Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 5
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 20
Quaestio V. Utrum quoties fuissent coniuncti, toties prolem genuissent.
Quinto quaeritur, utrum in qualibet coniunctione viri et mulieris esset prolis generatio. Et quod sic, videtur.
Fundamenta. 1. Matrimonium pro tempore innocentiae erat solum in officium, non in remedium1; sed officium consistit in procreando prolem: ergo solum ad hoc erat. Si ergo vir et mulier non coniungebantur matrimonialiter, nisi propter quod erat matrimonium; videtur, quod nunquam coniuncti essent, quin prolem generarent.
2. Item, qui debitum petit in statu naturae lapsae praeter necessitatem prolis procreandae, peccat saltem venialiter2: ergo ibi vir nunquam peteret debitum praeter necessitatem prolis procreandae, aut si peteret, peccaret et caderet a statu innocentiae. Ergo, illo statu manente, nunquam cognosceret uxorem, quin ex ea susciperet prolem, cum ibi actus non esset privatus debita intentione, nec intentio debito fine; privatio enim intentionis rectae non est sine culpa, privatio vero utilitatis intentae non est sine poena; quorum neutrum erat in natura instituta.
3. Item, nunquam homo comedisset, quin ex illa comestione sumsisset refectionem, nec unquam nutritiva in suo actu privata fuisset proprio effectu: ergo pari ratione generativa in suo actu nunquam caruisset debito fructu; sed fructus eius est proles: ergo etc.
4. Item, nunquam homo seminasset terram, quin ex ea collegisset fructum temporaneum; sterilitas enim non fuit in terra nisi propter hominis culpam3: ergo si venter mulieris ita erat alienus a sterilitate, sicut terra tempore naturae institutae; ergo nunquam mulierem cognovisset, quin ex ea debitum fructum sumsisset.
Ad oppositum. 1. Sed contra: Vis nutritiva semen administrat generativae: ergo cum homo continue nutriretur, humor seminarius generativae continue administrabatur4: ergo vel oportebat hominem extraordinarie pollui, vel naturam gravari ex tentione seminis, vel aliquando mulierem cognoscere, quando non esset apta generare, utpote quando prolem haberet in ventre. Si ergo prima duo membra sunt inconvenientia, restat ergo tertium, scilicet quod uxorem aliquando cognovisset, quando prolem non generasset.
2. Item, sicut comedere est actus naturalis, ita et coire; sed homo naturaliter appetit comedere non solum in statu naturae lapsae, sed etiam institutae: ergo pari ratione naturaliter appetebat coire. Sed homo tempore naturae institutae debebat appetitui naturae satisfacere, cum natura esset ordinata et ordinate appeteret, alioquin poenam sentiret: ergo videtur, quod sive mulier posset concipere sive non, vir praeter necessitatem prolis generandae aliquando mulierem cognosceret.
3. Item, ponatur, quod Adam cognosceret uxorem suam praegnantem; quaero: aut peccaret, aut non? Si non: ergo non erat necesse, quod in omni coitu generaret. Si sic; contra: sanctius erat tunc matrimonium quam tempore naturae lapsae et aeque magnae vel maioris efficaciae; sed nunc propter bonum matrimonii excusatur coitus a culpa, etiam quando nulla est prolis generandae necessitas: ergo videtur, quod multo fortius tunc.
4. Item, non erat maior inordinatio in contactu illorum membrorum quam in admovendo manum ad os5; sed manus admoveri potest ad os sine aliquo peccato, etiam praeter necessitatem: ergo videtur, quod Adam potuit cognoscere uxorem suam absque peccato praeter necessitatem prolis generandae.
Conclusio. In statu innocentiae et congruentia ordinis exigebat, et perfectio virtutis sufficiebat, ut ex quolibet actu, quo Adam cognovisset uxorem, proles susciperetur.
Respondeo: Dicendum, quod vir in quolibet actu, quo cognovisset uxorem, suscepisset ex ea prolem. — Et ratio huius est, quia congruentia ordinis exigebat, et perfectio virtutis ad hoc sufficiebat. Ratio 1. Exigebat namque hoc congruentia duplicis ordinis, scilicet virtutis generativae ad rationem, et utriusque ad suum finem. Vis enim generativa ordinem habebat ad rationem, ordinem, inquam, perfectae subiectionis; et ideo in actum non exibat, nisi secundum quod ratio dictabat. Ratio autem recta et ordinata dictat, nulla re esse utendum nisi ad id, propter quod est; et quia vis generativa data fuit homini ad prolis multiplicationem; ideo recta ratio nunquam dictaret, et vis generativa nunquam exiret in actum nisi propter prolis generationem; hoc enim congruentia ordinis6 exigebat. — Ratio 2. Perfectio etiam virtutis aderat, quae ad hoc sufficiebat. Quia enim vis generativa in viro ad generandum erat potens et sufficiens nec habebat impedimentum, similiter et in muliere pro suo loco et tempore; ideo, cum ordinate cognosceret vir uxorem, semper ex ea prolem susciperet propter exigentiam duplicis ordinis, et sufficientiam duplicis virtutis, scilicet generantis et concipientis, sicut praedictum est. Unde rationes hoc ostendentes concedendae sunt.
Solutio oppositorum. 1. Ad illud ergo quod primo obiicitur in contrarium, quod nutritiva semper deserviret generativae; dicendum, quod ita esset natura Adae ordinata, ut nunquam de cibo sumeret, nisi adeo temperate, quod superfluitas tertiae digestionis, quae quidem dicitur semen7, non esset sufficienter coadunata, quousque veniret hora debita generandi. Adam enim in statu innocentiae posse naturae suae cognovisset et sufficientiam alimenti et tempus et horam, quando generare debuisset; et ita viveret modeste et sobrie, quod nec ad superabundantiam nec ad indigentiam declinaret.
2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod naturaliter appeteret coire, sicut comedere; dicendum, quod non est simile, quia actus comestionis est ordinatus8 ad salutem individui, in quo continue fit deperditio; actus vero generationis ad conservationem speciei et multiplicationem similis — quod non oportet continue fieri, sed temporibus determinatis — et ideo non sic esset appetitus naturalis ad coitum, sicut est ad cibum, nec ita continuus nec ita frequens. Si enim in viris castis etiam tempore naturae lapsae non sic est inclinatio ad coitum sicut ad cibum, multo minus nec in Adam erat. Quod autem ita intendatur9 appetitus vis generativae, hoc potius est corruptionis naturae quam institutionis primariae.
3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si cognosceret praegnantem, non peccaret; dicendum, quod praegnans non potest cognosci sine deordinatione, vel quae sit, vel quae videtur. Et quia in statu innocentiae deordinationem timere non poterat, quia non erat ibi titillatio nec pruritus: ideo, si tunc cognovisset, si sciret, se inutiliter cognoscere, inordinatus fuisset, et ideo peccasset. Nec est simile, quod inducit de matrimonio in statu naturae lapsae, quia nunc non solum est in officium procreandae prolis, sed etiam in remedium vitandae fornicationis, sicut melius in quarto libro10 patebit.
4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod non esset ibi maior deordinatio quam in admovendo manum ad os; dicendum, quod similitudo illa attenditur quantum ad hoc, quod utrumque membrum rationi subiacebat, et utrumque concupiscentiae pruritu et ardore carebat. In hoc tamen dissimilitudo est, quia magis oportebat actum illum ad finem debitum ordinare quam qualemcumque motum manus vel pedis, propter determinationem usus illorum membrorum ad procreationem prolis. Usus autem manus vel pedis non est ita determinatus; et ideo non oportet cum tanta deliberatione exerceri.
I. De hac quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 3. — B. Albert., hic a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 1. quaestiunc. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 4. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic q. 1. a. 3.
II. De sequente (6.) quaest.: Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 4. — S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1. ad 1; S. I. q. 99. a. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 1. — Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 1. — Durand., hic q. 3.
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Question V. Whether as often as they were joined, they would each time have generated offspring.
Fifth, it is asked whether in every union of man and woman there would be the generation of offspring. And that this is so, it seems.
Fundamenta. 1. Matrimony, for the time of innocence, was only for office, not for remedy1; but the office consists in procreating offspring: therefore it was for this alone. If therefore man and woman were not joined matrimonially except on account of that for which matrimony existed, it seems that they would never be joined without generating offspring.
2. Likewise, one who in the state of fallen nature asks the conjugal debt apart from the necessity of procreating offspring sins at least venially2: therefore there the man would never ask the debt apart from the necessity of procreating offspring, or if he did ask, he would sin and would fall from the state of innocence. Therefore, with that state remaining, he would never know his wife without receiving offspring from her, since there the act would not be deprived of due intention, nor the intention of its due end; for the deprivation of right intention is not without fault, and the deprivation of the intended utility is not without penalty — neither of which existed in nature as instituted.
3. Likewise, never would man have eaten without taking refreshment from that meal, nor would the nutritive power in its act ever have been deprived of its proper effect: therefore by parallel reasoning the generative power in its act would never have lacked its due fruit; but its fruit is offspring: therefore etc.
4. Likewise, never would man have sown the ground without gathering temporal fruit from it; for sterility was not in the earth except on account of man's fault3: therefore if the womb of the woman was as alien to sterility as the earth in the time of nature instituted, then he would never have known the woman without taking due fruit from her.
Ad oppositum. 1. On the contrary: The nutritive power supplies seed to the generative; therefore since man would be continuously nourished, the seminal humor would continuously be administered to the generative power4: therefore either it was necessary that man be extraordinarily polluted, or that nature be burdened by retention of seed, or that he sometimes know the woman when she was not fit to generate, namely when she had offspring in her womb. If, therefore, the first two members are unfitting, the third remains, namely that he would sometimes have known his wife when he would not have generated offspring.
2. Likewise, just as eating is a natural act, so also is intercourse; but man naturally desires to eat not only in the state of fallen nature, but also of instituted nature: therefore by parallel reasoning he naturally desired intercourse. But man in the time of instituted nature ought to satisfy nature's appetite, since nature was ordered and would desire in an ordered way, otherwise he would feel pain: therefore it seems that whether the woman could conceive or not, the man would sometimes know the woman apart from the necessity of generating offspring.
3. Likewise, suppose Adam knew his wife when pregnant; I ask: would he sin, or not? If not: therefore it was not necessary that he generate in every coitus. If so; on the contrary: matrimony then was holier than in the time of fallen nature, and of equal or greater efficacy; but now, on account of the good of matrimony, coitus is excused from fault even when there is no necessity of generating offspring: therefore it seems that much more strongly so then.
4. Likewise, there was no greater disorder in the contact of those members than in moving the hand to the mouth5; but the hand can be moved to the mouth without any sin, even apart from necessity: therefore it seems that Adam could know his wife without sin apart from the necessity of generating offspring.
Conclusion. In the state of innocence both the congruence of order required, and the perfection of virtue sufficed, that from any act by which Adam knew his wife, offspring should be received.
I respond: It must be said that the man, in any act by which he knew his wife, would have received offspring from her. — And the reason for this is that the congruence of order required it, and the perfection of virtue sufficed for it. Ratio 1. For the congruence of a twofold order required this, namely of the generative power to reason, and of both to their end. For the generative power had an order to reason — an order, I say, of perfect subjection; and therefore it did not go forth into act except according as reason dictated. But right and ordered reason dictates that nothing is to be used except for that for which it exists; and since the generative power was given to man for the multiplication of offspring, therefore right reason would never dictate, nor would the generative power ever go forth into act, except for the generation of offspring; for this is what the congruence of order6 required. — Ratio 2. The perfection of virtue also was present, which sufficed for this. For since the generative power in the man was potent and sufficient for generating, and had no impediment, and likewise in the woman according to her place and time; therefore, when the man knew his wife in an ordered way, he would always receive offspring from her on account of the requirement of the twofold order and the sufficiency of the twofold virtue, namely of the one generating and of the one conceiving, as has been said. Hence the arguments showing this are to be conceded.
Solution of the opposing arguments. 1. To that, then, which is first objected on the contrary, that the nutritive would always serve the generative; it must be said that Adam's nature would be so ordered that he would never take of food except so temperately that the superfluity of the third digestion, which is called semen7, would not be sufficiently gathered together until the due hour of generating arrived. For Adam in the state of innocence would know the capacity of his nature, both the sufficiency of nourishment and the time and hour when he ought to generate; and so he would live modestly and soberly, so that he would incline neither to superabundance nor to need.
2. To that which is objected, that he would naturally desire intercourse just as eating; it must be said that it is not similar, because the act of eating is ordered8 to the welfare of the individual, in whom continual loss occurs; but the act of generation is ordered to the conservation of the species and the multiplication of the like — which need not occur continually, but at determined times — and therefore the natural appetite for intercourse would not be like that for food, nor so continuous nor so frequent. For if even in chaste men in the time of fallen nature the inclination to intercourse is not as to food, much less was it in Adam. But that the appetite of the generative power is so intensified9 — this belongs rather to the corruption of nature than to its primary institution.
3. To that which is objected, that if he knew her pregnant he would not sin; it must be said that a pregnant woman cannot be known without disorder, either real or apparent. And since in the state of innocence he could not fear disorder, because there was no titillation or itching there: therefore, if he had then known, if he knew that he was knowing uselessly, he would have been disordered, and so would have sinned. Nor is what is adduced about matrimony in the state of fallen nature similar, because now it is not only for the office of procreating offspring, but also for the remedy of avoiding fornication, as will appear better in the fourth book10.
4. To that which is objected, that there would be no greater disorder there than in moving the hand to the mouth; it must be said that that similitude is taken with respect to this, that both members were subject to reason, and both were free from the itching and ardor of concupiscence. In this, however, there is dissimilitude, because it was more necessary to order that act to the due end than any movement whatsoever of the hand or foot, on account of the determination of the use of those members to the procreation of offspring. But the use of the hand or foot is not so determined; and therefore it is not necessary to exercise it with such deliberation.
I. On this question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 89 m. 3. — Blessed Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1 a. 1, quaestiuncula 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 4 q. 2. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 1 a. 3.
II. On the following (6th) question: Alexander of Hales, Summa p. II q. 90 m. 4. — St. Thomas, here q. 2 a. 1 ad 1; Summa I q. 99 a. 2. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 2 a. 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here a. 2 q. 1. — Aegidius Romanus, here q. 2 a. 1. — Durandus, here q. 3.
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- Augustinus, IX. de Gen. ad lit. c. 7. n. 12: Quod sanis esse posset officium, sit aegrotis remedium. Cfr. IV. Sent. d. 26. a. 1. q. 1.Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis IX c. 7 n. 12: "What for the healthy could be an office, for the sick is a remedy." Cf. IV Sent. d. 26 a. 1 q. 1.
- Ut dicit Magister in lit. IV. Sent. d. XXXII. c. 1.As the Master says in his text, IV Sent. d. XXXII c. 1.
- Cfr. Gen. 3, 17. seqq.Cf. Genesis 3:17 ff.
- Vat. perperam administrabat. Dein codd. Y retentione pro tentione.The Vatican edition wrongly reads administrabat. Then codices Y read retentione for tentione.
- Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — In fine obiect. pro praeter necessitatem prolis Vat. perperam propter necessitatem prolis.Cf. here the text of the Master, c. 1. — At the end of the objection, for praeter necessitatem prolis the Vatican edition wrongly reads propter necessitatem prolis.
- Vat. et ed. 4 sic: hoc enim congrue natura hominis exigebat; plures codd. sic: hoc enim congrue natura ordinis exigebat. Nostram lectionem exhibent codd. F W aa cc ee cum edd. 1, 2, 3.The Vatican edition and ed. 4 thus: for this the nature of man fittingly required; many codices thus: for this the nature of order fittingly required. Our reading is given by codd. F W aa cc ee with edd. 1, 2, 3.
- Cfr. supra pag. 479, nota 5.Cf. above p. 479, note 5.
- Plures codd. ordinatur. Paulo inferius Vat. quam non pro quod non.Many codices read ordinatur. A little below, the Vatican edition reads quam non for quod non.
- Nonnulli codd. cum ed. 1 incendatur.Several codices with ed. 1 read incendatur ("be inflamed").
- Dist. 26. a. 1. q. 1. et d. 31. a. 2. q. 2. — Aliquanto superius Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 si scivisset pro si sciret.Sent. IV d. 26 a. 1 q. 1 and d. 31 a. 2 q. 2. — A little above, the Vatican edition with edd. 3, 4 reads si scivisset for si sciret.