Dist. 2, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2
Quaestio II. Utrum inter tempus et aevum sit aliqua mensura media.
Secundo quaeritur, utrum inter tempus et aevum sit aliqua mensura media. Et quod non, videtur:
1. Primo per Philosophum, qui dividit substantias mensuratas in libro de Causis1 sic, quod «inter substantiam, cuius substantia et actio est in momento aeternitatis, et substantiam, cuius substantia et actio est in momento temporis, est substantia media, cuius substantia est in momento aeternitatis, et actio in momento temporis». Si ergo omnis substantia creata ad aliquam istarum habet reduci; et ad has mensurandas sufficiunt tempus et aevum: ergo etc.
2. Item, hoc ipsum videtur per Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus2: «Aevi proprietas est sine alteratione et secundum totum metiri; temporis vero quod in alteratione aliter et aliter se habens; media vero entium, quae illinc quidem aevo, illinc tempore participant». Ergo omnia quae sunt, totaliter aevo, vel totaliter tempore, vel partim aevo et partim tempore mensurantur: ergo non est tertia mensura alia ab his.
3. Item, omne creatum aut est stabile et incorruptibile, aut variabile et corruptibile; sed primum mensuratur aevo, et secundum tempore: ergo nihil est medium inter aevum et tempus.
4. Item, esse omnis creati aut est terminabile aut interminabile. Si est terminabile, sic mensuratur tempore, quod est principium corruptionis, quia facit distare quod est3. Si vero interminabile, sic aevo: ergo non videtur, quod sit aliquod tertium mensurans praeter haec duo.
Contra:
1. Ante quartum diem non erat tempus, quia dicitur in factione luminarium: Erunt in signa et tempora et dies et annos4; et constat, quod non solum erat aevum, cum essent aliqua corporalia, ut herbae et arbusta: ergo erat alia mensura: ergo etc.
2. Item, post diem iudicii non erit tempus, secundum quod iurat Angelus in Apocalypsi5; tamen erit successio et variatio in tormentis, quae non poterit aevo mensurari: ergo necesse est mensuram tertiam ab his ponere.
3. Item, in affectionibus Angelorum est intensio et variatio, et ipsi sunt supra tempus, sicut dicitur in libro de Causis6: ergo mensura illa affectionum est supra tempus; sed non potest esse aevum, cum in aevo non cadat variatio: ergo oportet, quod sit alia mensura.
4. Item, Angelus cum convertitur ad Deum, elevatur supra tempus: ergo illa conversio, et illud quod in illa conversione accipit7, supra tempus est; et mensura supra tempus debet mensurari; sed Angelus ibi aliquid cognoscit quod potest desinere cogitare: saltem ergo illud non potest mensurari aevo, quod est mensura rei interminabilis, nec tempore: ergo etc.
Conclusio
Si tempus accipitur proprie, tunc inter aevum et tempus non est medium re, sed solum ratione differens; si autem magis proprie, tunc est media mensura differens, ab antiquis vocata saeculum.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod secundum quod tempus dividitur contra aevum, in duabus scilicet acceptionibus ultimis prius positis8, dupliciter potest accipi, aut scilicet prout dicit mensuram cuiuslibet durationis variae sive variationis successive; et sic inter aevum et tempus non est medium re, sed solum ratione; non, inquam, est medium differens ab utroque in genere mensurae, sed medium in genere mensuratorum, participans utrumque, ut est illa substantia, quae est in confinio aeternitatis et temporis. — Et sic procedunt omnes rationes ad primam partem, ut patet aspicienti de facili.
Aliter vero accipitur tempus prout est mensura variationis, in qua est successio habens continuationem et regulationem a motu orbis primi; et haec mensura habet finem et desinet esse. Et inter hanc et aevum est ponere mediam mensuram, in qua est variatio, nec oportet quod sit desitio, vel primi motus regulatio; cuiusmodi fuit in triduo conditionis rerum, et qualis erit in inferno post diem extremum. Et haec ab antiquis doctoribus appellata est saeculum9. — Et hoc concludunt rationes ad oppositum; et sic patet totum.
I. Orta est haec quaestio ex difficultatibus, quae in argg. pro parte affirmativa recensentur, scil. quod ante motum firmamenti et post iudicium non sit tempus, et tamen aliqua duratio successiva; quae etiam in Angelis est quoad affectiones, licet ipsi quoad substantiam sint supra tempus. — Solutio supponit distinctionem in praeced. quaest. factam circa tempus in 3. et in 4. sensu acceptum. Si tempus sumitur in sensu ultimo, ita ut importet mensuram regulatam a motu primi mobilis, tunc, deficiente hoc motu, actualis variatio et mutatio indiget alia mensura, differente et ab aevo et a tempore in dicto sensu sumto, quae quasi medium obtinet inter utrumque. De hac nonnullorum sententia, confirmata auctoritate Haymonis, plura dicit Alex. Hal. (S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 4. § 2.), quem sequuntur S. Bonav., Petr. a Tar. et Richard. a Med. — Alii sine ista distinctione simpliciter negant, esse mediam illam mensuram.
II. Specialis difficultas est de mensura affectionum et actuum intellectualium in Angelis. S. Thom., S. I. q. 10. a. 5. ad 1, de mente plurimorum dicit, quod «Angeli quantum ad affectiones et intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore... quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale mensurantur aevo; sed quantum ad visionem gloriae participant aeternitatem». Sed Scoto (hic q. 4; Report. hic q. 1; de Rerum princ. q. 1. a. 2.) non placet nec prima nec ultima positio; ipse enim nititur probare, omnes Angelorum operationes, quae sunt superiores, etiam liberae et beatificae, mensurari aevo, et tantum transeuntes tempore.
III. Praeter laudatos: B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 5. q. 23. m. 2. a. 1. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic a. 5. dub. later. in fine. — Henr. Gand., Quodl. 12. q. 8. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.
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Question II. Whether between time and the age there is any middle measure.
Secondly it is asked whether between time and the age there is any middle measure. And that there is not seems true:
1. First, through the Philosopher, who divides measured substances, in the book de Causis1, thus, that «between a substance whose substance and action is in the moment of eternity, and a substance whose substance and action is in the moment of time, there is a middle substance, whose substance is in the moment of eternity, and whose action [is] in the moment of time». If, then, every created substance has to be reduced to one of these; and to measure these, time and the age suffice: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, this same thing seems so through Dionysius, On the Divine Names2: «It is the property of the age to be measured without alteration and according to the whole; but of time, that which holds itself otherwise and otherwise in alteration; but the middle of beings, which partake on the one side of the age, on the other of time». Therefore all things that are, are measured either wholly by the age, or wholly by time, or partly by the age and partly by time: therefore there is no third measure other than these.
3. Likewise, every created thing is either stable and incorruptible, or variable and corruptible; but the first is measured by the age, and the second by time: therefore there is nothing middle between the age and time.
4. Likewise, the being of every created thing is either terminable or interminable. If it is terminable, then it is measured by time, which is the principle of corruption, because it makes apart that which is3. But if interminable, then by the age: therefore it does not seem that there is any third [thing] measuring besides these two.
On the contrary:
1. Before the fourth day there was no time, because it is said, at the making of the luminaries: Let them be for signs and for times and for days and years4; and it is evident that there was not only the age, since there were some corporeal things, like herbs and shrubs: therefore there was another measure: therefore, etc.
2. Likewise, after the day of judgment there will be no time, according to what the Angel swears in the Apocalypse5; yet there will be succession and variation in the torments, which cannot be measured by the age: therefore it is necessary to posit a third measure besides these.
3. Likewise, in the affections of the Angels there is intensity and variation, and they themselves are above time, as is said in the book de Causis6: therefore that measure of the affections is above time; but it cannot be the age, since in the age no variation falls: therefore it is necessary that there be another measure.
4. Likewise, an Angel, when it is converted to God, is elevated above time: therefore that conversion, and that which it receives in that conversion7, is above time; and a thing above time must be measured [by something above time]; but the Angel there knows something which it can cease to think: therefore at least that cannot be measured by the age, which is the measure of an interminable thing, nor by time: therefore, etc.
Conclusio
If time is taken properly, then between the age and time there is nothing middle in reality, but [something] differing only in reason; but if [taken] more properly, then there is a middle measure differing [from both], called by the ancients the saeculum.
I respond: It must be said that, according as time is divided over against the age, namely in the two last acceptations posited before8, it can be taken in two ways: either, that is, insofar as it states the measure of any varied duration or of successive variation; and thus between the age and time there is nothing middle in reality, but only in reason; not, I say, is there something middle differing from both in the genus of measure, but [something] middle in the genus of the measured, partaking of both, as is that substance which is in the confine of eternity and of time. — And thus all the reasons proceed to the first part, as is easily plain to one looking.
But in another way time is taken insofar as it is the measure of variation, in which there is succession having continuation and regulation from the motion of the first orb; and this measure has an end and will cease to be. And between this and the age one must posit a middle measure, in which there is variation, [but] it need not be [that there is] cessation, or regulation of the first motion; of which kind there was in the three days of the founding of things, and such as there will be in hell after the last day. And this has been called by the ancient doctors the saeculum9. — And this the reasons to the contrary conclude; and thus the whole is plain.
I. This question arose from the difficulties which are reviewed in the arguments for the affirmative part, namely that before the motion of the firmament and after the judgment there is no time, and yet [there is] some successive duration; which also is in the Angels as regards their affections, although they themselves as regards their substance are above time. — The solution presupposes the distinction made in the preceding question concerning time taken in the 3rd and in the 4th sense. If time is taken in the last sense, so that it implies a measure regulated by the motion of the first movable, then, this motion failing, actual variation and change needs another measure, differing both from the age and from time taken in the said sense, which holds as it were a middle between both. Of this opinion of several [authors], confirmed by the authority of Haymo, Alexander of Hales says more (S. p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 4, § 2), whom St. Bonaventure, Peter of Tarentaise, and Richard of Middleton follow. — Others, without this distinction, simply deny that there is that middle measure.
II. A special difficulty concerns the measure of the affections and intellectual acts in the Angels. St. Thomas, S. I, q. 10, a. 5, ad 1, on the mind of most says that «the Angels, as regards their affections and intellections, in which there is succession, are measured by time... but as regards their natural being are measured by the age; but as regards the vision of glory they partake of eternity». But it does not please Scotus (here q. 4; Reportatio here q. 1; On the Principle of Things q. 1, a. 2), neither the first nor the last position; for he strives to prove that all the operations of the Angels, which are higher, even the free and beatific ones, are measured by the age, and only as passing by time.
III. Besides those praised: Bl. Albert, S. p. I, tr. 5, q. 23, m. 2, a. 1. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Middleton, here a. 2, q. 1. — Giles of Rome, here a. 5, dub. later. at the end. — Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 12, q. 8. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 2.
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- 1Prop. 31. — In hoc verbo plures codd. ut A V Z his pro substantiam substituunt rem, et dein pro est substantia media ponunt est res media, quod textui originali concordat.Proposition 31. — At this word several codices, as A V Z, for substance substitute thing, and then for is a middle substance put is a middle thing, which agrees with the original text.
- 2Cap. 10. § 3: Proprietas aeterni [versio in oper. S. Thomae: aevi] est antiquum et immutabile et universale esse ... [versio ibid.: et totum secundum totum metiri]. Tempus autem vocant in generatione et corruptione et mutabilibus ... et aliud aliter habens ... media vero existentium et factorum quaecumque, alibi quidem aeternum, alibi vero tempus participant.Chapter 10, § 3: The property of the eternal [the reading in the works of St. Thomas: of the age] is to be ancient and immutable and universal being ... [the reading ibid.: and to be measured as a whole according to the whole]. Time, however, they speak of in generation and corruption and in changeable things ... and [that which] holds itself otherwise [at one time] and otherwise [at another] ... but the middle of existing and made things, whatsoever they be, partake on the one side of the eternal, on the other of time.
- 3Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 117. (c. 12.): Corruptionis enim causa per se tempus est; numerus enim ipsius motus est ... tus autem distare facit quod est [recentior versio: expellit quod inest]. Cfr. ibid. text. 128. (c. 13.).Aristotle, Physics IV, text 117 (c. 12): For time is per se the cause of corruption; for it is the number of motion itself ... but it makes apart that which is [a more recent version: expels that which is within]. Cf. ibid., text 128 (c. 13).
- 4Gen. 1, 14: Et sint in signa etc.Gen. 1:14: And let them be for signs etc.
- 5Cap. 10, 6: Et tempus non erit amplius.Chapter 10:6: And there shall be time no longer.
- 6Prop. 29: Omnis substantia simplex est stans per se ipsam, scilicet per essentiam suam: quod est, quia creata sine tempore, et est in substantialitate sua superior substantiis temporalibus. Et in prop. 30, substantiae sempiternae dicuntur quod sunt supra tempus. — In fine argumenti Vat. quod sit in alia mensura pro quod sit alia mensura.Proposition 29: Every simple substance is standing through itself, namely through its own essence: which is so, because it is created without time, and is in its substantiality superior to temporal substances. And in prop. 30, the sempiternal substances are said to be above time. — At the end of the argument the Vatican edition [reads] that it be in another measure for that there be another measure.
- 7Supple: Angelus. Vat. cum paucis codd. accipitur. Paulo inferius ed. 1 cum pluribus mss., variata interpunctione, potest desinere cogitare saltem: ergo.Supply: the Angel. The Vatican edition, with a few codices, [reads] is received. A little below, ed. 1, with several manuscripts, with the punctuation varied, [reads] it can cease to think at least: therefore.
- 8In corp. quaest. praeced.In the body of the preceding question.
- 9Damasc., II. de Fide orthod. c. 1. inter varias saeculi acceptiones hanc affert: «Quin saeculum quoque dicitur non tempus nec temporis pars ulla solis motu ac cursu definita sive ex dierum noctiumque serie conflata, sed ille velut temporalis motus ac spatium, quod una cum iis quae aeterna sunt, protenditur. Quod enim iis quae tempori subsunt, tempus est, hoc perpetuis est saeculum». Et Haymo, in expos. Epist. ad Titum, 1, 2: Saecularia dicuntur a saeculo, quod in se resolvantur (revolvantur?), Varrone teste. Saecula autem computantur ex eo, quo materies informis per species discreta est, et ex quo Deus dixit: Fiat lux, et facta est lux (Gen. 1, 3.); ex eo enim coepit varietas temporis et vicissitudo horarum pariterque dierum in semet resolvi (revolvi?); antea vero, ut doctores dicunt, non erat tempus, sed aevum, quod solummodo esse habebat.Damascene, II On the Orthodox Faith, c. 1, among the various acceptations of saeculum brings forward this one: «Indeed the saeculum is also said [to be] not time nor any part of time defined by the motion and course of the sun or composed of the series of days and nights, but that, as it were, temporal motion and span which extends together with the things that are eternal. For what to the things subject to time is time, this to perpetual things is the saeculum». And Haymo, in his exposition of the Epistle to Titus, 1, 2: Secular things are so called from saeculum, because they are resolved (revolved?) into themselves, on the testimony of Varro. The saecula are reckoned from that point at which formless matter was distinguished into [its] species, and from which God said: Let there be light, and there was light (Gen. 1:3); for from that point began the variety of time and the vicissitude of hours and likewise of days to be resolved (revolved?) into itself; but before, as the doctors say, there was no time, but the age, which had only being. ---