Dist. 28
Book II: On the Creation of Things · Distinction 28
DISTINCTIO XXVIII.
Cap. I.
De haeresi Pelagiana.
Id vero inconcusse et incunctanter teneamus, liberum arbitrium sine gratia praeveniente et adiuvante non sufficere ad iustitiam et salutem obtinendam; nec meritis praecedentibus gratiam Dei advocari, sicut Pelagiana haeresis tradidit. Nam, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro Retractationum1: « Novi haeretici Pelagiani liberum sic asserunt voluntatis arbitrium, ut gratiae Dei non relinquant locum, quam secundum merita nostra dari asserunt ».
Cap. II.
Quod Pelagiani dictis Augustini utuntur in testimonium sui erroris.
« Pelagianorum haeresis omnium recentissima a Pelagio monacho exorta est. Hi Dei gratiae, qua praedestinati sumus, et qua meruimus de potestate tenebrarum erui2, in tantum inimici sunt, ut sine hac credant hominem posse facere omnia divina mandata. Denique Pelagius a fratribus increpatus, quod nihil tribueret adiutorio gratiae Dei ad eius mandata facienda; non eam libero arbitrio praeponebat, sed infideli calliditate supponebat, dicens, ad hoc eam dari hominibus, ut quae facere per liberum arbitrium iubentur, facilius possint implere per gratiam. Dicendo utique facilius possint, voluit credi, etiamsi difficilius, tamen posse homines sine gratia facere iussa divina. Illam vero gratiam Dei, sine qua nihil boni possumus facere, non esse dicunt nisi in libero arbitrio, quod nullis suis praecedentibus meritis ab illo accepit nostra natura, ipso ad hoc tantum3 iuvante nos per suam legem atque doctrinam, ut discamus, quae facere et quae sperare debeamus; non autem ad hoc per donum Spiritus sancti, ut quae didicerimus esse facienda, faciamus. Ac per hoc divinitus nobis dari scientiam confitentur, qua ignorantia pellitur; caritatem autem negant divinitus dari, qua pie vivitur, ut scilicet sit donum Dei scientia, quae
sine caritate inflat; et non sit donum Dei ipsa caritas, quae, ut scientia non inflet, aedificat4. Destruunt etiam orationes, quas facit Ecclesia sive pro infidelibus et doctrinae Dei resistentibus, ut convertantur ad Deum, sive pro fidelibus, ut augeatur eis fides, et perseverent in ea. Haec quippe non ab ipso accipere, sed a se ipsis homines habere contendunt, gratiam Dei, qua liberamur ab impietate, dicentes secundum merita nostra dari. Parvulos etiam sine ullo peccati originalis vinculo asserunt nasci5 ».
Cap. III.
Quomodo Augustinus illa verba determinat in Retractationibus.
Quod vero dicunt, sine gratia hominem per liberum arbitrium omnia iussa implere, huiusmodi inductionibus muniunt. Si, inquiunt, non potest ea facere homo, quae iubentur, non est ei imputandum ad mortem, sicut tu ipse, Augustine, in libro de Libero Arbitrio6 asseris: « Quis, inquis, peccat in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest? Peccatur autem: caveri igitur potest ». Hoc testimonio Augustini Pelagius usus est, disputans adversus eum, immo adversus gratiam, sicut Augustinus in libro Retractationum7, illud et alia huiusmodi retractans, commemorat inquiens: « In iis atque huiusmodi verbis meis, quia gratia Dei commemorata non est, de qua tunc non agebatur, putant Pelagiani, suam nos tenuisse sententiam; sed frustra hoc putant. Voluntas quippe est, qua peccatur et recte vivitur, quod his verbis egimus; sed ipsa nisi Dei gratia liberetur et ut vitia superet, adiuvetur, recte a mortalibus vivi non potest ». — Ecce aperte determinat, ex quo sensu illa dixerit, inimicos gratiae refellens.
Similiter et innitebatur Pelagius verbis Augustini contra gratiam, qui in libro de Duabus Animabus8 dicit: « Peccati, inquit, reum tenere quemquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis et insaniae est ». His auditis, exiliit Pelagius dicens: Cur ergo parvuli et illi qui non habent gratiam, sine qua non possunt facere mandata divina, rei tenentur? — Hoc autem qua occasione dixerit, in libro Retractationum9 Pelagio respondens aperit. Id enim contra Manichaeos dixit, qui in homine duas naturas esse contendunt, unam bonam ex Deo, alteram malam ex gente tenebrarum, quae nunquam bona fuit nec bonum velle potest; quod si esset, non videretur ei imputandum esse, si non bonum faceret.
Alibi etiam Augustinus dicit quod huic gratiae contradicere videtur, qua iustificamur. Ait enim in libro contra Adimantum, Manichaei discipulum10: « Nisi quisque voluntatem suam mutaverit, bonum operari non potest; quod in nostra potestate esse positum Dominus docet ubi ait: Aut facite arborem bonam, aut fructus eius bonos etc. ». — Quod Augustinus in Retractationibus11 « non esse contra gratiam Dei, quam praedicamus, ostendit. In potestate quippe hominis est mutare in melius voluntatem, sed ea potestas nulla est, nisi a Deo detur, de quo dictum est: Dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Cum enim hoc sit in potestate, quod cum volumus, facimus, nihil tam in potestate, quam ipsa voluntas est; sed praeparatur a Domino voluntas: eo ergo modo dat potestatem ».
Sic etiam intelligendum est quod in eodem12 ait, scilicet, in nostra potestate esse, ut vel inseri bonitate Dei, vel excidi eius severitate mereamur; quia in potestate nostra non est, nisi quod nostram sequitur voluntatem, quae cum praeparatur a Domino, facile fit opus pietatis, etiam quod impossibile et difficile fuit.
In Expositione quoque quarundam propositionum Epistolae ad Romanos13 quaedam Augustinus interserit, quae videntur huic doctrinae gratiae adversari. Ait enim: « Quod credimus nostrum est; quod autem bonum operamur illius est, qui credentibus dat Spiritum sanctum ». Et paulo post: « Nostrum est credere et velle; illius autem dare credentibus et volentibus facultatem bene operandi per Spiritum sanctum ». — Quae qualiter intelligi debeant, Augustinus in libro Retractationum aperit dicens: « Verum est quidem, a Deo esse quod operamur bonum, sed eadem regula utriusque est, et volendi scilicet et faciendi; et utrumque ipsius est, quia ipse praeparat voluntatem, et utrumque nostrum est, quia non fit nisi volentibus nobis ». « Illa itaque profecto non dixissem, si iam scirem, etiam ipsam fidem inter Spiritus sancti munera reperiri ».
Illud etiam diligenter est inspiciendum, quod Augustinus in libro Sententiarum Prosperi14 ait, scilicet quod « posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum; habere autem fidem, sicut habere caritatem, gratiae est fidelium ». — Quod non ita dictum est, tanquam ex libero arbitrio valeat haberi fides vel caritas, sed quia aptitudinem naturalem habet mens hominis ad credendum vel diligendum, quae Dei gratia praeventa credit et diligit; quod sine gratia non valet.
Cap. IV.
De haeresi Ioviniani et Manichaei, quos collidit Hieronymus.
Id ergo de gratia et libero arbitrio indubitanter teneamus, quod Hieronymus in Explanatione fidei Catholicae ad Damasum Papam15, Ioviniani et Manichaei
et Pelagii errores collidens, docet. « Liberum, inquit, sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus, nos semper indigere Dei auxilio; et tam illos errare, qui cum Manichaeo dicunt, hominem peccatum vitare non posse, quam illos, qui cum Ioviniano asserunt, hominem non posse peccare. Uterque tollit arbitrii libertatem. Nos vero dicimus, hominem semper et peccare et non peccare posse, ut semper nos liberi confiteamur esse arbitrii. Haec est fides, quam in Catholica Ecclesia didicimus et quam semper tenuimus ».
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DISTINCTION XXVIII.
Cap. I.
On the Pelagian heresy.
But let us hold this unshakenly and without hesitation, that free choice without prevenient and assisting grace does not suffice to obtain justice and salvation; nor is the grace of God summoned by preceding merits, as the Pelagian heresy has handed down. For, as Augustine says in the first book of the Retractations1: « The new Pelagian heretics so assert the choice of the will that they leave no place for the grace of God, which they assert to be given according to our merits ».
Cap. II.
That the Pelagians use the sayings of Augustine in testimony of their error.
« The Pelagian heresy, the most recent of all, arose from Pelagius the monk. These are such enemies of the grace of God, by which we are predestined, and by which we have merited to be rescued from the power of darkness2, that they believe a man can do all the divine commands without it. In short, Pelagius, rebuked by the brethren because he attributed nothing to the help of the grace of God for the doing of his commands, did not place that grace before free choice, but with unbelieving cunning placed it beneath, saying that it is given to men for this, that the things which they are commanded to do through free choice they may be able to fulfill more easily through grace. By saying that they may be able to do them more easily, he wished it to be believed that, even if with more difficulty, yet men can do the divine commands without grace. But that grace of God, without which we can do nothing good, they say is nothing other than in free choice, which our nature received from him by no preceding merits of its own, he aiding us for this only3 through his law and teaching, that we may learn what we ought to do and what to hope for; but not for this through the gift of the Holy Spirit, that what we have learned ought to be done, we may do. And through this they confess that knowledge is given us divinely, by which ignorance is dispelled; but they deny that charity, by which one lives piously, is given divinely — so that knowledge, which
without charity puffs up, may be the gift of God; and charity itself, which, that knowledge may not puff up, builds up4, may not be the gift of God. They destroy also the prayers which the Church makes both for unbelievers and those resisting the teaching of God, that they may be converted to God, and for the faithful, that their faith may be increased, and that they may persevere in it. For men contend that they have these things not by receiving them from him, but of themselves, [namely] the grace of God by which we are freed from impiety, saying that it is given according to our merits. They assert also that little children are born without any bond of original sin5 ».
Cap. III.
In what way Augustine determines those words in the Retractations.
But that which they say, that without grace a man fulfills all commands through free choice, they fortify by inductions of this kind. If, they say, a man cannot do those things which are commanded, it is not to be imputed to him unto death, just as you yourself, Augustine, in the book on Free Choice6 assert: « Who, you say, sins in that which can in no way be guarded against? But sin is committed: therefore it can be guarded against ». Pelagius used this testimony of Augustine, disputing against him, nay rather against grace, as Augustine in the book of the Retractations7, retracting that and other things of this kind, recalls, saying: « In these and words of this kind of mine, because the grace of God is not mentioned, of which it was not then a question, the Pelagians think that we held their opinion; but they think this in vain. For it is the will by which one sins and lives rightly, which we treated in these words; but unless that will be freed by the grace of God and aided to overcome its vices, it cannot live rightly among mortals ». — Behold, he plainly determines in what sense he said those things, refuting the enemies of grace.
Similarly Pelagius also relied on the words of Augustine against grace, who in the book on the Two Souls8 says: « To hold anyone guilty of sin, he says, because he did not do what he could not do, is of the highest iniquity and madness ». Hearing this, Pelagius leapt up, saying: Why then are little children and those who do not have grace, without which they cannot do the divine commands, held guilty? — But on what occasion he said this, he discloses in the book of the Retractations9, answering Pelagius. For he said it against the Manichees, who contend that there are two natures in man, one good from God, the other evil from the race of darkness, which was never good nor can will the good; and if this were so, it would not seem to be imputed to it, if it did not do good.
Elsewhere too Augustine says that which seems to contradict this grace by which we are justified. For he says in the book against Adimantus, the disciple of Manichaeus10: « Unless one changes his will, he cannot do good; which the Lord teaches to be placed in our power, where he says: Either make the tree good, or its fruits good, etc. ». — Which Augustine in the Retractations11 « shows is not against the grace of God which we preach. For it is in the power of man to change his will for the better, but that power is nothing unless it be given by God, of whom it was said: He gave them power to become the sons of God. For since this is in our power, which we do when we will, nothing is so in our power as the will itself; but the will is prepared by the Lord: in this way, therefore, he gives the power ».
So too is it to be understood what he says in the same work12, namely, that it is in our power that we should merit either to be grafted in by the goodness of God, or to be cut off by his severity; because nothing is in our power except what follows our will, which, when it is prepared by the Lord, easily becomes a work of piety, even what was impossible and difficult.
In the Exposition also of certain propositions of the Epistle to the Romans13 Augustine inserts certain things which seem to be opposed to this teaching of grace. For he says: « What we believe is ours; but the good which we do is his, who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe ». And a little after: « It is ours to believe and to will; but his to give to those who believe and will the faculty of doing well through the Holy Spirit ». — In what way these are to be understood, Augustine discloses in the book of the Retractations, saying: « It is indeed true that the good we do is from God, but the rule of both is the same, namely of willing and of doing; and both are his, because he himself prepares the will, and both are ours, because it is not done unless we will it ». « Those things therefore I certainly would not have said, had I then known that faith itself also is to be found among the gifts of the Holy Spirit ».
This too must be carefully examined, which Augustine says in the book of the Sentences of Prosper14, namely that « to be able to have faith, just as to be able to have charity, is of the nature of men; but to have faith, just as to have charity, is of the grace of the faithful ». — Which is not said as though faith or charity could be had from free choice, but because the mind of man has a natural aptitude for believing or loving, which, prevented by the grace of God, believes and loves; which it cannot do without grace.
Cap. IV.
On the heresy of Jovinian and the Manichee, whom Jerome strikes down together.
This therefore concerning grace and free choice let us hold without doubt, which Jerome in the Explanation of the Catholic faith to Pope Damasus15, striking down together the errors of Jovinian and the Manichee
and of Pelagius, teaches. « Free choice, he says, we so confess, that we say we always need the help of God; and that both those err who with the Manichee say that a man cannot avoid sin, and those who with Jovinian assert that a man cannot sin. Each takes away the liberty of choice. But we say that a man can always both sin and not sin, so that we may always confess ourselves to be of free choice. This is the faith which in the Catholic Church we have learned and which we have always held ».
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- Cap. 9. n. 3.Chapter 9, n. 3.
- Respicitur Colos. 1, 13.Reference is to Colossians 1, 13.
- Codd. et ed. 1. tamen, contra alias edd. et originale Augustini.The codices and edition 1 read tamen [for tantum], against the other editions and Augustine's original.
- Respicitur I. Cor. 8, 1.Reference is to 1 Corinthians 8, 1.
- August., de Haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum, n. 88, et Epist. 177. ad Innocentium Papam, sed multis a Magistro omissis.Augustine, on Heresies, to Quodvultdeus, n. 88, and Letter 177, to Pope Innocent, but with many things omitted by the Master.
- Libr. III. c. 18. n. 50; I. Retract. c. 9. n. 5; de Natura et gratia, c. 67. n. 80.Book III, c. 18, n. 50; the first book of the Retractations, c. 9, n. 5; on Nature and Grace, c. 67, n. 80.
- Loc. cit. n. 4.The place cited, n. 4.
- Cap. 12. n. 17. — Paulo superius codd. B C D E etiam pro et, cod. A autem.Chapter 12, n. 17. — A little above, codices B C D E read etiam for et, codex A autem.
- Lib. I. c. 15. n. 6. — In fine sequentis propos. Vat. cum paucis edd. bonum non pro non bonum.Book I, c. 15, n. 6. — At the end of the following proposition, the Vatican edition with a few editions reads bonum non for non bonum.
- Cap. 26. Codd. et edd., excepta Vat. Adamantium — Paulo superius codd. A B C E et edd. 1, 5 quae huic... videntur pro quod huic... videtur. — In textu citatur Matth. 12, 33.Chapter 26. The codices and editions, except the Vatican, read Adamantium — A little above, codices A B C E and editions 1, 5 read quae huic... videntur for quod huic... videtur. — In the text Matthew 12, 33 is cited.
- Libr. I. c. 22. n. 4. — Respicitur Ioan. 1, 12.Book I, c. 22, n. 4. — Reference is to John 1, 12.
- Contra Adimant. c. 27, et I. Retract. c. 22. n. 4.Against Adimantus, c. 27, and the first book of the Retractations, c. 22, n. 4.
- Num. 60., quod declaratur I. Retract. c. 23. n. 2, deinde ibid. n. 61. (Retract. ibid. n. 3); ult. locus n. 2.Number 60, which is explained in the first book of the Retractations, c. 23, n. 2, then in the same place, n. 61 (Retractations, the same place, n. 3); the last passage, n. 2.
- Num. 316. — Vat. et edd. 4, 6 habent in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum (c. 5. n. 10.), ex quo S. Prosper illud sumsit.Number 316. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 6 have in the book on the Predestination of the Saints (c. 5, n. 10), from which St. Prosper took it.
- Inter opera non genuina S. Hieronymi est quaedam Explanatio Symboli, in cuius fine ista leguntur.Among the non-genuine works of St. Jerome is a certain Explanation of the Creed, at the end of which these things are read. ---