Dist. 12, Dubia
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 12
## DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI
Dub. I.
In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod materiam quatuor elementorum nomine terrae appellavit Moyses, quia inter omnia elementa est terra minus speciosa. Contra hoc obiicitur quod dicit Hugo1: «Per terram hoc elementum terrae significari puto, cum dicitur: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram»: ergo non videtur significare illam materiam informem in sua generalitate. — Item, si per terram significatur materia informis, cum in illa conveniat caelum et terra, videtur, quod non bene distinguantur ista duo.
Quaestio incidens. Iuxta hoc est quaestio, propter quid istis tribus nominibus illa informis materia appellatur, scilicet nomine terrae, abyssi et aquae2, cum non magis esset ibi de ratione terrae et aquae quam ignis et aeris.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod etsi multae sint
expositiones huius verbi: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram3; quatuor tamen sunt principales, et secundum has differenter exponitur nomen terrae.
Expositio 1. Una expositio est, quod caelum et terra eandem materiam nominant, scilicet materiam informem omnium corporalium, prout tamen de ipsa debebant fieri duorum corporum genera, scilicet caelestia et elementaria, ut sit sensus: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, id est materiam, ex qua debebat fieri caelum et omnia elementa. Et ista expositio confirmatur per subsequentem litteram4. Subsequenter enim exprimitur, qualiter factum est caelum, et qualiter facta est terra.
Expositio 2. Alia vero expositio est ab hac expositione valde longinqua, quae nomine caeli vult intelligi naturam spiritualem, nomine terrae naturam corporalem, ut sit sensus: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, id est angelicam naturam et materiam primam5. Et haec expositio confirmatur per litteram sequentem, quia in secundo die productio caeli corporei exprimitur: ergo in principio temporis, si qua fuerit productio caeli, non fuit caeli corporalis, sed spiritualis.
Expositio 3. Tertia expositio, quasi media inter has duas, est expositio Hugonis6, qui dicit, per terram intelligi terrenum elementum, et per caelum tria alia elementa, quae super terram circumquaque in modum nebulae erant oppansa et in una confusione permixta, sive potius in una permixtione confusa circumquaque suspensa, quae eousque in altum protendebantur, quousque nunc summitas corporeae naturae pertingit. Et illud videtur similiter per litteram sequentem confirmari7.
Expositio 4. Quarta expositio, quae communior est secundum expositores et planior, est, quod per caelum intelligatur caelum empyreum, quod est Angelorum habitaculum, in quo Angeli sunt creati; per terram vero materia omnium corporum intra ipsum contentorum, sive caelestium sive terrestrium8. Haec expositio sequenti litterae concordat, quae exprimit, de illa materia facta esse corpora caelestia et elementaria. Et si tu quaeras, quare illa duo distinguit? plana est responsio; quia caelum empyreum completum erat et immutabile et habebat mensurari aeviternitate cum suis contentis; materia vero illa incompleta erat et subiecta mutabilitati, tam ipsa, quam ea quae ex ipsa futura erant; et ideo debebat mensurari tempore. — Et per hoc patet, quod Scriptura distinxit illa duo valde rationabiliter et eleganter, cum in primaria conditione diversas haberent mensuras, secundum quas ad invicem differrent, sive eorum differentiae innotescerent. Et per hoc patent duo prima obiecta.
Ad quaestionem incid. Ad illud quod quaeritur, quare his tribus nominibus appellata est? dicendum, quod etsi ad hoc satis sufficienter respondeat Magister in littera9, potest tamen dici, quod insinuatur ipsa materia informis illis tribus nominibus sub triplici conditione se habere in comparatione ad formam. De relatione materiae ad formam. Ipsa enim materia dat formae fixionem, et propter hoc appellatur nomine terrae, quae inter cetera elementa plus habet de stabilitate10. Ipsa etiam materia a forma recipit speciositatem et completionem, et per se est quasi tenebra; et ideo significatur nomine abyssi tenebrosae. Ipsa etiam materia ad formam habet aptitudinem et inclinationem, et ita quandam fluxibilitatem, quae signatur nomine aquae11.
Dub. II.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Non enim tenebrae aliquid sunt. Si enim tenebra nihil est: ergo non est alicubi12: ergo non videtur, quod essent super faciem abyssi. — Item, si tenebra nihil dicit nisi negationem praesentiae lucis corporalis; cum ab aeterno esset verum dicere, quod lux corporalis non erat ab aeterno, est verum dicere, quod esset tenebra; quod falsum est. — Item, si tenebra nihil est; et quod nihil est non potest ab alio dividi: ergo non potuit tenebra dividi a luce, cuius contrarium habetur in littera Genesis13. — Item, si tenebra nihil est; et quod nihil est non benedicit Dominum: ergo tenebrae non benedicunt Domino14.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tenebra semper accipitur privative; et quoniam privatio relinquit constantiam alicuius subiecti15, tenebra semper aliquid praesupponit in obliquo; nunquam enim est tenebra, nisi sit aliquid quod obtenebretur; unde tenebra non dicit tantum non-existentiam lucis, sed etiam cum hoc addit aptitudinem corporis illuminabilis. Quia ergo tenebra privationem dicit, ideo non16
dicitur esse facta; quia vero aliquid ponit in obliquo, ideo non est aeterna. Si ergo alicubi dicatur, quod tenebra nihil est, hoc dicitur quantum ad illud quod dicit tenebra in recto, sicut dicitur caecitas nihil esse. Si vero dicatur, quod tenebrae aliquid sunt, vel quod divisae sunt, vel quod benedicunt Dominum, hoc dicitur ratione eius, circa quod sunt. Et sic patent obiecta.
Obiicitur. Sed adhuc posset obiici, quod habitus naturaliter praecedit privationem17: ergo si tenebra dicit privationem luminis, prius fuit lux, quam essent tenebrae. Praeterea, nox est differentia temporis, ergo non est privatio pura; sed Scriptura18 dicit, quod tenebras appellavit noctem: ergo videtur, quod falsum dicat, cum dicit, quod tenebrae non aliquid sunt.
Solvitur distinguendo. — Et propterea oportet distinguere, quod tenebra dupliciter potest importare privationem. Uno modo, quia simpliciter dicit lucis absentiam, et hoc modo non sequitur lucem; et sic nihil est, formaliter loquendo. Sic etiam intelligit Scriptura19, quod tenebrae erant super faciem abyssi; et sic intelligit Augustinus, cum dicit, quod tenebrae non aliquid sunt. Alio modo tenebra dicit privationem lucis in una parte cum positione illuminationis in alia, et hoc modo tenebra appellatur umbra, quae resultat ex obiectu corporis opaci; et sic tenebra, etsi aliquo modo sit privatio, non tamen est privatio pura; et per hunc modum accipiendo intelligitur a luce esse divisa, et significatur nomine noctis et invitatur ad laudem Creatoris et consequitur habitum lucis20.
Dub. III.
Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit Alcuinus, quod Deus operatur in Verbo omnia disponendo; contra: omni enim operationi respondet aliquis effectus: ergo si Deus operatur omnia disponendo in Verbo, cum operatio ista fuerit ab aeterno, videtur, quod multa ab aeterno produxerit. — Item, in sapiente operatore dispositio praecedit operationem: ergo cum Deus sit sapiens in omnibus operibus suis21, videtur, quod nulla operatio eius debeat dispositio dici.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Alcuinus indiget hic pio expositore. Multum enim loquitur improprie, dum ipsam aeternam dispositionem vocat operationem; ipse enim extendit nomen operationis ad omnem productionem. Et quoniam Pater, generando et producendo Verbum, omnia in ipso disposuit, ideo largo modo, sed improprio, ipsum ab aeterno disponendo in Filio operari dixit22.
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE MASTER'S TEXT
Dub. I.
In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first the question is asked concerning what he says, that Moses called the matter of the four elements by the name "earth," because among all the elements earth is the least comely. Against this it is objected — by what Hugh says1: «By "earth" I think this element of earth is signified, when it is said: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth»: therefore it does not seem to signify that unformed matter in its generality. — Likewise, if by earth unformed matter is signified, since heaven and earth coincide in it, it appears that those two are not well distinguished.
An incidental question. Alongside this is a question, why that unformed matter is called by these three names, namely by the name earth, deep, and water2, since there was there no more of the character of earth and water than of fire and air.
I respond: It must be said that, although there are many
expositions of this saying: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth3, yet four are the principal ones, and according to these the name of earth is differently expounded.
Exposition 1. One exposition is that heaven and earth name the same matter, namely the unformed matter of all corporeal things, yet inasmuch as out of it there were to be made two genera of bodies, namely the celestial and the elementary, so that the sense is: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, that is, the matter out of which the heaven and all the elements were to be made. And this exposition is confirmed by the following text4. For thereafter is expressed how the heaven was made and how the earth was made.
Exposition 2. But another exposition is very far removed from this one, which by the name heaven wishes to be understood spiritual nature, and by the name earth corporeal nature, so that the sense is: In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth, that is, the angelic nature and first matter5. And this exposition is confirmed by the following text, because on the second day the production of the corporeal heaven is expressed: therefore at the beginning of time, if there was any production of heaven, it was not [the production] of a corporeal heaven but of a spiritual [one].
Exposition 3. The third exposition, as it were midway between these two, is the exposition of Hugh6, who says that by earth is understood the element earth, and by heaven the other three elements, which were spread round about over the earth in the manner of a mist and were mingled together in a single confusion, or rather were suspended round about in a single confused commingling, which were stretched out on high to where the summit of corporeal nature now reaches. And this likewise seems to be confirmed by the following text7.
Exposition 4. The fourth exposition, which is the more common according to the expositors and the plainer, is that by heaven is understood the empyrean heaven, which is the dwelling-place of the Angels, in which the Angels were created; and by earth the matter of all bodies contained within it, whether celestial or terrestrial8. This exposition accords with the following text, which expresses that out of that matter were made the celestial and elementary bodies. And if you ask why he distinguishes the two, the answer is plain: because the empyrean heaven was complete and immutable and was to be measured by aeviternity together with its contents; but that matter was incomplete and subject to mutability — both itself and the things which were to come to be out of it — and therefore it had to be measured by time. — And by this it is clear that Scripture distinguished those two very reasonably and elegantly, since in their primary condition they had diverse measures, according to which they differed from one another, or [according to which] their differences became known. And by this both of the first two objections are answered.
To the incidental question. To that which is asked, why it was called by these three names: it must be said that, although the Master in the text responds sufficiently to this9, yet it can be said that it is intimated that the unformed matter itself by those three names has, under a threefold condition, [a relation] in comparison to form. On the relation of matter to form. For matter itself gives fixity to form, and on this account it is called by the name earth, which among the other elements has the most of stability10. Also matter receives from form beauty and completion, and is of itself as it were a darkness; and therefore it is signified by the name dark deep. Also matter has toward form an aptitude and inclination, and so a certain fluidity, which is signified by the name water11.
Dub. II.
Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: For darknesses are not anything. For if darkness is nothing: then it is not anywhere12: therefore it does not appear that they were upon the face of the deep. — Likewise, if darkness signifies nothing but the negation of the presence of corporeal light: since from eternity it was true to say that corporeal light was not from eternity, it is true to say that there was darkness; which is false. — Likewise, if darkness is nothing; and what is nothing cannot be divided from anything else: therefore darkness could not have been divided from the light, the contrary of which is held in the text of Genesis13. — Likewise, if darkness is nothing; and what is nothing does not bless the Lord: therefore darknesses do not bless the Lord14.
I respond: It must be said that darkness is always taken privatively; and since a privation leaves the constancy of some subject15, darkness always presupposes something in the oblique [case]; for there is never darkness unless there be something which is being darkened; hence darkness does not signify only the non-existence of light, but together with this also adds the aptitude of an illuminable body. Therefore because darkness signifies a privation, on that account it is not16
said to be made; but because it posits something in the oblique [case], on that account it is not eternal. If therefore it is said somewhere that darkness is nothing, this is said as regards what darkness signifies in the direct [case], as blindness is said to be nothing. But if it is said that darknesses are something, or that they were divided, or that they bless the Lord, this is said by reason of that about which they are. And thus the objections are answered.
An objection. But it could still be objected that habit naturally precedes privation17: therefore if darkness signifies the privation of light, light was prior to the time when darknesses existed. Furthermore, night is a difference of time, therefore it is not a pure privation; but Scripture18 says that He called the darknesses night: therefore it appears that he speaks falsely when he says that darknesses are not anything.
It is solved by distinguishing. — And therefore it must be distinguished, [namely] that darkness can imply privation in two ways. In one way, because it simply signifies the absence of light, and in this way it does not follow light; and so [in this sense] it is nothing, formally speaking. In this sense also Scripture19 understands [it] when [it says] that darknesses were upon the face of the deep; and in this sense Augustine understands [it] when he says that darknesses are not anything. In another way darkness signifies the privation of light in one part together with the position of illumination in another, and in this way darkness is called shadow, which results from the interposition of an opaque body; and so darkness, although in some way it is a privation, yet is not a pure privation; and taking [it] in this manner, it is understood to have been divided from the light, and is signified by the name night, and is invited to the praise of the Creator, and follows upon the habit of light20.
Dub. III.
Likewise it is asked concerning what Alcuin says, that God operates in the Word by disposing all things; on the contrary: every operation has some effect corresponding to it: therefore if God operates all things by disposing in the Word, since that operation has been from eternity, it appears that He has produced many things from eternity. — Likewise, in a wise operator disposition precedes operation: therefore since God is wise in all His works21, it appears that no operation of His ought to be called disposition.
I respond: It must be said that Alcuin needs here a pious expositor. For he speaks very improperly, when he calls the eternal disposition itself an operation; for he extends the name operation to every production. And since the Father, in generating and producing the Word, has disposed all things in Him, on this account in a broad but improper manner he said that [the Father] from eternity operates by disposing in the Son22.
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- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. I. c. 6.[Hugh of St. Victor,] On the Sacraments, book I, p. I, c. 6.
- Gen. 1, 2.Gen. 1, 2.
- Gen. 1, 1.Gen. 1, 1.
- Gen. 1, 6. seqq.Gen. 1, 6 and following.
- De hac Augustini sententia cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. et 3, nec non supra d. II. c. 1.On this view of Augustine, cf. here the Master's text, c. 1 and 3, as also above [book II,] d. II, c. 1.
- Libr. I. de Sacram. p. I. c. 6. Vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 5. — Mox non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 quae pro qui.[Hugh,] On the Sacraments, book I, p. I, c. 6. See here the Master's text, c. 5. — Just below, not a few codices with edition 1 [read] quae for qui.
- Cfr. supra d. II. lit. Magistri, c. 4.Cf. above [book II,] d. II, the Master's text, c. 4.
- Vide supra d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. ad 2. et ibid. a. 2. q. 1. et 3.See above d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, ad 2; and ibid., a. 2, q. 1 and 3.
- Hic c. 3.[Lombard, Sentences II, d. 12,] here, c. 3.
- Cfr. supra d. 2. p. I. dub. 1. et pag. 96, nota 5.Cf. above d. 2, p. I, dubium 1, and p. 96, note 5.
- Idem dubium solvunt Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 43. m. 2; B. Albert., hic a. 2. et S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 43. seq.; S. Thom. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 1, q. 2. a. 1. et dub. litt. 4. seqq.The same doubt is solved by Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 43, membrum 2; Bl. Albert, here a. 2 and Summa p. II, tract. 11, q. 43 and following; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary; Giles of Rome, here q. 1, a. 1, q. 2, a. 1, and dub. litt. 4 and following.
- Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 1: Etenim quae sunt omnes existimant alicubi esse, quod vero non est nusquam esse.Aristotle, Physics IV, text 1: For all suppose that the things that are exist somewhere, but that what is not is nowhere.
- Cap. 1, 4.[Gen.] c. 1, 4.
- Contrarium autem dicitur Dan. 3, 72: Benedicite lux et tenebrae Domino.But the contrary is said in Dan. 3, 72: Bless the Lord, light and darkness.
- Simili modo loquitur B. Albert., I. Phys. tract. 3. c. 16: Privatio autem, in quantum privatio, de se vel per se non est, eo quod de se habet non-esse; quia tamen dicit non-esse, etiam privatio aptitudinem in subiecto relinquit. — Vat. requirit pro relinquit.In a similar way Bl. Albert speaks, Physics I, tract. 3, c. 16: But privation, insofar as it is privation, is not of itself or per se, in that it has of itself not-being; yet because it signifies not-being, even privation leaves an aptitude in the subject. — The Vatican [edition reads] requirit for relinquit.
- Aliqui codd. cum Vat. omittunt non.Some codices with the Vatican [edition] omit non.
- Cfr. Aristot., de Praedicam. c. de Oppositis et IV. Phys. text. 67. (c. 8.), in cuius expositione Averroes ait: Quoniam dispositio in hoc [motu naturali et violento] est sicut dispositio in habitu et privatione; quoniam habitus est prior privatione in re, quae caret habitu. — Mox cod. ec et ed. 1 privatione lucis pro privationem luminis.Cf. Aristotle, Categories c. On Opposites, and Physics IV, text 67 (c. 8), in whose exposition Averroes says: For the disposition in this [namely natural and violent motion] is as the disposition in habit and privation; because habit is prior to privation in the thing which lacks the habit. — Just below, codex ec and edition 1 [read] privatione lucis for privationem luminis.
- Gen. 1, 5.Gen. 1, 5.
- Gen. 1, 2.Gen. 1, 2.
- De hoc dubio vide Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 45. m. 4; B. Albert., S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 31. m. 2; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.On this doubt see Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II, q. 45, membrum 4; Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tract. 11, q. 31, membrum 2; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantasia, and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary.
- Psalm. 103, 24: Omnia in sapientia fecisti.Ps. 103, 24: Thou hast made all things in wisdom.
- Cfr. I. Sent. d. 6. q. 3. et d. 27. p. II. q. 2; B. Albert., S. p. II. tract. 11. q. 30; S. Thom., Petr. a Tar., Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.Cf. Sentences I, d. 6, q. 3, and d. 27, p. II, q. 2; Bl. Albert, Summa p. II, tract. 11, q. 30; St. Thomas, Peter of Tarantasia, Richard of Mediavilla, here in the literal commentary.