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Dist. 22

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 22

Textus Latinus
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DISTINCTIO XXII.

Cap. I.

De origine illius peccati.

Hic videtur diligenter investigandum esse, quae fuerit origo et radix illius peccati. — Quidam putant, quandam elationem in animo hominis praecessisse, ex qua diaboli suggestioni consensit. Quod videtur Augustinus innuere super Genesim1, ita dicens: « Non est putandum, quod homo deiiceretur, nisi praecessisset in eo quaedam elatio comprimenda, ut per humilitatem peccati sciret, quam falso de se praesumserit, et quod non bene se habet natura, si a faciente recesserit ». Item in eodem: « Quomodo verbis tentatoris crederet mulier, Deum se a re bona et utili prohibuisse, nisi inesset eius menti amor ille propriae potestatis et de se superba praesumtio, quae per tentationem fuerat convincenda aut perimenda? Denique non contenta suasione serpentis, aspexit2 lignum bonum esu, decorum aspectu; nec credens, se inde posse mori, forte putavit, Deum alicuius causa significationis illa dixisse. Ideo manducavit et dedit viro suo, fortassis cum aliqua suasione, quam Scriptura intelligendam reliquit. Vel forte non fuit suaderi necesse, cum eam mortuam esse illo cibo non videret vir ». « Sicut ergo non est permissus diabolus tentare feminam nisi per serpentem, ita nec virum nisi per feminam », ut, sicut praeceptum Dei per virum venit ad mulierem, ita diaboli tentatio per mulierem transiret ad virum. « In muliere vero, quae rationalis erat, non est ipse locutus, ut in serpente, sed persuasio eius, quamvis instinctu adiuvaret interius, quod per serpentem gerebat exterius ». — Ex praedictis tentationis modus atque progressus insinuatur, nec non etiam quod praediximus innui videtur, scilicet quod tentationem praecesserit quaedam elatio et praesumtio in mente hominis.

Quod si ita fuit, non igitur alterius suggestione prius peccavit, cum auctoritas3 tradat, ideo peccatum diaboli incurabile esse, quia non suggestione, sed propria superbia cecidit; hominis vero curabile, quia non per se, sed per alium cecidit, et ideo per alium resurgere potuit. Quocirca praedicta verba Augustini pium ac diligentem lectorem efflagitant, quae sic intelligere sane quimus: non deiiceretur homo, scilicet in actum illius peccati, ut scilicet lignum vetitum ederet, et in has miserias per tentationem diaboli, nisi elatio comprimenda praecessisset, non utique tentationem, sed opus peccati. Talis enim fuit ordinis processus: diabolus tentando dixit: Si comederitis, eritis sicut dii, scientes bonum et malum; quo audito statim menti mulieris surrepsit elatio quaedam et amor propriae potestatis; ex quo placuit ei facere quod diabolus suadebat, et utique fecit. Suggestione igitur peccavit, quia tentatio praecessit, ex qua in mente eius orta est elatio, quam peccatum operis secutum est et poena peccati.

Cap. II.

De mulieris elatione.

Et talis quidem elatio in mente mulieris fuit certo, qua credidit et voluit habere similitudinem Dei cum aequalitate quadam, putans, id esse verum quod diabolus dicebat. Et ideo specialiter mulierem commemorat Augustinus4 inquiens: « Quomodo crederet mulier diabolo, nisi esset in mente eius de se superba praesumtio »? Et quod ibi sequitur, scilicet, « quae per tentationem fuerat convincenda, vel perimenda »; ad mulierem referendum est, ut intelligatur quae mulier, non elatio, fuerat per tentationem etc.

Cap. III.

De viri elatione.

Solet quaeri, utrum illa talis elatio et amor propriae potestatis in viro fuerit, sicut in muliere. — Ad quod dicimus, quod Adam non fuit seductus5 eo modo, quo mulier; non enim putavit, esse verum quod diabolus suggerebat. In eo tamen fuisse seductum credi potest, quod commissum veniale putaverit, quod peremptorium erat. Sed nec prior seductus fuit, nec in eo in quo mulier, ut crederet, Deum illud lignum ideo tangere prohibuisse, quoniam, si tangeret, fierent sicut dii. Verumtamen praevaricator fuit Adam, ut testatur Apostolus. Potuit ergo aliqua elatio menti eius inesse illico post tentationem, ex qua voluit lignum vetitum experiri, cum mulierem non videret mortuam, esca illa percepta. Unde Augustinus super Genesim6: « Cum Apostolus Adam praevaricatorem fuisse ostendat dicens: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae, seductum tamen negat, ubi ait: Adam non est seductus, sed mulier. Unde et interrogatus non ait: Mulier seduxit me; sed: Dedit mihi et comedi. Mulier vero inquit: Serpens seduxit me ». Hanc autem seductionem7 proprie vocavit Apostolus, per quam id quod suadebatur, cum falsum esset, verum putatum est, scilicet quod Deus lignum illud ideo tangere prohibuerit, quia sciebat, eos, si tetigissent, sicut deos futuros, tanquam eis divinitatem invideret, qui eos homines fecerat. « Sed etsi virum propter aliquam mentis elationem, quae Deum latere non poterat, sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum mulierem videret, accepta illa esca, non esse mortuam; non tamen eum arbitror, si iam spirituali mente praeditus erat, ullo modo credidisse quod diabolus suggerebat8 ».

Cap. IV.

Quis magis deliquerit, vir, an mulier.

Ex quo manifeste animadverti potest, quis eorum plus peccaverit, Adam scilicet, vel Eva. Plus enim videtur peccasse mulier, quae voluit usurpare divinitatis aequalitatem et nimia praesumtione elata credidit, ita esse futurum9. « Adam vero nec illud credidit, et de poenitentia et Dei misericordia cogitavit, dum uxori morem gerens, eius persuasioni consensit, nolens eam contristare et a se alienatam relinquere, ne periret, arbitratus, illud esse veniale, non mortale delictum ». Unde Augustinus10: « Apostolus inquit: Adam non est seductus; quod utique ita accipi potest, ut intelligatur non esse seductus prior scilicet, vel in eo in quo mulier, ut scilicet crederet, illud esse verum: Eritis sicut dii11; sed putavit, utrumque posse fieri, ut et uxori morem gereret et per poenitentiam veniam haberet. Minus ergo peccavit qui de poenitentia et Dei misericordia cogitavit ». « Postquam enim mulier manducavit eique dedit, ut simul ederent, nolens eam contristare, quam credebat sine suo solatio intabescere et a se alienatam omnino interire; non eidem carnali victus concupiscentia, quam nondum senserat, sed amicabili quadam benevolentia, qua plerumque fit, ut offendatur Deus, ne offendatur amicus; et eum facere non debuisse, divinae sententiae iustus actus indicavit ». « Ergo alio quodam modo ipse etiam deceptus est ». « Inexpertus enim divinae severitatis falli potuit, ut veniale crederet esse commissum12 »; « sed dolo illo serpentino, quo mulier seducta est, nullo modo arbitror illum potuisse seduci ». — Ex quo datur intelligi, quod mulier plus peccaverit, in qua maioris tumoris praesumtio fuit; quae etiam in se maximum et in Deum peccavit, vir autem tantum in se et in Deum. Inde etiam colligitur, quod mulier plus peccaverit, quia gravius punita est, cui dicitur: In dolore paries filios13 etc.

Sed huic videtur contrarium quod Augustinus super Genesim14 de viro et muliere peccatum suum excusantibus ait: « Dixit Adam: Mulier, quam dedisti mihi, dedit mihi de ligno, et comedi; non dicit: Peccavi. Superbia enim habet confusionis deformitatem, non confessionis humilitatem ». « Nec etiam mulier confessa est peccatum, sed refert in alterum, dicens: Serpens decepit me, et comedi, in impari sexu, sed pari ». — Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, quia parem fastum habuit mulier cum viro; pariter ergo superbierunt et pariter peccaverunt. — Sed hoc ita determinari potest, ut dicamus, parem utriusque fuisse fastum in causatione peccati et etiam in esu ligni vetiti, sed parem et in muliere multo maiorem in eo, quod credidit et voluit esse sicut Deus, quod non vir. — Verumtamen et de viro legitur, quod voluit esse sicut Deus. Dicit enim Augustinus super illum locum Psalmistam15: Quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam: « Rapuit Adam et Eva, praesumentes, ut diabolus, de divinitate; rapere voluerunt divinitatem, et perdiderunt felicitatem ». Item super illum locum: Deus, quis similis erit tibi? « Qui per se vult esse ut Deus, perverse vult esse similis Deo, ut diabolus, qui noluit sub eo esse, homo, qui ut servus noluit teneri praecepto, sed voluit, ut nullo sibi dominante, esset quasi Deus ». Item, super illum Epistolae16 locum: Non rapinam arbitratus est, se esse aequalem Deo: « Quia non usurpavit quod suum non esset, ut diabolus et primus homo ».

Ideo quibusdam videtur, quod etiam Adam ambivit esse sicut Deus, non tamen credidit17, id fieri posse; et ideo falsum esse quod diabolus promittebat, cognovit. Et licet divinitatis aequalitatem concupierit, non tamen adeo exarsit nec tanta est affectus ambitione, sicut mulier, quae illud fieri posse putavit, et ideo magis illud ambiendo superbivit. Virum autem aliqua forte ambitionis subreptio movit, sed non ita, ut illud putaret verum vel possibile fore. — Aliis18 autem videtur ideo dictum esse, quod Adam illud voluerit, quia mulier de eo sumta illud voluit, sicut, inquiunt, peccatum dicitur per unum hominem intrasse in mundum19, id est in humanam naturam, cum tamen mulier ante virum peccaverit, quia per mulierem intraverit de viro factam. Vel potius ideo per hominem dicitur intrasse, quia, etiam peccante muliere, si vir non peccasset, humanum genus minime peccatis corruptum periret. Minus ergo peccavit vir quam mulier.

His autem opponi solet hoc modo: « Tribus modis, ut Isidorus20 ait, peccatum geritur, scilicet ignorantia, infirmitate, industria. Et gravius est infirmitate peccare quam ignorantia, graviusque industria quam infirmitate. Eva autem videtur ex ignorantia peccasse, quia seducta fuit, Adam vero ex industria, quia non fuit seductus, ut Apostolus ait ». — Ad quod dicimus, quia, licet Eva in hoc per ignorantiam deliquerit, quod putavit, verum esse quod diabolus suadebat, non tamen in hoc, quin noverit, illud Dei esse mandatum, et peccatum esse contra agere. Et ideo excusari a peccato per ignorantiam non potuit.

Cap. V.

De ignorantia excusabili et inexcusabili.

Est enim ignorantia, quae excusat peccantem; et est ignorantia talis, quae non excusat; est autem ignorantia vincibilis, et ignorantia invincibilis. Excusatio omnis tollitur, ubi mandatum non ignoratur. Est autem ignorantia triplex: et eorum scilicet qui scire nolunt, cum possint, quae non excusat, quia et ipsa peccatum est; et eorum qui volunt, sed non possunt, quae excusat et est poena peccati, non peccatum; et eorum qui quasi simpliciter nesciunt, non renuentes vel proponentes scire, quae neminem plene excusat, sed sic fortasse, ut minus puniatur. Unde Augustinus ad Valentinum21: « Eis aufertur excusatio, qui mandata Dei noverunt, quam solent habere homines de ignorantia ». « Et licet gravius sit peccare scienter quam nescienter, non ideo tamen confugiendum est ad ignorantiae tenebras, ut in eis quisquam excusationem requirat. Aliud est enim nescisse, aliud scire noluisse », « quia in eis qui intelligere noluerunt, ipsa ignorantia peccatum est; in eis vero qui non potuerunt, poena peccati22 ». « Ignorantia vero, quae non est eorum qui scire nolunt, sed eorum qui tanquam simpliciter nesciunt, nullum sic excusat, ut aeterno igne non ardeat, sed fortasse, ut minus ardeat ». — Non igitur mulier excusationem habuit de ignorantia, cum et mandatum noverit, et peccatum esse secus agere non ignoraverit.

Cap. VI.

An voluntas praecesserit illud peccatum.

Solet etiam quaeri, cum sine vitio esset natura hominis, unde consensus mali processerit. — Ad quod responderi potest, quia ex libero arbitrio propriae voluntatis fuit. In eo23 ipso enim et in alio causa exstitit, ut fieret deterior: in alio, quia in diabolo, qui suasit; in ipso, quia voluntate liberi arbitrii consensit. Et cum liberum arbitrium sit bonum, ex re utique bona malus ille consensus provenit, et ita ex bono malum manavit. De hoc autem in sequenti24 plenius tractabimus, cum origo mali, et in qua re coalescat, investigabitur.

Si vero quaeritur, utrum voluntas illud peccatum praecesserit; dicimus, quia peccatum illud et in voluntate et in actu constitit25, et voluntas actum praecessit; sed ipsam voluntatem alia hominis voluntas mala non praecessit, atque ex diaboli persuasione et hominis arbitrio illa voluntas mala prodiit, qua iustitiam deseruit et iniquitatem inchoavit; et ipsa voluntas iniquitas fuit.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XXII.

Chapter I.

On the origin of that sin.

Here it seems it must be diligently investigated what was the origin and root of that sin. — Some suppose that a certain elation preceded in the mind of man, from which he consented to the suggestion of the devil. This Augustine seems to suggest on Genesis1, saying thus: “It is not to be supposed that man was cast down unless there had first been in him a certain elation to be checked, so that through the humility of sin he might know how falsely he had presumed of himself, and that nature does not stand well if it withdraws from its Maker.” Likewise in the same place: “How would the woman believe the words of the tempter, that God had forbidden her a good and useful thing, unless there were in her mind that love of her own power and a proud presumption about herself, which was to be convinced or destroyed by the temptation? Finally, not content with the persuasion of the serpent, she looked upon2 the tree as good for food and fair to the sight; and not believing that she could thereby die, she perhaps supposed that God had said that for the sake of some signification. Therefore she ate and gave to her husband, perhaps with some persuasion which Scripture has left to be understood. Or perhaps it was not necessary to persuade him, since the husband did not see her dead from that food.” “Therefore, just as the devil was not permitted to tempt the woman except through the serpent, so neither the man except through the woman,” so that, just as the precept of God came to the woman through the man, so the temptation of the devil might pass to the man through the woman. “But in the woman, who was rational, he did not himself speak, as in the serpent, but his persuasion did, although by an interior instinct he was aiding what through the serpent he carried on outwardly.” — From the foregoing the manner and progress of the temptation is intimated, and also what we said before seems to be suggested, namely that a certain elation and presumption preceded the temptation in the mind of man.

But if this was so, then he did not sin first by another’s suggestion, since authority3 hands down that the sin of the devil is therefore incurable, because he fell not by suggestion but by his own pride; but that of man is curable, because he fell not through himself but through another, and therefore could rise again through another. Wherefore the foresaid words of Augustine demand a devout and diligent reader, which we can soundly understand thus: man was not cast down, namely into the act of that sin, that is, that he should eat the forbidden tree, and into these miseries through the temptation of the devil, unless an elation to be checked had preceded — not indeed the temptation, but the work of the sin. For such was the process of the order: the devil in tempting said: If you eat, you shall be as gods, knowing good and evil; and on hearing this there crept at once into the mind of the woman a certain elation and love of her own power; from which it pleased her to do what the devil was urging, and indeed she did it. Therefore she sinned by suggestion, because the temptation preceded, from which there arose in her mind the elation, which the work of the sin followed, and the punishment of the sin.

Chapter II.

On the elation of the woman.

And such elation was certainly in the mind of the woman, by which she believed and willed to have the likeness of God with a certain equality, supposing that what the devil said was true. And therefore Augustine specially mentions the woman4, saying: “How would the woman believe the devil, unless there were in her mind a proud presumption about herself?” And what follows there, namely, “which was to be convinced or destroyed by the temptation,” is to be referred to the woman, so that it is understood who, that is the woman, not the elation, was [to be convinced] by the temptation, etc.

Chapter III.

On the elation of the man.

It is wont to be asked whether such elation and love of one’s own power was in the man as in the woman. — To which we say that Adam was not seduced5 in the manner in which the woman was; for he did not suppose that what the devil was suggesting was true. Yet he can be believed to have been seduced in this, that he supposed what was deadly to be a venial offense. But he was not seduced first, nor in that in which the woman was, namely to believe that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because, if they touched it, they would become as gods. Nevertheless Adam was a transgressor, as the Apostle testifies. There could therefore have been some elation in his mind immediately after the temptation, from which he willed to try the forbidden tree, since he did not see the woman dead after that food was taken. Hence Augustine on Genesis6: “Since the Apostle shows that Adam was a transgressor, saying: After the likeness of the transgression of Adam, yet he denies that he was seduced, where he says: Adam was not seduced, but the woman. Hence also, when questioned, he did not say: The woman seduced me; but: She gave me, and I ate. But the woman said: The serpent seduced me.” Now the Apostle properly called this a seduction7, by which that which was urged, though false, was supposed to be true, namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because He knew that they, if they touched it, would be as gods, as though He envied them the divinity, He who had made them men. “But even if some desire of experiencing solicited the man on account of some elation of mind, which could not be hidden from God, when he saw the woman, after that food was taken, not to be dead; yet I do not think that he, if he was already endowed with a spiritual mind, in any way believed what the devil was suggesting8.”

Chapter IV.

Who sinned more, the man or the woman.

From this it can be clearly observed which of them sinned more, namely Adam, or Eve. For the woman seems to have sinned more, who willed to usurp equality of divinity and, lifted up by excessive presumption, believed it would be so9. “But Adam neither believed that, and thought of penance and of God’s mercy, when, complying with his wife, he consented to her persuasion, not willing to grieve her and leave her alienated from himself, lest she perish, judging that it was a venial, not a mortal, offense.” Hence Augustine10: “The Apostle says: Adam was not seduced; which indeed can be taken so as to be understood that he was not seduced first, namely, or in that in which the woman was, that is, that he should believe that to be true: You shall be as gods11; but he supposed that both could be done, namely that he should both comply with his wife and through penance have pardon. Therefore he sinned less who thought of penance and of God’s mercy.” “For after the woman ate and gave to him, that they might eat together, not willing to grieve her, whom he believed to pine away without his comfort and, alienated from himself, to perish utterly; not by the concupiscence of carnal food, which he had not yet felt, but by a certain friendly benevolence, by which it often happens that God is offended lest a friend be offended; and the just act of the divine sentence showed that he ought not to have done it.” “Therefore in some other manner he too was deceived.” “For, inexperienced in the divine severity, he could be deceived so as to believe the deed committed to be venial12;” “but by that serpentine guile, by which the woman was seduced, in no way do I think he could have been seduced.” — From which it is given to understand that the woman sinned more, in whom there was a presumption of greater swelling; she also sinned most against herself and against God, but the man only against himself and against God. Hence also it is gathered that the woman sinned more, because she was more grievously punished, to whom it is said: In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children13, etc.

But to this there seems contrary what Augustine on Genesis14 says of the man and the woman excusing their sin: “Adam said: The woman, whom thou gavest me, gave me of the tree, and I ate; he does not say: I have sinned. For pride has the deformity of confusion, not the humility of confession.” “Nor did the woman confess the sin, but refers it to another, saying: The serpent deceived me, and I ate, in unequal sex, but equal.” — Behold, here Augustine says that the woman had pride equal to the man’s; therefore they grew proud equally and sinned equally. — But this can be so determined that we say that the pride of both was equal in the occasioning of the sin and also in the eating of the forbidden tree, but equal and even in the woman much greater in this, that she believed and willed to be as God, which the man did not. — Nevertheless it is read also of the man that he willed to be as God. For Augustine says on that passage of the Psalmist15: What I took not away, then did I pay: “Adam and Eve seized, presuming, as the devil did, concerning divinity; they willed to seize divinity, and lost felicity.” Likewise on that passage: O God, who shall be like to thee? “He who of himself wills to be as God, perversely wills to be like God, as the devil, who would not be under Him, and man, who as a servant would not be held to the precept, but willed, with none lording it over him, to be as it were God.” Likewise, on that passage of the Epistle16: He thought it not robbery to be equal with God: “Because He did not usurp what was not His own, as the devil and the first man did.”

Therefore it seems to some that Adam too aspired to be as God, yet did not believe17 that it could be done; and therefore he knew that what the devil was promising was false. And although he coveted equality of divinity, yet he did not burn for it so greatly nor was affected with so great an ambition, as the woman, who supposed it could be done, and therefore in aspiring to it grew prouder. But some stealth of ambition perhaps moved the man, yet not so as to suppose it to be true or possible. — But to others18 it seems to have been said that Adam willed it because the woman taken from him willed it, just as, they say, sin is said to have entered into the world through one man19, that is, into human nature, although the woman sinned before the man, because it entered through the woman made from the man. Or rather it is said to have entered through man, because, even with the woman sinning, if the man had not sinned, the human race would not have perished corrupted by sins. Therefore the man sinned less than the woman.

But to these it is wont to be objected in this way: “In three ways, as Isidore20 says, sin is committed, namely by ignorance, infirmity, deliberation. And it is more grievous to sin by infirmity than by ignorance, and more grievous by deliberation than by infirmity. But Eve seems to have sinned from ignorance, because she was seduced, but Adam from deliberation, because he was not seduced, as the Apostle says.” — To which we say that, although Eve transgressed in this by ignorance, that she supposed what the devil was urging to be true, yet not in this, but that she knew that it was God’s commandment, and that to act against it was a sin. And therefore she could not be excused from sin by ignorance.

Chapter V.

On excusable and inexcusable ignorance.

For there is an ignorance which excuses the sinner; and there is such an ignorance as does not excuse; and there is vincible ignorance and invincible ignorance. All excuse is taken away where the commandment is not unknown. Now ignorance is threefold: namely of those who will not know, when they can — which does not excuse, because it is itself a sin; and of those who will but cannot — which excuses and is a punishment of sin, not a sin; and of those who as it were simply do not know, not refusing nor proposing to know — which excuses no one fully, but perhaps so that he may be less punished. Hence Augustine to Valentinus21: “The excuse which men are wont to have from ignorance is taken away from those who have known the commandments of God.” “And although it is more grievous to sin knowingly than unknowingly, not for that reason, however, is one to take refuge in the darkness of ignorance, that anyone may seek therein an excuse. For it is one thing to have been ignorant, another to have been unwilling to know,” “because in those who were unwilling to understand, the ignorance itself is a sin; but in those who could not, it is a punishment of sin22.” “But the ignorance which is not of those who will not know, but of those who as it were simply do not know, excuses no one so that he should not burn in the eternal fire, but perhaps so that he should burn less.” — Therefore the woman did not have an excuse from ignorance, since she both knew the commandment and was not ignorant that to act otherwise was a sin.

Chapter VI.

Whether the will preceded that sin.

It is wont also to be asked, since the nature of man was without fault, whence the consent to evil proceeded. — To which it can be answered that it was from the free choice of one’s own will. For in23 itself and in another there was a cause that it should become worse: in another, because in the devil who urged; in itself, because it consented by the will of free choice. And since free choice is good, from a thing certainly good that evil consent came forth, and so from good evil flowed. But of this we shall treat more fully in what follows24, when the origin of evil, and in what thing it takes root, shall be investigated.

But if it is asked whether the will preceded that sin; we say that the sin consisted both in the will and in the act25, and the will preceded the act; but no other evil will of man preceded the will itself, and from the devil’s persuasion and man’s choice that evil will came forth, by which he forsook justice and began iniquity; and that will itself was iniquity.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Lib. XI. c. 5. n. 7. Seq. textus ibid. c. 30. n. 39, tertius et quartus ibid. c. 27. n. 34. Cfr. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 6.
    (Augustine,) Book XI On Genesis according to the Letter c. 5, n. 7. The following text is from the same place, c. 30, n. 39; the third and fourth from the same place, c. 27, n. 34. Compare Hugh (of St. Victor), Summa Sententiarum tr. 3, c. 6.
  2. Respicitur Gen. 3, 6. seqq. Supra quae intellige: mulier.
    Reference is to Genesis 3:6 ff. Above, understand quae (“which/who”) as: the woman.
  3. Gregor. IV. Moral. c. 13. n. 8, et Anselm., II. Cur Deus homo, c. 22, et August., loc. cit. c. 42. n. 60.
    Gregory, Morals IV, c. 13, n. 8, and Anselm, Why God Became Man II, c. 22, and Augustine, in the cited place, c. 42, n. 60.
  4. Loc. cit. c. 30. n. 39.
    In the cited place, c. 30, n. 39.
  5. I. Tim. 2, 14: Et Adam non est seductus, mulier autem seducta in praevaricatione fuit. — Paulo inferius pro Potuit ergo Vat. cum nonnullis edd. Poterat enim.
    1 Timothy 2:14: “And Adam was not seduced; but the woman, being seduced, was in the transgression.” — A little below, for Potuit ergo (“He could therefore”) the Vatican edition, with some editions, reads Poterat enim (“For he could”).
  6. Lib. XI. c. 42. n. 58, et XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2, et est in Glossa ad I. Tim. 2, 14. — Verba In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae sunt Rom. 5, 14.
    (Augustine,) Book XI On Genesis according to the Letter c. 42, n. 58, and On the City of God XIV, c. 11, n. 2, and it is in the Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14. — The words After the likeness of the transgression of Adam are Romans 5:14.
  7. Quid proprie sit seducere, dicit August., super Evang. Ioan. tr. 29. n. 1.
    What to seduce properly is, Augustine states in his commentary on the Gospel of John, tract 29, n. 1.
  8. August., XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 60, et est in Glossa ad Gen. 3.
    Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter XI, c. 42, n. 60, and it is in the Gloss on Genesis 3.
  9. Codd. B E adiungunt ita esse futurum.
    Codices B, E add ita esse futurum (“that it would be so”).
  10. Libr. XI. de Gen. ad lit. c. 42. n. 58, et seq. loc. ibid. n. 59, tertius etiam ibid. n. 60, sententialiter; sed haec sicut et quae praecedunt et quae sequuntur, verbotenus leguntur in Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. VII. c. 10, et etiam in Sum. Sent. tr. 3. c. 6. Cfr. etiam Glossa in I. Tim. 2, 14.
    (Augustine,) Book XI On Genesis according to the Letter c. 42, n. 58, and the following passage there, n. 59, the third also there, n. 60, in substance; but these, like what precedes and what follows, are read word for word in Hugh (of St. Victor), book On the Sacraments part VII, c. 10, and also in the Summa Sententiarum tr. 3, c. 6. Compare also the Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14.
  11. Gen. 3, 5.
    Genesis 3:5.
  12. August., XIV. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. n. 2; quod sequitur de Gen. ad lit. loc. cit. n. 60.
    Augustine, On the City of God XIV, c. 11, n. 2; what follows is from On Genesis according to the Letter, the cited place, n. 60.
  13. Gen. 3, 16. — Immediate ante pro fuit edd. 1, 8 est.
    Genesis 3:16. — Immediately before, for fuit (“was”) editions 1, 8 read est (“is”).
  14. Lib. XI. c. 35. n. 47. Seq. locus ibid. n. 48. Locus Scripturae est Gen. 3, 12. 13. Cod. Erf. annotat, haec et seqq. usque in finem cap. esse ex Gandolph. II. Sent. c. 181 et 182.
    (Augustine,) Book XI c. 35, n. 47. The following passage is there, n. 48. The Scripture passage is Genesis 3:12–13. Codex Erf. notes that these and the following down to the end of the chapter are from Gandulph, Sentences II, cc. 181 and 182.
  15. Psalm. 68, 5; August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. serm. 2. Cfr. Glossa ibid. — Paulo post pro praesumentes codd. cum paucis edd. praesumens. — Seq. locus Scripturae est Psalm. 70, 19; et August., Enarrat. in hunc Psalm. serm. 2. n. 6, sententialiter, sed fere ad verbum ibi in Glossa.
    Psalm 68:5; Augustine, Enarration on this Psalm, sermon 2. Compare the Gloss there. — A little after, for praesumentes (“presuming,” pl.) the codices with a few editions read praesumens (sg.). — The following Scripture passage is Psalm 70:19; and Augustine, Enarration on this Psalm, sermon 2, n. 6, in substance, but almost word for word there in the Gloss.
  16. Philip. 2, 6; August., tr. 17. in Ioan. n. 16, sententialiter; expressius in Glossa ad loc. cit.
    Philippians 2:6; Augustine, tract 17 on John, n. 16, in substance; more expressly in the Gloss on the cited place.
  17. Vat. cum paucis aliis edd. crediderit.
    The Vatican edition, with a few other editions, reads crediderit (“that he believed,” subjunctive).
  18. Cod. Erf. hic annotat: Gandolphus, II. c. 182, respondet ad primam auctoritatem: Adam et Eva, i. e. alter illorum, ut ibi: Id ipsum properabant latrones, i. e. alter illorum; infra nomine uno hominis in seqq. auctoritatibus Eva intelligitur, vel quia de latere hominis formata est, vel quia de ea omnis homo propagandus erat.
    Codex Erf. notes here: Gandulph, II, c. 182, replies to the first authority: “Adam and Eve,” that is, one of them, as there: The robbers were hastening to the very same thing, that is, one of them; below, under the single name of man in the following authorities, Eve is understood, either because she was formed from the side of man, or because from her all mankind was to be propagated.
  19. Rom. 5, 12. Cfr. August., Enchirid. c. 26. n. 8.
    Romans 5:12. Compare Augustine, Enchiridion c. 26, n. 8.
  20. Sent. sive de Sum. Bono, II. c. 17. n. 3, et Gregor., XXV. Moral. c. 11. n. 28.
    (Isidore,) Sentences or On the Highest Good II, c. 17, n. 3, and Gregory, Morals XXV, c. 11, n. 28.
  21. De Gratia et libero arbitrio, c. 3. n. 5, ubi et seq.
    (Augustine,) On Grace and Free Choice c. 3, n. 5, where also the following.
  22. Prosper, lib. Sent. n. 314. Quod sequitur est August., loc. cit.
    Prosper, book of Sentences n. 314. What follows is Augustine, in the cited place.
  23. Codd. A B C E cum edd. 1, 8, 6 praefigunt Et.
    Codices A, B, C, E with editions 1, 8, 6 prefix Et (“And”).
  24. Infra dist. XXXIV.
    Below, distinction XXXIV.
  25. Vat. cum codd. A E et plurimis aliis edd. minus bene consistit. Mox pro non praecessit omnes codd. cum ed. 1 non praeest.
    The Vatican edition, with codices A, E and most other editions, reads less well consistit (“consists,” present). Soon after, for non praecessit (“did not precede”) all codices with edition 1 read non praeest (“is not over”). ---
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