Bonaventure

The numbered footnotes below correspond to markers in both the Latin body above and the English translation; Quaracchi restart their numbering on every printed page, so the labels are qualified by page.

COLLATIO VI.

De prima visione tractatio tertia, quae est de prima virtutum causa exemplari, de virtutibus exemplaribus et de cardinalibus inde fluentibus.

Summarium

Introductio; repetitio, 1. — Errores philosophorum circa Deum ut causam exemplarem; doctrina Aristotelis in hoc deficit, 2. — Error triplex inde exortus, 3. — Item, triplex caecitas: circa aeternitatem mundi, unitatem intellectus et defectum retributionis post mortem, 4. 5. — De his erroribus adhuc pullulantibus, 6. — Pars I. De virtutibus exemplaribus in luce aeterna et cardinalibus inde ortis. In Deo sunt exemplaria non tantum rerum, sed etiam virtutum, 7. — De quatuor virtutibus exemplaribus in Deo, quae sunt celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis, 8. — Probantur per Scripturam, 9. — Ex his fluunt consimiles proprietates, scilicet virtutes cardinales, 10. — Virtutes cardinales habent nomen ob tres rationes, 11. — De prima ratione, 12. — De secunda et de quatuor integrantibus virtutibus secundum actus cardinalium, 13. — De tertia ratione; comparatio maioris mundi et minoris, 14. — De definitione et partibus singularum virtutum cardinalium, 15. — Ortus et praestantia earundem, 16. — Ipsae configurantur quatuor aliis divisionibus; primo, lucis quatuor influentiis, 17. — Secundo, elementorum quatuor proprietatibus, 18. — Tertio, causarum quatuor efficaciis; quarto, vitae quatuor salubritatibus, 19. — Ipsae fluunt a luce aeterna; reducunt in Deum, qui est vera beatitudo; tres gradus et effectus ipsarum; doctrina Salomonis, 20. — Pars II. Confirmatio per doctrinam Plotini relatam a Macrobio. De sententia, quod non sint sapientes et beati nisi philosophi, et quomodo haec distribuit exercitia virtutum, 21. — Aliter Plotinus, ponens quatuor genera quaternarum virtutum, 22. — Primo, de virtutibus politicis, quomodo exerceantur cardinales, 23. — Secundo, de virtutibus purgatoriis, 24. — Tertio, de virtutibus animi iam purgati, 25. — Quarto, de virtutibus exemplaribus, 26.

1. Vidit Deus lucem, quod esset bona, et divisit lucem a tenebris¹ etc. Propter primam visionem intelligentiae per naturam inditae sumtum est verbum illud: Vidit Deus lucem, id est videre fecit. De hoc supra in duabus collationibus dictum est², et per considerationem scientialem, pro eo quod radiat lux ut veritas rerum, ut veritas vocum, ut veritas morum. Et fuerunt distinctae novem partes doctrinae, quarum tres principales sunt radii, et sunt ex dictamine lucis aeternae, secundum Augustinum³. — Item, quod vidit, id est, videre fecit per contemplationem sapientialem, illuminando animam in se tanquam in speculo, in Intelligentia tanquam in medio delativo, in luce increata tanquam in obiecto fontano, secundum illas sex conditiones, quas imprimit menti; et secundum has consurgit anima in illam lucem ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo, ut dictum est⁴. Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset principium et finis et ratio exemplaris.

2. Divisit tamen Deus lucem a tenebris, ut, sicut dictum est⁵ de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sunt? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium principium, omnium finem, in medio tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse exemplaria rerum; quorum princeps videtur fuisse Aristoteles, qui et in principio Metaphysicae et in fine⁶ et in multis aliis locis exsecratur ideas Platonis. Unde dicit, quod Deus solum novit se et non indiget notitia alicuius alterius rei et movet ut desideratum et amatum. Ex hoc ponunt, quod nihil, vel

nullum particulare cognoscat. Unde illas ideas praecipuus impugnat Aristoteles et in Ethicis¹, ubi dicit, quod summum bonum non potest esse idea. Et nihil valent rationes suae, et commentator solvit eas.

3. Ex isto errore sequitur alius error, scilicet quod Deus non habet praescientiam nec providentiam, ex quo non habet rationes rerum in se, per quas cognoscat. — Dicunt etiam², quod nulla veritas de futuro est nisi veritas necessariorum; et veritas contingentium non est veritas. — Et ex hoc sequitur, quod omnia fiant a casu, vel necessitate fatali. Et quia impossibile est fieri a casu; ideo inducunt necessitatem fatalem Arabes, scilicet quod illae substantiae moventes orbem sunt causae omnium necessariae. — Ex hoc sequitur veritas occultata, scilicet dispositionis mundialium secundum poenas et gloriam. Si enim illae substantiae movent non errantes, nihil ponitur de inferno, nec quod sit daemon; nec Aristoteles unquam posuit daemonem nec beatitudinem post hanc vitam, ut videtur. Iste est ergo triplex error, scilicet occultatio exemplaritatis, divinae providentiae, dispositionis mundanae.

4. Ex quibus sequitur triplex caecitas vel caligo, scilicet de aeternitate mundi, ut videtur dicere Aristoteles secundum omnes doctores Graecos, ut Gregorium Nyssenum, Gregorium Nazianzenum, Damascenum, Basilium³, et commentatores omnium Arabum, qui dicunt, quod Aristoteles hoc sensit, et verba sua sonare videntur. Nunquam invenies, quod ipse dicat, quod mundus habuit principium vel initium; immo redarguit⁴ Platonem, qui solus videtur posuisse, tempus incepisse. Et istud repugnat lumini veritatis.

Ex isto sequitur alia caecitas de unitate intellectus, quia, si ponitur mundus aeternus, necessario aliquod istorum sequitur: vel quod animae sunt infinitae, cum homines fuerint infiniti; vel quod anima est corruptibilis; vel quod est transitio de corpore in corpus; vel quod intellectus sit unus in omnibus, qui error attribuitur Aristoteli secundum Commentatorem⁵.

Ex his duobus sequitur, quod post hanc vitam non est felicitas nec poena.

5. Hi ergo ceciderunt in errores nec fuerunt divisi a tenebris; et isti sunt pessimi errores. Nec adhuc clausi sunt clave putei abyssalis⁶. Hae sunt tenebrae Aegypti; licet enim magna lux videretur in eis ex praecedentibus scientiis, tamen omnis exstinguitur per errores praedictos. Et alii videntes, quod tantus fuit Aristoteles in aliis et ita dixit veritatem, credere non possunt, quin in istis dixerit verum.

6. Dico ergo, quod illa lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In illa ergo primo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum. « Absurdum enim est, ut dicit Plotinus⁷, quod exemplaria aliarum rerum sint in Deo, et non exemplaria virtutum ».

7. Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitudo virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis; de quibus Philo, « disertissimus Iudaeorum », loquens ut philosophus. — Sapientiae septimo⁸: Vapor est enim virtutis Dei et emanatio quaedam est claritatis omnipotentis Dei sincera; et ideo nihil inquinatum in eam incurrit; ecce celsitudo puritatis. — Candor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula Dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius. Et infra: Est enim haec speciosior sole, et super omnem dispositionem stella-

rum, luci comparata invenitur prior; ecce pulcritudo claritatis. Ubi enim est speculum et imago et candor, necessario est repraesentatio et pulcritudo. « Pulcritudo nihil aliud est quam aequalitas numerosa¹ »; ibi autem sunt rationes numerosae ad unum reductae. Et quia est speciosissima, ideo attingit ubique propter suam munditiam.

8. Ex quo sequitur, quod sit fortissima; ideo dicitur²: Sapientiam non vincit malitia. Attingit a fine usque in finem fortiter; ecce fortitudo virtutis: attingit a summo vel supremo usque ad infimum, ab intrinseco usque ad extrinsecum, a primo usque ad ultimum, quia ubique est centrum suae potentiae: ideo virtus eius est infinita.

9. Et ex hoc habet rectitudinem diffusionis; ecce iustitia; et ideo dicit³: Disponit omnia suaviter. — Et quia loquitur ut philosophus et ut amator sapientiae; ideo dicit: Hanc amavi et exquisivi a iuventute mea et quaesivi sponsam mihi eam assumere et amator factus sum formae illius; non solum propter se, sed quia ab illa in me consequenter fiunt consimiles proprietates. Unde statim post sequitur: Sobrietatem enim et prudentiam et iustitiam et virtutem docet, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus.

10. Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam. Ex celsitudine puritatis imprimitur sinceritas temperantiae; ex pulcritudine claritatis serenitas prudentiae; ex fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae; ex rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae. — Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares⁴, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi.

11. Cardinales dicuntur tripliciter: vel quia per ipsas est ingressus ad acquirendum omnes virtutes; vel quia sunt principales, in quibus integratur omnis virtus; vel quia omnis ratio vitae humanae habet dirigi et regulari per eas in quatuor cardinibus mundi minoris, ad similitudinem mundi maioris, quantum ad activam et contemplativam.

12. Philosophus⁵ dicit, quod « virtus est medium duarum extremitatum, secundum quod sapiens determinabit »; est enim in medietate consistens. Virtus enim secundum Augustinum, in libro de Moribus, non est aliud quam modus. Hunc modum prudentia invenit, ut in omnibus non excedas, sed circa centrum consistas. Unde prudentia auriga est virtutum⁶. Unde dicit prudentia: ego inveni modum; et temperantia custodit et dicit: et hoc volebam ego; iustitia distribuit, ut non tantum velit sibi, sed et alteri; et quia postmodum multiplices adversitates eveniunt, fortitudo defendit, ne perdatur modus.

13. Item, secundo dicuntur cardinales, quia secundum actus accipiuntur integrantes virtutes, qui sunt quatuor: modificare per appositionem circumstantiarum, rectificare — est enim recta ratio ducens in finem, coaequans legibus⁷ — ordinare, stabilire. Ab hoc dicitur virtus, quia est robur mentis ad bonum faciendum et malum evitandum. Temperantia modificat, prudentia rectificat, iustitia ordinat, fortitudo stabilit. Et omnes se circumincedunt. Oportet enim, quod temperantia sit prudens, iustitia fortis; item, quod prudentia sit sobria, iusta et fortis etc. Gregorius⁸: Quomodo potest esse fortis, nisi sit prudens? Temerarius est enim qui aggreditur quod super vires est; et ideo virtutes sunt connexae.

14. Item, tertio modo dicuntur cardinales, quia omnis vita hominis his quatuor cardinibus gubernatur; sicut sol habet quatuor aspectus ad quatuor partes mundi, scilicet orientem, meridiem, aquilonem, occidentem, in quibus habet quatuor proprietates. A sole autem omnis vita: in oriente purificat, in meridie illuminat, in aquilone stabilit, in occidente conciliat. Sic Sol iustitiae in oriente mentis

ponit sinceritatem temperantiae, in meridie claritatem prudentiae, in aquilone stabilitatem constantiae, in occidente suavitatem iustitiae. — Et hoc modo in Apocalypsi Ioannes describit quatuor latera civitatis secundum quatuor virtutes cardinales¹; et ordinabantur etiam tribus iuxta tabernaculum.

15. Temperantia, quae est ab oriente, sic describitur a Tullio²: « Temperantia est rationis in libidinem aliosque animi motus non rectos firma et moderata dominatio ». Partes eius sunt sobrietas in gustu, castitas in tactu, modestia in ceteris sensibus; quam modestiam vocant theologi disciplinam.

16. Serenitas prudentiae est a meridie, quae sic describitur³: « Prudentia est bonorum et malorum scientia et utrorumque discretio, cuius partes sunt memoria, intelligentia, providentia ». Prudentia enim est de praesentibus, praeteritis et futuris.

17. Fortitudo ab aquilone, quae sic describitur: « Fortitudo est aggressio periculorum vel susceptio et eorundem constans et laboriosa perpessio ». Cuius partes sunt fiducia, patientia, perseverantia: fiducia in aggrediendo, patientia in sustinendo, perseverantia in perseverando.

18. Item, in occidente suavitas iustitiae, quae est in exhibitione pietatis — volunt enim leges, poenas mitigari; unde finis iustitiae non est severitas, sed benignitas — quae sic describitur: « Iustitia est habitus, communi utilitate servata, suam unicuique tribuens dignitatem ». Partes eius secundum Tullium sunt ex lege, a natura, ex consuetudine; secundum nos una ordinat ad superiores, alia ad inferiores, tertia ad pares.

19. Hoc totum est per regulam rationis; et sicut sol transiens per duodecim signa⁴ dat vitam, sic sol sapientialis, in nostrae mentis hemisphaerio radians et transiens, per has duodecim partes virtutum ordinat vitam nostram; et quantumcumque homo habeat alias scientias, nisi habeat virtutes, non habet vitam; sicut, quantumcumque habeas stellas, nisi habeas solem in duodecim signis, non habebis diem.

20. Hae sunt tantae nobilitatis, quod dispositio mundi his correspondet. Virtutes enim configurantur quatuor lucis influentiis, quatuor elementorum proprietatibus, quatuor causarum efficaciis, quatuor vitae salubritatibus. — Primo, quatuor lucis principalibus influentiis: lux purgat, illuminat, perficit et stabilit; temperantia purgat, prudentia illuminat, iustitia conciliat, fortitudo roborat.

21. Item, quatuor elementorum proprietatibus: in terra est ariditas adornata, in aqua perspicuitas cum intensione lucis, in aëre subtilitas cum mulcebritate, in igne virtuositas in actione. Prima est temperantia, quae aridum reddit, et tamen ornat et vestit floribus. Prudentia respondet aquae perspicuitati, quae quasi incorporata est luci. Iustitia respondet aëris mulcebritati; aer enim ascendit et descendit, ad dexteram et sinistram movetur. Fortitudo respondet vigori ignis; unde ille loquens de fortitudine dicit⁵: Fortis est ut mors dilectio; dura sicut infernus aemulatio; lampades eius lampades ignis atque flammarum.

22. Item, quatuor causarum efficaciis: efficiens, forma, finis et materia integrant rem⁶. Fortitudo debetur efficienti, prudentia formae; iustitia fini; temperantia materiae, ne defluat.

23. Item, quatuor vitae salubritatibus: subtilitati spirituum, temperantia; vivacitati sensuum, prudentia; robori virium, fortitudo; coaequationi qualitatum, iustitia⁷.

24. Hae virtutes fluunt a luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit. Et haec est beatitudo. Unde primo sunt politicae, secundo purgatoriae, tertio animi iam purgati. Politicae sunt in actione, purgatoriae in contemplatione, animi iam purgati in lucis visione.

25. Et de his agit Salomon, ut dicit Origenes⁸, de politicis in Proverbiis, de purgatoriis in Ecclesiaste, de animi iam purgati in Cantico canticorum.

Et in notitiam istarum venerunt nobiles philosophi. Unde Macrobius¹, narrans sententiam Plotini, dicit sic: « Qui aestimant nullis nisi philosophantibus inesse virtutes, nullos praeter philosophos beatos esse pronuntiant. Agnitionem enim rerum divinarum sapientiam proprie vocantes, eos tantummodo dicunt esse sapientes, qui superna acie mentis requirunt et quaerendi sagaci diligentia comprehendunt, et quantum vivendi perspicuitas praestat, imitantur, et in hoc solo dicunt esse exercitia virtutum ».

26. « Quarum sic officia dispensant: prudentiae esse mundum istum et omnia, quae in mundo sunt, divinorum contemplatione despicere omnemque animi cognitionem in sola divina dirigere; temperantiae, omnia relinquere, in quantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis, non terreri animam a corpore quodam modo ductu philosophiae recedentem nec altitudinem perfectae ad superna ascensionis horrere; iustitiae, ad unam sibi huius propositi consentire viam uniuscuiusque virtutis obsequium. Atque ita fit, ut secundum hoc tam rigidae definitionis abruptum rerum publicarum rectores beati esse, vel omnino esse non possint ».

27. « Sed Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, in libro de Virtutibus² gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur, secundae purgatoriae, tertiae animi iam purgati, quartae exemplares ».

28. « Et sunt politicae hominis, quia sociale animal est. His boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbes tuentur; his parentes venerantur, liberos amant, proximos diligunt; his civium salutem gubernant; his socios circumspecta providentia protegunt, iusta liberalitate devinciunt, hisque « sui memores alios fecere merendo³ » ».

29. « Et est politicae prudentiae ad rationis normam quae cogitat, quaecumque agit, universa dirigere, ac nihil praeter rectum velle vel facere, humanisque actibus tanquam divinis arbitris providere. Prudentiae insunt ratio, intellectus, circumspectio, providentia, docilitas, cautio. — Fortitudinis est animum supra periculi metum agere, nihilque nisi turpia timere, tolerare fortiter vel adversa, vel prospera. Fortitudo praestat magnanimitatem, fiduciam, securitatem, magnificentiam, constantiam, tolerantiam, firmitatem. — Temperantiae est nihil appetere poenitendum, in nullo legem moderationis excedere, sub iugum rationis cupiditatem domare. Temperantiam sequuntur modestia, verecundia, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderamen vel⁴ moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia. — Iustitiae est servare unicuique quod suum est; et de iustitia veniunt innocentia, amicitia, concordia, pietas, religio, affectus, humanitas. His virtutibus vir bonus primum sui atque inde reipublicae rector efficitur, iuste ac provide gubernans humana, divina non deserens ».

30. « Secundae, quas purgatorias vocant, hominis sunt, qui divini capax est, solumque animum eius expediunt, qui decrevit se a corporis contagione purgare et quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserere divinis. Hae sunt otiosorum, qui a rerum publicarum actibus se sequestrant. Harum quid singulae velint, superius⁵ expressimus, cum de virtutibus philosophantium diceremus, quas solas quidam aestimaverunt esse virtutes ».

31. « Tertiae sunt purgati iam defaecatique animi et ab omni mundi huius aspergine presse pureque detersi. Illic prudentiae est divina non quasi in electione praeferre, sed sola nosse et haec tanquam nihil sit aliud, intueri; temperantiae, terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis, passiones ignorare, non vincere, ut nesciat irasci, cupiat nihil; iustitiae, ita cum superna et divina mente sociari, ut servet perpetuum cum ea foedus imitando ».

32. « Quartae sunt exemplares, quae in ipsa divina mente consistunt, quam diximus νοῦν⁶ vocari, a quarum exemplo reliquae omnes per ordinem defluunt. Nam si rerum aliarum, multo magis virtutum ideas esse in mente divina credendum est. Illic prudentia est ipsa mens divina; temperantia, quod in se perpetua intentione conversa est; fortitudo, quod semper idem est nec aliquando mutatur; iustitia, quod perenni lege a sempiterna operis sui continuatione non flectitur. — Haec sunt quaternarum quatuor genera virtutum, quae praeter cetera maximam in passionibus habent differentiam sui ». Hucusque Plotinus.

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COLLATION VI.

On the first vision, the third treatment, which is on the first exemplary cause of the virtues, on the exemplary virtues, and on the cardinal virtues flowing from them.

Summarium

Introduction; recapitulation, 1. — The errors of the philosophers concerning God as exemplary cause; the teaching of Aristotle is defective in this, 2. — A threefold error arising thence, 3. — Likewise, a threefold blindness: concerning the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect, and the lack of retribution after death, 4. 5. — On these errors, still burgeoning, 6. — Part I. On the exemplary virtues in the eternal light and the cardinal virtues arising thence. In God there are exemplars not only of things, but also of virtues, 7. — On the four exemplary virtues in God, which are the loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion, 8. — They are proved from Scripture, 9. — From these flow like properties, namely the cardinal virtues, 10. — The cardinal virtues have their name for three reasons, 11. — On the first reason, 12. — On the second, and on the four integrating virtues according to the acts of the cardinal virtues, 13. — On the third reason; a comparison of the greater world and the lesser, 14. — On the definition and the parts of each of the cardinal virtues, 15. — Their origin and excellence, 16. — They are configured to four other divisions; first, to the four influences of light, 17. — Second, to the four properties of the elements, 18. — Third, to the four efficacies of the causes; fourth, to the four wholesomenesses of life, 19. — They flow from the eternal light; they lead back to God, who is true beatitude; their three steps and effects; the teaching of Solomon, 20. — Part II. A confirmation from the teaching of Plotinus reported by Macrobius. On the opinion that none are wise and blessed but philosophers, and how he distributes the exercises of the virtues, 21. — Otherwise Plotinus, positing four kinds of fourfold virtues, 22. — First, on the political virtues, how the cardinal virtues are exercised in them, 23. — Second, on the purgatorial virtues, 24. — Third, on the virtues of the soul already purged, 25. — Fourth, on the exemplary virtues, 26.

1. God saw the light, that it was good, and he divided the light from the darkness¹, etc. For the sake of the first vision, that of the understanding implanted by nature, that word was taken up: God saw the light, that is, he made it to be seen. Of this it has been said above in two collations², and by way of the scientific consideration, in that the light shines as the truth of things, as the truth of words, as the truth of morals. And nine parts of doctrine were distinguished, of which three are the principal rays, and they are from the dictate of the eternal light, according to Augustine³. — Likewise, that he saw, that is, he made to be seen by the sapiential contemplation, illuminating the soul in itself as in a mirror, in an Intelligence as in a conveying medium, in the uncreated light as in the fontal object, according to those six conditions which it imprints upon the mind; and according to these the soul rises up into that light by reasoning, by experiencing, by understanding, as has been said⁴. And to this the philosophers came, and their nobles and the ancients, namely that it should be principle and end and exemplary ground.

2. Yet God divided the light from the darkness, so that, as has been said⁵ of the Angels, so it may be said of the philosophers. But whence did some follow the darkness? From this: that although all of them saw the first cause as the principle of all and the end of all, in the medium they nevertheless diverged. For some denied that in it there are the exemplars of things; of whom the chief seems to have been Aristotle, who both at the beginning of the Metaphysics and at the end⁶ and in many other places execrates the ideas of Plato. Hence he says that God knows only himself and has no need of the knowledge of any other thing, and moves as the desired and the beloved. From this they lay down that he knows nothing, or

no particular thing. Hence Aristotle chiefly attacks those ideas, and in the Ethics¹, where he says that the highest good cannot be an idea. And his arguments are worth nothing, and the commentator resolves them.

3. From this error there follows another error, namely that God has no foreknowledge nor providence, since he has not the grounds of things in himself, through which he might know them. — They say also² that there is no truth about the future save the truth of necessary things; and that the truth of contingent things is not truth. — And from this it follows that all things come about by chance, or by fatal necessity. And because it is impossible for things to come about by chance, therefore the Arabs bring in a fatal necessity, namely that those substances moving the sphere are the necessary causes of all things. — From this there follows a hidden truth, namely that of the disposition of the things of the world according to punishments and glory. For if those substances move without erring, nothing is laid down about hell, nor that there is a demon; nor did Aristotle ever posit a demon, nor beatitude after this life, as it seems. This, then, is the threefold error: the hiding of exemplarity, of divine providence, of the world's disposition.

4. From these there follows a threefold blindness or gloom: namely concerning the eternity of the world, which Aristotle seems to assert according to all the Greek doctors — as Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, the Damascene, Basil³ — and the commentators of all the Arabs, who say that Aristotle held this, and his words seem to sound so. You will never find that he himself says that the world had a beginning or a starting-point; rather he refutes⁴ Plato, who alone seems to have laid down that time began. And this is repugnant to the light of truth.

From this there follows another blindness, concerning the unity of the intellect: because, if the world is laid down as eternal, one of these necessarily follows: either that souls are infinite, since men will have been infinite; or that the soul is corruptible; or that there is a passage from body to body; or that the intellect is one in all, which error is attributed to Aristotle according to the Commentator⁵.

From these two it follows that after this life there is neither happiness nor punishment.

5. These men, then, fell into errors and were not divided from the darkness; and these are the worst errors. Nor are they yet shut up with the key of the bottomless pit⁶. These are the darknesses of Egypt; for although a great light seemed to be in them from the preceding sciences, yet the whole of it is extinguished by the aforesaid errors. And others, seeing that Aristotle was so great in other matters and so spoke the truth, cannot believe that he did not speak truly in these.

6. I say therefore that that eternal light is the exemplar of all things, and that a mind raised up, like the mind of the other noble philosophers of old, arrives at this. In it, then, there occur first to the soul the exemplars of the virtues. « For it is absurd, as Plotinus says⁷, that the exemplars of other things should be in God, and not the exemplars of the virtues ».

7. There appear, therefore, first in the eternal light the exemplary virtues, or the exemplars of the virtues, namely the loftiness of purity, the beauty of brightness, the fortitude of power, the rectitude of diffusion; of which Philo, « the most eloquent of the Jews », speaks as a philosopher. — Wisdom, chapter seven⁸: For she is a vapour of the power of God, and a certain pure emanation of the brightness of the almighty God; and therefore no defiled thing cometh into her; behold the loftiness of purity. — For she is the brightness of eternal light, and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of his goodness. And below: For she is more beautiful than the sun, and above all the order of the stars; being compared with the light, she is found before it; behold the beauty of brightness. For where there is a mirror and an image and brightness, there is necessarily representation and beauty. « Beauty is nothing else than numerous equality¹ »; and there the numbered grounds are led back to one. And because she is most comely, therefore she reacheth everywhere by reason of her purity.

8. From which it follows that she is most strong; therefore it is said²: Malice overcometh not wisdom. She reacheth from end to end mightily; behold the fortitude of power: she reaches from the summit or the supreme down to the lowest, from the intrinsic to the extrinsic, from the first to the last, because everywhere is the centre of her power: therefore her power is infinite.

9. And from this she has the rectitude of diffusion; behold justice; and therefore it says³: She ordereth all things sweetly. — And because he speaks as a philosopher and as a lover of wisdom, therefore he says: Her have I loved and have sought her out from my youth, and have desired to take her for my spouse, and I became a lover of her beauty; not only for her own sake, but because from her like properties consequently come to be in me. Hence immediately after there follows: For she teacheth sobriety and prudence and justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in life to men.

10. These are imprinted on the soul through that exemplary light and descend into the cognitive, into the affective, into the operative power. From the loftiness of purity is imprinted the sincerity of temperance; from the beauty of brightness, the serenity of prudence; from the fortitude of power, the stability of constancy; from the rectitude of diffusion, the sweetness of justice. — These are the four exemplary⁴ virtues, of which the whole of sacred Scripture treats; and Aristotle perceived nothing of them, but the ancient and noble philosophers did.

11. They are called cardinal in three ways: either because through them there is an entrance for acquiring all the virtues; or because they are the principal ones, in which every virtue is integrated; or because the whole ordering of human life has to be directed and regulated by them in the four hinges of the lesser world, after the likeness of the greater world, as regards the active and the contemplative life.

12. The Philosopher⁵ says that « virtue is the mean of two extremes, according as the wise man shall determine »; for it consists in a mean. For virtue, according to Augustine in the book On Morals, is nothing other than measure. This measure prudence finds out, so that in all things you may not exceed, but may hold to the centre. Hence prudence is the charioteer of the virtues⁶. Hence prudence says: I have found the measure; and temperance keeps it and says: and this is what I wanted; justice distributes it, so that a man may will it not only for himself but also for another; and because afterwards manifold adversities befall, fortitude defends it, lest the measure be lost.

13. Likewise, secondly they are called cardinal, because according to their acts the integrating virtues are taken, which are four: to modify, by the addition of the circumstances; to rectify — for it is right reason leading to the end, making equal with the laws⁷ — to order, to stabilize. From this it is called virtue, because it is the strength of the mind for doing good and avoiding evil. Temperance modifies, prudence rectifies, justice orders, fortitude stabilizes. And they all mutually interpenetrate one another. For it is needful that temperance be prudent, justice brave; likewise that prudence be sober, just and brave, etc. Gregory⁸: How can a man be brave, unless he be prudent? For he is rash who attempts what is beyond his strength; and therefore the virtues are connected.

14. Likewise, in a third way they are called cardinal, because the whole life of man is governed by these four hinges; as the sun has four aspects toward the four parts of the world, namely east, south, north, west, in which it has four properties. And from the sun comes all life: in the east it purifies, in the south it illuminates, in the north it stabilizes, in the west it reconciles. So the Sun of justice in the east of the mind sets the sincerity of temperance, in the south the brightness of prudence, in the north the stability of constancy, in the west the sweetness of justice. — And in this manner John in the Apocalypse describes the four sides of the city according to the four cardinal virtues¹; and the tribes too were ordered beside the tabernacle.

15. Temperance, which is from the east, is thus described by Tullius²: « Temperance is reason's firm and moderate dominion over lust and the other unruly motions of the soul ». Its parts are sobriety in taste, chastity in touch, modesty in the remaining senses; which modesty the theologians call discipline.

16. The serenity of prudence is from the south, which is thus described³: « Prudence is the knowledge of good and evil things and the discernment of both, whose parts are memory, understanding, foresight ». For prudence is of present, past and future things.

17. Fortitude is from the north, which is thus described: « Fortitude is the undertaking of dangers, or the taking of them up, and the constant and laborious endurance of the same ». Its parts are confidence, patience, perseverance: confidence in undertaking, patience in sustaining, perseverance in persevering.

18. Likewise, in the west is the sweetness of justice, which lies in the showing of piety — for the laws will have punishments mitigated; whence the end of justice is not severity, but benignity — and it is thus described: « Justice is a habit which, the common utility being preserved, assigns to each his own worth ». Its parts, according to Tullius, are from law, from nature, from custom; according to us, one orders us to superiors, another to inferiors, a third to equals.

19. All this is by the rule of reason; and as the sun, passing through the twelve signs⁴, gives life, so the sun of wisdom, shining and passing through the hemisphere of our mind, orders our life through these twelve parts of the virtues; and however many other sciences a man may have, unless he have the virtues, he has not life — just as, however many stars you may have, unless you have the sun in the twelve signs, you will not have day.

20. These are of such nobility that the disposition of the world corresponds to them. For the virtues are configured to the four influences of light, the four properties of the elements, the four efficacies of the causes, the four wholesomenesses of life. — First, to the four principal influences of light: light purges, illuminates, perfects and stabilizes; temperance purges, prudence illuminates, justice reconciles, fortitude strengthens.

21. Likewise, to the four properties of the elements: in earth there is dryness adorned, in water transparency with an intensity of light, in air subtlety with softness, in fire forcefulness in acting. The first is temperance, which makes dry, and yet adorns and clothes with flowers. Prudence answers to the transparency of water, which is as it were incorporated into light. Justice answers to the softness of air; for air ascends and descends, and is moved to right and left. Fortitude answers to the vigour of fire; whence he who speaks of fortitude says⁵: Love is strong as death; jealousy is hard as hell; the lamps thereof are lamps of fire and flames.

22. Likewise, to the four efficacies of the causes: the efficient, the form, the end and the matter make up a thing⁶. Fortitude is owed to the efficient, prudence to the form, justice to the end, temperance to the matter, lest it flow away.

23. Likewise, to the four wholesomenesses of life: to the subtlety of the spirits, temperance; to the vivacity of the senses, prudence; to the strength of the powers, fortitude; to the equalizing of the qualities, justice⁷.

24. These virtues flow from the eternal light into the hemisphere of our mind and lead the soul back to its origin, as a perpendicular or direct ray returns by the same way by which it came. And this is beatitude. Hence first they are political, second purgatorial, third of the soul already purged. The political are in action, the purgatorial in contemplation, those of the soul already purged in the vision of light.

25. And of these Solomon treats, as Origen says⁸: of the political in Proverbs, of the purgatorial in Ecclesiastes, of those of the soul already purged in the Canticle of Canticles.

And the noble philosophers came to a knowledge of these. Hence Macrobius¹, reporting the opinion of Plotinus, speaks thus: « Those who judge that the virtues are in none but philosophers pronounce that none but philosophers are blessed. For calling the recognition of divine things properly wisdom, they say that those alone are wise who seek them with the mind's higher edge and grasp them by a sagacious diligence in seeking, and imitate them so far as clarity of living allows, and they say that in this alone lie the exercises of the virtues ».

26. « The offices of these they distribute thus: it belongs to prudence to despise this world and all that is in the world by the contemplation of divine things, and to direct the whole knowledge of the soul upon the divine alone; to temperance, to leave behind, so far as nature suffers, all that the body's use requires; to fortitude, that the soul be not terrified as it withdraws in a manner from the body under philosophy's leading, nor shrink from the height of the perfect ascent to things above; to justice, that the obedience of each virtue consent to the one way of this purpose. And so it comes about that, by the abruptness of so rigid a definition, the rulers of commonwealths cannot be blessed, or even be at all ».

27. « But Plotinus, chief with Plato among the professors of philosophy, in the book On the Virtues² sets out in order their degrees, composed by a true and natural principle of division. There are four, he says, kinds of fourfold virtues. Of these the first are called political, the second purgatorial, the third those of the soul already purged, the fourth exemplary ».

28. « And the political are of man, because he is a social animal. By these good men take counsel for the commonwealth, guard cities; by these they venerate parents, love their children, cherish their neighbours; by these they govern the safety of the citizens; by these they protect their allies with circumspect providence, bind them by a just liberality, and by these « they have made others mindful of them by deserving well³ » ».

29. « And it belongs to political prudence to direct all that it thinks and whatever it does to the norm of reason, and to will or do nothing but what is right, and to provide for human acts as though for divine arbiters. To prudence belong reason, intellect, circumspection, foresight, docility, caution. — It belongs to fortitude to carry the mind above the fear of danger, and to fear nothing but base things, and to bear bravely either adversity or prosperity. Fortitude furnishes magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, tolerance, firmness. — It belongs to temperance to desire nothing that must be repented of, to exceed in nothing the law of moderation, to tame cupidity under the yoke of reason. Temperance is followed by modesty, shamefastness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, restraint or⁴ moderation, frugality, sobriety, purity. — It belongs to justice to preserve for each what is his own; and from justice come innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity. By these virtues a good man is made first the ruler of himself and thence of the commonwealth, governing human affairs justly and providently, and not deserting the divine ».

30. « The second, which they call purgatorial, are of the man who is capable of the divine, and they set free only the soul of him who has resolved to purge himself of the body's contagion and, by a certain flight from human things, to engage himself with the divine alone. These belong to men at leisure, who sequester themselves from the acts of public affairs. What each of these means we have set out above⁵, when we spoke of the virtues of those who philosophize, which certain men have reckoned to be the only virtues ».

31. « The third are those of the soul already purged and cleansed, and closely and purely wiped clean of every besprinkling of this world. There it belongs to prudence not to prefer divine things as though by a choice, but to know them alone and to gaze on them as though nothing else existed; to temperance, not to repress earthly cupidities but to forget them utterly; to fortitude, to be ignorant of the passions, not to conquer them, so that it may not know how to be angry, and may desire nothing; to justice, so to be joined with the supernal and divine mind that it may keep a perpetual covenant with it by imitation ».

32. « The fourth are the exemplary, which consist in the divine mind itself, which we have said is called νοῦν⁶, from whose exemplar all the rest flow down in order. For if it must be believed that the ideas of other things are in the divine mind, much more those of the virtues. There prudence is the divine mind itself; temperance, that it is turned upon itself by a perpetual intention; fortitude, that it is always the same and is never changed; justice, that by a perennial law it is not bent from the sempiternal continuation of its own work. — These are the four kinds of fourfold virtues, which beyond all the rest have the greatest difference among themselves in respect of the passions ». Thus far Plotinus.

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