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Dist. 20, Dubia

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 20

Textus Latinus
p. 487

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt quaestiones circa litteram, et primo quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod infirmitas prona ad ruinam turpitudinis excipitur honestate nuptiarum. Ex hoc enim videtur dicere, quod non possit actus ille sine peccato et turpitudine exerceri. Sed contra hoc est, quia omnis actus, qui est in praecepto, potest fieri sine peccato, ergo et coitus.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc1 non dicitur de turpitudine, quae sonat in culpam, sed quae magis sonat in poenam; vel si de illa intelligatur, tunc nuptiae ita excipiunt pronitatem carnis, quod actus ille absque omni peccato potest fieri. Unde quod dicit Magister, quod nuptiae ordinant actum illum, non est intelligendum ratione inordinationis, quae sit in actu illo, sed quae inesset, nisi esset matrimonium; de hoc autem diffusius agetur in quarto2 in tractatu de matrimonio.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in paradiso essent nuptiae honorabiles. Videtur enim, quod similiter sint honorabiles in statu Ecclesiae, cum sint Sacramentum magnum, sicut dicit Apostolus ad Ephesios quinto3, cum etiam approbentur a iure naturali. Si tu dicas, quod honorabilitas nuptiarum attenditur quantum ad actum illum; tunc quaeritur, quare magis actus ille honestus et castus sit cum pudore quam alius actus, in quo est culpae deordinatio; magis enim verecundatur quis de actu illo honeste et caste facto quam de alio actu inordinato, utpote cognoscere uxorem, quam percutere servum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod est loqui de nuptiis quantum ad significatum et quantum ad fructum et quantum ad actum; et quantum ad haec tria honorabiles erant in paradiso. Distinctio. In statu vero miseriae, quamvis sint honorabiles quantum ad significatum et fructum, habent tamen pudorem annexum quantum ad actum, quia omnis homo utens ratione actum illum erubescit exercere coram aliis, etiam cum propria uxore. — Ratio. Rationem autem huius assignat Augustinus in decimo quarto de Civitate Dei4: quia, cum ratio deberet dominari corpori, magis erubescit, quod ipsa subiiciatur alicui parti corporis; et quod aliqua pars corporis dominetur ei, quam quod ipsa inordinate dominetur sibi; et ideo magis verecundatur de ardore libidinis, quae est in actu illo, quam de perturbatione furoris, quae est in convitiando servo.

DUB. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Deus nondum iusserat, ut coirent. Hoc enim videtur esse p. 488 falsum, quia dicitur Genesis primo5: Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram; constat, quod hoc dictum est quantum ad actum generativae: ergo etc. — Quaestio incidens 1. Iuxta hoc quaeritur, si mandatum illud omnes obligabat. Quodsi sic: ergo videtur, quod transgressi sunt, quia non coierunt in statu innocentiae; si non: ergo videtur, quod poterant continue servare virginitatem.

Quaestio 2. Item quaero, utrum illud mandatum maneat adhuc. Quodsi manet: ergo non licet alicui servare virginitatem, quod est contra Apostolum, qui dicit primae ad Corinthios septimo6: Volo, omnes vos esse, sicut ego sum; loquitur de castitate. Si non obligat modo, quaero: quando revocatum est? Videtur etiam, quod modo sint melioris conditionis homines quam tunc, quia modo possunt servare virginitatem, tunc autem non poterant.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod illud mandatum Ad quaest. 1. datum fuit viro et mulieri in statu innocentiae; sed cum esset mandatum affirmativum, non obligabat ad semper, sed pro loco et tempore. Determinatio autem temporis dependebat ex revelatione divinae voluntatis; quam7 quia Deus nondum eis revelaverat, ideo dicit Magister, quod nondum iusserat.

Ad quaest. 2. Ad illud quod quaeritur, utrum illud mandatum fuerit revocatum; dicendum, quod aliter obligabat tempore naturae institutae, aliter nunc. Tunc enim omnes obligabat, quia omnibus erat in officium; nunc autem non obligat omnes, pro eo quod multi sunt, qui sufficiunt illud implere, aliis consilium virginitatis servantibus. Hoc autem consilium competit statui naturae lapsae, non autem naturae institutae, quia tunc, cum nulla esset pronitas, non esset maior virtus continere quam nubere, et omnes prolem ad cultum Dei generarent; nunc autem propter difficultatem et arduitatem omnino continere magnae est virtutis et dignitatis. — Et sic patent ea quae obiiciuntur8.

DUB. IV.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Completo numero, sine morte corpora in aliam qualitatem transirent. Videtur enim haec positio esse inconveniens. Primum, quia magnum dispendium esset parentibus, si tanto tempore gloria eorum differretur, quousque electorum numerus impleretur. — Et iterum, si spes, quae differtur, affligit animam9, videtur, quod in eis esset aliqua afflictio. Rursus, cum numerus electorum futurus sit in magna multitudine, quomodo possent omnes homines intra paradisi spatium contineri? Hoc non videtur esse probabile. Si tu dicas, quod propter hoc parentes transferrentur absque aliis10 et glorificarentur; hoc non videtur conveniens, quia ad magnificentiam Dei spectat, omnes simul glorificari, sicut faciet in die iudicii in generali resurrectione.

Responsio. Et dicendum est breviter, quod ista secunda opinio probabilior est, sicut dictae rationes ostendunt. Nec obstat illud de simultate glorificationis; hoc enim magis est propter iudicium et resurrectionem corporum, quam decet esse simul, quam propter beatitudinis collationem. Huius ratio expressius habetur in quarto11, in tractatu de resurrectione.

DUB. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod in parvulis exspectaretur aetas ad ambulandum et loquendum, sicut modo. Hanc enim opinionem videtur Magister approbare. Sed contra hoc est verbum Augustini12 praecedens paulo ante hoc. Dicit enim sic: «Infirmitati mentis congruit haec infirmitas carnis». — Item, si natura humana potentior et nobilior est quam brutalis, et quorundam animalium fetus statim, cum nascuntur, possunt ambulare: multo fortius videtur, quod filii hominum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod Magister nullam istarum opinionum intendit asserere; et dubium est, Notandum. utrum sic, vel sic esset; nihilominus tamen hanc opinionem approbat tanquam probabiliorem, quae dicit, parvulos paulative proficere et crescere ad usum membrorum. Nec hoc dicit sine ratione. Teneritudo enim membrorum debetur proli hominis propter bonitatem complexionis et congruentiam naturae, quae procedit a debiliori complexione ad fortiorem; unde parvuli habent teneriora membra quam adulti. Processus autem in incremento non p. 489 esset miraculosus, sed naturalis, etiam tempore naturae institutae; et ideo rationabiliter Magister hunc modum dicendi magis approbat. Verbum autem Augustini praecedens intelligitur de infantia ratione incommodorum concomitantium eam, non ratione imperfectionis membrorum. — Aliud13 quod obiicitur de illis generibus animalium, non valet, quia alterius sunt complexionis et organizationis.

DUB. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Parvulos per intervallum temporis in sensu et cognitione proficere. Cum enim anima rationalis non senescit in tempore14, non videtur secundum conditiones temporis alterari: ergo videtur, quod processu temporis non efficeretur magis sciens, cum non haberet in scientia per tempora alterari. — Item, Deus fecit animam Adae perfectam scientia15: ergo pari ratione fecisset animam filiorum, si ipse stetisset.

Respondeo: Dicendum ad hoc, quod haec est probabilior positio, quod aliquo modo per intervalla temporum in sensu et cognitione profecissent. Notandum. Anima enim, dum est in corpore, complexionem corporis imitatur. Et quoniam in infantia16 est mollis et fluida complexio cerebri, ideo non potest ibi esse fortis impressio specierum nec fortis conversio super illas. Unde sicut facies non relucet in aqua mota, sic parvuli non essent idonei statim ad usum cognitionis.

Quod ergo obiicitur, quod anima non alteratur in tempore; verum est, quantum est de se, sed ratione corporis17, cui coniungitur, quod crescit et in tempore fortificatur. — Ad aliud vero quod obiicit, quod haberet habitum; dicendum, quod si puer haberet scientiam quantum ad habitum, non tamen haberet quantum ad actualem considerationem propter organi ineptitudinem, sicut etiam non habent dormientes. Unde sicut parvuli baptizati dicuntur habere virtutes «in munere, non in usu18» vel actu; sic intelligendum est, parvulos illos scientiam habuisse; et postmodum, complexione facta habili ad considerandum, statim essent in actu considerationis sine penuria et labore; et potissime verum esset in eis illud verbum Philosophi19, quod dicit, quod «in sedendo et in quiescendo fit anima prudens et sciens», cum sessio et quies dicatur contra motum et fluxibilitatem complexionis.

DUB. VII.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: Praeceptum addidit obedientiae; quare Dominus addidit praeceptum super praeceptum? Et quare tot fuerunt praecepta, quae homini dedit? Et iterum, quare praeceptum obedientiae sive disciplinae potius fuit negativum quam affirmativum?

Responsio. Respondendum est ad hoc breviter, quod tria Dominus fecit eis praecepta in principio, unum scilicet quod fuit: Crescite et multiplicamini20. Aliud fuit: De omni ligno paradisi comedite. Tertium fuit: De ligno autem scientiae boni et mali nolite comedere. — Numerus autem et sufficientia istorum praeceptorum potest sumi dupliciter. Congruentia 1. Uno modo sic: quoddam enim est praeceptum, quod ordinat ad Deum; et istud fuit praeceptum obedientiae. Quoddam, quod ordinat ad proximum; et illud fuit praeceptum de multiplicando genere. Quoddam, quod ordinat ad se ipsum; et hoc fuit praeceptum de comestione. — Congruentia 2. Secundo modo sic, ut quoddam praeceptum respiciat corpus, et hoc est praeceptum de comedendo; quoddam respiciat animam, et hoc est praeceptum de abstinendo, quod est obedientiae meritum; quoddam coniunctum, et hoc est praeceptum de consimili multiplicando. — Praeceptum autem disciplinae fuit negativum, ut facilior esset eius observantia, et homo non posset de transgressione vel omissione habere excusationem. — Et in hoc terminatur totalis illa pars huius libri, quae est de hominis constitutione.

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English Translation

DUB. I.

In this part there are questions on the letter, and first it is asked concerning that which he says, that the infirmity prone to the ruin of turpitude is taken up [excused] by the honor of marriage. For from this he seems to say that this act cannot be performed without sin and turpitude. But to the contrary: every act which is in a precept can be done without sin; therefore so too can intercourse.

I respond: It must be said that this1 is not said of the turpitude which sounds [unto] fault, but rather of that which sounds [unto] punishment; or if it be understood of the former, then marriage so takes up the proneness of the flesh that the act can be performed without any sin. Hence what the Master says — that marriage orders that act — is not to be understood by reason of any disorder which is in that act, but of that which would be in it were there no marriage; on this however a fuller treatment will be given in the fourth [book]2, in the tract on matrimony.

DUB. II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that in paradise the nuptials would be honorable. For it seems that they are likewise honorable in the state of the Church, since they are a great Sacrament, as the Apostle says to the Ephesians, chapter five3, and since also they are approved by natural law. If you say that the honorability of marriage is to be considered with respect to the act itself, then it is asked why this honest and chaste act should be done with shame rather than another act in which there is the disorder of fault; for a man is more ashamed of that act honestly and chastely performed than of another disordered act, such as to know one's wife rather than to strike a servant.

I respond: It must be said that marriage may be spoken of with respect to what is signified, with respect to fruit, and with respect to act; and with respect to these three they were honorable in paradise. Distinction. But in the state of misery, although they are honorable as to what is signified and as to fruit, they nevertheless have shame attached as to the act, because every man who uses reason is ashamed to exercise that act before others, even with his own wife. — Reason. And Augustine assigns the reason for this in the fourteenth [book] of the City of God4: because, since reason ought to dominate the body, it is more ashamed that it itself should be subjected to some part of the body, and that some part of the body should dominate it, than that it itself should disorderedly dominate itself; and therefore one is more ashamed of the ardor of lust which is in that act than of the perturbation of fury which is in upbraiding a servant.

DUB. III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: God had not yet commanded that they should come together. For this seems to be false, because it is said in Genesis 15: Increase and multiply and fill the earth; and it is clear that this was said with respect to the act of the generative [power]: therefore etc. — Incidental question 1. In connection with this it is asked whether that command bound all. If yes: then it seems they transgressed, since they did not come together in the state of innocence; if no: then it seems they could continually preserve virginity.

Question 2. Likewise I ask whether that command still remains. If it remains: then it is not lawful for anyone to preserve virginity, which is against the Apostle, who says in 1 Corinthians 76: I wish all of you to be as I am; he is speaking of chastity. If it does not bind now, I ask: when was it revoked? And it would also seem that men are now in a better condition than then, because now they can preserve virginity, but then they could not.

I respond: It must be said that that command To question 1. was given to man and woman in the state of innocence; but since it was an affirmative command, it did not bind always, but for [a given] place and time. The determination of the time however depended on the revelation of the divine will; and because7 God had not yet revealed it to them, therefore the Master says that he had not yet commanded.

To question 2. To that which is asked, whether that command was revoked; it must be said that it bound differently in the time of nature instituted, differently now. For then it bound all, because for all it was a duty; but now it does not bind all, because there are many who suffice to fulfill it, while others observe the counsel of virginity. This counsel however befits the state of fallen nature, not the state of nature instituted, because then, when there was no proneness, it would not be a greater virtue to abstain than to marry, and all would generate offspring for the worship of God; but now, because of the difficulty and arduousness, to abstain altogether is of great virtue and dignity. — And thus the things objected8 are clear.

DUB. IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: When the number had been completed, bodies would pass without death into another quality. For this position seems to be unsuitable. First, because it would be a great loss for the parents if their glory were deferred for so long, until the number of the elect should be filled. — And again, if hope deferred afflicts the soul9, it seems there would be some affliction in them. Again, since the number of the elect that was to be would be in a great multitude, how could all men be contained within the space of paradise? This does not seem probable. If you say that for this reason the parents would be translated apart from the others10 and glorified; this does not seem fitting, because it pertains to the magnificence of God that all be glorified together, as he will do on the day of judgment in the general resurrection.

Response. And it must be said briefly that this second opinion is more probable, as the stated reasons show. Nor does that consideration about the simultaneity of glorification stand in the way; for this is rather on account of the judgment and the resurrection of bodies — which it is fitting should be together — than on account of the bestowal of beatitude. The reason for this is more expressly given in the fourth [book]11, in the tract on the resurrection.

DUB. V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that in little ones an age would be awaited for walking and speaking, just as now. For this opinion the Master seems to approve. But against this is the word of Augustine12 preceding a little before this. For he says thus: «To the infirmity of the mind this infirmity of the flesh corresponds». — Likewise, if human nature is more powerful and nobler than the brute, and the offspring of certain animals, as soon as they are born, can walk: much more does it seem that the sons of men [could].

I respond: It must be said that the Master does not intend to assert any of these opinions; and it is in doubt, Note. whether it would be thus or thus; nevertheless he approves this opinion as more probable, which says that little ones gradually advance and grow to the use of [their] members. Nor does he say this without reason. For the tenderness of members is due to the offspring of man on account of the goodness of his complexion and the congruity of [his] nature, which proceeds from a weaker complexion to a stronger; whence little ones have more tender members than adults. The process however in growth would not have been miraculous, but natural, even in the time of nature instituted; and therefore the Master more reasonably approves this way of speaking. The preceding word of Augustine is to be understood of infancy by reason of the inconveniences accompanying it, not by reason of imperfection of the members. — The other thing13 which is objected concerning those kinds of animals does not hold, because they are of a different complexion and organization.

DUB. VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: That little ones advance over an interval of time in sense and cognition. For since the rational soul does not grow old in time14, it does not seem to be altered according to the conditions of time: therefore it seems that with the passage of time it would not be made more knowing, since it would not have anything in knowledge to be altered through times. — Likewise, God made the soul of Adam perfect in knowledge15: therefore by the same reason he would have made the soul of [his] sons [perfect in knowledge], had he himself stood.

I respond: It must be said to this, that this is the more probable position, that in some way they would have advanced through intervals of times in sense and cognition. Note. For the soul, while it is in the body, imitates the complexion of the body. And since in infancy16 the complexion of the brain is soft and fluid, therefore there cannot there be a strong impression of species nor a strong conversion upon them. Hence just as a face does not shine back in moved water, so little ones would not be apt straightway for the use of cognition.

To what is objected, that the soul is not altered in time; it is true so far as the soul is concerned in itself, but by reason of the body17 to which it is joined — which grows and is strengthened in time. — To the other [objection], that he would have a habit; it must be said that if a boy had knowledge as to habit, he would not nevertheless have it as to actual consideration, on account of the ineptitude of the organ, as also those who sleep do not. Hence just as baptized little ones are said to have the virtues «in endowment, not in use18» or in act; so it is to be understood that those little ones had knowledge; and afterwards, when the complexion had been made apt for considering, they would straightway be in act of consideration without lack and labor; and most truly would that word of the Philosopher19 hold in them, which says that «in sitting and in being at rest the soul becomes prudent and knowing», since sitting and rest are said as against motion and the fluctuation of complexion.

DUB. VII.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: He added a precept of obedience; why did the Lord add precept upon precept? And why were there so many precepts which he gave to man? And again, why was the precept of obedience or discipline rather negative than affirmative?

Response. It must be answered to this briefly, that the Lord made for them three precepts at the beginning, namely, first, that which was: Increase and multiply20. The other was: Eat of every tree of paradise. The third was: But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil eat not. — The number however and sufficiency of these precepts can be taken in two ways. Congruity 1. In one way thus: for there is a certain precept which orders toward God, and this was the precept of obedience. Another, which orders toward the neighbor; and this was the precept of multiplying the race. Another, which orders toward oneself; and this was the precept of eating. — Congruity 2. In a second way thus, that one precept regards the body, and this is the precept of eating; another regards the soul, and this is the precept of abstaining, which is the merit of obedience; another conjoined, and this is the precept of multiplying the like. — But the precept of discipline was negative, in order that the keeping of it might be easier, and that man might not have any excuse for transgression or omission. — And in this terminates that whole part of this book which is on the constitution of man.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Aliqui codd. et ed. 1 dubitationes.
    Some codices and edition 1 read dubitations.
  2. Vat. cum edd. 3, 4 hic.
    The Vatican edition with editions 3 and 4 reads here.
  3. Dist. 31. a. 1. q. 1. et a. 2. q. 1. — De hoc dubio cfr. B. Albert., hic a. 6; S. Thom., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 3.
    Distinction 31, article 1, question 1, and article 2, question 1. — On this doubt cf. Bl. Albert, here at article 6; St. Thomas, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 3.
  4. Vers. 32. — Paulo inferius post actus ille nonnulli codd. et ed. 1 bene interiiciunt cum est (cod. Z qui est), ac subinde cum pluribus aliis codd. et edd. 2, 3, 4 pro sit substituunt fit. Dein cod. aa post quam subiungit aliquis.
    Verse 32. — A little further on, after actus ille, several codices and edition 1 rightly insert cum est (cod. Z reads qui est), and then with several other codices and editions 2, 3, 4 substitute fit for sit. Then cod. aa after quam adds aliquis.
  5. Cap. 16. 19. et 23. n. 2. seq. — Idem dub. solvunt S. Thom. et Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit., Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 4. — Paulo inferius pro dominetur sibi; et ideo Vat. dominetur ei, ideo. In fine dubii pro convitiando nonnulli codd. comminando.
    Chapter 16, 19, and 23, no. 2 and following. — The same doubt is solved by St. Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, here in the comment on the letter, [and] Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 4. — A little further on, for dominetur sibi; et ideo the Vatican reads dominetur ei, ideo. At the end of the doubt, for convitiando some codices read comminando.
  6. Vers. 28.
    Verse 28 [of Genesis 1].
  7. Vers. 7, ubi Vulgata: Volo enim, omnes vos esse sicut meipsum.
    Verse 7, where the Vulgate reads: For I wish all of you to be as myself.
  8. Cod. T quare.
    Codex T reads quare [why].
  9. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 89. m. 4; S. Thom., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 5.
    Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa part II, question 89, member 4; St. Thomas and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 5.
  10. Prov. 13, 12.
    Proverbs 13:12.
  11. Haud pauci codd. cum ed. 1 filiis. Paulo ante complures codd. et ed. 1, verbis transpositis, sic: Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod parentes. Cod. N omnes electi pro omnes homines.
    Not a few codices with edition 1 read filiis [sons]. A little earlier several codices and edition 1, with the words transposed, read thus: Si tu dicas propter hoc, quod parentes. Cod. N reads all the elect for all men.
  12. Dist. 43. a. 1. q. 3. Cfr. Petr. a Tar., et Richard. a Med., hic circa lit.; Aegid. R., hic dub. lit. 6.
    Distinction 43, article 1, question 3. Cf. Peter of Tarentaise and Richard of Mediavilla, here in the comment on the letter; Aegidius Romanus, here at the doubt on the letter, no. 6.
  13. Libr. I. de Peccatorum merit. et remiss. et bapt. parvul. c. 38. n. 69, qui locus allegatur hic in lit. Magistri, c. 4, ubi etiam sequens ratio exhibetur.
    Book I On the Merits and Remission of Sins and on the Baptism of Little Ones, c. 38, n. 69, which passage is cited here in the Master's letter, c. 4, where also the following reason is set out.
  14. Vat. et aliae edd. non bene Ad illud. — De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 3; B. Albert., hic a. 7; S. p. II. tr. 14. q. 83, ubi etiam seq. dubium solvitur; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 1; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 2; Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2; Aegid. R., hic q. 2. a. 2.
    The Vatican and other editions less well read Ad illud. — On this doubt cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa part II, question 90, member 3; Bl. Albert, here at article 7; [and] Summa part II, tract 14, question 83, where also the following doubt is solved; St. Thomas, here question 2, article 1; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 2, article 2; Richard of Mediavilla, here at article 2, question 2; Aegidius Romanus, here at question 2, article 2.
  15. Cfr. supra pag. 459, nota 6. — Pro non senescit Vat. senescit tantum; perperam.
    Cf. above page 459, note 6. — For non senescit the Vatican reads senescit only; wrongly.
  16. Ut ostenditur infra d. 23. a. 2. q. 1.
    As is shown below at distinction 23, article 2, question 1.
  17. Ante infantia vocula in a nobis inserta est, licet in omnibus codd. et edd. desideretur. Constat, in codd. antiquis aliqua particula saepissime a librariis omitti, quando repetitur.
    Before infantia the little word in has been inserted by us, although in all the codices and editions it is wanting. It is known that in ancient codices some particle is very often omitted by the scribes when it is repeated.
  18. Supple: alteratur. — Deinde Vat. omittit quod, postea pro habitum, scil. scientiae, substituit scientiam, et, suppressa voce puer, prosequitur: dicendum, quod etsi haberet.
    Supply: alteratur [is altered]. — Then the Vatican omits quod; afterwards for habitum, namely of knowledge, it substitutes scientiam; and, suppressing the word puer, it continues: dicendum, quod etsi haberet.
  19. Ut dicit Magister, IV. Sent. d. IV. in fine.
    As the Master says, Sentences IV, distinction 4, at the end.
  20. Libr. VII. Phys. text. 20. (c. 3.), ubi et haec sententia: Neque igitur pueri possunt quid discere neque iudicare similiter ac seniores; multa enim perturbatio circa ipsos fit et motus. Sedantur autem et desinunt perturbationes aliquando quidem a natura, aliquando vero ab aliis etc. — Hoc dubium solvunt etiam Alex. Hal., S. p. II. q. 90. m. 2; S. Thom., hic q. 2. a. 2; Petr. a Tar., hic q. 2. a. 4; Richard. a Med., hic q. 2. a. 3. — Pro quod dicit nonnulli codd. qui dicit.
    Book VII of the Physics, text 20 (c. 3), where also this sentence: Therefore neither can boys learn anything nor judge in like manner as the elders; for there is much perturbation about them and motion. The perturbations are quieted however and cease, sometimes indeed from nature, but sometimes from other things, etc. — This doubt is also solved by Alexander of Hales, Summa part II, question 90, member 2; St. Thomas, here question 2, article 2; Peter of Tarentaise, here question 2, article 4; Richard of Mediavilla, here question 2, article 3. — For quod dicit some codices read qui dicit. Note: Genesis 1:28 (Crescite et multiplicamini) is cited in the body of DUB. VII without a numbered footer anchor; the editors' note on it sits with the following NOTAE block tied to the d.21 littera on p. 489 R-2 and migrates forward. ---
← Dist. 20, Art. 1, Q. 6