Bonaventure

Capitulum IX.

(Vers. 1.). Sunt iusti atque sapientes etc. Tangitur hic secundum, scilicet discretionis incertitudo. Homo enim de se ipso nescit, utrum sit homo bonus, vel malus, etiam ipse bonus. Propterea dicit: Sunt iusti atque sapientes, et ita boni; et opera eorum in manu Dei, id est, in potestate cognoscendi, acceptandi et retribuendi. In eius manu sunt merita et praemia. Sunt merita bonarum cogitationum; Proverbiorum vigesimo primo⁷: « Sicut divisiones aquarum, ita cor regis in manu Domini ». Sunt merita bonarum affectionum; Psalmus: « In manu eius sunt omnes fines terrae ». Sunt etiam bonarum locutionum; Sapientiae septimo: « In manu illius et nos et sermones nostri ». Sunt etiam operationum, sicut in proposito. Sunt etiam praemia in manu eius; Sapientiae tertio: « Iustorum animae in manu Dei sunt »; et cum sint in manu Dei, debent nosci. Et tamen nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit, et ita nescit discernere; primae ad Corinthios quarto: « Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum » etc.

(Vers. 2.). Sed omnia in futurum servantur. Notatur hic tertium, scilicet incertitudinis ratio, quae provenit ex hoc, quod in praesenti non fit remuneratio secundum merita, sed reservatur in futurum. Et propterea dicit ita: Nescit homo... Sed omnia in futurum servantur incerta, ut scilicet certificentur; primae ad Corinthios quarto⁸: « Nolite ante tempus iudicare, quoadusque veniat Dominus, qui et illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium »; quod quidem modo non facit, sed reservat, secundum illud Iob decimo quarto: « Signasti quasi in sacculo delicta »; et ita in praesenti omnia sunt in occulto. Et subditur: Eo quod universa aeque eveniant iusto et impio etc.; universa, bona et mala, aeque eveniant iusto et peccatori, quos sub sex differentiis describit. Iusto et impio, quoad fidei credulitatem, quae scilicet iustificat impium; Habacuc secundo⁹: « Iustus in fide sua vivit ». Bono et malo, quantum ad dilectionis puritatem, quia sancta dilectio bonum facit; Matthaei septimo: « Bona arbor non potest malos fructus facere ». Mundo et immundo, quoad conversationis honestatem; illa enim attenditur circa exteriora, Tobiae quarto¹⁰. Immolanti hostias et victimas et sacrificia contemnenti, quoad p. 72 cultus religiositatem; Exodi duodecimo¹: « Haec est religio Phase; omnis alienigena non comedet ex eo ». Sicut bonus, sic et peccator, quantum ad mandatorum observationem, quorum observatio bonos, et transgressio peccatores facit; Danielis nono: « Peccavimus, iniquitatem fecimus et recessimus et declinavimus a mandatis tuis ac iudiciis ». Ut periurus, ita et ille qui verum deierat, quoad veritatis locutionem; deierat, ibi de auget, non minuit; deierat, id est vere iurat, secundum quam significationem accipitur primi Regum vigesimo²: « Et addidit Ionathas deierare David, eo quod diligeret illum ». Omnibus istis eveniunt aequa et quantum ad conditionem naturae, iuxta illud Sapientiae septimo: « Unus ergo est ingressus omnium ad vitam, et similis exitus »; et quantum ad conditionem culpae; ad Romanos tertio: « Omnes peccaverunt et egent gloria Dei »; et quantum ad conditionem poenae; Ecclesiastici octavo: « Memento, quoniam omnes in corruptione sumus ».

(Vers. 3.). Hoc est pessimum etc. Tangitur hic quartum, scilicet vanae securitatis origo, quoniam oritur magna securitas ex hac indistinctione, quae multorum peccatorum est occasio. Ideo dicit: Et hoc est pessimum inter omnia, quae sub sole fiunt, quia eadem cunctis eveniunt. Ideo pessimum, quia multorum occasio peccatorum; non enim videtur Deus curare de nobis. Unde oritur illa sententia Iob vigesimo secundo³: « Nubes latibulum eius, nec nostra considerat ». Et quod ex hoc oriantur mala, ostendit, quia oritur securitas, per quam homo cadit in malitiam et contemptum. Ideo dicit: Unde et corda filiorum hominum, id est malorum et carnalium, implentur malitia et contemptu. In impletione multitudo vitiorum designatur, ut malitia sit in concupiscibili, et contemptus in irascibili, quae sunt duae radices peccatorum; Genesis sexto⁴: « Corrupta est terra coram Deo et repleta iniquitate »; et hoc in vita sua, id est, quamdiu habent locum merendi; primae ad Thessalonicenses secundo: « Ut impleant peccata sua semper ». Et quia tales praecipitantur in poena, ideo subdit: Et post haec ad inferos deducentur; Psalmus: « Tu vero Deus, deduces eos in puteum interitus »; et Iob vigesimo primo: « Ducunt in bonis dies suos, et in puncto ad inferna descendunt ».

Quaestiones.

I. Incidit hic quaestio de hoc quod dixit⁵: Intellexi, quod operum Dei nullam possit homo invenire rationem.

1. Ergo si quod intelligimus debemus scire rationem⁶; et nullius possumus invenire rationem: ergo nihil intelligimus.

2. Item, rationalis natura est ad intelligendam et videndam rationem: ergo si rationem non possumus invenire, frustra habemus potentiam rationalem.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod « sermones accipiendi sunt secundum materiam⁷ »; ipse autem non loquitur de operibus Dei generaliter, sed de divinis iudiciis, quae sunt opera Dei, secundum illud Psalmi⁸: Magna opera Domini etc. « Haec iudicia, ut dicit Gregorius, non sunt discutienda, sed formidoloso silentio veneranda »; quia, etsi habeant rationem, habent tamen rationem latentem, et quam per nos non possumus indagare, quia supra nos est; et si intelligimus, hoc est per Spiritus sancti illustrationem, qui scrutatur profunda Dei⁹, non per humanam inventionem. Aliorum operum, ut creaturarum, multae rationes inveniuntur, et multae scientiae habentur; sed de illis operibus non loquitur hic.

II. Item, dubitatur de hoc quod dicit: Nescit homo, utrum amore, an odio dignus sit.

Quod videtur falsum: 1. Quia ad Romanos octavo¹⁰: Quis nos separabit a caritate Christi? certus sum etc.: ergo instantiam habet ibi. — Dices, quod sciebat revelatione; obiicitur, quod homo possit per se scire; quia dignitas divini amoris ponit in nobis gratiam gratum facientem; sed Augustinus¹¹ dicit, quod quae sunt essentialiter in anima melius cognoscuntur, quam quae secundum speciem: ergo si certi sumus de his quae cognoscimus secundum speciem, ut si ponatur dulce super linguam, multo magis de gratia.

2. Item, Augustinus¹² dicit, quod qui habet fidem certus est, se habere fidem. Ergo qui habet dilectionem sive caritatem certus est se habere: ergo qui habet gratiam certus est: ergo certus est, utrum Deo placeat.

3. Item, de odio potest quis esse certus, ut ille qui peccavit et vult peccare, certus est, quod est dignus odio.

p. 73 Contra: 1. Primae ad Corinthios quarto¹: Nihil mihi conscius sum, sed non in hoc iustificatus sum etc.

2. Item, Iob nono²: Si venerit ad me, non videbo eum; et si abierit, non intelligam; et ibidem: Si simplex fuero, hoc ipsum ignorabit anima mea.

3. Item, Ecclesiastici quinto³: De propitiato peccato noli esse sine metu: ergo nullus est certus.

Ad hoc respondent quidam, quod illud intelligitur de odio praedestinationis et reprobationis, de quo nullus est certus; et sic non habet instantiam, quia praedestinatio non ponit in nobis aliquem effectum, per quem possit sciri. — Aliter respondendum, eo quod haec responsio non satisfacit litterae; dicit enim littera: Nescit, utrum amore dignus sit; sed nullus dignus est nec meretur praedestinari: ideo intelligitur secundum praesentem iustitiam⁴.

Propter hoc respondent alii, quod duplex est cognitio, scilicet necessaria et infallibilis; et hanc habere non possumus, quia nemo certitudinaliter potest cognoscere, utrum habeat gratiam, nisi per revelationem, sicut Apostolus. Est alia probabilis et per signa; et haec quidem haberi potest et habetur; quia multi per signa probabilia cognoscunt, se esse in gratia.

1. 2. Quod ergo obiicitur, quod essentialiter videt; dico, quod habitus in anima non cognoscuntur nisi per hoc, quod anima videt se habilem ad aliquem actum; et quia actus fidei informis et formatae et dilectionis gratuitae et naturalis adeo sunt similes, ut vix aut nunquam possit homo discernere: ideo, etsi cognoscat habitum, nescit tamen, utrum gratuitus.

3. Quod obiicitur de odio, dico, quod ipse loquitur de iustis, quia ipsi nesciunt, utrum amore, an odio digni sint; non de aperte malis.

Quidquid tamen sit de caritate et fide, utrum homo sciat, se habere, vel non; tamen nescit, utrum amore, an odio Dei dignus sit; quia credere possumus, sed quomodo scimus, quod Dominus odiat malos et diligat bonos, cum tot et tanta bona faciat malis sicut et bonis? Unde Ecclesiastes non dixit, quod nesciant, se esse iustos, sed nesciunt, se dilectos a Deo⁵.

III. Potest etiam dubitari de hoc quod dicit: Hoc est pessimum sub sole, quod eadem cunctis eveniant.

Contra: 1. Peius est, quando malis eveniunt bona, et bonis mala, quam quando istis et illis eadem eveniunt, quia, sicut dictum fuit supra⁶, illud est indebitum et indignum.

2. Item, supra⁷ dictum est: Hoc vanissimum iudico de hoc, quod mali sunt securi, et iustis mala proveniunt; sed « quod per superabundantiam dicitur uni soli convenit »: ergo etc.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod intensio et remissio in vanitate vel malitia potest accipi proprie; et sic dicitur intensive, secundum quod dicitur: margarita est albior equo; et sic intensive maior est vanitas, cum mali exaltantur, et deprimuntur boni. Potest ulterius magis et minus accipi extensive, quia in pluribus vel plurium est causa vel occasio; et hoc modo indistinctio bonorum a malis est maior vanitas, quia plurium malitiarum origo. Si enim bonis evenirent mala, et malis bona; possent discerni boni a malis; sed dum eveniunt eadem, discerni non possunt.

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Chapter IX.

(Vers. 1.). There are just men and wise men etc. Here the second is touched upon, namely the uncertainty of discernment. For a man does not know of himself whether he is a good man or a bad one, even he who is himself good. Therefore he says: There are just men and wise men, and so good; and their works are in the hand of God, that is, in the power of knowing, of accepting and of repaying. In his hand are merits and rewards. There are merits of good thoughts; Proverbs, the twenty-first⁷: « As the divisions of waters, so the heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord ». There are merits of good affections; the Psalm: « In his hand are all the ends of the earth ». There are also merits of good speech; Wisdom, the seventh: « In his hand are both we and our words ». There are also merits of works, as in the matter proposed. There are also rewards in his hand; Wisdom, the third: « The souls of the just are in the hand of God »; and since they are in the hand of God, they ought to be known. And yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred, and so he does not know how to discern; the first to the Corinthians, the fourth: « I am not conscious to myself of anything, but I am not hereby justified » etc.

(Vers. 2.). But all things are kept for the time to come. Here the third is noted, namely the reason of the uncertainty, which comes from this, that in the present the recompense is not made according to merits, but is reserved for the time to come. And therefore he says thus: Man knoweth not… But all things are kept uncertain for the time to come, that is, so that they may be made certain; the first to the Corinthians, the fourth⁸: « Judge not before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts »; which indeed he does not do now, but reserves, according to that of Job, the fourteenth: « Thou hast sealed up offences as it were in a bag »; and so in the present all things are in hiding. And there is added: Because all things equally happen to the just and to the wicked etc.; all things, good and evil, equally happen to the just and to the sinner, whom he describes under six differences. To the just and to the wicked, as regards the believing of faith, which, namely, justifies the wicked; Habacuc, the second⁹: « The just man liveth in his faith ». To the good and to the evil, as regards the purity of love, since holy love makes good; Matthew, the seventh: « A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit ». To the clean and to the unclean, as regards the uprightness of conduct; for that is attended to in outward things, Tobias, the fourth¹⁰. To him that immolateth hosts and victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices, as regards p. 72 the religiousness of worship; Exodus, the twelfth¹: « This is the religion of the Phase; no alien shall eat of it ». As the good, so also the sinner, as regards the observance of the commandments, whose observance makes the good, and whose transgression makes sinners; Daniel, the ninth: « We have sinned, we have committed iniquity, and have departed, and have gone aside from thy commandments and judgments ». As the perjured, so also he that sweareth truth [deierat], as regards the speaking of truth; deierat: there de augments, it does not diminish; deierat, that is, swears truly, in which signification is taken that of the first of Kings, the twentieth²: « And Jonathan added to swear [deierare] to David, because he loved him ». To all these things happen alike, both as regards the condition of nature, according to that of Wisdom, the seventh: « There is therefore one entrance of all into life, and a like going out »; and as regards the condition of fault; to the Romans, the third: « All have sinned, and do need the glory of God »; and as regards the condition of punishment; Ecclesiasticus, the eighth: « Remember that we are all in corruption ».

(Vers. 3.). This is the worst etc. Here the fourth is touched upon, namely the origin of vain security, since great security arises from this indistinction, which is the occasion of many sins. Therefore he says: And this is the worst among all things that are done under the sun, that the same things happen to all. Therefore the worst, because it is the occasion of many sins; for God does not seem to care about us. Whence arises that saying of Job, the twenty-second³: « The clouds are his covert, and he doth not consider our things ». And that evils arise from this he shows, since security arises, through which a man falls into malice and contempt. Therefore he says: Whereby also the hearts of the children of men, that is, of the evil and the carnal, are filled with malice and with contempt. In filling a multitude of vices is designated, so that malice is in the concupiscible, and contempt in the irascible, which are the two roots of sins; Genesis, the sixth⁴: « The earth is corrupted before God and filled with iniquity »; and this in their life, that is, as long as they have place for meriting; the first to the Thessalonians, the second: « To fill up their sins always ». And since such men are cast headlong into punishment, therefore he adds: And afterwards they shall be brought down to hell; the Psalm: « But thou, O God, shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction »; and Job, the twenty-first: « They spend their days in good things, and in a moment they go down to hell ».

Questions.

I. Here a question falls in about what he said⁵: I understood that man can find no reason of the works of God.

1. Then if we ought to know the reason of what we understand⁶; and we can find the reason of nothing: then we understand nothing.

2. Likewise, the rational nature is for understanding and seeing the reason: then if we cannot find the reason, we have the rational power in vain.

I respond: it must be said that « words are to be taken according to their matter⁷ »; but he is not speaking of the works of God in general, but of the divine judgements, which are works of God, according to that of the Psalm⁸: Great are the works of the Lord etc. « These judgements, as Gregory says, are not to be discussed, but to be venerated with fearful silence »; because, although they have a reason, they nevertheless have a hidden reason, and one which we cannot track down by ourselves, because it is above us; and if we understand, this is through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, who searcheth the deep things of God⁹, not through human finding. Of the other works, as of creatures, many reasons are found, and many sciences are had; but he is not speaking of those works here.

II. Likewise, there is doubt about what he says: Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.

That it seems false: 1. Because to the Romans, the eighth¹⁰: Who shall separate us from the charity of Christ? I am sure etc.: then it has a counter-instance there. — You will say that he knew by revelation; it is objected that a man can know by himself; because the dignity of the divine love places in us the grace that makes pleasing; but Augustine¹¹ says that the things which are in the soul essentially are better known than those which are in it according to a species: then if we are certain of the things we know according to a species, as if something sweet is placed upon the tongue, much more of grace.

2. Likewise, Augustine¹² says that he who has faith is certain that he has faith. Then he who has love or charity is certain that he has it: then he who has grace is certain: then he is certain whether he pleases God.

3. Likewise, one can be certain of hatred, as he who has sinned and wills to sin is certain that he is worthy of hatred.

p. 73 On the contrary: 1. The first to the Corinthians, the fourth¹: I am not conscious to myself of anything, but I am not hereby justified etc.

2. Likewise, Job, the ninth²: If he come to me, I shall not see him; and if he depart, I shall not understand; and in the same place: Although I should be simple, even this my soul shall be ignorant of.

3. Likewise, Ecclesiasticus, the fifth³: Concerning sin propitiated be not without fear: then no one is certain.

To this some respond that it is understood of the hatred of predestination and reprobation, of which no one is certain; and so it has no counter-instance, because predestination places in us no effect through which it could be known. — One must respond otherwise, because this response does not satisfy the letter; for the letter says: He knoweth not whether he be worthy of love; but no one is worthy of, nor merits, being predestined: therefore it is understood according to present justice⁴.

On account of this others respond that cognition is twofold, namely necessary and infallible; and this we cannot have, because no one can know with certitude whether he has grace, except through revelation, as the Apostle did. The other is probable and through signs; and this indeed can be had and is had; because many know through probable signs that they are in grace.

1. 2. As to what is objected, then, that it sees essentially: I say that habits in the soul are not known except through this, that the soul sees itself apt for some act; and since the acts of unformed and formed faith and of gratuitous and natural love are so alike that hardly or never could a man discern them: therefore, although he knows the habit, he nevertheless does not know whether it is gratuitous.

3. As to what is objected about hatred, I say that he is speaking of the just, because they do not know whether they are worthy of love or hatred; not of the openly evil.

Whatever, nevertheless, may be the case about charity and faith, whether a man knows that he has them or not; yet he does not know whether he is worthy of the love or the hatred of God; because we can believe it, but how do we know that the Lord hates the evil and loves the good, when he does so many and such great good things to the evil as to the good? Whence Ecclesiastes did not say that they do not know that they are just, but they do not know that they are loved by God⁵.

III. There can also be doubt about what he says: This is the worst under the sun, that the same things happen to all.

On the contrary: 1. It is worse when good things happen to the evil and evil things to the good than when the same things happen to these and to those, because, as was said above⁶, that is undue and unworthy.

2. Likewise, it was said above⁷: This I judge most vain, concerning this, that the evil are secure and evils come to the just; but « what is said by superabundance belongs to one alone »: then etc.

I respond: it must be said that intension and remission in vanity or malice can be taken properly; and so it is said intensively, according as it is said: a pearl is whiter than a horse; and so intensively the vanity is greater when the evil are exalted and the good are cast down. More and less can further be taken extensively, since it is the cause or occasion in more things or of more things; and in this way the indistinction of the good from the evil is the greater vanity, because it is the origin of more malices. For if evil things happened to the good, and good things to the evil, the good could be discerned from the evil; but while the same things happen, they cannot be discerned.

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