Dist. 27
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 27
DISTINCTIO XXVII.
Cap. I.
Utrum eadem gratia sit, quae dicitur operans et cooperans.
Hic considerandum est, cum praedictum sit, per gratiam operantem et praevenientem voluntatem hominis liberari ac praeparari, ut bonum velit, et per gratiam cooperantem et subsequentem adiuvari, ne frustra velit; utrum una et eadem sit gratia, id est unum munus gratis datum, quod operetur et cooperetur; an diversa, alterum operans, et alterum cooperans. — Quibusdam non irrationabiliter videtur, quod una et eadem sit gratia, idem donum, eadem virtus, quae operatur et cooperatur, sed propter diversos eius effectus et dicitur operans et cooperans. Operans enim dicitur, in quantum liberat et praeparat voluntatem hominis, ut bonum velit; cooperans vero, in quantum eandem adiuvat, ne frustra velit, scilicet ut opus faciat bonum. Ipsa enim gratia non est otiosa, sed meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur et perfici1.
Cap. II.
Quomodo gratia meretur augeri.
Si vero quaeritur, quomodo ipsa2 gratia praeveniens mereatur augeri et perfici, cum nullum meritum sit absque libero arbitrio; et quid sit ipsa gratia, an virtus, an non; et si virtus, an actus, vel non: ut hoc aperte insinuari valeat, praemittendum est, tria esse genera bonorum.
Cap. III.
De tribus generibus bonorum.
Alia namque sunt magna, alia minima, alia media, ut Augustinus ait in primo libro Retractationum3: « Virtutes, inquit, quibus recte vivitur, magna bona sunt. Species autem quorumlibet corporum, sine quibus recte vivi potest, minima bona sunt. Potentiae vero animi, sine quibus recte vivi non potest, media bona sunt. Item, virtutibus nemo male utitur; ceteris autem bonis, id est mediis et minimis, non solum bene, sed etiam male quisque uti potest; et ideo virtute nemo male utitur, quia opus virtutis est bonus usus istorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus; nemo autem bene utendo male utitur. Non solum autem magna, sed etiam media et minima bona esse praestitit bonitas Dei ». — Ecce habes tria genera bonorum distincta.
Cap. IV.
In quibus bonis sit liberum arbitrium.
Quaeritur autem, in quibus bonis contineatur liberum arbitrium. De hoc Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum4 ita ait: « In mediis quidem bonis invenitur liberum voluntatis arbitrium, quia et male illo uti possumus; sed tamen tale est, ut sine illo recte vivere nequeamus. Bonus autem usus eius iam virtus est, quae in magnis reperitur bonis, quibus male uti nullus potest. Et quia bona et magna et media et minima ex Deo sunt, sequitur, ut ex Deo sit etiam bonus usus liberae voluntatis, qui virtus est et in magnis numeratur bonis ». — Attende diligenter quae dicta sunt, et confer in unum; sic enim aperietur quod supra quaerebatur. Dixit equidem, opus virtutis esse bonum usum illorum bonorum, quibus etiam non bene uti possumus, id est mediorum, in quibus posuit liberum arbitrium, cuius quoque bonum usum dixit esse virtutem. Quod si est, non est ergo opus virtutis, quod supra dixit, quia aliud est virtus, aliud opus eius.
Cap. V.
De virtute, quid sit, et quid actus eius.
Hic videndum est, quid sit virtus, et quid sit actus vel opus eius. — Virtus est, sicut ait Augustinus5, bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, et qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus solus in homine operatur. Ideoque opus Dei tantum est, sicut de virtute iustitiae Augustinus docet super illum locum Psalmi6: Feci iudicium et iustitiam, ita dicens: « Iustitia magna virtus animi est, quam non fecit in homine nisi Deus. Ideoque, cum ait Propheta ex persona Ecclesiae: Feci iustitiam, non ipsam virtutem, quam non facit homo, sed opus eius intelligi voluit ». — Ecce aperte insinuatur hic, quod iustitia in homine non est opus hominis, sed Dei; quod et de aliis virtutibus itidem intelligendum est.
Nam de gratia fidei Ephesiis scribens Apostolus, similiter fidem non ex homine, sed ex Deo tantum esse, asserit inquiens: Gratia estis salvati per fidem, et hoc non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est. Quod a Sanctis ita exponitur: « Hoc, id est7 fides, non est vi naturae nostrae, quia donum Dei pure est ». — Ecce et hic manifeste traditur, quod fides non est ex libertate arbitrii sive ex arbitrio voluntatis, quod superioribus consonat, ubi dictum est, gratiam praevenientem vel operantem esse virtutem, quae voluntatem hominis liberat et sanat. Unde Augustinus in libro de Spiritu et littera ait: « Iustificati sumus non per liberam voluntatem, sed per gratiam Christi; non quod sine voluntate nostra fiat, sed voluntas nostra ostenditur infirma per legem, ut sanet gratia voluntatem, et sana voluntas impleat legem ».
Cap. VI.
De gratia, quae liberat voluntatem, si virtus est, vel non.
Si igitur gratia, quae sanat et liberat voluntatem hominis, virtus est vel una, vel plures; cum ipsa gratia non sit ex arbitrio voluntatis, sed eam potius sanet ac praeparet, ut bona sit; consequitur, ut virtus non sit ex libero arbitrio, et ita non sit motus vel affectus mentis, cum omnis motus vel affectus mentis sit ex libero arbitrio, sed bonus ex gratia et libero arbitrio, malus vero ex libero arbitrio tantum. Ut enim ait Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum8: « Homo sponte et libero arbitrio cadere potuit, non etiam resurgere ». Idem in libro de Duabus Animabus9: « Animae si libero ad faciendum et non faciendum motu animi careant10, si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur; earum peccatum tenere non possumus ». — Hic aperte ostenditur, quod motus animi, sive ad bonum sive ad malum, ex libero arbitrio est. Ideoque, si gratia vel virtus motus mentis est, ex libero arbitrio est. Si vero ex libero arbitrio vel ex parte est, iam non solus Deus sine homine eam facit. Propterea quidam11 non inerudite tradunt, virtutem esse bonam mentis qualitatem sive formam, quae animam informat; et ipsa non est motus vel affectus animi, sed ea liberum arbitrium iuvatur, ut ad bonum moveatur et erigatur; et ita ex virtute et libero arbitrio nascitur bonus motus vel affectus animi, et exinde bonum opus procedit exterius. Sicut pluvia rigatur terra, ut germinet et fructum faciat, nec pluvia est terra nec germen nec fructus, nec terra germen vel fructus, nec germen
fructus; ita gratis terrae mentis nostrae, id est arbitrio12 voluntatis, infunditur pluvia divinae benedictionis, id est, inspiratur gratia — quod solus Deus facit, non homo cum eo — qua rigatur voluntas hominis, ut germinet et fructificet; id est, sanatur et praeparatur, ut bonum velit, secundum quod dicitur operans; et iuvatur, ut bonum faciat, secundum quod dicitur cooperans. Et illa gratia virtus non incongrue nominatur, quia voluntatem hominis infirmam sanat et adiuvat.
Cap. VII.
Quomodo ex gratia incipiant bona merita, et de qua gratia hoc intelligatur.
Cum ergo ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere; aut intelligitur gratia gratis dans, id est Deus, vel potius gratia gratis data, quae voluntatem hominis praevenit. Non enim esset magnum, si haec a Deo dicerentur esse, a quo sunt omnia; sed potius eius gratia gratis data intelligitur, ex qua incipiunt bona merita, quae cum ex sola gratia esse dicantur, non excluditur liberum arbitrium, quia nullum meritum est in homine, quod non sit per liberum arbitrium. Sed in bonis merendis causae principalitas gratiae attribuitur; quia principalis causa bonorum meritorum est ipsa gratia, qua excitatur liberum arbitrium et sanatur, atque iuvatur voluntas hominis, ut sit bona.
Cap. VIII.
Quod bona voluntas gratia principaliter dicitur.
Quae ipsa etiam donum Dei est et hominis meritum, immo gratiae, quia ex gratia principaliter est et gratia est. Unde Augustinus ad Sixtum presbyterum13: « Quid est meritum hominis ante gratiam, cum omne bonum meritum nostrum non in nobis facit nisi gratia »? Ex gratia enim, ut dictum est, quae praevenit et sanat arbitrium hominis, et ex ipso arbitrio procreatur in anima hominis bonus affectus sive bonus motus mentis; et hoc est primum bonum hominis meritum. Sicut, verbi gratia, ex fidei virtute et hominis arbitrio generatur in mente motus quidam bonus et remunerabilis, scilicet ipsum credere; ita ex caritate et libero arbitrio alius quidam motus provenit, scilicet diligere, bonus valde; sic de ceteris virtutibus intelligendum est. Et isti boni motus vel affectus merita sunt et dona Dei14, quibus meremur et ipsorum augmentationem et alia, quae consequenter hic et in futuro nobis apponuntur15.
Cap. IX.
Qua ratione dicitur fides mereri iustificationem.
Cum ergo dicitur fides mereri iustificationem et vitam aeternam, ex ea ratione dictum accipitur, quia per actum fidei meretur illa. Similiter de caritate et iustitia et de aliis accipitur. Si enim fides16 ipsa, virtus praeveniens, diceretur esse mentis actus, qui est meritum, iam ipsa ex libero arbitrio originem haberet; quod quia non est, sic dicitur esse meritum, quia actus eius est meritum, si tamen adsit caritas, sine qua nec credere nec sperare meritum est vitae. Unde apparet vere, quia caritas est Spiritus sanctus17, quae animae qualitates informat et sanctificat, ut eis anima informetur et sanctificetur, sine qua animae qualitas non dicitur virtus, quia non valet sanare animam.
Cap. X.
De muneribus virtutum, et de gratia, quae non est, sed facit meritum.
Ex muneribus18 itaque virtutum boni sumus et iuste vivimus; et ex gratia, quae non est meritum, sed facit, non tamen sine libero arbitrio, proveniunt merita nostra, scilicet boni affectus eorumque progressus atque bona opera, quae Deus remunerat in nobis, et haec ipsa sunt Dei dona. Unde Augustinus ad Sixtum presbyterum19: « Cum coronat Deus merita nostra, nihil aliud coronat quam munera sua. Unde vita aeterna, quae in fine a Deo meritis praecedentibus redditur — quia et eadem merita, quibus redditur, non a nobis sunt, sed in nobis facta sunt per gratiam — recte et ipsa vita gratia nuncupatur, quia gratis datur. Nec ideo gratis, quia non meritis datur, sed quia data sunt per gratiam et ipsa merita, quibus datur ». Ex praemissis iam innotescere nobis aliquatenus potest, qualiter gratia praeveniens meretur augeri, et alia; et quid ipsa sit, an virtus, an aliud; et si virtus, an sit actus, vel non. Ostensum enim est supra20 ex parte quorundam, quod ipsa est virtus, et virtus non est actus, sed eius causa, non tamen sine libero arbitrio. Unde quod supra21 Augustinus dixit, bonum usum liberi arbitrii esse virtutem, ita accipi potest, id est, actum virtutis; alioquin sibi contradicere videretur, qui etiam opus virtutis supra dixit esse bonum usum eorum, quibus non bene uti possumus, in quibus posuit liberum arbitrium. Si vero bonus usus liberi arbitrii opus virtutis est, iam virtus non est. Cum ergo bonum usum eius virtutem esse dixit, nomine virtutis ipsius usum significavit.
Cap. XI.
Quod idem est usus virtutis et liberi arbitrii, sed virtutis principaliter.
Idem nempe usus bonus ex virtute est et ex libero arbitrio, sed ex virtute principaliter. Et bonus ille usus in magnis bonis annumerandus est. Illa autem gratia praeveniens, quae et virtus est, non usus liberi arbitrii est, sed ex ea potius est bonus usus liberi arbitrii; quae nobis est a Deo, non a nobis. Usus vero bonus arbitrii et ex Deo est et ex nobis; et ideo bonum meritum est. Ibi enim solus Deus operatur, hic Deus et homo. Hoc meritum ex illa purissima gratia provenit; quod Apostolus22 notavit dicens: Gratia Dei sum id quod sum, et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit. Super quem locum Augustinus ita ait: « Recte gratiam nominat; primum enim solam gratiam dat Deus, et non nisi gratis, cum non praecedant nisi mala merita; sed post per gratiam incipiunt bona merita. Et ut ostenderet etiam liberum arbitrium, addit: Et gratia eius in me vacua non fuit. Et ne ipsa voluntas sine gratia Dei putetur aliquid boni posse, subdit: Non autem ego, solus scilicet sine gratia, sed gratia Dei mecum, id est cum libero arbitrio ». Plane cum data fuerit gratia, incipiunt esse nostra merita bona, per illam tamen; quia si illa defuerit, cadit homo.
Cap. XII.
Quidam putant, virtutes bonos usus esse liberi arbitrii, id est actus mentis.
Alii vero dicunt, virtutes esse bonos usus minorum potentiarum, non tamen omnes, sed tantummodo interiores, qui in mente sunt; exteriores vero, qui per corpus geruntur, non virtutes esse dicunt, sed opera virtutum. Et ideo quod Augustinus dicit, opus virtutis esse bonum usum naturalium potentiarum, de usu exteriori accipiunt; quod vero dicit, bonum usum liberi arbitrii virtutem esse et in magnis numerari bonis, de usu interiori intelligunt. Et virtutes nihil aliud esse quam bonos affectus vel motus mentis, asserunt, quos Deus in homine facit, non homo; quia, licet illi motus sint liberi arbitrii, non tamen esse queunt, nisi Deus ipsum liberet et adiuvet gratia sua operante et cooperante; quam Dei gratuitam voluntatem accipiunt, quia Deus est, qui et operatur in nobis velle et operari bonum.
Quod autem virtutes sint motus mentis, testimoniis Sanctorum astruunt. Dicit enim Augustinus super Ioannem23: « Quid est fides? Credere quod non vides ». Credere autem motus mentis est. Idem in libro tertio de Doctrina christiana: « Caritatem autem voco motum animi ». Si vero caritas et fides motus animi sunt, virtutes ergo motus animi sunt. — Quibus alii respondentes, praemissa verba Augustini ita intelligenda fore inquiunt: Fides est credere quod non vides, id est, fides est virtus, qua creditur quod non videtur. Item: Caritas est motus animi, id est gratia, qua movetur animus ad diligendum. Et quod haec et his similia ita accipienda sint, ex his coniicitur, quae alibi Augustinus ait. Nam in secundo libro Quaestionum Evangelii24 inquit: « Est fides, qua creduntur ea quae non videntur, quae proprie dicitur fides ». Item, in decimo tertio libro de Trinitate25: « Aliud sunt ea quae creduntur, aliud est fides, qua creduntur ». Ex quibus verbis sic argumentando procedunt: aliud est credere, aliud illud quo creditur. Praedictum autem est, fidem id esse, quo creditur. Sic igitur credere non est fides, quia credere non est id quo creditur. Addunt quoque: Virtus opus Dei tantum est, quam ipse solus facit in nobis. Ipsa ergo non est usus vel actus liberi arbitrii; sed credere est actus liberi arbitrii: non est itaque virtus. — Praemissis aliisque rationibus ac testimoniis innituntur utrique. Horum autem iudicium diligentis lectoris relinquo examini, ad alia properans.
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DISTINCTION XXVII.
Cap. I.
Whether the grace which is called operating is the same as that which is called cooperating.
Here it must be considered, since it has been said above that by operating and prevenient grace the will of man is freed and prepared, so that it may will the good, and by cooperating and subsequent grace is aided, lest it will in vain: whether the grace is one and the same, that is, one freely-given gift, which both operates and cooperates; or whether it is diverse, the one operating, the other cooperating. — To certain men it seems not irrationally that it is one and the same grace, the same gift, the same virtue, which both operates and cooperates, but on account of its diverse effects it is also called operating and cooperating. For it is called operating insofar as it frees and prepares the will of man, so that he may will the good; and cooperating insofar as it aids that same will, lest it will in vain, namely that it may do a good work. For grace itself is not idle, but merits to be increased, so that, increased, it may merit also to be perfected1.
Cap. II.
In what way grace merits to be increased.
But if it is asked in what way this2 prevenient grace merits to be increased and perfected, since no merit exists apart from free choice; and what this grace itself is, whether a virtue, or not; and if a virtue, whether an act, or not: so that this may be plainly intimated, it must be premised that there are three kinds of goods.
Cap. III.
On the three kinds of goods.
For some are great, some least, and some middling, as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations3: « The virtues, he says, by which one lives rightly, are great goods. But the appearances of any bodies whatsoever, without which one can live rightly, are least goods. And the powers of the soul, without which one cannot live rightly, are middling goods. Likewise, no one uses the virtues badly; but the other goods, that is, the middling and the least, anyone can use not only well but also badly; and therefore no one uses virtue badly, because the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can use also not well; but no one by using well uses badly. And not only the great, but also the middling and least goods, the goodness of God bestowed ». — Behold, you have the three kinds of goods distinguished.
Cap. IV.
In which goods free choice is found.
But it is asked, in which goods free choice is contained. On this Augustine in the first book of the Retractations4 thus says: « In the middling goods indeed is found the free choice of the will, because we can also use it badly; but yet it is such that without it we cannot live rightly. But the good use of it is now a virtue, which is found among the great goods, which no one can use badly. And since goods both great and middling and least are from God, it follows that the good use of free will is also from God, which is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods ». — Attend diligently to what has been said, and gather it into one; for thus will be opened what was asked above. He said indeed that the work of virtue is the good use of those goods which we can also use not well, that is, of the middling goods, in which he placed free choice, whose good use too he said to be a virtue. But if this is so, then it is not the work of virtue, as he said above, because virtue is one thing, the work of it another.
Cap. V.
On virtue, what it is, and what its act is.
Here it must be seen what virtue is, and what its act or work is. — Virtue is, as Augustine says5, a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly, and which no one uses badly, which God alone works in man. Therefore it is the work of God alone, as Augustine teaches concerning the virtue of justice upon that place of the Psalm6: I have done judgment and justice, thus saying: « Justice is a great virtue of the soul, which none has made in man save God. Therefore, when the Prophet, in the person of the Church, says: I have done justice, he willed not the virtue itself, which man does not make, but the work of it, to be understood ». — Behold, it is here plainly intimated that justice in man is not the work of man, but of God; which is likewise to be understood of the other virtues.
For writing to the Ephesians concerning the grace of faith, the Apostle similarly asserts that faith is not from man, but from God alone, saying: By grace you are saved through faith, and this not from yourselves; for it is the gift of God. Which is thus expounded by the Saints: « This, that is7, faith, is not by the power of our nature, because it is purely the gift of God ». — Behold, here too it is manifestly handed down that faith is not from the liberty of choice or from the choice of the will, which is consonant with what was said above, where it was said that prevenient or operating grace is the virtue which frees and heals the will of man. Whence Augustine in the book on the Spirit and the Letter says: « We are justified not through free will, but through the grace of Christ; not that this comes about without our will, but our will is shown to be infirm through the law, so that grace may heal the will, and the healed will may fulfill the law ».
Cap. VI.
On the grace which frees the will, whether it is a virtue, or not.
If, then, the grace which heals and frees the will of man is a virtue, whether one or several; since grace itself is not from the choice of the will, but rather heals and prepares it, that it may be good; it follows that virtue is not from free choice, and thus is not a motion or affection of the mind, since every motion or affection of the mind is from free choice, but the good [motion] is from grace and free choice, while the bad is from free choice alone. For as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations8: « Man of his own accord and by free choice was able to fall, but not also to rise again ». The same in the book on the Two Souls9: « If souls lack the motion of the mind for doing and not-doing freely, if finally no power of abstaining from their own work is granted them10, we cannot hold them guilty of sin ». — Here it is plainly shown that the motion of the mind, whether to good or to evil, is from free choice. Therefore, if grace or virtue is a motion of the mind, it is from free choice. But if it is from free choice even in part, then God alone does not make it without man. Therefore certain men11 not unlearnedly hand down that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind, which informs the soul; and it itself is not a motion or affection of the soul, but by it free choice is aided, that it may be moved and raised toward the good; and thus from virtue and free choice is born a good motion or affection of the soul, and thence a good work proceeds outwardly. Just as by rain the earth is watered, that it may germinate and bear fruit, yet the rain is not the earth, nor the sprout, nor the fruit, nor is the earth the sprout or fruit, nor the sprout
the fruit; so into the earth, freely given, of our mind, that is, into the choice12 of the will, is poured the rain of the divine blessing, that is, grace is breathed in — which God alone does, not man with him — by which the will of man is watered, that it may germinate and bear fruit; that is, it is healed and prepared, so that it may will the good, according to which it is called operating; and it is aided, that it may do the good, according to which it is called cooperating. And that grace is not incongruously named a virtue, because it heals and aids the infirm will of man.
Cap. VII.
In what way good merits begin from grace, and of which grace this is to be understood.
When therefore good merits are said to be from grace and to begin; either grace freely-giving is understood, that is, God, or rather grace freely given, which goes before the will of man. For it would be no great thing if these were said to be from God, from whom are all things; but rather his grace freely given is understood, from which good merits begin, which, although they are said to be from grace alone, free choice is not thereby excluded, because no merit is in man which is not through free choice. But in the meriting of good things the principality of cause is attributed to grace; because the principal cause of good merits is grace itself, by which free choice is stirred and healed, and the will of man is aided, that it may be good.
Cap. VIII.
That the good will is said to be principally from grace.
Which good will is itself also the gift of God and the merit of man, nay rather of grace, because it is principally from grace and is grace. Whence Augustine to the priest Sixtus13: « What is the merit of man before grace, since grace alone makes our every good merit in us »? For from grace, as has been said, which goes before and heals the choice of man, and from that choice itself, is procreated in the soul of man a good affection or a good motion of the mind; and this is man's first good merit. Just as, for example, from the virtue of faith and the choice of man is generated in the mind a certain good and rewardable motion, namely the very act of believing; so from charity and free choice another certain motion proceeds, namely loving, very good; and so is it to be understood of the other virtues. And these good motions or affections are merits and gifts of God14, by which we merit both their increase and other things, which are consequently bestowed upon us here and in the future15.
Cap. IX.
By what reckoning faith is said to merit justification.
When therefore faith is said to merit justification and eternal life, it is taken to be said on this account, that through the act of faith it merits them. Similarly it is taken of charity and justice and the others. For if faith16 itself, the prevenient virtue, were said to be an act of the mind, which is a merit, then it itself would have its origin from free choice; which, because it is not so, it is thus said to be a merit, because its act is a merit, provided however that charity is present, without which neither to believe nor to hope is a merit of life. Whence it appears truly that charity is the Holy Spirit17, which informs and sanctifies the qualities of the soul, that by them the soul may be informed and sanctified, without which a quality of the soul is not called a virtue, because it has no power to heal the soul.
Cap. X.
On the gifts of the virtues, and on the grace which is not, but makes, merit.
From the gifts18 of the virtues, therefore, we are good and live justly; and from the grace which is not a merit, but makes [merit], yet not without free choice, proceed our merits, namely good affections and their progress and good works, which God rewards in us, and these very things are the gifts of God. Whence Augustine to the priest Sixtus19: « When God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts. Whence eternal life, which at the end is rendered by God to preceding merits — since even the very merits, to which it is rendered, are not from us, but are made in us through grace — is rightly itself also called grace, because it is given freely. Nor freely on this account, that it is given not to merits, but because those very merits also, to which it is given, were given through grace ». From the foregoing it can now in some measure become known to us how prevenient grace merits to be increased, and other things; and what it itself is, whether a virtue, or something else; and if a virtue, whether it is an act, or not. For it has been shown above20, on the part of certain men, that it itself is a virtue, and that virtue is not an act, but its cause, yet not without free choice. Whence, what Augustine said above21, that the good use of free choice is a virtue, can be taken thus, that is, [as] the act of virtue; otherwise he would seem to contradict himself, who also said above that the work of virtue is the good use of those things which we can use not well, in which he placed free choice. But if the good use of free choice is the work of virtue, then it is not virtue. Therefore, when he said that its good use is a virtue, by the name of virtue he signified the use of it.
Cap. XI.
That the use of virtue and of free choice is the same, but principally of virtue.
For indeed the same good use is from virtue and from free choice, but principally from virtue. And that good use is to be numbered among the great goods. But that prevenient grace, which is also a virtue, is not the use of free choice, but rather from it is the good use of free choice; which is to us from God, not from us. But the good use of choice is both from God and from us; and therefore it is a good merit. For there God alone operates, here God and man. This merit proceeds from that most pure grace; which the Apostle22 noted, saying: By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me has not been void. Upon which place Augustine thus says: « Rightly does he name grace; for first God gives grace alone, and not save freely, since nothing precedes save evil merits; but afterward through grace good merits begin. And to show free choice also, he adds: And his grace in me has not been void. And lest the will itself without the grace of God be thought able to do something good, he subjoins: Not however I, alone namely without grace, but the grace of God with me, that is, with free choice ». Plainly, when grace has been given, our good merits begin to be, yet through it; because if it is wanting, man falls.
Cap. XII.
Some think that the virtues are good uses of free choice, that is, acts of the mind.
But others say that the virtues are good uses of the lesser powers, yet not all, but only the interior ones, which are in the mind; while the exterior ones, which are carried out through the body, they say are not virtues, but works of the virtues. And therefore what Augustine says, that the work of virtue is the good use of the natural powers, they take of the exterior use; but what he says, that the good use of free choice is a virtue and is numbered among the great goods, they understand of the interior use. And they assert that the virtues are nothing other than good affections or motions of the mind, which God makes in man, not man; because, although those motions are of free choice, yet they cannot be unless God frees and aids him by his grace operating and cooperating; which gratuitous will of God they take [it to be], because it is God who both works in us to will and to do the good.
But that the virtues are motions of the mind, they establish by the testimonies of the Saints. For Augustine says upon John23: « What is faith? To believe what you do not see ». But to believe is a motion of the mind. The same in the third book on Christian Doctrine: « But charity I call a motion of the soul ». But if charity and faith are motions of the soul, then the virtues are motions of the soul. — To whom others, answering, say that the foregoing words of Augustine are thus to be understood: Faith is to believe what you do not see, that is, faith is the virtue by which is believed what is not seen. Likewise: Charity is a motion of the soul, that is, the grace by which the soul is moved to loving. And that these and the like are thus to be taken, is gathered from these things which Augustine says elsewhere. For in the second book of the Questions on the Gospel24 he says: « It is faith by which are believed those things which are not seen, which is properly called faith ». Likewise, in the thirteenth book on the Trinity25: « The things which are believed are one thing, the faith by which they are believed another ». From which words they thus argue and proceed: to believe is one thing, that by which one believes another. But it has been said before that faith is that by which one believes. Thus therefore to believe is not faith, because to believe is not that by which one believes. They add also: Virtue is the work of God alone, which he alone makes in us. It therefore is not the use or act of free choice; but to believe is an act of free choice: it is therefore not a virtue. — Upon the foregoing and other reasons and testimonies both [parties] rely. The judgment of these things I leave to the examination of the diligent reader, hastening on to other matters.
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- August., Epist. 186. c. 3. n. 10.Augustine, Letter 186, c. 3, n. 10.
- Edd. 1, 8 illa. — Mox post augeri codd. et ed. 1 omittunt et perfici.Editions 1 and 8 read illa. — Shortly after, following augeri, the codices and edition 1 omit et perfici.
- Cap. 9. n. 4, et II. de Lib. Arb. c. 19. n. 50.Chapter 9, n. 4, and the second book on Free Choice, c. 19, n. 50.
- Loc. cit. n. 6.The place cited, n. 6.
- Haec definitio virtutis ex variis locis S. Augustini collecta est, praesertim ex I. Retract. c. 9. n. 3, et II. de Lib. Arb. c. 18. 19. — Ut iam dictum est, hoc loco communiter assignatur initium et cap. I. d. XXVII. S. Thom. in Comment. eandem divisionem habet, sicut S. Bonav.This definition of virtue is gathered from various places of St. Augustine, especially from the first book of the Retractations, c. 9, n. 3, and the second book on Free Choice, cc. 18, 19. — As has already been said, at this place the beginning is commonly assigned also to c. I of d. XXVII. St. Thomas in his Commentary has the same division, as does St. Bonaventure.
- Psalm. 118, 121, Serm. 26. n. 1.Psalm 118, [verse] 121, Sermon 26, n. 1.
- Cap. 2, 8; cfr. ibi Glossa interlinearis. Pro Hoc, id est Vat. ceteraeque edd., exceptis 1, 8, cum cod. C habent Haec scilicet. Mox Vat. cum pluribus edd. aperte pro manifeste.Chapters 2, 8; cf. the interlinear Gloss there. For Hoc, id est the Vatican edition and the rest, except 1 and 8, together with codex C have Haec scilicet. Shortly after, the Vatican edition with several editions reads aperte for manifeste.
- Cap. 9. n. 15.Chapter 9, n. 15.
- Cap. 9. n. 6; II. de Lib. Arb. c. 20. n. 54; de Dono persev. c. 11. n. 27.Chapter 9, n. 6; the second book on Free Choice, c. 20, n. 54; on the Gift of Perseverance, c. 11, n. 27.
- Cap. 12. n. 17, et I. Retract. c. 15. n. 6. — Paulo inferius edd. 1, 8 carent pro careant.Chapter 12, n. 17, and the first book of the Retractations, c. 15, n. 6. — A little further down, editions 1 and 8 read carent for careant.
- Cfr. Hugo, I. de Sacram. p. VI. c. 17.Cf. Hugh, the first book on the Sacraments, part VI, c. 17.
- Vat. ceteraeque edd., exceptis 1, 8, cum cod. C praefigunt libero, et paulo superius eadem cum edd. 2, 9 legit gratia terrae pro gratis terrae.The Vatican edition and the rest, except 1 and 8, together with codex C prefix libero, and a little above the same [editions] with editions 2 and 9 read gratia terrae for gratis terrae.
- Epist. 194. c. 5. n. 19.Letter 194, c. 5, n. 19.
- Solummodo Vat. et plures edd. addunt bonus.Only the Vatican edition and several editions add bonus.
- Cod. Erf. annotat: supra d. 26. cap. Itaque bona etc. Huic sententiae Magistri satis concordat Gandolph. III. c. 114; sed tamen in fine probat, quod fides meretur, per Glossam Rom. 12: Unicuique sicut Deus divisit mensuram fidei, et est in Glossa ibid. i. e. ea ratione, quod Deus dedit unicuique divisim dona mensurata, quae fides meretur; et patet exponendo sic: quae dona fides meretur i. e. ex fide sunt nobis dona, quibus meremur.Codex Erf. notes: above, d. 26, the chapter Itaque bona, etc. With this opinion of the Master agrees well enough Gandulph, book III, c. 114; yet in the end he proves that faith merits, through the Gloss on Romans 12: To each as God has apportioned the measure of faith, and it is in the Gloss there, i.e. by this reckoning, that God gave to each separately measured gifts, which faith merits; and it is plain by expounding thus: which gifts faith merits, i.e. from faith there are to us the gifts by which we merit.
- Cod. A addit scilicet.Codex A adds scilicet.
- De hac opinione Magistri cfr. Comment. supra d. 26. q. 2.On this opinion of the Master cf. the Commentary above, d. 26, q. 2.
- Edd. 1, 5, 8 adiiciunt vel actibus. Cod. Erf. advertit: Alii habent: ex actibus itaque et muneribus, ut actus sumatur pro usu, munus pro habitu.Editions 1, 5, 8 add vel actibus. Codex Erf. observes: Others have ex actibus itaque et muneribus, so that actus is taken for usus, and munus for habitus.
- Epist. 194. c. 5. n. 19; in Ioan. tract. 3. n. 10; de Corrept. et gratia, c. 13. n. 41. Est etiam in Glossa ad Rom. 6, 23. — In principio huius textus post Cum coronat codd. et edd. 1, 8 omittunt Deus.Letter 194, c. 5, n. 19; on John, tract 3, n. 10; on Rebuke and Grace, c. 13, n. 41. It is also in the Gloss on Romans 6, 23. — At the beginning of this text, after Cum coronat, the codices and editions 1 and 8 omit Deus.
- Hic c. 5. seqq. — Mox Vat. pro et virtus habet quia virtus, refragantibus codd. et edd. 1, 8.Here, c. 5 and following. — Shortly after, the Vatican edition for et virtus has quia virtus, against the codices and editions 1 and 8.
- Hic c. 3. 4.Here, cc. 3, 4.
- Epist. 1. Cor. 15, 10. August., de Gratia et lib. arb. c. 5. n. 12, et de Corrept. et gratia, c. 13. n. 41. — In quo textu post gratia eius edd. 1, 8 gratiam nominat pro gratis.The Epistle, 1 Corinthians 15, 10. Augustine, on Grace and Free Choice, c. 5, n. 12, and on Rebuke and Grace, c. 13, n. 41. — In which text, after gratia eius, editions 1 and 8 read gratiam nominat for gratis.
- Tract. 40. n. 9. Sequens textus est loc. cit. c. 10. 16: Caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum.Tract 40, n. 9. The following text is from the place cited, c. 10, [n.] 16: I call charity a motion of the soul toward enjoying God for his own sake.
- Quaest. 39. n. 1.[Questions on the Gospel, Book II,] question 39, n. 1.
- Cap. 2. n. 5. — Paulo inferius ante illud quo codd. B C et edd. 1, 8 addunt est.Chapter 2, n. 5. — A little further down, before illud quo, codices B and C and editions 1 and 8 add est. ---