Dist. 17, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 17
Articulus II. De productione hominis quoad corpus.
Consequenter quaeritur de productione primi hominis ex parte corporis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria.
Primo quaeritur, utrum corpus primi hominis produci debuit pure de natura caelesti.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum productum fuerit pure de natura elementari.
Tertio quaeritur, utrum conditum fuerit in complexione aequali, vel inaequali.
Quaestio I. Utrum corpus Adae debuerit produci de natura pure caelesti.
Circa primum sic proceditur et ostenditur, quod corpus Adae produci debuerit pure de natura caelesti, sic.
Ad oppositum.
1. Nobilissimae formae debet dari nobilissima materia1; sed nobilissima inter formas est anima rationalis innocens et absque peccato, qualis fuit anima Adae; sed nobilissima inter naturas corporales est natura caelestis: ergo etc.
2. Item, motoris ad mobile debet esse proportio2; sed anima rationalis est motor incorruptibilis: ergo debuit ei dari corpus impassibile.
3. Item, finis imponit necessitatem his quae sunt ad finem3; sed totus Adam factus est ad perceptionem beatitudinis, locus autem beatitudinis spiritualis est ipse Deus, corporalis est caelum: ergo sicut spiritus Adae non quiescit nisi in Deo, sic debuit ei dari corpus, quod non quiescit nisi in caelo; hoc autem est corpus de natura caelesti: ergo etc.
4. Item, spiritus rationalis, prout absque culpa conditus fuit, maxime erat potens et idoneus ad agendum, perfectus erat cognitionis lumine et4 idoneus ad cognoscendum, liber erat voluntate et rectitudine, et ideo facilis ad tendendum in sui optimum: ergo debuit ei dari corpus, cui maxime competit agere et ad cognitionem disponere, et quod minime habet retardationem; hoc autem est lux et natura caelestis: ergo corpus Adae pure produci debuit de caelesti corpore.
Sed contra:
Fundamenta.
1. «Anima rationalis quodam modo est omnia5.» Si igitur corpus debet proportionari animae, corpus eius debet habere cum omnibus convenientiam; sed hoc non haberet, si esset pure de natura caelesti et non communicaret elementis: ergo etc.
2. Item, anima rationalis, quamvis sit simplex in essentia, tamen est multiplex in effectu6: ergo si corpus ei debet correspondere, necesse est, quod corpus eius habeat varietatem in partium compositione et organizatione; sed hoc non haberet, si esset corpus pure caeleste: ergo etc.
3. Item, vegetabilis et sensibilis disponunt ad rationalem, et magis ad ipsam appropinquant quam natura alicuius corporis, nec alicui corpori unitur rationalis potentia absque vegetabili et sensibili: nullum ergo corpus est habile ad actum vitae rationalis, nisi prius fuerit habile ad actum vitae vegetabilis7; tale autem est corpus cibabile, et huiusmodi non potest esse corpus pure caeleste: ergo etc.
4. Item, corpori simplici debetur unus motus tantum, sive illud corpus sit caeleste, sive elementare8; corpori autem, quod movetur ab anima, debetur motus in omnem differentiam, cum anima sit motor sufficiens: ergo corpus Adae non potuit esse omnino de natura corporis simplicis, ergo nec pure de natura caelesti.
Conclusio. Corpus Adae non fuit formatum nec debuit formari de natura pure caelesti.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod corpus Adae non fuit pure formatum de natura caelesti, sicut innuit textus Genesis9 qui dicit eum formatum de limo terrae. Conclusio 1.
Nec debuit pure de natura caelesti formari, immo de natura elementari, hoc exigente ordinis congruentia, quam in omnibus suis operibus semper servat Sapientia divina. Conclusio 2. Requirebat enim hoc ordo hominis, sive in se, sive ad creaturam inferiorem, sive ad creaturam parem, sive ad Deum finem. Quadruplex ordo.
Ordo hominis in se. Ordo ipsius hominis in se ipso hoc requirebat. Quia enim homo conditus fuit ut natus multa cognoscere, non solum cognitione intellectiva, sed etiam sensitiva; ideo debuit ei dari corpus multiforme, ut diversa organa diversitati sensuum deservirent ad diversa obiecta cognoscenda. Quia etiam10 conditus fuit in vertibilitate liberi arbitrii ut potens vivere in iustitia et mori per culpam; dari debuit etiam corpus, quod non tantum esset habile ad vivendum, sed etiam, quod posset fieri habile ad corrumpendum sive moriendum. Et ita ordo hominis ipsius in se requirebat, ut corpus daretur homini multiforme et ad corruptionem possibile, et ideo non caeleste, sed elementare.
Ad creaturam inferiorem. Ordo etiam hominis ad creaturam inferiorem requirebat. Quia enim corporales naturae inferiores factae sunt, ut deservirent creaturae rationali, sicut supra11 ostensum fuit; factae sunt etiam, ut mediante illa quodam modo perducantur in finem: hinc est, quod debuit fieri rationalis creatura taliter composita, quod obsequium inferiorum creaturarum esset ei utile, et quod, mediante illa creatura, naturae inferiores quodam modo perducerentur ad beatitudinem. Et ideo, ut naturae inferiores possent homini deservire et in homine quodam modo glorificari, debuit homo non tam ex natura superiorum corporum quam ex natura elementorum constitui.
Ad creaturam parem. Ordo etiam ad creaturam parem, id est ad Angelum, hoc requirebat. Sicut enim facta est una rationalis creatura prope Deum et in loco supremo, ut in empyreo; sic debuit fieri alia rationalis creatura in loco infimo, scilicet terra. Et ideo corpus eius constitui debuit ex natura tali habitationi convenienti, et ideo magis ex natura elementari quam caelesti.
Ad Deum finem. Ordo etiam ad finem12 hoc requirebat. Debebat enim homo subiici, ut per humilitatem subiectionis ascenderet unde angelus ceciderat per sublimitatem elationis; et ideo debuit sibi dari corpus constitutum de natura inferiori, ut, se ipsum pulverem reputans, Deo per omnia subiaceret. Unde et Scriptura maluit eum dicere de limo terrae productum, ut ex hoc homo proficeret et ascenderet per humilitatis meritum. — Et ideo concedendae sunt rationes, quae ad hoc sunt inductae.
Solutio oppositorum.
1. Ad illud vero, quod obiicitur in contrarium de nobilitate formae, dicendum, quod nobilitas materiae venit ex ordinatione ad formam. Quoniam igitur corpus magis erat ordinabile ad animam, quod erat constitutum ex varietate naturae, quam corpus, quod esset pure caeleste; hinc est, quod si13 illud sit nobilius in se, tamen in relatione ad formam corpus ex diversis elementis compositum magis est nobile.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod motoris ad mobile debet esse proportio; dicendum, quod quamvis anima sit immortalis morte naturae, quando tamen creata fuit, mori potuit morte culpae. Et quia corpus datum est ei non solum ad vivificandum, sed etiam ad merendum; ideo non solum debuit dari corpus aptum eius immortalitati, sed etiam aptum eius vertibilitati, et ideo non solum necessarium ad perpetuitatem, sed etiam possibile ad mortalitatem.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod homo factus est propter beatitudinis perceptionem; dicendum, quod etsi factus est propter beatitudinem, ita tamen, ut illuc14 perveniret per merita et bona opera, et ita prius esset viator quam comprehensor; et quia prius oportuit eum transire per viam, quam perveniret ad patriam: ideo in primaria sui conditione debuit ei dari corpus conveniens secundum statum viae. Notandum. Et quia locus sibi deputatus ad merendum erat locus inferior, scilicet paradisus terrestris15; inde est, quod competebat, corpus suum de natura terrestri assumi, non principaliter de caelesti. Cum autem assumetur in gloria, tunc corporis eius dispositio erit variata, sicut patet in quarto16, ubi agitur de dotibus corporum glorificatorum.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod anima illa erat potens ad agendum et cognoscendum et tendendum in Deum; dicendum, quod etsi erat potens ad actionem, non tamen ita perfecte potens erat, quin esset possibilis ad defectionem17. Et ideo non sequitur, quod deberet sibi ad haec complenda dari corpus caeleste, quod est incorruptibile, sed magis elementare, quod ex bona dispositione et complexione aequali esset idoneum ad agendum, et nihilominus, si homo peccaret, esset possibile ad patiendum.
I. Tres huius articuli quaestiones in compendium rediguntur doctrinam Alexandri Hal., qui integra quaestione (S. p. II. q. 77.) diffuse disputat de causa materiali corporis humani, et q. 81. m. 1. de compositione eiusdem. Alii auctores adhuc brevius et plerumque una quaestione has tres qq. fere in eadem sententia resolvunt. — Supponuntur autem plura, quae supra d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. 3. de compositione corporum animalium dicta sunt.
II. De his 3 qq. praeter laudatum Alexandrum Hal., Scot., in utroque Scripto II. Sent. d. 15. q. unica, et apud Hier. de Montefortino, t. II. p. 1. q. 91. a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. I. q. 91. a. 1. et a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert., hic a. 3; S. p. II. q. 76. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegid. R., II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. a. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.
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Article II. On the production of the human being with respect to the body.
It is next asked concerning the production of the first human with respect to the body. And concerning this three things are asked.
First it is asked whether the body of the first human ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature.
Second it is asked whether it was produced purely from an elementary nature.
Third it is asked whether it was constituted in an equal complexion, or in an unequal one.
Question I. Whether the body of Adam ought to have been produced from a purely celestial nature.
Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial nature, thus.
To the opposite [view].
1. To the most noble form ought to be given the most noble matter1; but the most noble among forms is the rational soul, innocent and without sin, such as was the soul of Adam; but the most noble among corporeal natures is the celestial nature: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable2; but the rational soul is an incorruptible mover: therefore there ought to be given to it an impassible body.
3. Likewise, the end imposes necessity on those things which are ordered to the end3; but the whole of Adam was made for the reception of beatitude, and the place of spiritual beatitude is God himself, the corporeal [place] is heaven: therefore just as the spirit of Adam does not rest except in God, so there ought to have been given to him a body which does not rest except in heaven; but this is a body of celestial nature: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, the rational spirit, inasmuch as it was constituted without fault, was supremely able and fit for acting, was perfect with the light of cognition, and4 fit for knowing, was free in will and rectitude, and therefore prone to tending toward its own optimum: therefore there ought to have been given to it a body to which it maximally pertains to act and to dispose for cognition, and which has the least retardation; but this is light and the celestial nature: therefore the body of Adam ought to have been produced purely from a celestial body.
On the contrary:
Foundations.
1. «The rational soul is in some manner all things5.» If therefore the body ought to be proportioned to the soul, its body ought to have agreement with all things; but it would not have this, if it were purely of celestial nature and did not communicate with the elements: therefore etc.
2. Likewise, the rational soul, although it is simple in essence, is nevertheless manifold in effect6: therefore if the body ought to correspond to it, it is necessary that its body have variety in the composition and organization of its parts; but it would not have this, if it were a purely celestial body: therefore etc.
3. Likewise, the vegetative and the sensitive [powers] dispose for the rational, and approach more closely to it than the nature of any [particular] body, nor is the rational power united to any body without the vegetative and the sensitive: therefore no body is fit for the act of rational life, unless it is first fit for the act of vegetative life7; but such is a body capable of nourishment, and a body of this kind cannot be a purely celestial body: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, to a simple body there is owed but one motion only, whether that body be celestial or elementary8; but to a body which is moved by the soul there is owed motion in every difference, since the soul is a sufficient mover: therefore the body of Adam could not be wholly of the nature of a simple body, and therefore neither purely of celestial nature.
Conclusion. The body of Adam was not formed nor ought to have been formed from a purely celestial nature.
I respond: It must be said that the body of Adam was not formed purely from a celestial nature, as the text of Genesis9 indicates, which says he was formed from the slime of the earth. Conclusion 1.
Nor ought it to have been formed purely from a celestial nature, but rather from an elementary nature, this being demanded by the congruence of order, which in all his works divine Wisdom always preserves. Conclusion 2. For this was required by the order of the human being, whether in himself, or to the inferior creature, or to the equal creature, or to God as end. Fourfold order.
Order of the human being in himself. The order of the human being in himself required this. For since the human being was constituted as one born to know many things, not only by intellective cognition, but also by sensitive [cognition]; therefore there had to be given to him a multiform body, that diverse organs might serve the diversity of senses for the knowing of diverse objects. And since10 he was constituted in the vertibility of free choice, as able to live in justice and to die through fault; there had to be given also a body which would not only be fit for living, but also one which could be made fit for corrupting or dying. And thus the order of the human being himself in himself required that there be given to him a body multiform and capable of corruption, and therefore not celestial, but elementary.
To the inferior creature. The order of the human being to the inferior creature also required this. For since the inferior corporeal natures were made that they might serve the rational creature, as was shown above11; they were also made so that, by its mediation, they might in some manner be led to their end: hence it is that the rational creature had to be made composed in such a way, that the service of the inferior creatures should be useful to him, and that, by the mediation of that creature, the inferior natures should in some manner be led to beatitude. And therefore, that the inferior natures might be able to serve the human being and in some manner to be glorified in him, the human being had to be constituted not so much from the nature of the superior bodies as from the nature of the elements.
To the equal creature. The order to the equal creature, that is to the Angel, also required this. For just as one rational creature was made near God and in the supreme place, as in the empyrean; so another rational creature had to be made in the lowest place, namely the earth. And therefore his body had to be constituted from a nature suitable to such a habitation, and therefore rather from elementary nature than from celestial.
To God as end. The order to the end12 also required this. For the human being had to be subjected, so that by the humility of subjection he might ascend whence the angel had fallen through the sublimity of pride; and therefore there had to be given to him a body constituted of an inferior nature, so that, accounting himself dust, he might in all things lie subject to God. Whence Scripture also preferred to say him produced from the slime of the earth, that hereby the human being might profit and ascend by the merit of humility. — And therefore the reasons which were adduced for this are to be conceded.
Solution of the opposing arguments.
1. To that, however, which is objected on the contrary concerning the nobility of the form, it must be said that the nobility of matter comes from its ordination to the form. Since therefore the body was more ordainable to the soul, which was constituted from a variety of nature, than a body which would be purely celestial; hence it is that even if13 the latter is nobler in itself, nevertheless in relation to the form a body composed of diverse elements is more noble.
2. To that which is objected, that there ought to be a proportion of mover to movable; it must be said that, although the soul is immortal with the death of nature, yet when it was created, it could die with the death of fault. And since the body was given to it not only for vivifying, but also for meriting; therefore there had not only to be given a body apt for its immortality, but also apt for its vertibility, and therefore not only necessary for perpetuity, but also possible to mortality.
3. To that which is objected, that the human being was made for the reception of beatitude; it must be said that, although he was made for beatitude, yet so that he should arrive there14 through merits and good works, and so that he should first be a wayfarer before a comprehensor; and since it was first fitting for him to pass through the way before he came to the fatherland: therefore in his primary condition there had to be given to him a body suitable according to the state of the way. To be noted. And since the place deputed to him for meriting was the inferior place, namely the terrestrial paradise15; hence it is that it was fitting that his body be assumed from a terrestrial nature, not principally from a celestial one. But when it shall be assumed into glory, then the disposition of his body shall be varied, as is clear in the fourth [book]16, where there is treated the dowries of the glorified bodies.
4. To that which is objected, that that soul was able to act and to know and to tend toward God; it must be said that although it was able for action, yet it was not so perfectly able, that it was not capable of defection17. And therefore it does not follow that there ought to be given to it, for the fulfillment of these things, a celestial body, which is incorruptible, but rather an elementary one, which from a good disposition and an equal complexion would be fit for acting, and nevertheless, if the human being should sin, would be capable of suffering.
I. The three questions of this article reduce in compendium the doctrine of Alexander of Hales, who in a whole question (Summa, p. II. q. 77) diffusely disputes concerning the material cause of the human body, and in q. 81. m. 1. concerning the composition of the same. Other authors, still more briefly and most often in a single question, resolve these three questions almost in the same opinion. — There are presupposed, however, many things which above, in d. 15. a. 1. q. 2. 3., were said concerning the composition of animal bodies.
II. On these three questions, besides the praised Alexander of Hales, [see] Scotus, in either Scriptum on II Sent. d. 15. q. unica, and in Hieronymus of Montefortino, t. II. p. 1. q. 91. a. 1. — S. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 1; Summa I. q. 91. a. 1. and a. 3. ad 1. — B. Albert, here a. 3; Summa p. II. q. 76. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2. a. 1. 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2. q. 1. 2. 3. — Aegidius Romanus, II. Sent. d. 18. q. 1. a. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 4.
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- Cfr. supra pag. 380, nota 1. — Conclusionem arg. codd. Y aa ita supplent: ergo corpus Adae constitui debuit de natura caelesti pure.Cf. above p. 380, note 1. — The conclusion of the argument codices Y aa supply thus: therefore the body of Adam ought to have been constituted purely of celestial nature.
- Vide supra pag. 216, nota 3. et pag. 346, nota 4.See above p. 216, note 3, and p. 346, note 4.
- Secundum Aristot., II. Phys. text. 88. seqq. (c. 9.). — De Deo ut loco spirituali cfr. supra d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. et scholion.According to Aristotle, Physics II, text 88 ff. (c. 9). — On God as spiritual place cf. above d. 2. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. and scholion.
- Cod. W et ideo si, Vat. et ideo.Codex W reads et ideo si, the Vatican edition et ideo.
- Aristot., III. de Anima, text. 37. (c. 8.).Aristotle, On the Soul III, text 37 (c. 8).
- Sive operatione. Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. fundam. 3.Or in operation. Cf. above d. 13. a. 1. q. 2. fundamentum 3.
- Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 31. seq. (c. 3.).Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul II, text 31 ff. (c. 3).
- Aristot., I. de Caelo et mundo, text. 7. (c. 2.).Aristotle, On the Heavens I, text 7 (c. 2).
- Cap. 2, 7. — Paulo inferius plures codd. quem in omnibus pro quam in omnibus.Chap. 2, 7. — A little below, several codices read quem in omnibus in place of quam in omnibus.
- Ita codd. F l aa; alii cum edd. 1, 2 enim, Vat. vero.So codices F l aa; others, with editions 1, 2, read enim; the Vatican edition [reads] vero.
- Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1. et infra pag. 421, nota 4.Dist. 15. a. 2. q. 1., and below p. 421, note 4.
- Vat. Deum finem; codd. F l autem post subiici addunt Deo.The Vatican edition reads Deum finem; codices F l add Deo after subiici.
- Vat. etsi.The Vatican edition reads etsi.
- In multis codd. et ed. 1 desideratur illuc.In many codices and in edition 1, illuc is wanting.
- Gen. 2, 8.Gen. 2, 8.
- Dist. 49. p. II. art. princ. 1. a. 2. q. 1. seqq.Dist. 49. p. II. principal art. 1. a. 2. q. 1. ff.
- Unus alterque cod. cum Vat. defectum.One or another codex, with the Vatican edition, reads defectum. ---