or as it is raised to separate spiritual substances; and thus there are two powers, namely reason and intellect: by reason it compares, by intellect it knows itself and the spiritual substances; and then it thrusts itself in among the Intelligences, and then it enters their aeviternity². — Likewise the divine operation or power is twofold: one which turns itself to beholding the divine spectacles; another which turns itself to tasting the divine solaces. The first comes about through understanding, the second through the unitive or amative power, which is hidden, and of which they knew little or nothing.

25. Therefore the power is threefold, and there are six operations; and when the soul sees all these objects, thus returning upon itself, it becomes a certain most beautiful and burnished mirror, in which it sees whatever there is of brightness and of beauty, as an image is seen in a polished mirror. But for this there is required natural opacity or artificial: natural, as in a mirror of steel; artificial, as in lead laid under glass; second, polishing is required, through which it receives the form or image; third, splendour is required, since at night a mirror gives nothing back. Likewise in the soul the lower virtues are as it were holding the light, lest it flow away; the middle ones are as the polishings; the supreme ones are as supervening splendours: and thus the soul is a mirror.

26. But it is needful that we have the second step, that there be set beside it beautiful forms, namely heavenly lights proportioned to it, such as the Angels — because, if it were straightway to raise itself to the divine flashings, it would be beaten back. Now the Angels are both lights and mirrors³; and for the contemplating of them the soul is raised in three ways. — For the Angels have lowest powers, by which they regulate the motions of the noble bodies and flow into the things of this world; and this is the position of the philosophers⁴. For it is agreed that « the cause is nobler than its effect »; and it is agreed that at the influence of the heavenly bodies what is living and animate comes to be or is generated: therefore the soul also. If, then, the animate is nobler than the inanimate, it is necessary that it have another cause than those bodies. And that is the angelic influence together with the influence of the heavenly bodies. Hence this comes about through the governance of an intellectual substance flowing into the motion of the sphere which it rules. — Others posited that the Angels were numbered according to the number of the motions, on account of a natural inclination toward motion⁵. — Others posited only ten Intelligences, considering their influences; and they wrought madnesses and contentions. An Angel can very well be without motion.

27. Likewise, there are in the Angels powers directed to rational souls, by which they rule men. For they are bearers of lights and raisers of understandings to receive illuminations. There is therefore in them a conveying power, since they are certain lights and a certain passage, and they temper within themselves the divine ray for us, that it may be proportioned to us. — In a second mode there is in them an elevative power, by which they fit us, through condescension and uplifting, to receive that ray — not as though perfecting us⁶. — Likewise, there is in them a supreme power, by which they turn themselves to God in the reception of the splendours and of the eternal light, which they love; and they lead all things back to it, that they may tend toward God through love and praise. Hence in Job⁷: Where wast thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody? And all this the philosophers perceived. Likewise, the Angels are from this about to give thanks. — When the soul sees this, it thrusts itself in among the Angels and enters their age.

28. The third step is that the intellect itself, considering the conditions of being according to the relation of cause to caused, transfers itself from the effect to the causes and passes over to the eternal grounds. The cause differs from the things caused: because the first cause is first being, the caused a produced being; the first cause is simple being, the caused composite; the first cause is pure being, and the caused intermixed; the first cause is fixed being, and the caused varied; the first cause is absolute being, and the caused bound; the first cause is perfect being, the caused diminished. These, then, are most certain.

29. Now the understanding is borne toward this light in three ways: by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding; ratiocinatively, experimentally, intelligentially. — By the way of reason, thus¹. If there is a produced being: then there is a first being, because an effect posits a cause. For if there is a being from another, according to another and on account of another: then there is a being from itself, according to itself and on account of itself. — Likewise, if there is a composite being, it is necessary that there be a simple one, from which it has its to-be, since a to-be which recedes from simplicity falls into composition. — Likewise, if there is an intermixed being, it is necessary that there be a pure being; but no created thing is pure. — Likewise, if there is a being varied in itself, it is necessary that there be a fixed one, since the mobile is led back to the immobile. For when the hand is moved, the elbow stands still; and when the elbow is moved, the shoulder stands still; and so always what is moved will be moved through something fixed². — Likewise, if a bound thing is granted, then an absolute one also is; for every creature is bound to some genus of the predicaments; but what is bound does not, being one, give to-be to another: it is necessary, therefore, that there be an absolute being from which they may receive to-be. — Likewise, if there is a diminished being, it is necessary that there be a perfect being. — And by this way the Philosopher proceeds³ to show the world to be eternal, since circular local motion precedes every motion and change, because it is perfect. But I answer: it must be said that it is true that the perfect is before the diminished, speaking of the perfect simply, but not of the perfect in a genus, such as local motion is. — And thus the understanding is borne by reasoning.

30. It is borne likewise by experiencing, thus: the produced is defective in respect of the first; likewise the composite in respect of the simple; likewise the intermixed in respect of the pure, and so of the rest; therefore they bespeak privations. But « privations are not known save through their own habits⁴ ». « For the judge is the rule of itself and of the oblique ». And if « all cognition comes about from a pre-existing cognition »: then necessarily the understanding experiences in itself that it has some light, through which it may know the first being.

31. Thus, then, these things being presupposed, the intellect understands and says: the first being is, and to nothing does to-be truly belong save to the first being, and from it all things have their to-be, since this predicate is in nothing save in the first being. Likewise simple to-be is simply perfect to-be: therefore it is that than which nothing better is understood. Hence God cannot be thought not to be, as Anselm proves⁵.

32. When the soul sees this more familiarly — first by reasoning, second by experiencing, third by understanding — there it can rest. Hence by reasoning it infers through the opposite: if there is a posterior, there is a prior; if there is a composite, there is a simple, etc.; experimentally, since privations are not known save in the positing of the cause, and those six are said by way of defect and privation; intelligentially, since they cannot lie hidden from the soul⁶, as that the first being is, that simple being is, etc. — Likewise, it considers that being as it has substance, power and operation, as first, most pure, most simple, and so of the other six; as there is in it unity, truth, goodness, as first, as most pure, as most absolute, and so of the other six; as it has firmness, comeliness, goodness, as first, most pure and most absolute; as it has memory, understanding and will, according to those six; as it has life, wisdom, joyousness, according to those six: and then it understands that it is the good by essence, and that all things are beatified through it, and therefore that it is supremely desirable and ought supremely to be desired; and in doing this it comes to rest.

33. First, then, the soul sees itself as a mirror, then the Angels or Intelligences as lights and as a conveying medium; or it sees in itself as in a mirror, in an Intelligence as in a medium conveying and tempering the eternal light; then in the eternal light as in the fontal object, as regards those six conditions spoken of, and rationally and experimentally and intelligentially. — While, therefore, it perceives these things and rises up to the divine contuition, it says that it has the acquired intellect which the philosophers promised; and to this the truth draws it. — Yet one must arrive there through the virtues, as the philosophers did; when they saw that so high a place could not be reached save through the virtues, they turned themselves to teaching them, as Socrates did; whence he is reckoned to have spoken less well, in that he spoke only of them; but he did this because he saw that that understanding cannot be reached unless the soul be purified⁷.

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