Bonaventure

Secundo oritur securitas ex apparentia defectus regiminis providentiae; quae apparentia dupliciter ostenditur.

Verti me ad aliud etc. Sicut supra dictum est, securitas est in malis, primo, quia videtur deficere retributio iustitiae; secundo, quia videtur deficere regimen providentiae. Actum est de defectu, qui apparet esse in retributione iustitiae; agitur hic secundo de defectu, qui apparet esse circa regimen p. 76 providentiae, non enim videntur haec regi ordinate, sed casualiter. Et habet haec pars duas, quia primo ostenditur defectus ordinis communiter; secundo specialiter, ibi: Hanc quoque vidi sapientiam etc., circa praelationis inordinationem.

Primo ostenditur defectus ordinis in generali.

Circa primum sic procedit. Primo ostendit inordinationem et casum, quod videtur esse quantum ad vitae conversationem; secundo, quod videtur esse quantum ad mortis terminationem, ibi: Nescit homo finem suum.

(Vers. 11.). Quantum igitur ad vitae conversationem ostendit inordinationem, quia res non aptantur ad ea, ad quae habent idoneitatem. Propter quod dicit: Verti me ad aliud, quia supra consideravit retributionem, hic vertit se ad considerandum ordinem. Vidique sub sole, et enumerat quinque dona gratis data, quae a suis actibus defraudantur; nec velocium esse cursum, cum tamen sint idonei ad currendum; Amos secundo¹: « Peribit fuga a veloce ». Nec fortium bellum, cum tamen sint idonei ad pugnandum; secundi Regum primo: « Ceciderunt robusti, et perierunt arma bellica ». Nec sapientium panem, cum tamen idonei sint ad cibaria distribuendum; Isaiae tertio: « Non sum medicus, et in domo mea non est panis ». Nec doctorum divitias, cum sint idonei ad omnia dona possidendum; infra eodem²: « Inventus est in ea vir pauper ». Nec artificum gratiam, cum tamen sint idonei ad grata opera faciendum; Isaiae vigesimo: « Confusi sunt omnes, qui operabantur bene ». Sed tempus casumque in omnibus, quasi omnia a casu veniant, et temporalia varientur; supra tertio: « Omnia tempus habent et suis spatiis transeunt ». Et distinguuntur praedicta dona, quia duo prima respiciunt corpus: agilitas, ad assequendum desideratum, fortitudo ad resistendum malo illato; tria sequentia animam, scilicet sapientia in corde, doctrina in ore, ars in opere.

(Vers. 12.). Nescit homo finem suum etc. Tangitur hic secundum, scilicet defectus regiminis quoad mortis terminationem, quia nulli determinatum est, nec quando nec quomodo debeat mori. Et videtur, quod mors talis vel talis casu eveniat. Et propterea dicit: Nescit homo finem suum, id est diem mortis; Matthaei vigesimo quarto³: « Vigilate ergo, quia nescitis, qua-hora Dominus vester venturus sit ». Et ponit exemplum, quomodo est inordinatio et incertitudo, dicens: Sed sicut pisces capiuntur hamo, scilicet ignoranter, et sicut aves comprehenduntur laqueo, scilicet per fraudem; Ecclesiastici undecimo: « Sicut perdix induritur in caveam, et sicut caprea in laqueum; sic et cor superborum ». Sic capiuntur homines in tempore malo; primae ad Thessalonicenses quinto: « Cum dixerint: Pax et securitas, repentinus superveniet interitus ». Cum eis supervenerit extemplo, id est repente; Isaiae trigesimo: « Subito, dum non speratur, veniet contritio eius, et conteritur velut lagena figuli ».

Spiritualiter hic insinuatur bonorum superna electio, et postmodum malorum occulta damnatio. Ut igitur totam bonorum operationem Deo attribuat, dicit primo: Non esse velocium cursum; quia non est a se, quod currunt, sed a Deo; ad Romanos nono⁴: « Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis ». Nec fortium bellum, quia in Psalmo: « Non salvatur rex per multam virtutem ». Nec sapientium panem, a se, sed a Deo; Ioannis sexto: « Pater meus dat vobis panem de caelo verum ». Nec doctorum divitias, sapientiae scilicet et scientiae, a se, sed a Deo; primae ad Corinthios primo: « In omnibus divites facti estis in illo », scilicet in Christo. Nec artificum gratiam, a se, sed a Deo; Psalmus: « Misericordiam et veritatem diligit Deus; gratiam et gloriam dabit Dominus ».

Quantum autem ad malorum damnationem occultam dicit: Nescit homo finem suum; quia « via impiorum tenebrosa⁵ » etc. Sicut pisces hamo, id est voluptuosi, qui capiuntur hamo voluptatis; Habacuc primo: « Totum in hamo sublevavit ». Et sicut aves laqueo, id est ambitiosi laqueo honoris; primae ad Timotheum tertio: « Non neophytum, ne, in superbiam elatus, in iudicium incidat diaboli ». Sic capiuntur homines, id est avari, in tempore malo; Iob vigesimo septimo: « Dives, cum dormierit, nihil secum auferet ».

Quaestiones.

I. Potest dubitari de hoc quod dicit, quod vidit tempus et casum in omnibus. — Ergo secundum hoc videtur, quod omnia casu eveniant.

Sed contra. Videtur, quod non omnia casu eveniant: p. 77

1. Quia quae eveniunt secundum propositum non eveniunt casu; sed multa fiunt ex proposito: ergo non omnia casu.

2. Praeterea videtur, quod in nullis sit casus, quia, ut dicit Plato¹, « nihil est praeter primam causam, cuius ortum legitima causa non praecesserit »: ergo secundum hoc nihil fit casu, sed omnia a causa determinata proveniunt.

3. Item, in omni operatione Deus est agens principaliter²; sed quidquid Deus agit principaliter, agit et scienter et ex proposito, et nihil tale fit casu: ergo nihil omnino casu fit.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod casus et fortuna sunt causae per accidens³, non quia aliae causae a causis per se, sed quia, quando natura et intellectus aliquid faciunt, ad quod directe ordinantur, hoc per se faciunt, et non est ibi casus; quando vero ex eorum operatione aliquid evenit, ad quod directe non ordinantur, propter concursum alterius causae; ibi est casus; ut patet de creditore invento in foro et lapide cadente super caput. Dico ergo, quod si eventus rerum comparentur ad causam primam, quae Deus est; cum Deus omnia praevideat, nihil est casuale secundum divinae praescientiae ordinationem. Si autem loquimur per comparationem ad causas creatus, aut circa immutabiles, sicut est circa motum superiorum corporum, aut circa mutabiles, sicut sunt causae inferiores, quae sunt sub sole; in dispositione causarum istarum mutabilium vix est, quin concurrat aliquis effectus non intentus, immo praeter intentionem; et ideo invenitur casus in omnibus, non quod omnia casu eveniant, sed quia circa omnem mutabilem creaturam aliquid evenit casuale.

3. Quod obiicitur de divina praescientia, iam patet. Non enim dicitur casus in comparatione ad divinam praescientiam.

2. Quod obiicitur secundo, quod omnia habent causam; dicendum, quod verum est, quod omnia habent legitimam causam, scilicet naturam, vel intellectum⁴; sed tamen per hoc non excluditur, quin aliquid possint facere vel faciant praeter ordinem, Deo excepto.

II. Quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Sicut pisces capiuntur hamo; utrum comprehensio piscium sit a casu, vel non. Quod sic, videtur:

1. Quia, quod iste piscis magis veniat quam alius, hoc non est per naturam nec per rationem: ergo per casum.

2. Item, quod unus homo capiat, alter non, hoc non est per rationem naturae, vel artis: ergo a casu.

Sed contra: Si quis intendens invenire aurum foderet, non esset casus⁵: ergo cum qui piscatur intendat capere, non est ibi casus.

Respondeo: dicendum, quod est loqui de captione per comparationem ad capientes, et sic non est a casu; est etiam loqui per comparationem ad pisces, qui vadunt ad hamum; et quia vadunt propter cibum, et aliud evenit, quantum ad illos est ibi casus.

---

Secondly, security arises from the appearance of a failure in the government of providence; which appearance is shown in two ways.

I turned me to another thing etc. As was said above, security is in the evil, first, because the retribution of justice seems to fail; secondly, because the government of providence seems to fail. It has been treated of the failure that appears to be in the retribution of justice; here, secondly, it is treated of the failure that appears to be in regard to the government p. 76 of providence, for these things do not seem to be governed in an orderly way, but by chance. And this part has two, because first the failure of order is shown in common; secondly in particular, there: This wisdom also I have seen etc., in regard to the disorder of prelacy.

First the failure of order is shown in general.

Concerning the first he proceeds thus. First he shows disorder and chance, as it seems to be with regard to the conduct of life; secondly, as it seems to be with regard to the ending of death, there: Man knoweth not his own end.

(Vers. 11.). With regard, then, to the conduct of life he shows disorder, because things are not fitted to those things for which they have fitness. On account of which he says: I turned me to another thing, because above he considered retribution, here he turns himself to considering order. And I saw under the sun, and he enumerates five gifts freely given, which are defrauded of their acts; that the race is not to the swift, though they are fit for running; Amos, the second¹: « Flight shall perish from the swift ». Nor the battle to the strong, though they are fit for fighting; the second of Kings, the first: « The valiant have fallen, and the weapons of war have perished ». Nor bread to the wise, though they are fit for distributing food; Isaias, the third: « I am no physician, and in my house there is no bread ». Nor riches to the learned, though they are fit for possessing all gifts; below, in the same²: « There was found in it a poor man ». Nor favour to the skilful, though they are fit for doing pleasing works; Isaias, the twentieth: « All are confounded that wrought well ». But time and chance in all, as if all things came by chance, and temporal things varied; above, the third: « All things have their season, and pass away in their spaces ». And the aforesaid gifts are distinguished, because the first two regard the body: agility, for attaining what is desired, strength for resisting evil inflicted; the three following the soul, namely wisdom in the heart, teaching^tr. in the mouth, art in the work.

(Vers. 12.). Man knoweth not his own end etc. Here the second is touched upon, namely the failure of government with regard to the ending of death, because it is determined for no one, neither when nor how he must die. And it seems that such or such a death comes about by chance. And therefore he says: Man knoweth not his own end, that is, the day of death; Matthew, the twenty-fourth³: « Watch ye therefore, because ye know not at what hour your Lord will come ». And he gives an example of how there is disorder and uncertainty, saying: But as fishes are taken with the hook, namely unknowingly, and as birds are caught with the snare, namely through fraud; Ecclesiasticus, the eleventh: « As the partridge is brought into the cage, and as the roe into the snare; so also is the heart of the proud ». So men are taken in the evil time; the first to the Thessalonians, the fifth: « When they shall say: Peace and security, sudden destruction shall come upon them ». When it shall suddenly come upon them, that is, all at once; Isaias, the thirtieth: « Suddenly, when it is not looked for, shall come the breaking thereof, and it shall be broken as the potter's vessel ».

Spiritually there is here intimated the heavenly election of the good, and afterwards the hidden damnation of the evil. So then, that he may attribute the whole working of the good to God, he says first: That the race is not to the swift; because it is not from themselves that they run, but from God; to the Romans, the ninth⁴: « It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy ». Nor the battle to the strong, because in the Psalm: « The king is not saved by a great power ». Nor bread to the wise, from themselves, but from God; John, the sixth: « My Father giveth you the true bread from heaven ». Nor riches to the learned, namely of wisdom and of knowledge, from themselves, but from God; the first to the Corinthians, the first: « In all things you are made rich in him », namely in Christ. Nor favour to the skilful, from themselves, but from God; the Psalm: « God loveth mercy and truth; the Lord will give grace and glory ».

But with regard to the hidden damnation of the evil he says: Man knoweth not his own end; because « the way of the wicked is darksome⁵ » etc. As fishes with the hook, that is, the voluptuous, who are taken with the hook of pleasure; Habacuc, the first: « He lifted up all with his hook ». And as birds with the snare, that is, the ambitious with the snare of honour; the first to Timothy, the third: « Not a neophyte, lest, being puffed up with pride, he fall into the judgement of the devil ». So men are taken, that is, the avaricious, in the evil time; Job, the twenty-seventh: « The rich man, when he shall sleep, shall take away nothing with him ».

Questions.

I. It can be doubted about what he says, that he saw time and chance in all. — Then according to this it seems that all things come about by chance.

On the contrary. It seems that not all things come about by chance: p. 77

1. Because things that come about according to purpose do not come about by chance; but many things are done from purpose: then not all things by chance.

2. Moreover it seems that in nothing is there chance, because, as Plato says¹, « there is nothing besides the first cause whose rise a legitimate cause has not preceded »: then according to this nothing is done by chance, but all things proceed from a determinate cause.

3. Likewise, in every operation God is the principal agent²; but whatever God does principally, he does both knowingly and from purpose, and nothing such is done by chance: then nothing at all is done by chance.

I respond: It must be said that chance and fortune are causes per accidens³, not because they are other causes than the causes per se, but because, when nature and understanding do something to which they are directly ordered, this they do per se, and there is no chance there; but when from their operation something comes about to which they are not directly ordered, on account of the concurrence of another cause; there there is chance; as is plain in the case of the creditor found in the market-place and of the stone falling upon the head. I say therefore that if the outcomes of things are compared to the first cause, which is God; since God foresees all things, nothing is by chance according to the ordinance of the divine foreknowledge. But if we speak by comparison to created causes, either regarding the immutable, as it is regarding the motion of the higher bodies, or regarding the mutable, as are the lower causes, which are under the sun; in the disposition of these mutable causes it scarcely happens that some effect not intended does not concur, nay rather beyond intention; and therefore chance is found in all, not that all things come about by chance, but because in regard to every mutable creature something comes about by chance.

3. What is objected concerning the divine foreknowledge is already plain. For chance is not spoken of in comparison to the divine foreknowledge.

2. What is objected secondly, that all things have a cause; it must be said that it is true that all things have a legitimate cause, namely nature or understanding⁴; but nevertheless by this it is not excluded that they can do or may do something beyond the order, God excepted.

II. It is asked about what he says: As fishes are taken with the hook; whether the catching of fishes is from chance, or not. That it is, it seems:

1. Because that this fish comes rather than another, this is not through nature nor through reason: then through chance.

2. Likewise, that one man catches, another not, this is not through the reason of nature or of art: then from chance.

On the contrary: If someone, intending to find gold, were to dig, it would not be chance⁵: then since he who fishes intends to catch, there is not chance there.

I respond: It must be said that one can speak of the catching by comparison to those who catch, and so it is not from chance; one can also speak by comparison to the fishes, which go to the hook; and because they go for the sake of food, and something else comes about, as regards them there is chance there.

---