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Dist. 26

Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 26

Textus Latinus
p. 627

DISTINCTIO XXVI.

Cap. I.

De gratia operante et cooperante.

Haec est gratia operans et cooperans; operans enim gratia praeparat hominis voluntatem, ut velit bonum, gratia cooperans adiuvat, ne frustra velit. Unde Augustinus in libro de Gratia et libero arbitrio1: « Cooperando Deus in nobis perficit quod operando incipit, quia ipse, ut velimus, operatur incipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur perficiens ». « Ut ergo velimus, operatur; cum autem volumus, et sic volumus, ut perficiamus, nobis cooperatur, tamen sine illo vel operante, ut velimus, vel cooperante, cum volumus, ad bona pietatis opera nihil valemus ». — Ecce his verbis satis aperitur, quae sit operans gratia, et quae cooperans. Operans enim gratia est quae praevenit voluntatem bonam; ea enim liberatur et praeparatur hominis voluntas, ut sit bona bonumque efficaciter velit. Cooperans vero gratia voluntatem iam bonam sequitur adiuvando. Unde Augustinus contra Iulianum haereticum2, qui bonam voluntatem ex libero arbitrio tantum esse dicebat, atque hominem per liberum arbitrium posse bonum velle et operari sine gratia asserebat, ait: Apertam de commendatione gratiae Apostolus sententiam protulit, cum ait: Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis. « Hoc si attenderes, Iuliane, non extenderes contra gratiam merita voluntatis humanae. Non enim ideo miseretur Deus alicuius, quia voluit et cucurrit; sed ideo voluit et cucurrit, quia misertus est3 Deus. Paratur enim voluntas hominis a Deo, et a Domino gressus hominis diriguntur. Ideoque congrue ait: Non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei »; « non quia hoc sine voluntate nostra agatur, sed quia voluntas nostra nil boni agit, nisi divinitus adiuvetur ». Unde alibi: « Apostolus ait: Non autem ego, sed gratia Dei mecum. Non ideo dicit, quia nihil boni agebat; sed quia nihil boni ageret, si illa non adiuvaret ». — His testimoniis aperte insinuatur, quia voluntas hominis gratia Dei praevenitur atque praeparatur, ut fiat bona, non ut fiat voluntas, quia et ante gratiam voluntas erat, sed non erat bona et recta voluntas.

Cap. II.

Quid sit voluntas.

Voluntatem ipsam Augustinus in libro de Duabus Animabus4 ita definit: « Voluntas est animi motus, cogente nullo, ad aliquid non admittendum, vel adipiscendum ». Haec autem, ut non admittat malum et adipiscatur bonum, praevenitur et praeparatur Dei gratia. Unde Apostolus gratiam praevenientem et subsequentem commendans, id est, operantem et cooperantem, vigilanter dixit: « Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis; et non e converso, non est miserentis Dei, sed volentis et currentis. Nam si, ut quibusdam placuit, quod dictum est ita accipiatur: Non est volentis neque currentis, sed miserentis Dei, tanquam diceretur: non sufficit sola voluntas hominis, si non sit etiam misericordia Dei; contra dicitur, non sufficit etiam misericordia Dei, si non sit voluntas5 hominis. Ac per hoc, si recte dictum est illud, quia id voluntas hominis sola non implet, cur non etiam a contrario recte dicitur: non miserentis est Dei, sed volentis est hominis, cum id misericordia Dei sola non impleat6 »? « Homo enim credere vel sperare non poterit, nisi velit, nec pervenire ad palmam, nisi voluntate currat ». « Restat ergo, ut ideo ita recte dictum intelligatur, ut totum detur Deo, qui hominis voluntatem bonam praevenit et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat praeparatam, nolentem praevenit, ut velit, volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit ». — Ecce his verbis et aliis praemissis evidenter traditur, quia voluntas hominis praeparatur et praevenitur gratia Dei, ut velit bonum, et adiuvatur, ne frustra velit.

Itaque bona voluntas comitatur gratiam, non gratia voluntatem. Unde Augustinus7 ad Bonifacium Papam scribens contra Pelagianos, inquit: « Cum fides impetrat iustificationem, sicut unicuique Deus partitus est mensuram fidei, non gratiam Dei aliquid meriti praecedit humani, sed ipsa meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici, voluntate comitante, non ducente, pedissequa, non praevia ». — Ecce hic expresse8 habes, quod gratia praevenit bonae voluntatis meritum, et ipsa bona voluntas pedissequa est gratiae, non praevia.

Cap. III.

Quae sit gratia voluntatem bonam praeveniens.

Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi monstratur, quae sit ipsa gratia voluntatem praeveniens et praeparans, scilicet fides cum dilectione. Ideoque Augustinus in eodem9, tractans, quomodo iustificati sumus ex fide, et tamen gratis — utrumque enim dicit Apostolus, qui dicit: Iustificati ex fide, alibi ait: Iustificati gratis per gratiam — hoc, inquit10, ideo dixit, « ne fides ipsa superba sit, ne dicat sibi: si ex fide iustificati,

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quomodo gratis? Quod enim fides meretur11, cur non potius redditur, quam donatur? Non dicat ista homo fidelis, quia cum dixerit: habeo fidem, ut merear iustificationem, respondetur ei: Quid habes, quod non accepisti12 »? Fides enim, qua iustificatus es, gratis tibi data est. — Hic aperte ostenditur, quod fides est causa iustificationis, et ipsa est gratia et beneficium, quo hominis praevenitur voluntas et praeparatur. Unde Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum13: « Voluntas est, qua et peccatur et recte vivitur. Voluntas vero ipsa nisi Dei gratia liberetur a servitute, qua peccati serva facta est, et ut vitia superet, adiuvetur; recte pieque vivi a mortalibus non potest; et hoc beneficium, quo liberatur, nisi eam praeveniret, iam meritis daretur et non esset gratia, quae utique gratis datur ». — Praevenitur ergo bona hominis voluntas illo gratiae beneficio, quo liberatur et praeparatur. Et illud beneficium recte fides Christi intelligitur, sicut Augustinus in Enchiridio14 evidenter ostendit dicens: « Ipsum arbitrium liberandum est post illam ruinam a servitute peccati. Nec omnino per se ipsum, sed per solam Dei gratiam, quae in fide Christi posita est, liberatur, ut voluntas ipsa praeparetur ». — Ecce aperte dicit, gratiam, per quam liberatur arbitrium et praeparatur voluntas, positam esse in fide Christi. « Fides enim Christi, ut in eodem ait, impetrat quod lex imperat ».

Cap. IV.

Quod bona voluntas, quae praevenitur gratia, quaedam Dei dona praevenit.

Ipsa tamen eadem voluntas quaedam gratiae dona praevenit. Unde Augustinus in Enchiridio15: « Praecedit bona voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed non omnia; quae autem non praecedit ipsa, in eis est et ipsa iuvat; nam utrumque legitur in sanctis Eloquiis: Et misericordia eius praeveniet me — Et misericordia eius subsequetur me. Nolentem quippe praevenit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit. Cur enim admonemur orare pro inimicis nostris nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus in eis operetur et velle? Itemque, cur admonemur petere, ut accipiamus, nisi ut ab illo fiat quod volumus, a quo factum est, ut velimus »? « Inde Apostolus ait: Non est volentis neque currentis, sed Dei miserentis ». — Ex his apparet, quod bona hominis voluntas quaedam dona Dei praevenit, quia eam comitatur gratia adiuvans; et quibusdam praevenitur, quia eam praevenit gratia operans, scilicet fides cum caritate.

Non est tamen ignorandum, quod alibi Augustinus16 significare videtur, quod ex voluntate sit fides, de illo verbo Apostoli, scilicet: Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ita super Ioannem17 tractans: « Ideo non simpliciter Apostolus ait creditur, sed corde creditur, quia cetera potest homo nolens, credere non nisi volens; intrare ecclesiam et accedere ad altare potest nolens, sed non credere ». Item super Genesim18, ubi Laban et Bathuel dixerunt: Vocemus puellam et quaeramus eius voluntatem, dicit expositor: « Quia fides est voluntatis, non necessitatis ». — Ad quod respondentes dicimus, non haec ita accipienda fore, ut ex voluntate hominis fides intelligatur provenire, cum ipsa sit proprie Dei donum, ut ait Apostolus19 et ex ea bona hominis merita incipiant. Per hanc enim, ut ait Augustinus super Psalmum sexagesimum septimum20, « iustificatur impius, id est, fit de impio pius, ut deinde ipsa fides incipiat per dilectionem operari; unde omnia bona merita incipiunt ». Sed potius haec ideo ita dicta sunt, quia non est fides, nisi in eo qui vult credere, cuius bonam voluntatem fides praevenit, non tempore, sed causa et natura. Unde Augustinus supra congruenter dixit, quod bona voluntas in eis donis est, quae non praecedit, et ipsa iuvat; quia ea iuvat, quibus praevenitur, dum eis consentit ad effectum boni, et in eis est, quia tempore ab eis non praeceditur.

Ceterum hanc quaestionem magis acuunt et urgent verba Augustini, quibus in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum21 utitur, pertractans illud verbum Apostoli: « Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Attendant, inquit, hic et verba ista perpendant qui putant, ex nobis esse fidei coeptum, et ex Deo esse fidei supplementum. Commendans enim istam gratiam, quae non datur secundum aliqua merita, sed efficit omnia bona merita, inquit: Non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid boni, scilicet ex nobis. Quis autem non videat, prius esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus quippe credit aliquid, nisi prius cogitaverit, esse credendum. Si ergo cogitare bonum non est ex nobis, ut hic Apostolus tradit, nec credere; quamquam et ipsum credere nihil est aliud quam cum assensione mentis cogitare ». — Hic videtur insinuare, quod cogitatio bona praecedat fidem, et ita bona voluntas praeveniat fidem, non praeveniatur; quod praedictis adversari videtur. — Ad hoc autem dicimus, quod aliquando cogitatio bona sive voluntas praevenit fidem, sed non est illa bona voluntas, vel cogitatio, qua recte vivitur. Illa enim sine fide et caritate non est. Nam ut ait Augustinus ad Anastasium22, « sine spiritu non est voluntas hominis libera, cum cupiditatibus vincatur », « non est libera ad bonum, nisi liberata fuerit ». Non autem liberatur, nisi per Spiritum sanctum diffundatur caritas in cordibus. Non est libera voluntas, nisi eam liberet gratia per legem fidei, id est, non est libera

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sine fide operante per dilectionem; et illa sufficienter et vere bona est23. « Non est enim fructus bonus, qui de caritatis radice non surgit. Si vero adsit fides operans per dilectionem, fit delectatio boni ».

Cap. V.

Quod cogitatio boni praecedit fidem.

Illa autem cogitatio sive voluntas, quae fidem et caritatem aliasque iustificationes praecedit, non sufficit ad salutem, nec recte ea vivitur. Hac voluntate concupiscitur illa bona voluntas, quae est magnum bonum, ista vero non. Alia est ergo illa voluntas sive cogitatio, alia ista.

Cap. VI.

Quod intellectus et cogitationem boni et delectationem praevenit.

Et sicut illa istam praecedit, ita illam praevenit intellectus. Unde Augustinus, ista distinguens, super illum locum Psalmi centesimi decimi octavi24 Concupivit anima mea desiderare iustificationes, ait: « Concupivit desiderare, inquit, non desideravit ». « Videmus enim ratione nonnunquam, quam utiles sint iustificationes Dei; sed infirmitate praepediti, aliquando non desideramus. Praevolat ergo intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus; scimus bonum, nec delectat agere, et cupimus, ut delectet. Sic iste olim desiderare concupiscebat quae bona esse cernebat, cupiens eorum habere delectationem, quorum potuit videre rationem ». « Ostendit itaque, quibus quasi gradibus ad eas perveniatur: prius enim est, ut videantur, quam sint utiles et honestae; deinde, ut earum desiderium concupiscatur; postremo, ut, proficiente gratia, delectet earum operatio, quarum sola ratio delectabat ». — Attende hunc ordinem gratiarum, quem hic distincte assignat Augustinus, qualiter scilicet intellectus bonorum praecedit concupiscentiam eorundem, et ipsa concupiscentia delectationem, quae fit per fidem et caritatem; qua habita, vere bona est voluntas, qua recte vivitur, ipsaque fidei comes est, non praevia.

Cap. VII.

An per liberum arbitrium operetur homo bonum sine gratia.

Qui verba Augustini praemissa25 secundum hanc distinctionem considerat, nullam ibi repugnantiam fore animadvertit, non ignorans, etiam ante gratiam praevenientem et operantem, qua voluntas bona praeparatur in homine, praecedere quaedam bona ex Dei gratia et libero arbitrio, quaedam etiam ex solo libero arbitrio, quibus tamen vitam non meretur nec gratiam, qua iustificatur. « Illius enim gratiae percipiendae, quae voluntatem hominis sanat, ut sanata legem impleat, nulla merita praecedunt26 ». Ipsa est enim, qua iustificatur impius, id est, fit iustus, qui prius erat impius; « meritis autem impii non gratia, sed poena debetur; nec ista esset gratia, si non daretur gratuita ». Datur autem gratuita, quia nil boni ante feceramus, unde hoc mereremur. Non negamus tamen, multa ante hanc gratiam et praeter hanc gratiam ab homine fieri bona per liberum arbitrium, ut tradit Augustinus in Responsionibus contra Pelagianos27, ubi dicit, homines per liberum arbitrium agros colere, domos aedificare et alia plura bona facere sine gratia cooperante.

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English Translation

DISTINCTION XXVI.

Cap. I.

On operating and cooperating grace.

This is operating and cooperating grace; for operating grace prepares the will of man, that he may will the good, while cooperating grace assists, lest he will in vain. Hence Augustine in the book On Grace and Free Choice1: « By cooperating, God perfects in us what He begins by operating, since He Himself, that we may will, operates as the one beginning, who cooperates with those willing as the one perfecting ». « Therefore that we may will, He operates; but when we will, and so will that we may bring it to perfection, He cooperates with us; yet without Him, whether operating that we may will, or cooperating when we will, we avail nothing toward the good works of piety ». — Behold, by these words it is sufficiently disclosed what operating grace is, and what cooperating grace is. For operating grace is that which precedes the good will; for by it the will of man is freed and prepared, that it may be good and may effectively will the good. But cooperating grace follows the will already good by assisting it. Hence Augustine against the heretic Julian2, who said that good will is from free choice alone, and asserted that man through free choice can will and work the good without grace, says: The Apostle put forth a manifest sentence concerning the commendation of grace, when he said: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. « If you had attended to this, Julian, you would not have extended the merits of the human will against grace. For God does not show mercy to anyone because he willed and ran; but he willed and ran because God showed mercy3. For the will of man is prepared by God, and the steps of man are directed by the Lord. And therefore he fittingly says: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy »; « not because this is done without our will, but because our will does nothing good unless it is divinely assisted ». Hence elsewhere: « The Apostle says: Not I, however, but the grace of God with me. He does not say this because he was doing no good; but because he would do no good if it did not assist him ». — By these testimonies it is openly intimated that the will of man is preceded and prepared by the grace of God, that it may become good, not that it may become will, since the will existed even before grace, but it was not a good and right will.

Cap. II.

What the will is.

Augustine in the book On the Two Souls4 defines the will itself thus: « The will is a motion of the mind, with nothing compelling, toward not admitting something, or toward attaining it ». But this, that it may not admit evil and may attain the good, is preceded and prepared by the grace of God. Hence the Apostle, commending preceding and subsequent grace, that is, operating and cooperating, said watchfully: « It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy; and not conversely, it is not of God who shows mercy, but of him who wills and runs. For if, as it pleased some, what is said be taken thus: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy, as if it were said: the will of man alone does not suffice, if there be not also the mercy of God; on the contrary it is said, neither does the mercy of God suffice, if there be not the will5 of man. And through this, if that was rightly said, that the will of man alone does not fulfill it, why is it not also conversely rightly said: it is not of God who shows mercy, but of man who wills, since the mercy of God alone does not fulfill it6 »? « For man will not be able to believe or to hope, unless he wills, nor to attain the palm, unless he runs by his will ». « It remains therefore that it be rightly understood thus, that the whole be given to God, who precedes and prepares the good will of man to be assisted, and assists it when prepared, precedes the unwilling that he may will, follows the willing, lest he will in vain ». — Behold, by these words and the others set forth before, it is evidently handed down that the will of man is prepared and preceded by the grace of God, that it may will the good, and is assisted, lest it will in vain.

And so good will accompanies grace, not grace the will. Hence Augustine7, writing to Pope Boniface against the Pelagians, says: « When faith obtains justification, just as God has apportioned to each one the measure of faith, no human merit precedes the grace of God, but it itself merits to be increased, that increased it may merit also to be perfected, with the will accompanying, not leading, following at heel, not going before ». — Behold, here you have it expressly8 that grace precedes the merit of the good will, and the good will itself follows at the heel of grace, not before it.

Cap. III.

What the grace is that precedes the good will.

And if you attend diligently, there is nonetheless shown to you what this grace is that precedes and prepares the will, namely faith with love. And therefore Augustine in the same place9, treating how we are justified by faith and yet freely — for the Apostle says both, who says: Justified by faith, and elsewhere says: Justified freely by grace — said this, he says10, for this reason, « lest faith itself be proud, lest it say to itself: if we are justified by faith,

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how freely? For what faith merits11, why is it not rather repaid than given? Let not the faithful man say this, for when he has said: I have faith, that I may merit justification, it is answered to him: What have you that you have not received12 »? For the faith by which you are justified was given to you freely. — Here it is openly shown that faith is the cause of justification, and it itself is the grace and benefit by which the will of man is preceded and prepared. Hence Augustine in the first book of the Retractations13: « The will is that by which both one sins and one lives rightly. But the will itself, unless it is freed by the grace of God from the servitude by which it has been made the servant of sin, and is assisted that it may overcome vices, cannot be made to live rightly and piously by mortals; and this benefit, by which it is freed, unless it preceded it, would already be given to merits and would not be grace, which surely is given freely ». — Therefore the good will of man is preceded by that benefit of grace, by which it is freed and prepared. And that benefit is rightly understood to be the faith of Christ, as Augustine in the Enchiridion14 evidently shows, saying: « Choice itself must be freed after that ruin from the servitude of sin. And not at all by itself, but by the grace of God alone, which is placed in the faith of Christ, is it freed, that the will itself may be prepared ». — Behold, he says openly that the grace by which choice is freed and the will is prepared is placed in the faith of Christ. « For the faith of Christ, as he says in the same place, obtains what the law commands ».

Cap. IV.

That the good will, which is preceded by grace, precedes certain gifts of God.

Yet that same will precedes certain gifts of grace. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion15: « The good will of man precedes many gifts of God, but not all; but those which it does not itself precede, in these it both is and itself assists; for both are read in the holy Scriptures: And his mercy will go before me — And his mercy will follow me. For it precedes the unwilling, that he may will; it follows the willing, lest he will in vain. For why are we admonished to pray for our enemies who are unwilling to live piously, except that God may work in them also the willing? And likewise, why are we admonished to ask, that we may receive, except that by Him from whom it was made that we will, may be made that which we will »? « Hence the Apostle says: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy ». — From these it appears that the good will of man precedes certain gifts of God, because assisting grace accompanies it; and by certain ones it is preceded, because operating grace precedes it, namely faith with love.

Yet it must not be ignored that elsewhere Augustine16 seems to signify that faith is from the will, concerning that word of the Apostle, namely: With the heart it is believed unto justice, treating thus upon John17: « For this reason the Apostle does not say simply it is believed, but with the heart it is believed, because other things a man can do unwilling, but believe only willing; to enter the church and to approach the altar he can do unwilling, but not to believe ». Likewise upon Genesis18, where Laban and Bathuel said: Let us call the girl and ask her will, the expositor says: « Because faith is of the will, not of necessity ». — Responding to which we say that these are not to be so taken that faith be understood to come forth from the will of man, since it itself is properly the gift of God, as the Apostle says19, and from it the good merits of man begin. For through it, as Augustine says upon the sixty-seventh Psalm20, « the impious is justified, that is, from impious he is made pious, that thereafter faith itself may begin to work through love; whence all good merits begin ». But rather these things were said thus because there is no faith except in him who wills to believe, whose good will faith precedes, not in time, but in cause and nature. Hence Augustine above fittingly said that the good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and itself assists; because it assists those by whom it is preceded, while it consents with them to the effect of the good, and is in them, because in time it is not preceded by them.

Furthermore, the words of Augustine which he uses in the book On the Predestination of the Saints21, treating that word of the Apostle, sharpen and press this question more: « Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves. Let them attend, he says, here, and let them weigh these words, who think that the beginning of faith is of us, and the supplement of faith is of God. For, commending that grace which is not given according to any merits, but effects all good merits, he says: Not that we are sufficient to think anything good, namely of ourselves. But who does not see that to think is prior to believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it must be believed. If therefore to think the good is not of us, as the Apostle here hands down, neither is to believe; although to believe itself is nothing other than to think with the assent of the mind ». — Here he seems to intimate that good thought precedes faith, and so that good will precedes faith, and is not preceded; which seems to be opposed to what was said before. — To this, however, we say that sometimes good thought or will precedes faith, but that is not the good will or thought by which one lives rightly. For that does not exist without faith and love. For as Augustine says to Anastasius22, « without the Spirit the will of man is not free, since it is overcome by desires », « it is not free toward the good, unless it has been freed ». But it is not freed unless through the Holy Spirit love is poured forth in hearts. The will is not free unless grace frees it through the law of faith, that is, it is not free

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without faith working through love; and that will is sufficiently and truly good23. « For there is no good fruit which does not rise from the root of love. But if there is present faith working through love, the delight of the good comes about ».

Cap. V.

That thought of the good precedes faith.

But that thought or will which precedes faith and love and the other justifications does not suffice for salvation, nor is one made to live rightly by it. By this will is desired that good will which is a great good, but this latter is not. Therefore that will or thought is one thing, this is another.

Cap. VI.

That the intellect precedes both thought of the good and delight.

And just as that precedes this, so the intellect precedes that. Hence Augustine, distinguishing these, treating upon that place of the one hundred eighteenth Psalm24 My soul has desired to long for thy justifications, says: « It has desired to long for, he says, it has not longed for ». « For we sometimes see by reason how useful the justifications of God are; but hindered by infirmity, sometimes we do not long for them. Therefore the intellect flies ahead, there follows a slow affection or none; we know the good, and it does not delight to do it, and we desire that it may delight. So this one once longed to desire the things which he discerned to be good, desiring to have the delight of those things whose ground he could see ». « It shows therefore by what steps, as it were, one arrives at them: for first it is, that they be seen how useful and honorable they are; then, that their desire be longed for; lastly, that, grace advancing, the working of those things delight, whose ground alone used to delight ». — Attend to this order of graces, which Augustine here distinctly assigns, namely how the intellect of good things precedes the longing for them, and the longing itself the delight, which comes about through faith and love; which once had, the will is truly good, by which one lives rightly, and is itself the companion of faith, not its forerunner.

Cap. VII.

Whether through free choice man works the good without grace.

He who considers the aforementioned words of Augustine25 according to this distinction observes that there will be no contradiction there, not being ignorant that, even before preceding and operating grace, by which good will is prepared in man, there precede certain goods from the grace of God and free choice, and certain ones also from free choice alone, by which, however, he merits neither life nor the grace by which he is justified. « For of that grace which is to be received, which heals the will of man, that healed it may fulfill the law, no merits precede26 ». For it is that by which the impious is justified, that is, made just, who before was impious; « but to the merits of the impious not grace, but punishment is owed; nor would this be grace, if it were not given gratuitously ». But it is given gratuitously, because we had done nothing good beforehand whereby we might merit this. We do not deny, however, that many goods are done by man before this grace and apart from this grace through free choice, as Augustine hands down in the Responses against the Pelagians27, where he says that men through free choice till fields, build houses, and do many other goods without cooperating grace.

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Apparatus Criticus
  1. Cap. 17. n. 33., ubi paulo inferius etiam seq. locus. — Cfr. Hugo, Sum. Sent. tr. 2. c. 3. et tr. 3. c. 7.
    Ch. 17, n. 33, where the following passage is also a little below. — Cf. Hugh, Summa Sententiarum tr. 2, c. 3 and tr. 3, c. 7.
  2. Libr. I. Operis imperfecti c. 141, nonnullis a Magistro mutatis. Locus Scripturae est Rom. 9, 16.
    Book I of the Unfinished Work c. 141, with some things changed by the Master. The Scripture passage is Rom. 9:16.
  3. Codd. BC miseretur, cod. E prius est misertus. — Locus Scripturae est Prov. 16, 9 et Ps. 36, 23.
    Codices BC read miseretur, codex E prius est misertus. — The Scripture passage is Prov. 16:9 and Ps. 36:23.
  4. August., de Perfectione iustitiae hominis, c. 19. n. 40. Seq. locus est Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 10. n. 36. — Locus Scripturae est 1. Cor. 15, 10.
    Augustine, On the Perfection of Man's Justice, c. 19, n. 40. The following passage is Letter 186 to Paulinus, c. 10, n. 36. — The Scripture passage is 1 Cor. 15:10.
  5. Cap. 10. n. 14.
    Ch. 10, n. 14.
  6. Vat. praefigit etiam, refragantibus codd. ABCE, ed. 1 et originali.
    The Vatican edition prefixes etiam, against codices ABCE, edition 1, and the original.
  7. August., Enchirid. c. 32. n. 9, ubi etiam duo seqq. loci.
    Augustine, Enchiridion c. 32, n. 9, where also the following two passages occur.
  8. Vel potius Epist. 186. ad Paulinum, c. 3. n. 10, et est in Glossa ad Rom. 5, 1.
    Or rather Letter 186 to Paulinus, c. 3, n. 10, and it is in the Gloss on Rom. 5:1.
  9. Vat. aperte, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.
    The Vatican edition reads aperte, against the codices and editions 1, 8.
  10. Epist. cit. c. 3. n. 9. — Loci Scripturae sunt Rom. 5, 1. et 3, 24.
    The cited Letter, c. 3, n. 9. — The Scripture passages are Rom. 5:1 and 3:24.
  11. Ita ed. 8; in aliis edd. et in codd. enim pro impiit [impetrat], qua lectione oratio fit incongrua.
    So edition 8; in the other editions and in the codices enim stands for impetrat, by which reading the sentence becomes incongruous.
  12. Edd. 1, 8 meruit.
    Editions 1, 8 read meruit.
  13. Epist. 1. Cor. 4. 7.
    Letter; 1 Cor. 4:7.
  14. Cap. 9. n. 4.
    Ch. 9, n. 4.
  15. Cap. 106. n. 28. — In quo textu post voluntas Vat. cum paucis edd. et codd. ACE omittit ipsa. — Verba in fine capituli sunt ibid. c. 117. n. 31.
    Ch. 106, n. 28. — In which text, after voluntas, the Vatican edition with a few editions and codices ACE omits ipsa. — The words at the end of the chapter are ibidem c. 117, n. 31.
  16. Cap. 32. n. 9, ubi et seq. locus. — Respicitur ibi ad Ps. 58, 11; Ps. 22, 6; Matth. 5, 44; Luc. 11, 9, et Rom. 9, 16.
    Ch. 32, n. 9, where also the following passage. — Reference is made there to Ps. 58:11; Ps. 22:6; Matt. 5:44; Luke 11:9; and Rom. 9:16.
  17. Tract. 26. in Ioan. n. 2, multis omissis. Locus praecedens Apostoli est Rom. 10, 10. In verbis Augustini post credere cod. B et edd. 1, 8 addunt autem; codd. DE legunt non potest nisi.
    Tractate 26 on John, n. 2, with many things omitted. The preceding passage of the Apostle is Rom. 10:10. In the words of Augustine, after credere, codex B and editions 1, 8 add autem; codices DE read non potest nisi.
  18. Cap. 24. v. 36, ubi in Glossa interlin. sunt verba citata.
    Ch. 24, v. 36, where the cited words are in the interlinear Gloss.
  19. Ephes. 2, 8.
    Eph. 2:8.
  20. Vers. 33; Enarrat. n. 41.
    Verse 33; Enarration n. 41.
  21. Cap. 2. n. 5. — Locus Apostoli est II. Cor. 3, 5, in quo codd. BCDE et ed. 8 habent ex nobis pro a nobis, quod cum Vulgata habent edd. 1, 8; aliae edd. haec verba omittunt.
    Ch. 2, n. 5. — The passage of the Apostle is 2 Cor. 3:5, in which codices BCDE and edition 8 have ex nobis for a nobis, which with the Vulgate editions 1, 8 have; other editions omit these words.
  22. Epist. 145. n. 2. Locus sequens est in Glossa ad II. Cor. 3, 6. Inferius respicitur Rom. 5, 5; denique Rom. 3, 27.
    Letter 145, n. 2. The following passage is in the Gloss on 2 Cor. 3:6. Below, reference is made to Rom. 5:5; finally Rom. 3:27.
  23. Edd. 1, 8 legunt et illam sufficienter habere bonum est. — Locus, qui sequitur, est August., de Spiritu et lit. c. 14. n. 26. et Gregor., Homil. 27.
    Editions 1, 8 read et illam sufficienter habere bonum est. — The passage that follows is Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 14, n. 26, and Gregory, Homily 27.
  24. Vers. 20. August., Serm. 8. in hunc Ps. n. 5. et deinde n. 4. et tertio iterum n. 5.
    Verse 20. Augustine, Sermon 8 on this Psalm, n. 5, and then n. 4, and a third time n. 5.
  25. Scil. in c. 4, sumta ex August., de Praedest. c. 2. n. 5.
    Namely in c. 4, taken from Augustine, On Predestination c. 2, n. 5.
  26. Sunt verba August. de Spiritu et lit. c. 9. n. 5; seq. locus est in Glossa ad Rom. 3, 24, apud Lyranum. — Pro verbis iustificatur impius, id est fit, Vat. aliaeque edd. perperam habent iustificatus impius fit, refragantibus codd. ABDE et edd. 1, 8.
    These are the words of Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter c. 9, n. 5; the following passage is in the Gloss on Rom. 3:24, in Lyra. — For the words iustificatur impius, id est fit, the Vatican and other editions wrongly have iustificatus impius fit, against codices ABDE and editions 1, 8.
  27. Libr. III. Hypognosticon, c. 4. — In codd. et edd. communiter haec d. XXVI. comprehendit adhuc prima quatuor capitula sequentis distinctionis, nempe cc. VIII.—XI, quae sunt in indice Magistri (supra pag. 9), et excurrit usque ad verba: Hic videndum est. Satis constat, Magistrum ipsum tantum distinxisse capitula sui libri, non distinctiones, quae in scholis postea a magistris additae sunt. Quoad hunc locum ipse S. Bonav. in divisione textus d. 27. manifestat, ante ipsam distinctionem XXVII. incepisse a verbis Hic videndum est.
    Book III of the Hypognosticon, c. 4. — In the codices and editions this distinction XXVI commonly comprehends still the first four chapters of the following distinction, namely cc. VIII–XI, which are in the Master's index (above, p. 9), and it runs as far as the words: Here it must be considered. It is sufficiently clear that the Master himself distinguished only the chapters of his book, not the distinctions, which were afterwards added by the masters in the schools. As regards this passage, St. Bonaventure himself in the division of the text of d. 27 shows that before distinction XXVII itself it began from the words Here it must be considered.
Dist. 26, Divisio Textus→