Dist. 2, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 2

Textus Latinus

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Quaestio III. Utrum Angelus sit in loco impartibili sive punctali.

Tertio quaeritur de modo essendi Angelum in loco. Et quaeritur, utrum sit in loco impartibili sive punctali. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Damascenus¹ dicit, «quod Angelus est in loco, non figuraliter, sed intelligibiliter»: cum ergo nihil ipsius loci sit infigurabile et intelligibile nisi punctus, est in puncto.

2. Item, proportio debet esse locati ad locum; sed Angelus est simplex et impartibilis: ergo ei debetur locus simplex et impartibilis². Sed hic est solus punctus loci: ergo etc.

3. Item, ponamus, Angelum esse in loco, in quo minori non potest esse, quaero: aut ille locus est partibilis, aut impartibilis. Si partibilis: ergo cum Angelus sit simplex, ergo adhuc potest esse in minori. Quod si non potest esse in minori, videtur, quod ille³ sit impartibilis; sed nihil est impartibile in loco nisi punctus: ergo etc.

4. Item, «quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur ibi per modum recipientis, non⁴ per modum recepti»: si ergo Angelus est in loco partibili, est partibiliter. Sed impossibile est, Angelum recipere partitionem: ergo etc.

5. Item, si Angelus est in loco partibili tan-

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quam in loco primo, aut ergo est totus in qualibet parte, aut est ita in toto, quod pars est in parte. Si totus est in toto, ita quod pars in parte, ergo est partibilis; si ita quod in qualibet parte totus, cum ergo partes loci sint multae, erit⁵ in pluribus locis. Si tu dicas, quod est in omnibus illis tanquam in loco uno, sicut anima est in omnibus partibus corporis; contra: esto quod corpus illud dividatur et locus, in quo est Angelus⁶; constat, quod nihilominus potest esse in omnibus partibus, cum non pendeat in aliqua parte principaliter. Et si hoc, cum sit ibi locorum multitudo, erit Angelus in pluribus locis.

Contra:

1. Punctus nec est locus, nec pars loci⁷: ergo quod est in puncto vel in loco punctali non est in loco.

2. Item, «punctus, ut dicit Philosophus⁸, est substantia posita», id est essentia habens positionem, in quo differt ab unitate: ergo si Angelus est in puncto secundum proportionem puncto convenientem, ergo Angelus habet positionem. Sed forma, habens positionem in materia, non est motor sufficiens eius in quo est: ergo etc.

3. Item, si Angelus est in puncto, primo ergo influit virtutem supra punctum: ergo cum punctus sit improportionalis corpori, impossibile est, quod virtus eius se extendat ad corpus; et ita nunquam movebit corpus.

4. Item, anima est in toto corpore; sed hoc non facit unio, quia ex hoc ipso habet dependentiam, et ita arctationem: ergo hoc est ratione simplicitatis⁹. Cum ergo Angelus sit aeque simplex, vel magis quam anima, videtur, quod multo fortius in maiori loco vel aequali totus possit esse.

Conclusio

Angelus definitive est in loco divisibili, ita tamen, ut non sit locus ita parvus, quin Angelus adhuc possit esse in minori.

Respondeo: Triplex fuit circa hoc positio.

Fuerunt enim quidam dicentes, quod Angelus, quamvis sit in loco corporali, non tamen est in eo corporaliter, sed spiritualiter. Quoniam vero non est in loco situaliter, ideo nec secundum totum, nec secundum partem, nec secundum impartibile, quia nulla omnino est commensuratio Angeli ad locum. — Sed ista positio non intelligibilis esse videtur, quomodo scilicet aliquid possit esse in aliquo et definiri et contineri, nec tamen primo¹⁰ immediate sit in toto, vel in parte, vel in impartibili. Omne enim quod est in aliquo toto, vel est ratione totius, vel ratione alicuius partis.

Et ideo fuit circa hoc secunda positio, scilicet quod Angelus est in loco impartibili sive punctali. Et ratio eorum erat ista, quia Angelus non habet materiam omnino differentem a corporalium materia nisi¹¹ secundum esse, scilicet quia non est extensa. Unde cum materia sit simplex ut punctus de se, dicunt, Angelum habere simplicitatem proportionalem puncto, et ita est in loco punctali. — Sed haec positio falsa est et non intelligibilis. Quidquid enim sit de materia, sicut infra¹² dicetur, hoc tamen est verum, quod omnis locus corporeus est partibilis: ergo sicut est oppositio in adiecto, dicere corpus impartibile sive punctale, ita et dicere locum punctalem. Et iterum, cum punctus non sit locus, ponere Angelum in puncto est ponere, ipsum non esse in loco.

Et ideo est tertia positio, quod Angelus, cum contineatur a loco corporali, quod est in loco partibili, tanquam in loco primo; et quoniam non potest extendi in eo, ideo necesse est, quod sit in toto, ita quod totus in toto, et totus in qualibet parte. Et in hoc est similis quodammodo simplicitas Angeli simplicitati divinae: sed deficit, quia Angelus in uno loco sic est¹³, Deus autem ubique. Ex hoc dicit Ioannes Damascenus, quod Angelus est in loco corporali, sed intelligibiliter, non figuraliter¹⁴, quia hoc solum capit intellectus, quomodo videlicet substantia tota sit in partibus et tota in toto.

1. Et ita patet responsio ad verbum Damasceni.

2. Quod obiicitur, quod debet esse proportio; dicendum, quod non oportet, quod sit proportio secundum speciales conditiones et proprias¹⁵ Angeli vel loci, quia Angelus non ponitur esse in loco pro-

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prie; est tamen ibi proportio quoad finitatem et limitationem, per quae duo Angelus definitur et est in loco; sicut enim Angelus habet substantiam et virtutem finitam, sic locus eius arctatus est et limitatus.

3. Quod quaeritur de hoc: si ponatur Angelus in loco, in quo minori non possit esse; dicendum, quod in hoc differt existentia Angeli in corpore et animae, quod anima, quia est perfectio corporis nati vivificari vita rationali¹⁶, et illud est in determinata quantitate, ideo potest esse in corpore ita parvo, quod non in minori, quia minus non esset organizabile et vivificabile; Angelus autem, quia non est ut perfectio et simplex est, est in qualibet parte loci totus, quantumcumque parva est — quia ratio loci salvatur in qualibet¹⁷ — non potest accipi locus ita parvus, quin adhuc possit esse in minori — et ideo non est dare locum, in quo minori non possit esse; est tamen dare, in quo maiori non potest, sicut et anima, quia hoc venit ex limitatione. Sicut ergo in corporibus status est in ascendendo, sed in dividendo nunquam est ponere statum, nec unquam devenitur ad impartibile: sic intelligendum est circa existentiam Angeli in loco.

4. Quod obiicitur, quod est per modum recipientis etc.; dicendum, quod verum est, ubi receptum dependet a recipiente, sicut species recipitur in organo, recipitur et in intellectu, et existentia eius pendet ex eo in quo recipitur, et se habet ad illud per modum informantis; hinc est, quod recipit modum suae existentiae ab eo in quo recipitur. Non sic Angelus recipitur a loco, quia non pendet ex illo.

5. Quod obiicitur: si totus est in qualibet parte loci, cum sint plura loca etc.; dicendum, quod totus est in qualibet parte, nec tamen in pluribus locis, sicut nec anima, dum vivificat totum corpus, non vivificat diversa corpora, sed unum.

Quod autem obiicitur: esto quod corpus illud sive locus, in quo est Angelus, dividatur; dico, quod si divideretur in mille partes, dum tamen partes non sequestrarentur longe ab invicem, totus esset in omnibus, et omnes essent ei unus locus, quia nullam habent rationem ambiendi vel definiendi Angelum, sed illud quod complectitur omnes partes. Locus¹⁸ enim non numeratur secundum numerum corporum locantium, sed in comparatione ad locatum¹⁹; sicut patet, quia unum corpus potest esse partim in aere, partim in aqua, partim in terra, nec tamen in tribus locis, sed in uno est.

Scholion

I. Quid sit esse definitive in loco, explicatur hic in fine corp. — Prima et secunda opinio hic recensita etiam a S. Thoma reiicitur, qui secundum principia de fundamentali ratione praesentiae angelicae in loco ab ipso stabilita resolvit, Angelos posse suam virtutem pro libitu applicare vel loco indivisibili, vel divisibili. Idem sentit Petr. a Tar. — Sed S. Bonav. cum Aegidio R. aliisque negat, Angelum posse esse in loco indivisibili, hac ductus ratione, quod punctum non sit locus. Hanc suam sententiam declarat in solut. ad 3. — Scotus (hic q. 6. n. 13.) putat, non esse rationem necessariam nec ad unam nec ad aliam partem, quod etiam Richard. (loc. citand. ad 3.) approbat.

II. S. Thom., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 3. a. 3; S. I. q. 52. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., 1. Sent. d. 37. q. 4. a. 2. praesertim ad 4. — Richard. a Med., 1. Sent. d. 37. a. 2. q. 2.

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English Translation

Question III. Whether an Angel is in an impartible or punctual place.

Thirdly it is asked concerning the mode of the Angel's being in a place. And it is asked whether it is in an impartible or punctual place. And that [it is] so, it seems.

1. Damascene¹ says «that an Angel is in a place not figurally but intelligibly»: since therefore nothing of the place itself is unfigurable and intelligible except the point, it is in a point.

2. Likewise, there ought to be a proportion of what is located to the place; but the Angel is simple and impartible: therefore to it is owed a simple and impartible place². But this is the point of place alone: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, let us suppose the Angel to be in a place than which it cannot be in a lesser; I ask: either that place is partible or impartible. If partible: therefore since the Angel is simple, it can therefore still be in a lesser [one]. But if it cannot be in a lesser [one], it seems that that [place]³ is impartible; but nothing is impartible in place except the point: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, «what is received in something is received there in the mode of the receiver, not⁴ in the mode of what is received»: if therefore the Angel is in a partible place, it is [there] partibly. But it is impossible that the Angel receive partition: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if the Angel is in a partible place as

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in a primary place, then either it is whole in any part, or it is so in the whole that part is in part. If it is whole in the whole, so that part [is] in part, then it is partible; if so that it is whole in any part, then, since the parts of the place are many, it will be⁵ in several places. If you say that it is in all of them as in one place, just as the soul is in all the parts of the body; on the contrary: suppose that that body be divided, and the place in which the Angel is⁶; it is established that it can nonetheless be in all the parts, since it does not depend principally on any part. And if [it is] so, since there is there a multitude of places, the Angel will be in several places.

On the contrary:

1. The point is neither a place nor a part of place⁷: therefore what is in a point or in a punctual place is not in a place.

2. Likewise, «the point, as the Philosopher says⁸, is a posited substance», that is, an essence having position, in which it differs from unity: therefore if the Angel is in a point according to a proportion befitting a point, then the Angel has position. But a form, having position in matter, is not a sufficient mover of that in which it is: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if the Angel is in a point, then it first influences power upon the point: therefore since the point is disproportionate to body, it is impossible that its power extend to body; and so it will never move a body.

4. Likewise, the soul is in the whole body; but union does not do this, because from this very [union] it has dependence, and so constriction: therefore this is by reason of simplicity⁹. Since therefore the Angel is equally simple, or more so than the soul, it seems that much more strongly it can be whole in a greater or equal place.

Conclusion

An Angel is definitively in a divisible place, yet so that there is no place so small but that the Angel can still be in a smaller [one].

I respond: There were three positions concerning this.

For there were some saying that the Angel, although it is in a corporeal place, is nevertheless not in it corporeally, but spiritually. But since it is not in a place situally, therefore [it is] neither according to whole, nor according to part, nor according to the impartible, because there is no commensuration at all of the Angel to the place. — But this position does not seem intelligible, namely how something could be in something and be defined and contained, and yet not first¹⁰ immediately be in the whole, or in a part, or in the impartible. For everything that is in some whole is either by reason of the whole or by reason of some part.

And therefore there was concerning this a second position, namely that the Angel is in an impartible or punctual place. And their reason was this, that the Angel does not have matter wholly different from the matter of corporeal [things] except¹¹ according to being, namely because it is not extended. Hence, since matter is simple as a point of itself, they say that the Angel has a simplicity proportional to a point, and so is in a punctual place. — But this position is false and not intelligible. For whatever be [the truth] about matter, as will be said below¹², this however is true, that every corporeal place is partible: therefore just as it is a contradiction in the adjective to say an impartible or punctual body, so also to say a punctual place. And again, since a point is not a place, to posit the Angel in a point is to posit that it is not in a place.

And therefore there is a third position, that the Angel, since it is contained by a corporeal place, [is] in a partible place as in a primary place; and since it cannot be extended in it, therefore it is necessary that it be in the whole, so that [it is] whole in the whole and whole in any part. And in this the simplicity of the Angel is in a certain way similar to the divine simplicity: but it falls short, because the Angel is so¹³ in one place, but God [is] everywhere. From this John Damascene says that the Angel is in a corporeal place, but intelligibly, not figurally¹⁴, because the intellect grasps this only, namely how the substance is whole in the parts and whole in the whole.

1. And so the response to the word of Damascene is clear.

2. To what is objected, that there ought to be a proportion; it must be said that it is not necessary that there be a proportion according to the special and proper¹⁵ conditions of the Angel or of the place, because the Angel is not posited to be in a place prop-

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erly; yet there is there a proportion as to finitude and limitation, by which two [the Angel] is defined and is in a place; for just as the Angel has a finite substance and power, so its place is constricted and limited.

3. As to what is asked about this: if the Angel be posited in a place than which it could not be in a lesser; it must be said that in this the existence of the Angel in a body and [that] of the soul differ, [namely] that the soul, because it is the perfection of a body born to be vivified by rational life¹⁶, and that [body] is in a determinate quantity, therefore it can be in a body so small that [it can] not [be] in a lesser [one], because a lesser [one] would not be organizable and vivifiable; but the Angel, because it is not as a perfection and is simple, is whole in any part of the place, however small it is — because the character of place is preserved in any [part]¹⁷ — a place cannot be taken so small but that it can still be in a lesser [one] — and therefore there is no giving a place than which it could not be in a lesser; yet there is giving [one] than which [it can] not [be] in a greater, just as also [in] the soul, because this comes from limitation. As therefore in bodies there is a stop in ascending, but in dividing there is never a stop to posit, nor is it ever arrived at the impartible: so it is to be understood concerning the existence of the Angel in a place.

4. To what is objected, that it is in the mode of the receiver etc.; it must be said that this is true where what is received depends on the receiver, as a species [which] is received in an organ is received also in the intellect, and its existence depends on that in which it is received, and is related to it in the mode of [something] informing; hence it is that it receives the mode of its existence from that in which it is received. Not so is the Angel received by a place, because it does not depend on it.

5. To what is objected: if it is whole in any part of the place, since there are several places etc.; it must be said that it is whole in any part, nor however in several places, just as neither [does] the soul, while it vivifies the whole body, vivify diverse bodies, but one.

But as to what is objected: suppose that that body or place in which the Angel is be divided; I say that if it were divided into a thousand parts, provided however that the parts were not sequestered far from one another, it would be whole in all, and all would be one place to it, because they have no character of encompassing or defining the Angel, but [only] that which embraces all the parts. For a place¹⁸ is not numbered according to the number of locating bodies, but in comparison to what is located¹⁹; as is plain, because one body can be partly in air, partly in water, partly in earth, nor however in three places, but is in one.

Scholion

I. What it is to be definitively in a place is explained here at the end of the body. — The first and second opinion here reviewed are also rejected by St. Thomas, who, according to the principles concerning the fundamental character of angelic presence in a place established by himself, resolves that the Angels can apply their power at pleasure either to an indivisible or to a divisible place. Peter of Tarentaise thinks the same. — But St. Bonaventure with Giles of Rome and others denies that the Angel can be in an indivisible place, led by this reason, that a point is not a place. He declares this opinion of his in the solution to [argument] 3. — Scotus (here q. 6, n. 13) thinks that there is no necessary reason either to one or to the other part, which Richard also (at the place to be cited, ad 3) approves.

II. St. Thomas, 1 Sent. d. 37, q. 3, a. 3; S. I, q. 52, a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, 1 Sent. d. 37, q. 4, a. 2, especially ad 4. — Richard of Middleton, 1 Sent. d. 37, a. 2, q. 2.

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Apparatus Criticus

1
Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 13. Vide supra pag. 79, nota 5. — Paulo superius plurimi codd. perperam in loco partibili sive, recte cod. M in loco vel partibili vel pro in loco impartibili sive.
Book I On the Orthodox Faith, c. 13. See above p. 79, note 5. — A little above most codices wrongly [read] in loco partibili sive, rightly codex M in loco vel partibili vel for in loco impartibili sive.
2
Aristot., 1. de Anima, text. 70. (c. 4.): Quorum enim locus est indivisibilis, et ipsa [sunt indivisibilia].
Aristotle, 1 On the Soul, text 70 (c. 4): For those things whose place is indivisible, [they] themselves [are indivisible].
3
Cod. aa locus ille.
Codex aa [reads] locus ille.
4
Libr. de Causis, prop. 10. et 20. seq. Cfr. etiam Boeth., V. de Consol. prosa 4. — Paulo inferius plures codd. ut C H K O S Y cc et edd. 1, 2 partialiter pro partibiliter. Dein cod. T prosequitur Sed impossibile est, Angelum esse partitum vel recipere partitionem.
The book On Causes, prop. 10 and 20 ff. Cf. also Boethius, V On Consolation, prose 4. — A little below several codices, as C H K O S Y cc and editions 1, 2, [read] partialiter for partibiliter. Then codex T continues But it is impossible that the Angel be divided or receive partition.
5
Cod. A simul erit. — Simile argumentum S. Bonav. de anima ponit I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. fundam. 3; et ibid. ad 6. habetur illa replicatio, quae mox affertur.
Codex A [reads] simul erit. — A similar argument St. Bonaventure puts concerning the soul in I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 3, fundamentum 3; and there, ad 6, is had that rejoinder which is presently brought forward.
6
Vat., mutata interpunctione, dividatur; et locus est in quo est Angelus. Mox post partibus codd. U Y adiungunt corporis. Dein fide codd. B D H I U V aa cc et ed. 1 substituimus in aliqua parte pro ex aliqua parte.
The Vatican edition, the punctuation changed, [reads] dividatur; et locus est in quo est Angelus. Then after partibus codices U Y add corporis. Then on the faith of codices B D H I U V aa cc and ed. 1 we substitute in aliqua parte for ex aliqua parte.
7
Cfr. Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 47. (c. 5.).
Cf. Aristotle, IV Physics text 47 (c. 5).
8
Libr. 1. Poster. c. 23. (c. 27.): Unitas substantia est sine positione, punctum autem substantia posita. Cfr. I. de Anima, text. 68. (c. 4.) et V. Metaph. text. 12. (IV. c. 6.). De ultima propositione arg. vide I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3. in corp. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 secundum positionem pro secundum proportionem.
Book 1 Posterior [Analytics], c. 23 (c. 27): Unity is a substance without position, but the point a posited substance. Cf. I On the Soul, text 68 (c. 4) and V Metaphysics text 12 (IV, c. 6). On the last proposition of the argument see I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 3, in the body. — A little below codex cc and ed. 1 [read] secundum positionem for secundum proportionem.
9
Cfr. I. Sent. d. 8. p. II. q. 3.
Cf. I Sent. d. 8, p. II, q. 3.
10
Codd. L O interserunt et. Aliquanto superius Vat. cum nonnullis codd. Sed ista ratio pro Sed ista positio. — De seq. prop. vide Aristot., IV. Phys. text. 24. (c. 3.), ubi affert duplicem modum essendi in aliquo, scil. aut secundum se, aut secundum alterum i. e. secundum partem. — Vat. cum pluribus mss. in aliquo loco toto pro in aliquo toto; nimis constricte.
Codices L O insert et. Somewhat above the Vatican edition with some codices [reads] Sed ista ratio for Sed ista positio. — On the following proposition see Aristotle, IV Physics text 24 (c. 3), where he brings forward a twofold mode of being in something, namely either according to itself, or according to another, i.e. according to a part. — The Vatican edition with several manuscripts [reads] in aliquo loco toto for in aliquo toto; too constricted.
11
Vat. cum paucis codd. omittens non et nisi modo positivo propositionem format, fortasse, quia multi codd. minus congrue omittunt solummodo non, quod exhibetur in codd. B (F a secunda manu) I Q U aa bb.
The Vatican edition with a few codices, omitting non and forming the proposition only in the positive mode, perhaps because many codices less congruously omit non alone, which is exhibited in codices B (F by a second hand) I Q U aa bb.
12
Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 2.
Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 2.
13
Codd. B E H (bb in marg.) addunt quod non in alio; nonnulli, ut N Z legunt sic tantum est, codd. I cc et ed. 1 uno loco tantum est, Vat. omittit sic.
Codices B E H (bb in the margin) add quod non in alio; some, as N Z, read sic tantum est, codices I cc and ed. 1 uno loco tantum est, the Vatican edition omits sic.
14
In cod. A subnectitur id est, circumscriptibiliter.
In codex A is appended that is, circumscriptibly.
15
Cod. cc et ed. 4 proprietates.
Codex cc and ed. 4 [read] proprietates.
16
Idem dicitur vulgari definitione: actus primus corporis physici, organici, vitam rationalem potentia habentis. Cfr. Aristot., II. de Anima, text. 6. seqq. — Paulo ante non pauci codd. cum ed. 1 et anima pro et animae, et dein codd. aa cc ed. 1 quod anima, quae pro quod anima, quia.
The same is said by the common definition: the first act of a physical, organic body having rational life in potency. Cf. Aristotle, II On the Soul, text 6 ff. — A little before, not a few codices with ed. 1 [read] et anima for et animae, and then codices aa cc ed. 1 quod anima, quae for quod anima, quia.
17
Fide cod. 1 emendavimus falsam editionem et codicum lectionem, quae, transposita particula quia et omisso verbo [salvatur], haec est: simplex est, quia in qualibet parte loci totus, qu[antum]cumque parva est ratio loci, salvatur in qualibet. Post in qualibet Vat. addit et ideo.
On the faith of cod. 1 we have emended the false [reading of the] edition and of the codices, which, the particle quia transposed and the verb [salvatur] omitted, is this: it is simple, because whole in any part of the place, however small the character of the place is, it is preserved in any [part]. After in qualibet the Vatican edition adds et ideo.
18
Simul audi: Angelus. — Paulo inferius cod. cc et ed. 1 in corporalibus pro in corporibus.
At the same time understand: the Angel. — A little below codex cc and ed. 1 [read] in corporalibus for in corporibus.
19
In Vat. deest sed in comparatione ad locatum.
In the Vatican edition sed in comparatione ad locatum is lacking. ---