Bonaventure

Capitulum VII.

(Vers. 1.). Quid necesse est? Hic revocat tertio a perscrutando sublimia et inquirendo, et hoc, cum habeat satis facere de cognoscendo sua propria mala, vel communia. Ideo dicit: Quid necesse est homini maiora se quaerere? quasi dicat, non est necesse; Ecclesiastici tertio⁵: « Altiora te ne quaesieris, et fortiora te ne scrutatus fueris »; et ad Romanos undecimo: « Noli altum sapere, sed time ». Et subiungit rationem, quare non debet quaerere maiora: Cum ignoret, quid conducat sibi in vita sua, id est, quid sibi sit utile; Sapientiae nono: « Difficile aestimamus quae in terra sunt, et quae in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore. Quae autem in caelis sunt, quis investigabit »? Ignorat utique, quid sit utile in hac vita momentanea; unde subiungit: Numero dierum peregrinationis suae; Genesis quadragesimo septimo⁶: « Dies peregrinationis vitae meae parvi et mali sunt »; secundae ad Corinthios quinto: « Quamdiu sumus in hoc corpore, peregrinamur a Domino ». Et tempore, quod velut umbra praeteriit; primi Paralipomenon ultimo: « Peregrini sumus coram te et advenae, sicut omnes patres nostri. Dies nostri quasi umbra super terram, et nulla est mora ». Et ita per se non potest inquirere; nec etiam ab alio addiscere; propterea subiungit: Aut quis ei poterit indicare, quid post eum venturum sit sub sole? Non enim homo scit futura, nisi Domino revelante per gratiam. Ideo ad hoc non debet homo extendere cogitationem; Isaiae quadragesimo octavo⁷: « Ante diem non audisti ea, ne forte dicas: Ecce cognovi ea. Neque audisti neque cognovisti, neque ex tunc aperta est auris tua »; infra octavo: « Ignorat homo praeterita et futura nullo potest scire nuntio ». Unde solus Deus futura cognoscit et revelat.

Quaestiones.

I. Sed quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Melius est videre quod cupias, quam desiderare quod nescias. Ergo non implicat, quod aliquis potest desiderare quod nescit.

p. 54 Contra: 1. Augustinus¹ dicit, quod « invisa possumus diligere, incognita nequaquam »; sic igitur ad hoc, quod aliquid diligatur et desideretur, necesse est cognosci.

2. Praeterea, affectus sequitur intellectum: ergo ubi intellectus non praecedit, non se extendit affectus; sed intellectus non extendit se ad ea quae nescit: ergo nec affectus illa desiderat.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod duplex est cognitio, certitudinis scilicet et aestimationis; sic et per oppositum duplex nescientia: una per privationem cuiuslibet certitudinis, et alia per privationem cuiuslibet aestimationis. Dico ergo, quod ad hoc, quod aliquid desideretur, non necesse est, quod praecedat cognitio certitudinis; desiderium enim sequitur solam aestimationem; sed oportet, quod aliqua cognitio aestimationis praecedat². Hic autem loquitur de nescientia per privationem certitudinis.

II. Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Quid necesse est homini maiora se quaerere? Ex hoc videtur, quod homo non debeat aliquid perscrutari nec labore³ cognoscere, quod sit supra se. — Hoc ipsum probatur per illud Ecclesiastici tertio⁴: Altiora te ne quaesieris. Hoc ipsum ad Romanos undecimo: Noli altum sapere, sed time.

Sed contra: 1. Homo est in medio inter creaturas visibiles et Deum; sed dicit Augustinus⁵, quod anima hominis obtenebratur, quando in his terrenis et infimis oculum figit; illuminatur autem, cum convertitur ad aeterna bona: ergo semper illa debet quaerere. Sed illa sunt altiora: ergo etc.

2. Praeterea, nunquam anima perficitur perfectione completa, nisi in his quae sunt altiora ipsa⁶; sed unumquodque perfectibile debet tendere et quaerere id, in quo perficitur: ergo quaerere debet altiora. — Si tu dicas, quod non intelligit, quod non debet quaerere nec considerare altiora secundum substantiam, sed quod non debet considerare ea quae excedunt suae considerationis possibilitatem; obiicitur tunc: quia omnia, quae sunt fidei, sunt supra nostrum intellectum: ergo secundum hoc non debet intellectus noster erigere se ad credendum ea quae sunt fidei.

3. Item, tunc maxime erunt reprehensibiles qui articulos fidei volunt discutere: ergo omnes reprehensibiles, qui disputant de fide.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod facienda est vis in hoc, quod dicit: maiora se; et in hoc, quod dicit: quaerere. Maiora se vocat illa quae nostram considerationem excedunt, secundum hoc quod excedunt. Quaerere vocat inquirere et discutere, quasi dicat, quod stultum est velle indagare illa, ad quae nostra inquisitio non pertingit, quantum ad ea, ad quae non sufficit nostra consideratio. Nam aliqua sunt, quae nobis sunt manifesta de Deo; et illa non sunt maiora nobis; unde non dehortatur considerare Deum.

2. 3. Quod obiicit de fide, dicendum, quod ipse non dissuadet credere, sed quaerere. — Praeterea, etsi ea quae sunt fidei, sint supra nostrum intellectum per se nudum, non tamen sunt supra intellectum fidei gratia illustratum; unde quaerere illa et credere et indagare usque ad illud, ad quod se extendit lumen fidei, non est se extendere ad maiora; et sic est omnis disputatio sobria ipsorum articulorum. Si autem excedat, nisi sit a Deo, sic est excessus reprehensibilis⁷.

III. Quaeritur etiam de hoc quod dicit: Quis poterit ei indicare, quid post eum venturum sub sole sit?

Contra: In anima nostra est potentia, quae est omnia fieri et omnia facere⁸; sed possibilis potest in se recipere omnia praesentia, omnia praeterita et omnia futura: ergo si agens potest reducere ipsum ad actum, ergo homo potest per se ipsum cognoscere ventura.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod si agens possit formare sive abstrahere cognitionem in intellectu possibili, tamen operatio eius dependet et a certitudine rei extra et interius a sensu; quia « deficiente re, perit scientia »; et « deficiente sensu, necesse est, unam scientiam deficere secundum illum sensum⁹ ». Quia ergo futura contingentia non generant similitudinem sui in sensu, nec per se nec per causam determinatam antecedentem; et ipsa non habent in se stabilitatem, quae exigitur ad cognitionem: ideo intellectus noster, qui accipit a rebus, non potest per p. 55 se in eorum cognitionem venire, nisi per eum cuius cognitio non dependet a rebus¹.

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Chapter VII.

(Vers. 1.). What needeth? Here he calls us back, thirdly, from searching into lofty things and inquiring into them, and this since he has enough to do in knowing his own evils, or the common ones. Therefore he says: What needeth a man to seek things that are above him? as if to say, there is no need; Ecclesiasticus, the third chapter⁵: « Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability »; and to the Romans, the eleventh chapter: « Be not highminded, but fear ». And he adds the reason why he ought not to seek greater things: Whereas he knoweth not what is profitable for him in his life, that is, what is useful to him; Wisdom, the ninth chapter: « Hardly do we guess aright at things that are upon earth, and with labour do we find the things that are before us. But the things that are in heaven, who shall search out »? He is ignorant indeed of what is useful in this momentary life; whence he adds: In the number of the days of his pilgrimage; Genesis, the forty-seventh chapter⁶: « The days of the pilgrimage of my life are few and evil »; the second epistle to the Corinthians, the fifth chapter: « While we are in this body, we are absent from the Lord ». And the time that passeth like a shadow; the first of Paralipomenon, the last chapter: « We are sojourners before thee, and strangers, as were all our fathers. Our days upon earth are as a shadow, and there is no stay ». And so he cannot inquire by himself; nor even learn from another; therefore he adds: Or who can tell him what shall be after him under the sun? For man does not know future things, unless the Lord reveals them through grace. Therefore man ought not to extend his thought to this; Isaias, the forty-eighth chapter⁷: « Before the day thou heardest them not, lest thou shouldst say: Behold I knew them. Thou hast neither heard, nor known, neither was thy ear opened of old »; below, in the eighth chapter: « Man is ignorant of things past, and things to come he cannot know by any messenger ». Hence God alone knows future things and reveals them.

Questions.

I. But it is asked concerning what he says: It is better to see what thou mayest desire, than to desire what thou knowest not. Therefore it involves no contradiction that someone can desire what he does not know.

p. 54 On the contrary: 1. Augustine¹ says that « we can love things unseen, but things unknown by no means »; thus, therefore, in order that something be loved and desired, it is necessary that it be known.

2. Likewise, affection follows understanding: therefore where understanding does not go before, affection does not extend itself; but understanding does not extend itself to the things it does not know: therefore neither does affection desire them.

I respond: It must be said that cognition is twofold, namely of certitude and of estimation; so also, by the opposite, ignorance is twofold: one through the privation of any certitude whatever, and the other through the privation of any estimation whatever. I say, therefore, that in order that something be desired, it is not necessary that cognition of certitude go before; for desire follows estimation alone; but it is necessary that some cognition of estimation go before². Here, however, he speaks of ignorance through the privation of certitude.

II. It is asked concerning what he says: What needeth a man to seek things that are above him? From this it seems that man ought not to search into anything or to know by labour³ what is above him. — This same is proved by that word of Ecclesiasticus, the third chapter⁴: Seek not the things that are too high for thee. This same, to the Romans, the eleventh chapter: Be not highminded, but fear.

On the contrary: 1. Man is in the middle between visible creatures and God; but Augustine⁵ says that the soul of man is darkened when it fixes its eye on these earthly and lowest things, but is illumined when it is turned to the eternal goods: therefore it ought always to seek these. But these are higher things: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the soul is never perfected with complete perfection except in the things that are higher than itself⁶; but each perfectible thing ought to tend toward and seek that in which it is perfected: therefore it ought to seek higher things. — If you say that he does not mean that one ought not to seek or consider higher things according to their substance, but that one ought not to consider the things that exceed the possibility of one's consideration; it is objected then: because all things that are of faith are above our understanding: therefore according to this our understanding ought not to raise itself to believing the things that are of faith.

3. Likewise, then those would be most of all reprehensible who wish to discuss the articles of faith: therefore all are reprehensible who dispute about faith.

I respond: It must be said that the force is to be laid on what he says: above him; and on what he says: to seek. Above him he calls those things that exceed our consideration, insofar as they exceed it. To seek he calls to inquire and to discuss, as if to say that it is foolish to wish to track down those things to which our inquiry does not reach, as to those things for which our consideration does not suffice. For there are some things that are manifest to us about God; and those are not above us; whence he does not dissuade from considering God.

2. 3. To what he objects concerning faith, it must be said that he does not dissuade from believing, but from seeking. — Further, although the things that are of faith are above our understanding bare in itself, yet they are not above the understanding illumined by the grace of faith; whence to seek those things and to believe and to track them down as far as that to which the lumen^tr. of faith extends itself, is not to extend oneself to greater things; and thus every sober disputation of the articles themselves is. But if it exceeds, unless it be from God, then it is a reprehensible excess⁷.

III. It is asked also concerning what he says: Who can tell him what shall be after him under the sun?

On the contrary: In our soul there is a power which is to become all things and to make all things⁸; but the possible can receive in itself all things present, all things past and all things future: therefore if the agent can reduce it to act, then man can by himself know things to come.

I respond: It must be said that, although the agent can form or abstract cognition in the possible intellect, yet its operation depends both on the certitude of the thing outside and, within, on sense; because « when the thing fails, knowledge perishes »; and « when a sense fails, it is necessary that one knowledge fail according to that sense⁹ ». Since, then, future contingents do not generate a likeness of themselves in sense, neither through themselves nor through a determinate antecedent cause; and they do not have in themselves the stability that is required for cognition: therefore our understanding, which receives from things, cannot by p. 55 itself come to the cognition of them, except through him whose cognition does not depend on things¹.

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