Dist. 23
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 23
DISTINCTIO XXIII.
Cap. I.
Quare Deus permiserit, hominem tentari, quem sciebat casurum.
Praeterea quaeri solet, « cur Deus hominem tentari permiserit, quem decipiendum esse1 praesciebat. — Sed non esset laudabile homini, si ideo bene vivere posset, quia nemo male vivere suaderet, cum in natura posse et in potestate haberet velle non consentire suadenti, Deo iuvante2 »; « et est gloriosius non consentire quam tentari non posse ». — Moventur etiam quidam dicentes: « Cur creavit Deus quos futuros malos praesciebat? — Quia praevidit quid boni de malis eorum esset facturus. Sic enim eos fecit, ut relinqueret eis unde aliquid facerent; et si culpabiliter aliquid facerent, illum de se laudabiliter operantem invenirent. A se habent voluntatem malam, ab illo naturam bonam et iustam poenam ». « Frustra igitur dicitur, non deberet Deus creare quos praesciebat malos futuros; sciebat enim, bonis profuturos et iuste pro mala voluntate puniendos »: — Addunt etiam, « talem hominem deberet facere, qui nollet omnino peccare. — Concedimus quidem, meliorem naturam esse, quae omnino peccare nollet. Concedant et ipsi, non esse malam, quae talis facta est, ut posset non peccare, si vellet; et iuste punitam, quae voluntate, non necessitate peccavit. Cum ergo haec bona sit, illa melior, cur non utramque faceret, ut uberius laudaretur de utraque? Illa enim in3 sanctis Angelis, haec in hominibus est ». — Item inquiunt: « Si Deus vellet, et illi boni essent. — Et hoc quidem concedimus; sed melius voluit, ut quod vellent essent, et boni quidem non infructuose, mali vero non impune essent ». — Item inquiunt: « Posset Deus voluntatem eorum vertere in bonum, quia omnipotens est. — Posset revera. Cur non fecit? Quia noluit. Cur noluit? Ipse novit. Non debemus plus sapere, quam oportet ».
Cap. II.
Qualis secundum animam fuerit homo ante peccatum.
« Et quidem secundum animam4 rationalis fuit homo, habens discretionem boni et mali. Scientiam quoque rerum creatarum et cognitionem veritatis, quae primae perfectioni congruebat, mox conditus non incongrue accepisse putatur, et ad illam non studio vel disciplina aliqua per intervallum5 temporis profecisse, sed ab exordio suae conditionis divinitus illam percepisse ».
Cap. III.
De triplici scientia hominis ante lapsum.
« Fuitque6 homo primus ante lapsum triplici cognitione praeditus, rerum scilicet propter se factarum et Creatoris et sui ». « Rerum quippe cognitionem hominem accepisse, perspicuum est, cum non ipse Creator vel Angelus aliquis, sed homo omnibus animantibus nomina imposuerit, ut ostenderetur, quod singulorum notitiam homo ipse habuerit. Quae enim propter illum creata erant et ab illo regenda et disponenda erant, horum omnium Deus illi et scientiam tribuit et providentiam atque curam reliquit, quia, ut ait Apostolus7, non est cura Deo de bobus. Quorum aliorumque animalium Deus homini curam reliquit et providentiam, ut dominationi eius subiicerentur et ratione illius gubernarentur; ut sciret illis necessaria providere, a quibus emolumentum debebat recipere. Hanc autem scientiam homo peccando non perdidit, sicut nec illam, qua carnis necessaria providentur8; et idcirco in Scriptura homo de huiusmodi non eruditur, sed de scientia animae, quam peccando amisit ». « Cognitionem quoque Creatoris primus homo habuisse creditur. Cognovit enim, a quo creatus fuerat, non eo modo cognoscendi, quo ex auditu solo9 percipitur, quo modo a credentibus absens quaeritur, sed quadam interiori aspiratione, qua Dei praesentiam contemplabatur; non tamen ita excellenter, sicut post hanc vitam Sancti visuri sunt, neque ita in aenigmate, qualiter in hac vita videmus ». « Porro sui cognitionem idem homo talem accepisse videtur, ut et quid deberet superiori et quid aequali et inferiori non ignoraret. Conditionem quoque suam et ordinem, scilicet qualis factus esset, et qualiter incedere deberet, quid agere, quid10 cavere, intellexit. Si horum notitiam non habuisset, non esset reus praevaricationis neque se ipsum cognovisset ».
Cap. IV.
Utrum homo praescius fuerit eorum quae sibi futura erant.
« Si autem quaeratur, utrum homo scientiam habuerit eorum quae circa eum futura erant, id est, si ruinam suam praesciverit; et similiter, si11 praesciverit bona, quae habiturus fuisset, si in obedientia perstitisset; responderi potest, quod ei magis facienda indicta sunt, quam futura revelata. Accepit enim scientiam et praeceptum eorum quae facienda fuerant, sed non habuit praescientiam eorum quae futura erant ». Non fuit ergo homo praescius sui casus, sicut et de Angelo diximus; quod Augustinus super Genesim asserit, ratione utens, quam supra12 posuimus13. — « Haec de scientia hominis, quantum ad primum statum pertinet, dixisse sufficiat ».
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DISTINCTION XXIII.
Chapter I.
Why God permitted man to be tempted, whom He knew would fall.
Moreover it is wont to be asked, “why God permitted man to be tempted, whom He foreknew was to be deceived1. — But it would not be praiseworthy for man, if he could therefore live well because no one was urging him to live ill, since by nature he had the power and in his power had the willing not to consent to one urging him, with God helping2;” “and it is more glorious not to consent than not to be able to be tempted.” — Some are moved also, saying: “Why did God create those whom He foreknew would be evil? — Because He foresaw what good He was to make out of their evils. For He so made them that He should leave to them whence they might do something; and if they did something culpably, they should find Him operating laudably concerning Himself. Of themselves they have an evil will, from Him a good nature and a just punishment.” “In vain therefore is it said that God ought not to create those whom He foreknew would be evil; for He knew that they would profit the good and would justly be punished for their evil will:” — They add also, “He ought to make such a man as would by no means will to sin. — We grant indeed that the better nature is one which would by no means will to sin. Let them also grant that the nature is not evil which was so made that it could not sin, if it willed; and that it was justly punished, since it sinned by will, not by necessity. Since therefore this is good, that is better, why would He not make both, so that He might be the more abundantly praised concerning each? For the one is in3 the holy Angels, the other in men.” — Likewise they say: “If God willed it, those too would be good. — And this indeed we grant; but He willed better, that what they willed they should be, and the good indeed not unprofitably, but the evil not unpunished.” — Likewise they say: “God could turn their will into good, because He is omnipotent. — He could indeed. Why did He not do it? Because He did not will to. Why did He not will to? He Himself knows. We ought not to be wiser than is fitting.”
Chapter II.
What man was according to the soul before sin.
“And indeed according to the soul4 man was rational, having discernment of good and evil. He is supposed also, not unfittingly, to have received as soon as he was made the knowledge of created things and the cognition of truth, which befitted his first perfection, and not to have advanced to it by study or any discipline over an interval5 of time, but to have received it divinely from the beginning of his condition.”
Chapter III.
On the threefold knowledge of man before the fall.
“And the first man was6 before the fall endowed with a threefold cognition, namely of the things made for his sake, and of the Creator, and of himself.” “That man received cognition of things is evident, since not the Creator Himself nor any Angel, but man imposed names on all living creatures, so that it might be shown that man himself had knowledge of each. For the things which had been created for his sake and were to be ruled and disposed by him — of all these God granted him both knowledge and left him providence and care, because, as the Apostle says7, God hath no care for oxen. Of these and the other animals God left to man care and providence, that they might be subjected to his dominion and governed by his reason; that he might know how to provide necessaries for those from which he ought to receive benefit. But this knowledge man did not lose by sinning, just as neither that one by which the necessaries of the flesh are provided8; and therefore in Scripture man is not instructed about such things, but about the knowledge of the soul, which he lost by sinning.” “The first man is believed also to have had cognition of the Creator. For he knew by whom he had been created, not in that mode of knowing by which He is perceived from hearing alone9, in the way in which He is sought as absent by believers, but by a certain interior breathing, by which he contemplated the presence of God; yet not so excellently as the Saints shall see after this life, nor so in an enigma as we see in this life.” “Further, the same man seems to have received such cognition of himself that he was not ignorant both of what he owed to his superior and what to an equal and to an inferior. He understood also his condition and order, namely of what sort he had been made, and how he ought to walk, what to do, what10 to beware of. If he had not had knowledge of these things, he would not be guilty of transgression nor would he have known himself.”
Chapter IV.
Whether man was foreknowing of the things which were to befall him.
“But if it be asked whether man had knowledge of the things which were going to befall him, that is, whether he foreknew his own ruin; and likewise, whether11 he foreknew the goods which he would have had, if he had persisted in obedience; it can be answered that the things to be done were enjoined upon him rather than the future things revealed. For he received knowledge and a precept of the things which were to be done, but he did not have foreknowledge of the things which were to come.” Man therefore was not foreknowing of his own fall, just as we have said also of the Angel; which Augustine asserts on Genesis, using the reason which we set down above1213. — “Let this suffice to have said concerning the knowledge of man, so far as pertains to the first state.”
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- Vat. cum aliis edd., exceptis 1, 8, fore, refragantibus codd. Paulo inferius post in natura cod. D bene addit haberet.The Vatican edition, with other editions except 1, 8, [reads] fore (“will be”), the codices being against it. A little below, after in natura codex D rightly adds haberet (“would have”).
- August., XI. Gen. ad lit. c. 4. n. 6, ex quo libro etiam sequentes huius capituli loci sumti sunt, nempe seq. locus c. 6. n. 8; tertius c. 9. n. 12; quartus c. 6. n. 8. — Teste cod. Erf., eadem usque ad verba Addunt etiam occurrunt etiam apud Gandolphum, II. c. 187. seq.Augustine, On Genesis according to the Letter XI, c. 4, n. 6, from which book also the following passages of this chapter are taken, namely the following passage c. 6, n. 8; the third c. 9, n. 12; the fourth c. 6, n. 8. — By the witness of codex Erf., the same things down to the words Addunt etiam (“They add also”) occur also in Gandulph, Sentences II, c. 187 ff.
- Codd. et edd. 1, 8 de, et mox de hominibus. Paulo inferius post melius voluit cod. C addit id est permisit.The codices and editions 1, 8 [read] de, and soon de hominibus (“of men”). A little below, after melius voluit codex C adds id est permisit (“that is, He permitted”).
- August., ibid. c. 7. n. 9; seq. locus c. 9. n. 12; tertius c. 10. n. 13. — In fine respicitur Rom. 12, 3, in quo cum Vulgata edd. 1, 8 post oportet addunt sapere.Augustine, in the same place, c. 7, n. 9; the following passage c. 9, n. 12; the third c. 10, n. 13. — At the end reference is to Romans 12:3, in which, with the Vulgate, editions 1, 8 add sapere (“to be wise”) after oportet.
- Ita codd. et edd. 1, 8; Vat. cum reliquis edd. intervalla.So the codices and editions 1, 8; the Vatican edition with the remaining editions reads intervalla (“intervals”).
- Ita Vat. cum pluribus edd. et cod. D, sed edd. 1, 8 et codd. ABCE, animum. Hoc integrum capitulum et seqq. Magister accepit ex Hugone, l. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 12-15, sed contraxit.So the Vatican edition with several editions and codex D, but editions 1, 8 and codices ABCE [read] animum. This entire chapter and the following the Master took from Hugh (of St. Victor), book On the Sacraments part VI, cc. 12–15, but abridged it.
- Vat. cum paucis edd. solummodo Fuit; sed edd. 1, 8 Fuit itaque.The Vatican edition with a few editions [reads] only Fuit (“Was”); but editions 1, 8 [read] Fuit itaque (“And so it was”).
- Epist. 1. Cor. 9, 9.Epistle, 1 Corinthians 9:9.
- Vat. providerentur, refragantibus edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 et codd.The Vatican edition [reads] providerentur, the editions 1, 2, 3, 7 and the codices being against it.
- Respicitur Rom. 10, 16. et paulo inferius I. Cor. 13, 12.Reference is to Romans 10:16, and a little below 1 Corinthians 13:12.
- Codd. B D addunt etiam.Codices B, D add etiam (“also”).
- Vat. cum paucis edd. omittit si.The Vatican edition with a few editions omits si (“whether/if”).
- Dist. IV. c. 1, ubi etiam locus Augustini citatur.Distinction IV, c. 1, where the passage of Augustine is also cited. ---