Bonaventure

Capitulum IV.

Secundo, de vanitate malitiae in subditis secundum triplicem differentiam.

Verti me ad alia etc. Supra actum est de vanitate malitiae in praelatis; hic in subditis. Vanitas autem malitiae tangitur hic quantum ad triplicem differentiam: primo calumniae in malitiose nocendo; secundo invidiae in⁴ malitiose dolendo, ibi: Rursus contemplatus sum; tertio accidiae, a bono opere discedendo; et hoc tangitur ibi: Stultus complicat.

(Vers. 1. 2. 3.). Describit igitur calumniae vanitatem; et quantum ad considerationem calumniae dicit: Verti me ad alia, supple: consideranda; et vidi calumnias, quae sub sole geruntur, id est in hoc mundo; Ezechielis vigesimo secundo⁵: « Populi terrae calumniabantur calumniam et rapiebant violenter, egenum et pauperem affligebant et advenam opprimebant calumnia absque iudicio ». Et dicitur calumnia violenta bonorum extorsio, quasi per iustitiam, sed per malitiam. — Et subiungit aggravationem miseriae, propter oppressorum calamitatem, quia opprimuntur iniuste, inconsolabiliter, irremediabiliter. — Quia iniuste, dicit: Et lacrymas innocentium, scilicet pro huiusmodi calumniis; Iob trigesimo quinto⁶: « Propter multitudinem calumniatorum clamabunt, et eiulabunt propter vim brachii tyrannorum ». — Quia inconsolabiliter: et neminem consolatorem, quod quidem aggravat crudelitatem; unde Threnorum primo: « Non est qui consoletur eam ex omnibus caris eius ». Econtra Ecclesiastici septimo: « Non desis plorantibus in consolatione, et cum lugentibus ambula »; — Nec tantum consolatione caret, immo remedio; unde et subdit: Nec posse resistere violentiae eorum, cunctorum auxilio destitutos, supple: vidi. De hac malitia dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo secundo⁷: « Non facias violentiam pauperi, quia pauper est, neque conteras egenum in porta ». Ideo secundi Paralipomenon vigesimo: « In nobis non est tanta fortitudo, ut possimus huic multitudini resistere, quae irruit super nos ». — Quantum autem ad detestationem culpae subiungit: Et laudavi magis mortuos quam viventes, eo scilicet, quod ista mala et crudelitates non vident, quas nemo bonus potest videre et non dolere; tertii Regum decimo nono⁸ dixit Elias: « Sufficit mihi, Domine, tolle animam meam; non enim melior sum quam patres mei ». — Et feliciorem utroque iudicavi, scilicet mortuo et vivente, qui necdum natus est nec vidit mala, quae sub sole sunt; quasi videre ista mala vel vidisse magna sit miseria; primi Machabaeorum secundo: « Vae mihi, dixit Mathathias, utquid natus sum videre contritionem populi mei et contritionem

p. 38 civitatis sanctae, et sedere illic »? — Sic igitur notatur hic consideratio calumniae, aggravatio miseriae, quia illi sunt oppressi, desolati, auxilio destituti, et tunc detestatio culpae.

(Vers. 4.). Rursus contemplatus sum etc. Hic secundo tangitur vanitas invidiae in dolendo de bono et prosperitate proximi malitiose, quam etiam vidit; unde subdit: Rursus contemplatus sum. Haec contemplatio est liber ac perspicax et defixus intuitus¹. Contemplatus sum, inquam, omnes labores et industrias hominum; labores, quantum ad corpus; et industrias hominum, quantum ad animam. — Vel: labores et industrias, id est virtutes; unde alia translatio²: Omnem virtutem operis; supra secundo: « Detestatus sum omnem industriam meam, qua sub sole studiosissime laboravi ». Et animadverti, id est, percepi in animo; patere, id est, exposita esse; invidiae proximi, quia videns bona invidus statim dolet; Ecclesiastici decimo quarto: « Nequam est oculus lividi et avertens faciem et despiciens animam suam ». Et in hoc ergo vanitas, scilicet malitiae; Proverbiorum vigesimo octavo: « Vir, qui festinat ditari et aliis invidet » etc. Et cura superflua, scilicet poenae, quia, cum deberet de bonis suis cogitare, cogitat semper de alienis; unde Proverbiorum vigesimo tertio: « Ne comedas cum homine invido, et ne desideres cibos eius, quoniam in similitudinem arioli aestimat quod ignorat ».

(Vers. 5. 6.). Stultus complicat etc. Hic tertio tangitur vanitas accidiae, propter quam homo redditur taediosus et piger ad omne bonum et per hoc stultus. Ideo dicit: Stultus complicat manus suas; ideo stultus, quia piger; Proverbiorum duodecimo³: « Qui sectatur otium stultissimus est »; Proverbiorum sexto: « Vade ad formicam, o piger, et disce sapientiam ». Hic stultus complicat manus, quia renuit operari; Proverbiorum vigesimo sexto: « Abscondit piger manus suas sub ascella sua et laborat, si ad os suum eas converterit ». Et ex hoc, quod operari renuit, pauper efficitur et macer propter defectum inopiae; unde dicit: Et comedit carnes suas, dicens; hyperbolice dictum est, eo quod macer efficitur, non habens cibum; Proverbiorum vigesimo primo⁴: « Desideria occidunt pigrum, noluerunt enim quidquam manus eius operari ». — Sed in hac pigritia accidiae habere sibi videtur excusationem sapientiae; unde et subdit dicens: Melior est pugillus cum requie quam plena utraque manus cum labore et afflictione animi. Haec est sententia pigri, per quam se excusat; unde dicitur Proverbiorum vigesimo sexto: « Sapientior sibi videtur piger septem viris loquentibus sententias ». — Et sic insinuatur in pigro torpor accidiae, quia complicat manus; sustinentia penuriae, quia comedit carnes; excusatio ignorantiae, quia laudat requiem.

Quaestiones

I. Quaeritur hic de hoc quod dicit: Laudavi magis mortuos quam viventes.

Contra: 1. Infra nono⁵: Melior est canis vivus leone mortuo.

2. Praeterea, hoc videtur ratione: quia melior est habitus quam privatio, ergo vita quam mors: ergo, a coniugatis⁶, meliores sunt viventes quam mortui.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod laudare aliquid magis alio vel praeferre dupliciter potest esse: vel simpliciter, vel quoad aliquam conditionem. Simpliciter loquendo, praefertur vivens mortuo, nisi addatur conditio beatitudinis; sed quoad aliquid praefertur mortuus vivo: primo, quia non habet tot occasiones peccandi; unde dicebat Apostolus ad Romanos septimo⁷: Infelix ego homo, quis me liberabit a servitute corporis huius? Secundo, quia non habet tot occasiones tristandi, quia non videt tot mala; Ionae ultimo: Melius est mihi mori quam vivere. Et quantum ad istam conditionem praefertur mortuus vivo in exaggerationem praesentium malitiarum et miseriarum.

II. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicitur: Feliciorem utroque iudicavi, qui necdum natus est.

Contra: 1. Ille nihil boni habet: ergo non est felicior.

2. Praeterea, omne, quod habet aliquo modo rationem felicitatis, est appetendum; sed nullus potest appetere non-esse, sicut dicit Augustinus⁸: ergo qui non est natus nullo modo felix est.

III. Item quaeritur, utrum aliquis possit hoc velle, scilicet magis non-esse quam poenam, ordinato

p. 39 appetitu. — Quod sic: Matthaei vigesimo sexto¹: « Melius erat ei, si natus non fuisset »: ergo si omne melius appetendum et praeeligendum, etiam et hoc.

Quod non, videtur, quia totum bonum tollit: ergo nihil illo peius.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod felicitas duobus modis est in aliquo: vere et aestimative. Vere est in uno solo, aestimative in multis secundum opiniones et considerationes diversas et eius conditiones in diversis repertas. Quia enim est bonum iucundissimum, ideo Epicurus eam ponit in voluptatibus, et sic de aliis. Quia igitur felix nulla malitia vel miseria molestatur; et ista conditio reperitur in eo qui nondum natus est: ratione istius conditionis dicit: Feliciorem aestimavi etc. Dico etiam, quod ratione illius conditionis appetitur a multis afflictis.

Quod quaeritur, utrum debeat appeti vel praeeligi; dicendum, quod duplex est poena: temporalis et aeterna; neutra poena totum adimit, sed tamen aeterna semper adimit; corruptio vero in non-esse totum adimit, sed semel. Si igitur talis corruptio in non-esse comparetur poenae temporali, simpliciter est peior; si autem aeternae, se habent sicut excedentia et excessa, quia haec in ademptione, illa in continuatione excedit. Et quia illa est infinita duratione, ista vero momentanea; in hoc excedit et potest magis rationabiliter fugi et sperni².

IV. Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Animadverti, omnia patere invidiae proximi. Quaero, utrum homo debeat cessare propter eius invidiam a bono opere. — Quod sic, videtur: quia magis diligendus est proximus quam quaelibet utilitas praesens: ergo si proximus perit invidendo, illud debet omitti.

Contra: Opus bonum bonum praestat exemplum et excitat ad bonum: ergo si bonum aperiendum est ad laudem, non debet homo occultare propter invidiam proximi.

Respondeo: aut est opus illud de necessitate, aut de utilitate. Si de necessitate, nequaquam dimittitur; si de utilitate³, aut potest aeque bonum fieri in eius absentia, ut in praesentia, aut non; si sic, debet homo opus illud ab eius oculis absentare, ut tollat occasionem, quando probabiliter coniicit, quod ille invidet; si autem non potest, facere debet nec dat occasionem, sed ille accipit.

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Chapter IV.

Secondly, on the vanity of malice in subjects according to a threefold difference.

I turned myself to other things etc. Above he treated of the vanity of malice in prelates; here in subjects. Now the vanity of malice is touched on here as to a threefold difference: first of calumny, in harming maliciously; secondly of envy, in⁴ grieving maliciously, at: Again I considered; thirdly of acedia, in departing from good work; and this is touched on at: The fool foldeth.

(Vers. 1. 2. 3.). He describes, then, the vanity of calumny; and as to the consideration of calumny he says: I turned myself to other things, supply: to be considered; and I saw the calumnies that are done under the sun, that is, in this world; Ezechiel, the twenty-second chapter⁵: « The people of the land practised calumny and committed robbery with violence; they afflicted the needy and the poor, and they oppressed the stranger by calumny without judgement ». And calumny is called the violent extortion of goods, as though by justice, but by malice. — And he adds the aggravation of misery, on account of the calamity of the oppressed, since they are oppressed unjustly, without consolation, without remedy. — Because unjustly, he says: And the tears of the innocent, namely for calumnies of this kind; Job, the thirty-fifth chapter⁶: « By reason of the multitude of calumniators they shall cry out, and they shall wail for the violence of the arm of tyrants ». — Because without consolation: and they had no comforter, which indeed aggravates the cruelty; hence Lamentations, the first chapter: « There is none to comfort her among all them that were dear to her ». On the contrary, Ecclesiasticus, the seventh chapter: « Be not wanting to them that weep in comforting, and walk with them that mourn »; — And not only does he lack consolation, but also remedy; hence he also adds: And they were not able to resist their violence, being destitute of help from any, supply: I saw. Of this malice it is said in Proverbs, the twenty-second chapter⁷: « Do no violence to the poor, because he is poor, neither crush the needy in the gate ». Therefore, II Paralipomenon, the twentieth chapter: « In us there is not so great strength that we can resist this multitude which rusheth upon us ». — But as to the detestation of fault he adds: And I praised the dead rather than the living, namely in this, that they do not see these evils and cruelties, which no good man can see and not grieve; III Kings, the nineteenth chapter⁸, Elias said: « It is enough for me, Lord, take away my soul; for I am no better than my fathers ». — And I judged him happier than them both, namely than the dead and the living, that is not yet born, nor hath seen the evils that are under the sun; as though to see these evils, or to have seen them, were a great misery; I Machabees, the second chapter: « Woe is me, said Mathathias, wherefore was I born to see the ruin of my people and the ruin

p. 38 of the holy city, and to sit there »? — Thus, then, there is noted here the consideration of calumny, the aggravation of misery, since they are oppressed, desolate, destitute of help, and then the detestation of fault.

(Vers. 4.). Again I considered etc. Here secondly is touched the vanity of envy, in grieving maliciously over the good and prosperity of one's neighbour, which he also saw; hence he adds: Again I considered. This contemplation is a free and clear-sighted and fixed gaze¹. I considered, I say, all the labours and industries of men; labours, as to the body; and industries of men, as to the soul. — Or: labours and industries, that is, virtues; hence another translation²: All the virtue of the work; above, the second chapter: « I detested all my industry wherewith I laboured most studiously under the sun ». And I remarked, that is, I perceived in my mind; that they lie open, that is, are exposed; to the envy of the neighbour, because on seeing good things the envious man grieves at once; Ecclesiasticus, the fourteenth chapter: « The eye of the envious is wicked, and he turneth away his face, and despiseth his own soul ». And in this therefore vanity, namely of malice; Proverbs, the twenty-eighth chapter: « A man that maketh haste to be rich, and envieth others » etc. And superfluous care, namely of punishment, since, when he ought to think of his own goods, he thinks always of other men's; hence Proverbs, the twenty-third chapter: « Eat not with an envious man, and desire not his meats, because like a soothsayer he esteemeth that which he knoweth not ».

(Vers. 5. 6.). The fool foldeth etc. Here thirdly is touched the vanity of acedia, on account of which a man is rendered weary and sluggish towards every good, and through this a fool. Therefore he says: The fool foldeth his hands together; therefore a fool, because sluggish; Proverbs, the twelfth chapter³: « He that pursueth idleness is very foolish »; Proverbs, the sixth chapter: « Go to the ant, O sluggard, and learn wisdom ». This fool foldeth his hands, because he refuses to work; Proverbs, the twenty-sixth chapter: « The sluggard hideth his hands under his armpit, and it is a labour to him if he turn them to his mouth ». And from this, that he refuses to work, he is made poor and lean through the want of need; hence he says: And eateth his own flesh, saying; it is said hyperbolically, in that he is made lean, not having food; Proverbs, the twenty-first chapter⁴: « Desires kill the sluggard, for his hands have refused to work at all ». — But in this sluggishness of acedia he seems to himself to have the excuse of wisdom; hence he also adds, saying: Better is a handful with rest than both hands full with labour and vexation of mind. This is the sentence of the sluggard, by which he excuses himself; hence it is said in Proverbs, the twenty-sixth chapter: « The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences ». — And thus there is intimated in the sluggard the torpor of acedia, since he foldeth his hands; the endurance of penury, since he eateth his flesh; the excuse of ignorance, since he praises rest.

Questions

I. Here it is asked concerning that which he says: I praised the dead rather than the living.

Contra: 1. Below, the ninth chapter⁵: Better is a living dog than a dead lion.

2. Likewise, this seems so by reason: since a habit is better than a privation, therefore life than death: therefore, from conjugates⁶, the living are better than the dead.

I respond: it must be said that to praise one thing more than another, or to prefer it, can be in two ways: either simply, or as to some condition. Speaking simply, the living is preferred to the dead, unless the condition of beatitude is added; but as to something the dead is preferred to the living: first, because he has not so many occasions of sinning; hence the Apostle said, to the Romans, the seventh chapter⁷: Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the servitude of this body? Secondly, because he has not so many occasions of sorrowing, since he does not see so many evils; Jonas, the last chapter: It is better for me to die than to live. And as to that condition the dead is preferred to the living, in exaggeration of present malices and miseries.

II. Likewise it is asked concerning that which is said: I judged him happier than them both, that is not yet born.

Contra: 1. He has nothing of good: therefore he is not happier.

2. Likewise, everything that has in any way the character of happiness is to be desired; but no one can desire non-being, as Augustine says⁸: therefore he who is not born is in no way happy.

III. Likewise it is asked whether anyone can will this, namely non-being rather than punishment, with an ordered

p. 39 appetite. — That he can: Matthew, the twenty-sixth chapter¹: « It were better for him, if he had not been born »: therefore if everything better is to be desired and chosen before, this also.

That he cannot, it seems, since it takes away all good: therefore nothing is worse than that.

I respond: it must be said that happiness is in a thing in two ways: truly and in estimation. Truly it is in one alone; in estimation in many, according to divers opinions and considerations, and according as its conditions are found in divers things. For because it is a most delightful good, therefore Epicurus places it in pleasures, and so of the others. Since, then, the happy man is troubled by no malice or misery, and this condition is found in him who is not yet born: by reason of this condition he says: I esteemed him happier etc. I say also that by reason of that condition it is desired by many who are afflicted.

As to what is asked, whether it ought to be desired or chosen before; it must be said that punishment is twofold: temporal and eternal; neither punishment takes away the whole, but yet the eternal takes away always; whereas corruption into non-being takes away the whole, but once. If, then, such corruption into non-being is compared to temporal punishment, it is simply worse; but if to eternal, they stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, since the one exceeds in the taking away, the other in the continuation. And since the one is infinite in duration, but the other momentary, in this it exceeds, and can more reasonably be fled and spurned².

IV. Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: I remarked that all things lie open to the envy of the neighbour. I ask whether a man ought to cease from a good work on account of his envy. — That he ought, it seems: since one's neighbour is more to be loved than any present usefulness: therefore if one's neighbour perishes by envying, that work ought to be left off.

Contra: A good work gives a good example and stirs up to good: therefore if the good is to be disclosed for praise, a man ought not to hide it on account of his neighbour's envy.

I respond: either that work is one of necessity, or of usefulness. If of necessity, it is by no means left off; if of usefulness³, either it can be done equally well in his absence as in his presence, or not; if so, a man ought to remove that work from his eyes, so as to take away the occasion, when he probably conjectures that the other envies; but if it cannot, he ought to do it, and he does not give the occasion, but the other takes it.

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