Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2
Articulus II. De mensura angelicae naturae in comparatione ad mensuram rei corporalis.
Consequenter quaeritur de mensura substantiae spiritualis in comparatione ad mensuram rei corporalis. De qua tria quaeruntur.
Primum est, utrum aevum praecedat tempus aliquo prioritatis genere.
Secundum, utrum inter aevum et tempus cadat mensura mediae naturae.
Tertio, utrum res spirituales et corporales, sive aeviternae et temporales fuerint simul productae.
Quaestio I. Utrum aevum praecedat aliquo modo tempus.
Circa primum sic. Quod aevum sit prius tempore, ostenditur:
1. Per illud Boethii de Consolatione1 loquentis ad Deum:
Qui tempus ab aevo Ire iubes;
sed tempus ire ab aevo non potest intelligi nisi vel ratione causalitatis, vel durationis, vel excellentiae, quia deficit ab aevo: ergo videtur omnino intelligendum, quod aevum sit tempore prius.
2. Item, omnis motus et mutatio ad immobile reducitur tanquam ad prius2: ergo et mensura mobilis ad mensuram rei immobilis: ergo et tempus ad aevum tanquam ad prius. Prima consequentia manifeste est vera, quia omne fluxibile ad stans tanquam ad prius reducitur. Et secunda consequentia tenet secundum rationem proportionis, quia, sicut se habet mensuratum ad mensuratum, sic mensura ad mensuram: ergo etc.
3. Item, a priori et posteriori in magnitudine causatur prius et posterius in motu, et a priori et posteriori in motu causatur prius et posterius in tempore3: ergo per naturam prior est magnitudo et magnitudinis esse, quam sit esse temporis; et substantiae primi corporis mensuratur aevo, motus vero tempore: ergo aevum prius est tempore.
4. Item, aevum fuit a principio creaturae, scilicet et Angeli; sed tempus coepit cum motu primi mobilis, qui incepit, ut dicitur, die quarto, vel saltem ante secundum diem non potuit incipere4: ergo aevum duratione praecedit tempus.
Contra:
1. Beda5 dicit, quod quatuor fuerunt primo creata, et inter illa enumerat tempus; aevum autem non enumeratur inter primo creata; et est creatum: ergo posterius.
2. Item, Richardus de sancto Victore6 dicit et accipit ab Augustino, quod omne quod coepit, coepit ex tempore; sed aevum coepit: ergo coepit ex tempore. Sed quod incipit ex tempore non antecedit tempus, sed potius consequitur vel concomitatur: ergo aevum non potest esse ante tempus.
3. Item, tempus est mensura mutationis; sed aevum est mensura stabilis et fixi: ergo cum ante esse creatum praecedat ipsa creatio, quae est mutatio, ergo tempus est ante aevum.
4. Item, prius est7 quod imperfectum est, deinde quod perfectum; sed tempus est mensura secundum esse imperfectum, quod est esse in potentia, aevum vero secundum esse actuale et completum: ergo tempus per naturam est ante aevum. — Quaeritur igitur de ordine temporis ad aevum, et e converso.
Conclusio
Distincto quadruplici sensu termini tempus, asseritur, quod in tertio sensu aevum et tempus sunt simul duratione, sed aevum est prius dignitate; in quarto sensu aevum praecedit tempus et duratione et dignitate.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod tempus accipi consuevit quadrupliciter in scripturis Sanctorum, scilicet communissime, communiter, proprie et magis proprie. Communissime tempus dicit mensuram cuiuslibet durationis creatae; per quem modum accipitur a Beda, cum dicit, quod quatuor fuerunt primo creata, inter quae enumerat tempus. — Communiter; sic dicit mensuram mutationis cuiuscumque, sive illius quae est de non-esse in esse, sive alterius quae est de uno esse in aliud esse; et sic
accipitur illud quod dicit Richardus, quod omne quod coepit, ex tempore coepit; et habetur in Glossa, in principio Genesis8: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, scilicet temporis. — Tertio modo accipitur proprie; et sic dicit mensuram variationis successivae, sive sit successiva successione regulari et continua, sive non; et sic dicit Augustinus ad Orosium9: «Affectiones variae Angelorum mensurantur tempore et omnis variatio rerum». — Quarto modo accipitur magis proprie; et sic dicitur mensura motus sive variationis successivae et continuae et regulatae secundum regulam motus octavae sphaerae; et sic consuevit accipi a Philosopho10: sed ista est coarctata temporis acceptio.
Cum igitur quaeritur de ordine, dicendum, quod si tempus accipiatur primo modo, sic includit aevum; et sic temporis ad aevum nullus est ordo; si autem secundo modo, sic tempus praecedit aevum secundum rationem intelligendi, sicut creatio esse creatum. Si autem tertio modo, aevum et tempus simul sunt duratione, sed aevum prius est dignitate. Si autem quarto modo, sic aevum praecedit tempus et duratione et dignitate. — Ex his patet quaestio principalis, et obiectiones adductae pro magna parte.
Quod enim ostenditur, quod aevum praecedit tempus; intelligitur vel tertio modo, et ita praecedit dignitate; vel quarto modo, et ita duratione.
1. Quod tamen ostenditur, quod praecedat causalitate; dicendum, quod illud non oportet; neutra harum mensurarum est ab alia11, sed a Deo producente utrumque indivisibile, scilicet nunc aevi et nunc temporis. Unde quod dicitur, quod tempus exit ab aevo, hoc dicitur, quia deficit ab illo et defluit continua deperditione; sed in aevo est fixio sine deperditione et novi acquisitione.
2. Quod obiicitur de reductione ad immobile, dicendum, quod verum est ex parte motoris, et illum non oportet esse creatum, et similiter nec mensuram oportet esse creatam: et ideo non oportet, tempus reduci ad aevum sicut ad prius.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de priori et posteriori magnitudinis et motus et temporis, dicendum, quod non causatur a priori et posteriori in magnitudine prius et posterius in motu vel tempore, nisi secundum quod magnitudo illa est mobilis; et sic habet mensurari per nunc temporis, non aevi; nam sicut tempus mensurat motum, sic nunc temporis mensurat ipsum mobile in quantum mobile.
4. Quod ultimo obiicitur, patet, quod12 procedit de quarta acceptione temporis.
Rationes vero ad oppositum procedunt de tempore secundum primam acceptionem vel secundam, ut patet aspicienti, excepta ultima, quae accipitur a comparatione imperfecti ad perfectum. Ad quam respondendum: quod imperfectum praecedit perfectum, verum est, ubi13 sunt circa idem; sed circa diversa est e converso. Et ideo potius potest argui oppositum quam propositum per illud medium.
I. Quadruplex temporis distinctio sumta est ex Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 1. § 1, et fere eisdem verbis repetitur a Petr. a Tar. (hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2, et quando agit de hac ipsa quaest. ibid. a. 3.). Differentia inter tempus 3. et 4. modo sumtum a Richard. a Med. (hic a. 2. q. 2.) ita explicatur: «Tempus dupliciter potest accipi, scil. communiter pro quacumque mensura esse existentis in variatione [sive sit successionis continuae, sive non], et proprie, scil. secundum quod est continuatio motus ab anima numerata, qua, mediante motu, cuius est passio, mensurat anima durationes motuum aliorum» etc. (cfr. Schol. ad a. 1. q. 1.). Dionys. Carth. (hic q. 2.) de hac quaest. refert tantum verba Petri a Tar.
---
Article II. On the measure of the angelic nature in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing.
Consequently it is asked about the measure of a spiritual substance in comparison with the measure of a corporeal thing. Concerning which three things are asked.
The first is, whether the age precedes time by any genus of priority.
The second, whether between the age and time there falls a measure of a middle nature.
The third, whether spiritual and corporeal things, that is, aeviternal and temporal, were produced simultaneously.
Question I. Whether the age in any way precedes time.
Concerning the first, thus. That the age is prior to time is shown:
1. Through that [verse] of Boethius, On Consolation1, speaking to God:
You who bid time go forth from the age;
but time's going forth from the age cannot be understood except either by reason of causality, or of duration, or of excellence, because it falls short of the age: therefore it seems altogether to be understood that the age is prior to time.
2. Likewise, every motion and change is reduced to the immobile as to something prior2: therefore also the measure of the movable to the measure of the immobile thing: therefore also time to the age as to something prior. The first consequence is manifestly true, because everything flowing is reduced to the standing as to something prior. And the second consequence holds by the account of proportion, because, as the measured stands to the measured, so the measure to the measure: therefore, etc.
3. Likewise, from before and after in magnitude is caused before and after in motion, and from before and after in motion is caused before and after in time3: therefore by nature magnitude and the being of magnitude is prior to the being of time; and the substance of the first body is measured by the age, but its motion by time: therefore the age is prior to time.
4. Likewise, the age was from the beginning of the creature, namely also of the Angel; but time began with the motion of the first movable, which began, as is said, on the fourth day, or at least could not begin before the second day4: therefore the age precedes time in duration.
On the contrary:
1. Bede5 says that four things were created first, and among them he enumerates time; but the age is not enumerated among the things created first; and it is created: therefore [it is] later.
2. Likewise, Richard of Saint Victor6 says, and takes it from Augustine, that everything that began, began from time; but the age began: therefore it began from time. But what begins from time does not antecede time, but rather follows or accompanies [it]: therefore the age cannot be before time.
3. Likewise, time is the measure of change; but the age is the measure of the stable and fixed: therefore, since before created being there precedes creation itself, which is a change, therefore time is before the age.
4. Likewise, that which is imperfect is prior7, then that which is perfect; but time is a measure according to imperfect being, which is being in potency, but the age according to actual and complete being: therefore time is by nature before the age. — It is asked, therefore, about the order of time to the age, and conversely.
Conclusio
The fourfold sense of the term time being distinguished, it is asserted that in the third sense the age and time are simultaneous in duration, but the age is prior in dignity; in the fourth sense the age precedes time both in duration and in dignity.
I respond: It must be said that time has been customarily taken in four ways in the writings of the Saints, namely most commonly, commonly, properly, and more properly. Most commonly time states the measure of any created duration; in which mode it is taken by Bede, when he says that four things were created first, among which he enumerates time. — Commonly; thus it states the measure of any change whatever, whether of that which is from non-being into being, or of another which is from one being into another being; and thus
is taken that which Richard says, that everything that began, began from time; and it is had in the Gloss, at the beginning of Genesis8: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, namely [in the beginning] of time. — In the third mode it is taken properly; and thus it states the measure of a successive variation, whether it be successive by a regular and continuous succession or not; and thus Augustine says, to Orosius9: «The varied affections of the Angels are measured by time, and every variation of things». — In the fourth mode it is taken more properly; and thus it is called the measure of motion or of a successive and continuous variation regulated according to the rule of the motion of the eighth sphere; and thus it has been customarily taken by the Philosopher10: but this is the restricted acceptation of time.
When, therefore, it is asked about the order, it must be said that if time is taken in the first mode, then it includes the age; and so there is no order of time to the age; but if in the second mode, then time precedes the age according to the manner of understanding, as creation [precedes] created being. But if in the third mode, the age and time are simultaneous in duration, but the age is prior in dignity. But if in the fourth mode, then the age precedes time both in duration and in dignity. — From these things the principal question is plain, and the objections adduced for the most part.
For what is shown, that the age precedes time, is understood either in the third mode, and so it precedes in dignity; or in the fourth mode, and so in duration.
1. As to what is nevertheless shown, that it precedes by causality; it must be said that this is not necessary; neither of these measures is from the other11, but from God producing each indivisible, namely the now of the age and the now of time. Whence what is said, that time goes forth from the age, is said because it falls short of it and flows away by continual loss; but in the age there is a fixity without loss and without acquisition of anything new.
2. As to what is objected about reduction to the immobile, it must be said that it is true on the side of the mover, and that [mover] need not be created, and likewise neither need the measure be created: and therefore it is not necessary that time be reduced to the age as to something prior.
3. As to that which is objected about the before and after of magnitude and of motion and of time, it must be said that before and after in motion or time is not caused from before and after in magnitude, except insofar as that magnitude is movable; and so it has to be measured by the now of time, not of the age; for as time measures motion, so the now of time measures the movable itself insofar as it is movable.
4. As to what is objected last, it is plain that it12 proceeds from the fourth acceptation of time.
But the reasons to the contrary proceed concerning time according to the first acceptation or the second, as is plain to one looking, except the last, which is taken from the comparison of the imperfect to the perfect. To which it must be responded: that the imperfect precedes the perfect is true where13 they are about the same thing; but about diverse things it is the reverse. And therefore the opposite can rather be argued than the proposition by that middle term.
I. The fourfold distinction of time is taken from Alexander of Hales, S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 1, § 1, and is repeated in nearly the same words by Peter of Tarentaise (here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2, and where he treats this very question, ibid. a. 3). The difference between time taken in the 3rd and 4th mode is explained thus by Richard of Middleton (here a. 2, q. 2): «Time can be taken in two ways, namely commonly, for any measure of the being of what exists in variation [whether it be of continuous succession or not], and properly, namely according as it is the continuation of motion numbered by the soul, by which, through the mediation of motion, of which it is a property, the soul measures the durations of other motions» etc. (cf. the Scholion on a. 1, q. 1). Dionysius the Carthusian (here q. 2) of this question reports only the words of Peter of Tarentaise.
---
- 1Libr. III. Metro 9.Book III, metre 9.
- 2Cfr. tom. I. pag. 78, nota 2. et pag. 157, nota 11.Cf. vol. I, p. 78, note 2, and p. 157, note 11.
- 3Vide supra pag. 61, nota 4.See above, p. 61, note 4.
- 4Ita cod. aa, cuius lectio firmatur plurimis aliis codd. qui habent tantummodo potuit; Vat. et ed. 1 incepit. Cod. Q post vel saltem interserit in die secundo, quia.Thus codex aa, whose reading is confirmed by very many other codices which have only could; the Vatican edition and ed. 1 [read] began. Codex Q after or at least inserts on the second day, because.
- 5Cfr. supra pag. 55, nota 8.Cf. above, p. 55, note 8.
- 6Libr. I. de Trin. c. 6: Omne quod est vel esse potest, aut ab aeterno habet esse aut esse coepit ex tempore. Ibid. libr. II. c. 9: Omne itaque creatum ex tempore esse coepit. — Quod spectat ad Augustinum cfr. de Gen. ad lit. imperf. libr. c. 3. n. 7. seq.; V. de Gen. ad lit. c. 5. n. 12, c. 19. n. 38; I. de Gen. contra Manich. c. 2. n. 3. seq.; XI. de Civ. Dei, c. 6.Book I, On the Trinity, c. 6: Everything that is or can be either has being from eternity or began to be from time. Ibid., book II, c. 9: And so everything created began to be from time. — As regards Augustine, cf. On Genesis to the Letter, Unfinished Book, c. 3, n. 7 f.; V On Genesis to the Letter, c. 5, n. 12, c. 19, n. 38; I On Genesis against the Manichaeans, c. 2, n. 3 f.; XI On the City of God, c. 6.
- 7In cod. aa prius est secundum naturam.In codex aa, that which is imperfect is prior by nature.
- 8Cap. 1, 1. — Glossa interlinearis: In principio temporis vel ante cetera, vel in Filio suo.Chapter 1, [verse] 1. — Interlinear Gloss: In the beginning of time, or before [all] the rest, or in His Son.
- 9Quaest. 41. et 42, sententialiter. Cfr. supra a. 1. q. 1. argum. 1. ad opp.Questions 41 and 42, in substance. Cf. above, a. 1, q. 1, argument 1 to the contrary.
- 10Libr. IV. Phys. text. 133. (c. 14.). — Paulo superius cod. T secundum regulationem pro secundum regulam.Physics IV, text 133 (c. 14). — A little above, codex T [reads] according to the regulation for according to the rule.
- 11Cod. cc et ed. 1 perperam ab anima, qui et paulo inferius cum pluribus aliis mss. pro quod tempus exit ponit quod tempus it, quod verbis Boethii respondet.Codex cc and ed. 1 wrongly [read] from the soul; the same, a little below, with several other manuscripts, for that time goes forth puts that time goes, which corresponds to the words of Boethius.
- 12Codd. aa bb quia.Codices aa bb [read] because (quia).
- 13Cod. cc et ed. 1 ut.Codex cc and ed. 1 [read] as (ut). ---