Bonaventure

DISTINCTIO XXIV.

Pars I.

Cap. I.

De gratia hominis et potentia ante casum.

Nunc diligenter investigari oportet, quam gratiam vel potentiam habuerit homo ante casum, et utrum per eam potuerit stare, vel non. — Sciendum est igitur, quod homini in creatione, sicut de Angelis diximus¹, datum est per gratiam auxilium, et collata est potentia, per quam poterat stare, id est non declinare ab eo quod acceperat; sed non poterat proficere in tantum, ut per gratiam creationis sine alia mereri salutem valeret. Poterat quidem per illud auxilium gratiae creationis resistere malo, sed non perficere bonum. Poterat tamen per illud bene vivere quodam modo, quia poterat vivere sine peccato; sed non poterat sine alio gratiae adiutorio spiritualiter vivere, quo vitam mereretur aeternam. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio²: « Sic factus est homo rectus, ut et manere in ea rectitudine posset, non sine divino adiutorio, et suo fieri perversus arbitrio; utrumlibet horum elegisset, Dei voluntas fieret vel ab illo, vel de illo. Et quia suam maluit facere voluntatem quam Dei, de illo facta est voluntas Dei ». Item in eodem³: « Sic oportebat, prius hominem fieri, ut et bene posset velle et male; nec frustra, si bene; nec impune, si male ». Idem quoque in libro

de Correptione et gratia⁴ ait: « Si hoc adiutorium vel Angelo vel homini, cum primum facti sunt, defuisset; quoniam non talis natura facta erat, ut sine divino auxilio posset manere, si vellet, non utique sua culpa cecidisset; defuisset quippe adiutorium, sine quo manere non posset ». Idem: « Dederat Deus homini bonam voluntatem, in illa quippe eum fecerat⁵ rectum; dederat adiutorium, sine quo non posset in ea manere, si vellet, et per quod posset. Ut autem hoc vellet, in eius dimisit arbitrio ». In eodem: « Acceperat posse, si vellet, sed non habuit velle, quo posset; nam si habuisset, perseverasset ». — His testimoniis evidenter monstratur, quod homo rectitudinem et bonam voluntatem in creatione accepit atque auxilium, quo stare poterat, alioquin non sua culpa videretur cecidisse.

Sed quomodo rectam et bonam voluntatem habuit homo, si per eam nec mereri vitam valuit, nec ea stare voluit? — Quia nec aliquid mali ea tunc volebat et ad tempus stare voluit, sed non perseveranter; et ideo recta et bona fuit tunc voluntas hominis.

Ad hoc autem, quod diximus, hominem non potuisse proficere vel mereri per gratiam creationis, solet opponi sic: Per illud auxilium gratiae creationis potuit stare in bono, quod acceperat: potuit ergo resistere tentationi. Sed resistere tentationibus atque suggestionibus malis meritum est ac bonum remunerabile; omne autem bonum meritum profectus est: per gratiam igitur creationis proficere potuit sine adiectione alterius gratiae. — Ad quod dicimus, quia resistere malo et non consentire tentationi non fecisset illi meritum, etsi non consensisset, quia nihil in eo erat, quod ad malum impelleret, sicut Angelis, qui non ceciderunt, non fuit meritum, quod steterunt, id est, quod non corruerunt. Nobis autem meritum est aliquando, si malum non facimus, sed resistimus, ibi dumtaxat, ubi causa subest, quae nos id facere movet: quia ex peccati corruptela proni sunt ad lapsum gressus nostri⁹. Ubi autem non intervenit causa nos ad malum impellens, non meremur, si ab eo declinamus. Declinare enim a malo semper vitat poenam, sed non semper meretur palmam.

Cap. II.

De adiutorio homini in creatione dato, quo stare poterat.

Hic considerandum est, quod fuerit illud adiutorium homini datum in creatione, quo poterat manere, si vellet. Illud utique fuit libertas arbitrii, ab omni labe et corruptela immunis, atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animae sinceritas atque vivacitas¹⁰.

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Cap. III.

De libero arbitrio.

Liberum vero arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur, gratia assistente, vel malum, eadem desistente. Et dicitur liberum quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest; arbitrium vero quantum ad rationem, cuius est facultas vel potentia illa, cuius etiam est discernere inter bonum et malum; et aliquando quidem, discretionem habens boni et mali, quod malum est eligit, aliquando vero quod bonum est. Sed quod bonum est, nisi gratia adiuta, non eligit, malum vero per se eligit. Est enim in anima rationali voluntas naturalis, qua naturaliter vult bonum, licet tenuiter et exiliter, nisi gratia iuvet, quae adveniens iuvat eam et erigit, ut efficaciter velit bonum. Per se autem potest velle malum efficaciter. Illa igitur rationalis animae potentia, qua bonum vel malum potest velle, utrumque discernens, liberum arbitrium nuncupatur; quod bruta animalia non habent, quia ratione carent, habent tamen sensum et appetitum sensualitatis.

Cap. IV.

De sensualitate.

Est enim sensualitas quaedam vis animae inferior, ex qua est motus, qui intenditur in corporis⁶ sensus atque appetitus rerum ad corpus pertinentium; ratio vero vis animae est superior, quae, ut ita dicamus, duas habet partes vel differentias, superiorem et inferiorem. Secundum superiorem supernis conspiciendis vel consulendis intendit, secundum inferiorem ad temporalium dispositionem prospicit⁷. Quidquid ergo in anima nostra nobis considerantibus occurrit, quod non sit commune cum bestiis, ad rationem pertinet. Quod autem in ea reperis commune cum belluis, ad sensualitatem pertinet. Et ubi nobis gradatim in consideratione partium animae progredientibus primum aliquid occurrit, quod non est commune cum bestiis, ibi incipit ratio. Hoc autem Augustinus docet in libro duodecimo de Trinitate⁸ ita dicens: « Videamus, ubi sit quasi quoddam hominis exterioris interiorisque confinium. Quidquid enim habemus in animo commune cum pecore, recte dicitur ad exteriorem hominem pertinere. Non enim solum corpus homo exterior deputabitur, sed adiuncta quadam vita sua, qua compages corporis et omnes sensus vigent, quibus instructus est ad exteriora sentienda ». « Ascendentibus ergo introrsum quibusdam gradibus considerationis per animae partes, ubi incipit aliquid occurrere, quod nobis non sit commune cum bestiis, ibi incipit ratio, ubi homo interior iam possit agnosci¹⁵ ».

Cap. V.

De ratione et partibus eius.

« Rationis autem pars superior aeternis rationibus conspiciendis vel consulendis adhaerescit, portio inferior ad temporalia gubernanda deflectitur¹¹ ». « Et illa rationis intentio, qua contemplamur aeterna, sapientiae deputatur; illa vero, qua bene utimur rebus temporalibus, scientiae deputatur ». « Cum vero disserimus de natura mentis humanae, de una quadam re disserimus, nec eam in haec duo, quae commemoravi¹², nisi per officia geminamus ». « Carnalis autem vel sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis pecoribusque communis est, qui seclusus est a ratione sapientiae, rationi autem scientiae vicinus est ».

Cap. VI.

De simili ordine peccandi in nobis et in primis parentibus.

Illud quoque praetermittendum non est, quod talis nunc in uno homine tentationis est ordo et progressio, qualis tunc in primis praecessit parentibus. Ut enim tunc serpens mulieri malum suasit, ipsaque consensit, deinde viro suo dedit, sicque consummatum est peccatum;

Cap. VII.

Quod in nobis est vir et mulier et serpens.

Ita et nunc in nobis pro serpente est sensualis motus animae, pro muliere inferior portio rationis, pro viro superior rationis portio. Et hic est vir, qui secundum Apostolum dicitur imago et gloria Dei¹³; et illa est mulier, quae secundum eundem dicitur gloria viri.

Cap. VIII.

De spirituali coniugio viri et mulieris in nobis.

Atque inter hunc virum et hanc mulierem est velut quoddam spirituale coniugium naturalisque contractus, quo superior rationis portio quasi vir debet praeesse et dominari; inferior vero quasi mulier debet subesse et obedire. Ideo vir secundum Apostolum non debet habere velamen, sed mulier¹⁴. Et sicut in cunctis animantibus non est repertum homini adiutorium simile sibi, sed de illo sumtum quod ei formaretur in coniugium; ita et in partibus animae, quas cum pecoribus habemus communes, nullum menti nostrae simile est adiutorium. Unde Augustinus in eodem¹⁶: « Illud nostrum, quod in actione temporalium tractandorum ita versatur, ut non sit nobis commune cum pecore, rationale est quidem, sed ex illa rationali mente, qua subhaeremus intelligibili et incommutabili veritati, tanquam ductum et inferioribus tractandis gubernandisque deputatum est. Sicut enim in omnibus pecoribus non est inventum viro adiutorium simile illi, nisi de illo detractum in coniugium formaretur; ita

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menti nostrae, qua supernam consulimus veritatem, nullum est ad usum rerum temporalium, quantum naturae hominis satis est, simile adiutorium ex animae partibus, quas communes cum pecoribus habemus. Ideoque rationale nostrum, non ad unitatis divortium separatum, sed in auxilium societatis quasi derivatum, in suo dispertitur officio. Et sicut una caro est duorum in masculo et in femina; sic intellectum nostrum et actionem sive rationem et appetitum rationalem, vel si aliquo modo significantius dici possunt, una mentis natura complectitur, ut, sicut de illis dictum est: erunt duo in carne una¹⁷, sic de his dici possit: duo in mente una ». — Ecce ex his intelligi potest, qualiter in anima hominis exsistat imago illius coniugii, et qualiter in singulis nostrum spiritualiter sint illa tria, scilicet vir, mulier, serpens.

Cap. IX.

Qualiter per illa tria in nobis consummetur tentatio.

Nunc superest ostendere, quomodo per haec tria in nobis consummetur peccatum; ubi agnosci poterit, si diligenter intendatur, quid sit in anima mortale, vel veniale peccatum. Ut enim ibi serpens suasit¹⁸ mulieri, et mulier viro; ita et in nobis sensualis motus, cum illecebram peccati conceperit, quasi serpens suggerit mulieri, scilicet inferiori parti rationis, id est rationi scientiae; quae si consenserit illecebrae, mulier edit cibum vetitum; post de eodem dat viro, cum superiori parti rationis, id est rationi sapientiae, eandem illecebram suggerit, quae si consentit, tunc vir etiam cum femina cibum vetitum gustat. Si ergo in motu sensuali tantum peccati illecebra teneatur, veniale ac levissimum est peccatum.

Cap. X.

Quando mulier sola manducat cibum vetitum.

Si vero inferior pars rationis consenserit, ita ut sola cogitationis delectatione sine voluntate perficiendi teneatur, mulier sola manducavit, non vir, cuius auctoritate cohibetur voluntas, ne ad opus usque perveniat.

Cap. XI.

Quando etiam vir manducat.

Si vero adsit plena voluntas perficiendi, ut, si adsit facultas et ad effectum perducatur, vir quoque manducat, quia superior pars rationis illecebrae consensit¹⁹; et tunc est damnabile et grave peccatum.

Cap. XII.

Quando sit veniale vel mortale peccatum.

Quando autem mulier sine viro gustat, aliquando est mortale, aliquando veniale peccatum. Ut enim dictum est, tunc mulier sine viro gustat, cum ita delectatione cogitationis peccatum tenetur, ut faciendum non decernatur; vel cum quidam terminus et mensura peccato adhibetur a viro, ut non liceat mulieri effrenata libertate in peccatum progredi. Si ergo peccatum non diu teneatur delectatione cogitationis, sed statim, ut mulierem tetigit, viri auctoritate repellatur, veniale est. Si vero diu in delectatione cogitationis teneatur, etsi voluntas perficiendi desit, mortale est, et pro eo damnabitur simul vir et mulier, id est totus homo, quia et tunc vir non, sicut debuit, mulierem cohibuit, unde potest dici consensisse.

Itaque, ut breviter summam perstringam, quando peccatum ita in anima concipitur, ut illud facere disponat vel etiam perficiat, aliud²⁰ frequenter, aliud semel, vel etiam quando delectatione cogitationis diu tenetur, mortale est. Cum vero in sensuali motu tantum est, ut praediximus, tunc levissimum est, quia ratio tunc non delectatur. Ideo autem supra dixi: aliud frequenter, aliud semel, quia²¹ quaedam sunt, quae, si tantum semel fiant vel facienda disponantur, damnant; quaedam vero non, nisi saepius fiant vel facienda decernantur, ut de otioso verbo et huiusmodi. Haec Augustinus in libro duodecimo de Trinitate²² tradit ita: « Sicut in illo coniugio primorum hominum serpens manducandum persuasit, mulier autem non manducavit sola, sed viro suo dedit, et simul manducaverunt; ita et in quodam secreto coniugio, quod in uno homine geritur et dignoscitur, cum rationi scientiae, quae in rebus temporalibus agendis ratiocinandi vivacitate versatur, animalis sensus ingerit quandam illecebram; tunc velut serpens alloquitur feminam. Huic autem illecebrae consentire de ligno vetito est edere. Sed iste consensus si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, superiori vero auctoritate ita retinentur membra, ut non exhibeantur arma iniquitatis peccato²³; sic habendum existimo, velut lignum vetitum mulier sola comederit. — Si autem in consensu illo ita decernitur quodque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam opere impleatur, intelligenda est mulier dedisse viro suo simul edendum illicitum cibum. Neque enim potest peccatum non solum cogitandum suaviter, verum etiam perpetrandum efficaciter mente decerni, nisi et illa mentis intentio, penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat. Nec sane, cum sola cogitatione mens oblectatur illicitis, non quidem decernens esse facienda, tenens tamen et volvens libenter, quae statim, ut attigerunt animum, respui debuerunt, negandum est esse peccatum, sed longe minus, quam si et opere statuatur implendum. Et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum et dicendum: Dimitte nobis debita nostra. Neque enim, sicut in illis duobus primis hominibus personam suam quisque portabat, et ideo si sola mulier cibum edisset illicitum, sola utique mortis supplicio plecteretur, ita dici potest in homine uno, si delectationibus illicitis, a quibus continuo se deberet avertere, cogitatio libenter sola pascatur, nec facienda decernantur mala, sed tantum suaviter in recordatione teneantur, quasi mulierem sine viro posse damnari. Absit hoc credere. Haec quippe una persona est, unus homo est, totusque damnabitur, nisi haec quae sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata, per Mediatoris gratiam remittantur ». — Idem quoque in libro contra Manichaeos²⁴ de hoc eodem sic ait: « Apostolus dicit, secundum principem potestatis aeris huius, spiritus, qui nunc operatur in filiis diffidentiae. Numquid ergo visibiliter eis apparet, aut quasi corporeis locis accedit ad eos et operatur? Sed miris modis per cogitationem suggerit quidquid potest; quibus suggestionibus resistendum est. Non enim ignoramus astutias eius. Quomodo enim accessit ad Iudam, quando ei persuasit, ut Dominum traderet? Numquid in locis, aut per hos oculos ei visus est? Sed utique, ut dictum est, in cor eius intravit. Repellit autem illum homo, si paradisum mentis custodiat. Posuit enim hominem Deus in paradiso, ut operaretur et custodiret²⁵, quia sic Ecclesiae dicitur in Canticis Canticorum: Hortus conclusus, fons signatus; quo utique non admittitur perversitatis ille persuasor, sed tamen per mulierem decepit. Non enim etiam ratio nostra deduci ad consensionem peccati potest, nisi cum delectatio mota fuerit in illa parte animi, quae debet obtemperare rationi tanquam rectori viro. Etiam in unoquoque nostrum nihil aliud agitur nunc²⁶, cum ad peccatum quisque delabitur, quam tunc actum est in illis tribus: serpente, muliere et viro. Nam primo fit suggestio sive per cogitationem, sive per sensus corporis vel videndo, vel tangendo, vel audiendo, vel gustando, vel olfaciendo; quae suggestio cum facta fuerit, si cu-

piditas nostra non moveatur ad peccandum, excluditur serpentis astutia. Si autem mota fuerit, quasi iam mulieri persuasum erit; sed aliquando ratio viriliter etiam commotam cupiditatem refrenat atque compescit. Quod cum fit, non labimur in peccatum, sed cum aliquantula luctatione coronamur. Si autem ratio consentiat et quod libido commoverit faciendum esse decernat ab omni vita beata tanquam de paradiso expellitur homo. Iam enim peccatum imputatur, etiamsi non subsequatur factum, quando rea tenetur in consensione conscientia ».

Haec de animae partibus interseruimus, ut ipsius animae natura plenius cognosceretur, et secundum quam sui portionem in ea sit liberum arbitrium intelligatur, scilicet secundum rationem, quo²⁷ omne peccatum mortale geritur, sed non omne veniale, illud scilicet, quod in solo motu sensualitatis existit.

Cap. XIII.

Quibus modis accipitur sensualitas in Scriptura.

Non est autem silentio praetereundum, quod saepe in Scriptura nomine sensualitatis non id solum in anima, quod est nobis commune cum pecore, sed etiam inferior portio rationis, quae temporalium dispositioni intendit, intelligitur. Quod diligens lector in locis Scripturae, ubi de ipsa fit mentio, vigilanter annotet²⁸.

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DISTINCTION XXIV.

Part I.

Chapter I.

On the grace and power of man before the fall.

Now it must be diligently investigated what grace or power man had before the fall, and whether through it he was able to stand, or not. — It must therefore be known that to man at his creation, as we said concerning the Angels¹, there was given through grace a help, and a power was conferred, by which he was able to stand, that is, not to turn aside from what he had received; but he was not able to advance so far that through the grace of creation he could merit salvation without another [grace]. He was indeed able, through that help of the grace of creation, to resist evil, but not to accomplish the good. He was able, however, through it to live well in a certain manner, because he was able to live without sin; but he was not able, without another help of grace, to live spiritually, by which he might merit eternal life. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion²: « Thus man was made upright, in such a way that he could both remain in that uprightness, not without divine help, and become perverse by his own choice; whichever of these he should choose, the will of God would be done either by him, or concerning him. And because he preferred to do his own will rather than God's, concerning him was the will of God done ». Likewise in the same work³: « Thus it was fitting that man should first be made, so that he could will both well and ill; and not in vain, if well; nor with impunity, if ill ». The same also in the book

(Chapter I continued)

On Correction and Grace⁴ says: « If this help had been lacking to the Angel or to man, when they were first made; since the nature made was not such that it could remain without divine help, if it willed, it would assuredly not have fallen by its own fault; for the help would have been lacking, without which it could not remain ». The same: « God had given man a good will, for in it he had made him⁵ upright; he had given help, without which he could not remain in it, if he willed, and through which he could. But that he should will this, he left to his own choice ». In the same: « He had received the power, if he willed, but he did not have the willing by which he could; for if he had had it, he would have persevered ». — By these testimonies it is evidently shown that man received in his creation uprightness and a good will, and also a help by which he was able to stand, otherwise he would not seem to have fallen by his own fault.

But how did man have a right and good will, if through it he was neither able to merit life, nor willed to stand by it? — Because he then willed nothing evil by it and willed to stand for a time, but not perseveringly; and therefore the will of man was then right and good.

But to this which we said, that man was not able to advance or to merit through the grace of creation, it is usually objected thus: Through that help of the grace of creation he was able to stand in the good which he had received: therefore he was able to resist temptation. But to resist temptations and evil suggestions is a merit and a rewardable good; and every good is the advancement of merit: therefore through the grace of creation he was able to advance without the addition of another grace. — To which we say that to resist evil and not to consent to temptation would not have made merit for him, even if he had not consented, because there was nothing in him which impelled toward evil, just as for the Angels who did not fall, it was not a merit that they stood, that is, that they did not fall. But for us it is sometimes a merit, if we do not do evil but resist, only there, namely, where there is an underlying cause which moves us to do it: because from the corruption of sin our steps are prone to falling⁹. But where there does not intervene a cause impelling us to evil, we do not merit, if we turn aside from it. For to turn aside from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the palm.

Chapter II.

On the help given to man at creation, by which he was able to stand.

Here it must be considered what that help was that was given to man at creation, by which he was able to remain, if he willed. It was assuredly the liberty of choice, immune from every stain and corruption, and the uprightness of the will and the sincerity and vigor of all the natural powers of the soul¹⁰.

(Chapter III)

Chapter III.

On free choice.

Free choice is the faculty of reason and will, by which the good is chosen, with grace assisting, or the evil, with the same desisting. And it is called free with respect to the will, which can be bent to either alternative; and choice with respect to the reason, whose is that faculty or power, whose also it is to discern between good and evil; and sometimes indeed, having discernment of good and evil, it chooses what is evil, sometimes what is good. But what is good, unless aided by grace, it does not choose; but evil it chooses of itself. For there is in the rational soul a natural will, by which it naturally wills the good, though weakly and slightly, unless grace aid it, which coming aids it and raises it up, so that it may effectively will the good. But of itself it can will evil effectively. That power of the rational soul, therefore, by which it can will good or evil, discerning each, is called free choice; which the brute animals do not have, because they lack reason, yet they have sense and the appetite of sensuality.

Chapter IV.

On sensuality.

For sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises the motion which is directed toward the senses of the body⁶ and the appetite for things pertaining to the body; but reason is the higher power of the soul, which, so to speak, has two parts or differences, a higher and a lower. According to the higher it directs itself to the contemplating or consulting of the things above, according to the lower it looks to the disposition of temporal things⁷. Whatever therefore occurs to us in our soul, as we consider, which is not common with the beasts, pertains to reason. But what you find in it common with the brutes pertains to sensuality. And where, as we proceed step by step in the consideration of the parts of the soul, the first thing occurs which is not common with the beasts, there reason begins. And this Augustine teaches in the twelfth book On the Trinity⁸ saying thus: « Let us see where there is, as it were, a certain boundary of the exterior and interior man. For whatever we have in our mind in common with cattle is rightly said to pertain to the exterior man. For not the body alone shall the exterior man be reckoned, but with a certain life of its own adjoined, by which the framework of the body and all the senses are vigorous, by which it is furnished for perceiving exterior things ». « As we ascend inward, therefore, by certain steps of consideration through the parts of the soul, where something begins to occur which is not common to us with the beasts, there reason begins, where the interior man may now be recognized¹⁵ ».

Chapter V.

On reason and its parts.

« The higher part of reason cleaves to the eternal reasons to be contemplated or consulted, the lower portion is bent down to the governing of temporal things¹¹ ». « And that intention of reason, by which we contemplate eternal things, is assigned to wisdom; but that by which we use temporal things well, is assigned to knowledge ». « But when we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss one certain thing, nor do we double it into these two, which I mentioned¹², except by their offices ». « But the carnal or sensual motion of the soul, which is directed toward the senses of the body, is common to us and to the cattle, which is shut off from the reason of wisdom, but is near to the reason of knowledge ».

Chapter VI.

On the similar order of sinning in us and in our first parents.

This also must not be passed over, that such now in one man is the order and progression of temptation, as then preceded in our first parents. For as then the serpent suggested evil to the woman, and she consented, then gave to her husband, and so the sin was consummated;

Chapter VII.

That in us there is a man and a woman and a serpent.

so also now in us, in place of the serpent there is the sensual motion of the soul, in place of the woman the lower portion of reason, in place of the man the higher portion of reason. And this is the man who according to the Apostle is called the image and glory of God¹³; and that is the woman who according to the same is called the glory of the man.

Chapter VIII.

On the spiritual marriage of man and woman in us.

And between this man and this woman there is, as it were, a certain spiritual marriage and a natural contract, by which the higher portion of reason as the man ought to preside and rule; but the lower as the woman ought to be subject and obey. Therefore the man according to the Apostle ought not to have a veil, but the woman¹⁴. And just as among all living creatures there was not found for man a help like to himself, but taken from him so that it might be formed for him into a marriage; so also in the parts of the soul, which we have in common with the cattle, there is no help like to our mind. Hence Augustine in the same work¹⁶: « That part of ours which is so engaged in the action of handling temporal things, that it is not common to us with the beast, is indeed rational, but it is, as it were, drawn off from that rational mind by which we cleave to intelligible and immutable truth, and assigned to handling and governing lower things. For just as in all the cattle there was not found for the man a help like to him, unless drawn off from him it were formed into a marriage; so

(Chapter VIII continued)

to our mind, by which we consult the supernal truth, there is no help like to it, for the use of temporal things, as much as suffices for the nature of man, from the parts of the soul which we have in common with the cattle. And therefore our rational part, not separated unto a divorce of unity, but as it were derived into the help of fellowship, is divided in its office. And just as one flesh belongs to two in male and female; so a single nature of the mind embraces our intellect and action, or reason and rational appetite, or if they can be named in some more significant way, so that, as it was said of those: they shall be two in one flesh¹⁷, so of these it may be said: two in one mind ». — Behold, from these it can be understood how in the soul of man there exists the image of that marriage, and how in each of us there are spiritually those three, namely man, woman, serpent.

Chapter IX.

How through those three temptation is consummated in us.

Now it remains to show how through these three sin is consummated in us; where it can be recognized, if one attends diligently, what is mortal sin in the soul, or venial. For as there the serpent suggested¹⁸ to the woman, and the woman to the man; so also in us the sensual motion, when it has conceived the enticement of sin, as a serpent suggests it to the woman, namely to the lower part of reason, that is to the reason of knowledge; which if it consents to the enticement, the woman eats the forbidden food; then she gives of the same to the man, when she suggests the same enticement to the higher part of reason, that is to the reason of wisdom, which if it consents, then the man also with the woman tastes the forbidden food. If, therefore, the enticement of sin is held only in the sensual motion, the sin is venial and most slight.

Chapter X.

When the woman alone eats the forbidden food.

But if the lower part of reason has consented, in such a way that it is held by the delight of thought alone without the will of accomplishing, the woman alone has eaten, not the man, by whose authority the will is restrained, lest it come even to the deed.

Chapter XI.

When the man too eats.

But if there is present a full will of accomplishing, so that, if the faculty is present and it is carried into effect, the man too eats, because the higher part of reason has consented to the enticement¹⁹; then it is a damnable and grave sin.

Chapter XII.

When the sin is venial or mortal.

But when the woman tastes without the man, it is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For as has been said, the woman tastes without the man when sin is so held by the delight of thought that it is not decreed to be done; or when a certain limit and measure is applied to the sin by the man, so that it is not permitted to the woman to advance into sin with unbridled liberty. If, therefore, the sin is not long held by the delight of thought, but immediately, as soon as it has touched the woman, is driven back by the authority of the man, it is venial. But if it is long held in the delight of thought, even if the will of accomplishing is absent, it is mortal, and for it both the man and the woman, that is, the whole man, will be damned, because then too the man did not, as he ought, restrain the woman, whence he can be said to have consented.

And so, to summarize the matter briefly, when sin is so conceived in the soul that he disposes to do it or even accomplishes it, one thing²⁰ frequently, another once, or even when it is long held by the delight of thought, it is mortal. But when it is only in the sensual motion, as we said before, then it is most slight, because reason then does not take delight. And I said above for this reason: one thing frequently, another once, because²¹ there are some things which, if they are done or disposed to be done even once, condemn; but certain others not, unless they are done or decreed to be done more often, as concerning the idle word and the like. This Augustine in the twelfth book On the Trinity²² hands down thus: « Just as in that marriage of the first men the serpent persuaded that the food be eaten, but the woman did not eat alone, but gave to her husband, and they ate together; so also in a certain secret marriage, which is carried on and discerned in one man, when to the reason of knowledge, which in the doing of temporal things is engaged with the liveliness of reasoning, the animal sense brings in a certain enticement; then it is, as it were, the serpent that addresses the woman. But to consent to this enticement is to eat of the forbidden tree. But if this consent is content with the delight of thought alone, while by the higher authority the members are so held back that they are not presented as weapons of iniquity to sin²³; thus I think it must be held, as though the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food. — But if in that consent it is so decreed that each sin, if there be the power, should also be fulfilled in deed, the woman is to be understood to have given to her husband to eat the unlawful food together. For sin cannot be decreed in the mind not only to be thought of sweetly, but even to be perpetrated effectively, unless that intention of the mind also, in whose power is the highest authority of moving the members into the work or of restraining them from the work, yields to the evil action. Nor indeed, when the mind is delighted with unlawful things by thought alone, not indeed decreeing that they are to be done, yet holding and turning them over willingly, which as soon as they touched the mind ought to have been rejected, is it to be denied that there is sin, but it is far less than if it were also resolved to be fulfilled in deed. And therefore for such thoughts too pardon is to be sought, and the breast struck and it must be said: Forgive us our debts. For not, as in those two first human beings each one bore his own person, and therefore if the woman alone had eaten the unlawful food, she alone would surely be smitten with the punishment of death, can it so be said in one man, if the thought alone is willingly fed by unlawful delights, from which it ought continually to turn away, and evil things are not decreed to be done, but are only held sweetly in remembrance, that the woman without the man can be damned. Far be it to believe this. For this is one person, one man, and the whole will be damned, unless these things, which without the will of acting, yet with the will of delighting the mind in such things, are perceived to be sins of thought alone, are remitted through the grace of the Mediator ». — The same also in the book against the Manichees²⁴ says of this same matter thus: « The Apostle says, according to the prince of the power of this air, of the spirit who now works in the children of distrust. Does he then appear to them visibly, or as it were approach them in bodily places and work? But in wondrous ways through thought he suggests whatever he can; which suggestions must be resisted. For we are not ignorant of his cunning. For how did he approach Judas, when he persuaded him to betray the Lord? Was it in places, or through these eyes that he was seen by him? But assuredly, as has been said, he entered into his heart. But man drives him off, if he guards the paradise of the mind. For God placed man in paradise, that he might cultivate and guard it²⁵, since thus it is said to the Church in the Canticle of Canticles: A garden enclosed, a fountain sealed; into which that persuader of perversity is assuredly not admitted, but nonetheless he deceived through the woman. For neither can our reason be led to consent to sin, unless when the delight has been moved in that part of the soul which ought to obey reason as its ruling husband. Even in each of us nothing else is done now²⁶, when anyone slips into sin, than was done then in those three: the serpent, the woman, and the man. For first there comes the suggestion, either through thought, or through the senses of the body, by seeing, or touching, or hearing, or tasting, or smelling; and when that suggestion has been made, if

(Chapter XII continued)

our desire is not moved to sinning, the cunning of the serpent is shut out. But if it has been moved, it will be as if it had already been persuaded to the woman; but sometimes reason manfully reins in and checks even the aroused desire. And when this happens, we do not fall into sin, but with a little struggle we are crowned. But if reason consents and decrees that what the appetite has aroused is to be done, the man is expelled from all the blessed life as from paradise. For now sin is imputed, even if the deed does not follow, when the conscience is held guilty in consent ».

These things concerning the parts of the soul we have inserted, that the nature of the soul itself might be more fully known, and according to which portion of it free choice is in it may be understood, namely according to reason, by which²⁷ every mortal sin is carried on, but not every venial sin, that one namely which exists in the motion of sensuality alone.

Chapter XIII.

In what ways sensuality is taken in Scripture.

But it must not be passed over in silence that often in Scripture under the name of sensuality is understood not only that in the soul which is common to us with the beast, but also the lower portion of reason, which is directed to the disposition of temporal things. Which the diligent reader should watchfully note in the places of Scripture where mention is made of it²⁸.

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